The Geneva Protocol Part 37

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43. As regards the filling of the gap in article 15 of the Covenant, little progress was made. On the 19th September, therefore, the British representative submitted a scheme to the sub-committee, in which he had endeavoured to meet the differences of opinion which had been expressed. This scheme provided for the acceptance as compulsory of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court in the cases covered by article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, with such reserves as may be consistent therewith. Its main object was, however, the amendment of the Covenant on the lines of the following text:--

"The undersigned will support the introduction of amendments to article 15 of the Covenant for the purpose of amplifying paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of that article on the following lines:--

"If the dispute submitted to the Council is not settled by it as provided in paragraph 3, the Council shall endeavour to persuade the parties to submit the dispute to judicial settlement or arbitration.

"If the parties cannot agree to do so, the Council shall again take the dispute under consideration, and, if it reaches a report which is unanimously agreed to by the Members thereof other than the representatives of the parties to the dispute, the Members of the League agree to accept the recommendations contained in the report.

"If the Council fails to reach a report which is concurred in by all the members other than the representatives of the parties to the dispute, and if the parties are still unable to agree to refer the dispute to arbitration, the Council is empowered to refer the dispute to arbitration on their behalf. One-half of the members of the tribunal, excluding the president, shall be appointed by the Council, after consultation with one party to the dispute, and the other half after consultation with the other party to the dispute. The president shall be appointed by the Council after consultation with the Permanent Court of International Justice if in session, or, if not in session, with the members of its chamber of summary jurisdiction.

"The Members of the League agree that they will comply with the {237} recommendations contained in any award of the Arbitration Tribunal set up by the Council as above.

"In the event of any failure to comply with the recommendations of a report concurred in by all the Members of the Council other than the parties to the dispute or in any award of an arbitration tribunal set up by the Council as above, the Council shall exert all its influence to secure compliance therewith. If such failure to carry out the recommendations is accompanied by any resort to war, the sanctions provided for in article 16, interpreted as provided in this Protocol, shall be applied."

44. The British Delegate explained that the willingness of Governments to amend the Covenant must be clearly expressed in the Protocol. In no other way could the danger of creating within the League an inner ring of Powers, bound towards each other by ties and obligations more close than those binding the ordinary members of the League, be avoided. The drafting of amendments to the Covenant was, however, a technical matter, and time was short. He therefore suggested that the Council should be asked to set up a committee of experts to draft the amendments to the Covenant contemplated by the Protocol.

45. These proposals provided the bases of articles 1, 3 and 4 of the Protocol and of paragraph 3 of the a.s.sembly Resolution of the 2nd October. The bases of articles 2 and 5 had already been established.

Article 10 was beginning to take shape in new drafts in subst.i.tution for Dr. Benes's definition of an aggressor. On the 21st September these articles were provisionally adopted by the joint drafting committee of the First and Third Committees. At this stage, therefore, for the first time, the substance of a workable text on the subjects referred to the First Committee began to emerge from the shadow of discussion.

46. Throughout this period, however, the negotiations had been carried on entirely in the sub-committee in secret sessions. Although the closest possible touch had been kept by the British Delegation with the Dominion and Indian Delegations, the British representative felt himself to be in a position {238} of great responsibility in carrying on the work in the sub-committee. He felt that a stage had been reached where a wider consultation was necessary, as, with the exception of the Attorney-General of the Irish Free State, who was unfortunately obliged to return to Ireland about this date, he was the only British member. He proposed, therefore, that the work of the sub-committee should be reported to the full Committee on which all the Dominion and Indian Delegations were represented. The full Committee thereupon met on the 24th September, and then and at further meetings held on the 25th, 26th, 27th and 28th September, the articles of the Protocol were fully discussed in public sessions. The articles of the Protocol under consideration thus took their shape in the sub-committee, they were then submitted to the Joint Drafting Committee representing the First and Third Committees, and were then finally approved after public discussions in Committee No. 1. Here, then, it will be convenient to deal with the purpose and evolution of each article separately.

_The Preamble._

47. The draft of the Preamble, as revised by the Joint Drafting Committee of the First and Third Committees, was adopted at a plenary session of the First Committee on the 27th September. The Lithuanian Delegate made a reservation that the reference to territorial security in no way prejudiced existing disputes between States signing the Protocol. The Portuguese Delegate proposed an amendment to subst.i.tute for the word "territories" in the first sentence, the phrase "territories under the sovereignty of States." The object was to make it clear that oversea territories under the sovereignty of a State were not excluded, but the British representative reminded the committee of the nature of the varied character of the territories of the British Empire, and said that if one cla.s.s of oversea territories were mentioned, all must be mentioned. The amendment was rejected.

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_Article 1._

48. Article 1 was designed to ensure that the universality of the League should be maintained even if the Protocol comes into force. For a while there must no doubt be a dual regime. States signatory to the Protocol will be bound by its terms, and the regime of the Covenant will continue to exist and to be binding upon States members of the League. This will, however, not last, as the princ.i.p.al provisions of the Protocol will be transformed into amendments to the Covenant.

_Article 2._

49. Article 2 was intended to make all aggressive war illegal.

Exceptions were, however, made to safeguard (1) the right of a State to fight in self-defence, and (2) the position of a State acting in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant or the Protocol. A proposal, strongly urged, to subst.i.tute the words "resort to force" for the words "resort to war" was rejected.

_Article 3._

50. Article 3 provides for the compulsory recognition of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court. The Joint Drafting Committee proposed to remove this article from the Protocol, as certain Delegations felt it went beyond the a.s.sembly Resolution. The British Empire Delegation feared that this might result in the separation of the three principles--arbitration, security and disarmament. At the suggestion of the British representative, therefore, the article was retained. As a result of the discussions on this matter, it was generally agreed that the power to make reservations to article 36 of the Permanent Court Statute was much wider than had been at first believed. It was understood that the proposed British reservation was within the limits admissible.

_Article 4._

51. Article 4 was designed to extend the system of {240} arbitration contained in the Covenant and to fill the existing gap in article 15 of the Covenant, by which the parties to a dispute recover their liberty of action and are ent.i.tled to resort to war if the Members of the Council are unable to agree upon a unanimous report. In the sub-committee a strong feeling manifested itself against unanimous decisions of the Council being binding in cases where one party to a dispute, but not both, desired arbitration. Certain of the smaller States, in particular, felt that such a system gave too much power to the Council, which was already regarded as a body which expressed only the will of the great Powers.

52. Paragraphs 2 (_a_) and (_b_) of article 4 were drafted to avoid this difficulty. Arbitration is to be compulsory at the request of one of the parties, and the Council is given power to appoint the arbitral body if the parties cannot agree as to its const.i.tution. A unanimous decision of the Council is only to be binding where none of the parties ask for arbitration. If, therefore, any party wishes to avoid a decision by the Council, it has only to ask for arbitration. For similar reasons, the words "accepted by one of the parties" were added after the words "decision of the Council" in paragraph 5.

53. Discussions in the sub-committee revealed a divergence of view as to whether or not sanctions should be applied in the event of pa.s.sive resistance to the award of the Arbitral Commission. It was finally agreed that the provision contained at the end of article 13 of the Covenant would be sufficient to meet a case of pa.s.sive resistance and that the sanctions of article 16 should only be applied when such resistance was accompanied by a resort to war (_vide_ paragraph 6 of article 4).

54. At the request of the British representative, paragraph 7 was added to ensure that reservations, similar to that which the British Delegation considered that it would be obliged to make if the British Empire accepted article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court, would also exist in the case of the new system of compulsory arbitration.

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_Article 5._

55. Article 5 was inserted as the result of a unanimous decision of the sub-committee to leave untouched paragraph 8 of article 15 of the Covenant, which safeguards the rights of States Members in regard to matters of domestic jurisdiction. The whole British Empire Delegation held the view that when the Arbitration Commissions were faced with such questions, they should be bound to refer them to the Permanent Court, and that the opinion of the Court should be binding. As the Permanent Court itself is bound to apply international law, and paragraph 8 of article 15 refers to questions which by _international law_ are solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the State concerned, this provision ensures that a uniform rule will be applied by the Council, the Permanent Court and the arbitral bodies to be set up under the new system.

56. The last sentence of article 5 was added to meet certain difficulties raised by the j.a.panese Delegation. They pointed out that the second gap in the Covenant, referred to by the French Delegation during the general discussion, had not been filled. On the 24th September, they accordingly proposed an amendment to article 5, which appeared to have the effect of giving the Council power, in cases relating to domestic jurisdiction, to recommend the parties to adopt some solution which would ensure a pacific settlement of the dispute.

After the discussion in the sub-committee, the j.a.panese Delegation modified this proposal and suggested that the following words be added as the final paragraph of article 5:--

"The above provisions do not prejudice the duty of the Council to endeavour to bring the parties to an agreement so as to ensure the maintenance of peace and a good understanding between nations."

This proposal came up before the plenary session of the First Committee on the 25th September. The British Delegation asked for a postponement of the discussion. Immediate steps were {242} taken to consult the Dominion and Indian Delegations, and in the subsequent negotiations the closest co-operation with them was maintained.

57. It transpired that the j.a.panese Delegation, if they failed to secure acceptance of this amendment to article 5, intended to press for the exclusion from article 10 of the sentence at the end of paragraph 2 (1), which included in the definition of an "aggressor" a State which resorted to war and disregarded a unanimous report of the Council or a judicial sentence or an arbitral award recognising that the dispute arose out of a matter within the domestic jurisdiction of the other State concerned. They pointed out that it was unjust that in such cases the League, while refusing pacific means of settlement to an injured State, should denounce that State as an aggressor if it took steps to defend its legitimate interests by force.

58. The possible effect of this alternative amendment was regarded by many Delegations with great concern. It would have suggested the legitimacy of a resort to war in connection with a dispute arising out of some domestic matter as to which the Council could give no help and make no recommendation for its solution.

59. In these circ.u.mstances the British Empire Delegation was agreed that the best course was to endeavour to find a solution by enlarging article 19 of the Protocol, so as to make it clear that the existing power of the Council, under article 11 of the Covenant, of endeavouring to achieve a pacific settlement in any case where the peace of the world was endangered, was not prejudiced by the provisions of the Protocol. Though the discussions of the matter remained very friendly in tone this proposal did not prove acceptable to the j.a.panese Delegation. Accordingly, when the amendment came before the plenary meeting of the First Committee on the 28th September, the j.a.panese Delegation withdrew their amendment to article 5 and proposed the amendment to article 10. At the suggestion of the French Delegate the question was referred back to the sub-committee.

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60. Late on the 29th September the basis of solution was found. It was immediately submitted to the representatives of the Dominions and India, and was fully considered by them at two further meetings on the following day. After slight modifications the text of two amendments proved acceptable to the British Empire Delegation, and after being accepted by the j.a.panese and French Delegations, these amendments were adopted by the First Committee. They involved the addition to the last sentence of article 5 of the words "this decision shall not prevent consideration of the situation by the Council or the a.s.sembly under article 11 of the Covenant," and the addition at the end of paragraph 2 (1) of article 10 of the words "nevertheless in the last case the State shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not previously submitted the question to the Council or the a.s.sembly in accordance with article 11 of the Covenant."

61. In the opinion of the British Empire Delegation these amendments conferred no new powers or functions on either the Council or the a.s.sembly. They merely served to make clear the relationship between paragraph 8 of article 15 and article 11 of the Covenant. Article 11 of the Covenant only operates in time of war or threat of war, and it confers no right on the Council or the a.s.sembly to impose a solution of a dispute without the consent of the parties. The Council or the a.s.sembly may mediate and conciliate, but they cannot make recommendations which are binding under paragraph 6 of article 15 of the Covenant. When these amendments were adopted at the final plenary meeting of the First Committee on the 30th September, the British representative made a statement on the above lines. This interpretation proved generally acceptable, and it was agreed to incorporate it in the report to be submitted to the a.s.sembly.

62. At the final plenary meeting of the First Committee the British representative drew attention to the difficulty in which many Delegations were placed, in that they had had no {244} opportunity to consult their Governments in regard to these amendments. The Delegations of Australia and several other countries thereupon stated that, though they accepted the texts, they could not commit their Governments in any way.

_Article 6._

63. Article 6. When the system of compulsory arbitration, contained in article 4, had been established, the British representative pointed out that under paragraphs 9 and 10 of article 15 of the Covenant a dispute might still be referred to the a.s.sembly. Article 6 was therefore drafted to ensure that the provisions referring to the actions and powers of the Council should apply to the a.s.sembly under the new system. After considerable discussion it was decided to reserve questions of procedure to the Council as being a more suitable body.

_Article 10._

64. Article 10, which contains the definition of an aggressor, provided one of the most difficult tasks of the First Committee. By the 23rd September a number of drafts had been considered but no satisfactory text had been found. The original idea was that it should be the duty of the Council to determine the aggressor, but the question then arose as to whether, in making this decision, the Council should act unanimously or by majority vote. Adherence to the unanimity rule would have made it possible for one State to prevent a decision being reached. Procedure by a majority vote might have resulted in a State being obliged to apply sanctions against its own judgment. The only way out of this difficulty was to avoid a decision by the Council at all, and to make the test of aggression automatic, when once certain conditions had been found to obtain. This is achieved by establishing a presumption which is to hold good until the Council has made a unanimous decision to the contrary. If the presumption stands it is considered sufficient to justify the application of sanctions. Even then it was thought that there would have to be something in the nature of a {245} "declaration of aggression" in order to initiate the enforcement of sanctions, and that this declaration would have to be made by unanimity. Objections were raised to this, but these objections were finally satisfied by the insertion of paragraph 3, according to which the Council, if it cannot at once determine the aggressor is bound, as a matter of course, to enjoin an armistice upon the belligerents.

65. The j.a.panese Delegation were opposed to any presumption of aggression arising against a state which was involved in a dispute covered by paragraph 8 of article 15 of the Covenant, and found as the result that, though it had submitted the dispute to the Council, the Council were unable to make any recommendations on the subject. To meet this view, the amendment previously referred to was made to article 5, and the words "nevertheless in the last case the State shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not previously submitted the question to the Council or the a.s.sembly in accordance with article 11 of the Covenant" were added to paragraph 2 (1) of article 10. In the opinion of the British Delegation, this amendment does not affect paragraph 3 of article 10. If a resort to war occurs, and the Council cannot determine the aggressor, it is still bound to impose an armistice upon the belligerents.

66. To the final paragraph of article 10 the words "and any signatory State thus called upon shall thereupon be ent.i.tled to exercise the rights of a belligerent" were added at the suggestion of the British representative. This addition was made to safeguard the position of a State which, though no party to the dispute, joined in coercive measures to uphold the Covenant of the League and in so doing took forcible measures against the persons or the property of nationals of another State.

_Article 16._

67. The relations between States signatory to the Protocol and States non-signatory and non-members of the League presented a problem the solution of which required great care. {246} The various aspects of the question were thoroughly examined, and it was finally agreed that it would be sufficient to bring the principle contained in article 17 of the Covenant into harmony with the provisions of the Protocol.

Sanctions can only be imposed on a State which is not a Member of the League if it refuses to accept the conditions and obligations of the Protocol when invited to do so, and resorts to war against a signatory State.

68. The question was raised of the relationship between States Members of the League signatory to the Protocol and non-signatory States Members. After careful examination, it was generally agreed that no special arrangement was necessary. The Members of the League are bound _inter se_ by the Covenant and non-signatory Members are ent.i.tled, if they wish, to prefer the procedure laid down in the Covenant to the new procedure of the Protocol.