The Geneva Protocol Part 27

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION.

(_Articles 1 to 6, 10, 16, 18 and 19 of the Protocol_)

1.--INTRODUCTION.

Compulsory arbitration is the fundamental basis of the proposed system.

It has seemed to be the only means of attaining the ultimate aim pursued by the League of Nations, viz. the establishment of a pacific and legal order in the relations between peoples.

The realisation of this great ideal, to which humanity aspires with a will which has never been more strongly affirmed, presupposes, as an indispensable condition, the elimination of war, the extension of the rule of law and the strengthening of the sentiment of justice.

The Covenant of the League of Nations erected a wall of protection around the peace of the world, but it was a first attempt {165} at international organisation and it did not succeed in closing the circle sufficiently thoroughly to leave no opening for war. It reduced the number of possible wars. It did not condemn them all. There were some which it was forced to tolerate. Consequently, there remained, in the system which it established, numerous fissures, which const.i.tuted a grave danger to peace.

The new system of the Protocol goes further. It closes the circle drawn by the Covenant; it prohibits all wars of aggression. Henceforth no purely private war between nations will be tolerated.

This result is obtained by strengthening the pacific methods of procedure laid down in the Covenant. The Protocol completes them and extends them to all international disputes without exception, by making arbitration compulsory.

In reality, the word "arbitration" is used here in a somewhat different sense from that which it has generally had up to now. It does not exactly correspond with the definition given by the Hague Conferences which, codifying a century-old custom, saw in it "the settlement of disputes between States by judges of their own choice and on the basis of respect for law" (Article 37 of the Convention of October 18th, 1907, for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes).

The arbitration which is now contemplated differs from this cla.s.sic arbitration in various respects:

(_a_) It is only part of a great machinery of pacific settlement.

It is set up under the auspices and direction of the Council of the League of Nations.

(_b_) It is not only an instrument for the administration of justice. It is, in addition and above all, an instrument of peace. The arbitrators must no doubt seek in the first place to apply the rules and principles of international law. This is the reason why, as will be seen below, they are bound to consult the Permanent Court of International Justice if one of the parties so requests. But if international law furnishes no rule or principle applicable to the particular {166} case, they cannot, like ordinary arbitrators, refuse to give a decision. They are bound to proceed on grounds of equity, for in our system arbitration is always of necessity to lead to a definitive solution of the dispute. This is not to be regretted, for to ensure the respect of law by nations it is necessary first that they should be a.s.sured of peace,

(_c_) It does not rest solely upon the loyalty and good faith of the parties. To the moral and legal force of an ordinary arbitration is added the actual force derived from the international organisation of which the kind of arbitration in question forms one of the princ.i.p.al elements; the absence of a sanction which has impeded the development of compulsory arbitration is done away with under our system.

In the system of the Protocol, the obligation to submit disputes to arbitration is sound and practical because it has always a sanction.

Its application is automatically ensured, by means of the intervention of the Council; in no case can it be thrown on one side through the ill-will of one of the disputant States. The awards to which it leads are always accompanied by a sanction, adapted to the circ.u.mstances of the case and more or less severe according to the degree of resistance offered to the execution of the sentence.

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2.--NATURE OF THE RULES OP THE PROTOCOL.

_Article 1._

The rules laid down in the Protocol do not all have the same scope or value for the future.

As soon as the Protocol comes into force, its provisions will become compulsory as between the signatory States, and in its dealings with them the Council of the League of Nations will at once be able to exercise all the rights and fulfil all the duties conferred upon it.

As between the States Members of the League of Nations, the Protocol may in the first instance create a dual regime, for, if it is not immediately accepted by them all, the relations between signatories and non-signatories will still be governed by the Covenant alone while the relations between signatories will be governed by the Protocol as well.

But this situation cannot last. Apart from the fact that it may be hoped that all Members of the League will adhere to it, the Protocol is in no sense designed to create among the States which accept it a restricted League capable of competing with or opposing in any way the existing League. On the contrary, such of its provisions as relate to articles of the Covenant will, as soon as possible, be made part of the general law by amendment of the Covenant effected in accordance with the procedure for revision laid down in Article 26 thereof. The signatory States which are Members of the League of Nations undertake to make every effort to this end.

When the Covenant has been amended in this way, some parts of the Protocol will lose their value as between the said States: some of them will have enriched the Covenant, while others, being temporary in character, will have lost their object.

The whole Protocol will remain applicable to relations between signatory States which are Members of the League of Nations and signatory States outside the League, or between States coming within the latter category.

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It should be added that, as the League realises its aim of universality, the amended Covenant will take the place, as regards all States, of the separate regime of the Protocol.

3.--CONDEMNATION OF AGGRESSIVE WAR.

_Article 2._

The general principle of the Protocol is the prohibition of aggressive war.

Under the Covenant, while the old unlimited right of States to make war is restricted, it is not abolished. There are cases in which the exercise of this right is tolerated; some wars are prohibited and others are legitimate.

In future the position will be different. In no case is any State signatory of the Protocol ent.i.tled to undertake on its own sole initiative an offensive war against another signatory State or against any non-signatory State which accepts all the obligations a.s.sumed by the signatories under the Protocol.

The prohibition affects only aggressive war. It does not, of course, extend to defensive war. The right of legitimate self-defence continues, as it must, to be respected. The State attacked retains complete liberty to resist by all means in its power any acts of aggression of which it may be the victim. Without waiting for the a.s.sistance which it is ent.i.tled to receive from the international community, it may and should at once defend itself with its own force.

Its interests are identified with the general interest. This is a point on which there can be no doubt.

The same applies when a country employs force with the consent of the Council or the a.s.sembly of the League of Nations under the provisions of the Covenant and the Protocol. This eventuality may arise in two cla.s.ses of cases: either a State may take part in the collective measures of force decided upon by the League of Nations in aid of one of its Members which is the victim of aggression; or a State may employ force with the authorisation of the Council or the a.s.sembly in order to enforce {169} a decision given in its favour. In the former case, the a.s.sistance given to the victim of aggression is indirectly an act of legitimate self-defence. In the latter, force is used in the service of the general interest, which would be threatened if decisions reached by a pacific procedure could be violated with impunity. In all these cases the country resorting to war is not acting on its private initiative but is in a sense the agent and the organ of the community.

It is for this reason that we have not hesitated to speak of the exceptional authorisation of war. It has been proposed that the word "force" should be used in order to avoid any mention of "war"--in order to spare the public that disappointment which it might feel when it found that, notwithstanding the solemn condemnation of war, war was still authorised in exceptional cases. We preferred, however, to recognise the position frankly by retaining the expression "resort to war" which is used in the Covenant. If we said "force" instead of "war," we should not be altering the facts in any way. Moreover, the confession that war is still possible in specific cases has a certain value, because the term describes a definite and well-understood situation, whereas the expression "resort to force" would be liable to be misunderstood, and also because it emphasises the value of the sanctions at the disposal of the community of States bound by the Protocol.

4.--COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE.

_Article 3._

The general principle of the Protocol could not be accepted unless the pacific settlement of all international disputes without distinction were made possible.

This solution has been found, in the first place, in the extension of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

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According to its Statute, the jurisdiction of the Court is, in principle, optional. On the other hand, Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute, offers States the opportunity of making the jurisdiction compulsory in respect of all or any of the cla.s.ses of legal disputes affecting: (_a_) the interpretation of a Treaty; (_b_) any question of international law; (_c_) the existence of any fact which, if established, would const.i.tute a breach of an international obligation; (_d_) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. States have only to declare their intention through the special Protocol annexed to the Statute. The undertaking then holds good in respect of any other State which a.s.sumes the same obligation. It may be given either unconditionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain other States; either permanently or for a fixed period.

So far such compulsory jurisdiction has only been accepted by a small number of countries. The majority of States have abstained because they did not see their way to accept compulsory jurisdiction by the Court in certain cases falling within one or another of the cla.s.ses of dispute enumerated above, and because they were not sure whether, in accepting, they could make reservations to that effect.

It was for this reason that the a.s.sembly in its resolution of September 6th, requested the First Committee to render more precise the terms of Article 36, paragraph 2, in order to facilitate its acceptance.

Careful consideration of the article has shown that it is sufficiently elastic to allow of all kinds of reservations. Since it is open to the States to accept compulsory jurisdiction by the Court in respect of certain of the cla.s.ses of dispute mentioned and not to accept it in respect of the rest, it is also open to them only to accept it in respect of a portion of one of those cla.s.ses; rights need not be exercised in their full extent. In giving the undertaking in question, therefore, States are free to declare that it {171} will not be regarded as operative in those cases in which they consider it to be inadmissible.

We can imagine possible and therefore legitimate, reservations either in connection with a certain cla.s.s of dispute or, generally speaking, in regard to the precise stage at which the dispute may be laid before the Court. While we cannot here enumerate all the conceivable reservations, it may be worth while to mention merely as examples those to which we referred in the course of our discussions.

From the cla.s.s of disputes relating to "the interpretation of a treaty"

there may be excluded, for example, disputes as to the interpretation of certain specified cla.s.ses of treaty such as political treaties, peace treaties, etc.

From the cla.s.s of disputes relating to "any point of international law"

there may be excluded, for example, disputes as to the application of a political treaty, a peace treaty, etc., or as to any specified question or disputes which might arise as the outcome of hostilities initiated by one of the signatory States in agreement with the Council or the a.s.sembly of the League of Nations.