The Fight For The Republic in China Part 11

Moreover there is no man in China who answers the description of a suitable, successor which I have just given. Here arises a difficult problem; and what has been specified in the Const.i.tutional Compact is a vain attempt to solve it. It is pertinent to ask why the law-makers should not have made the law in such a way that the people could exercise their free choice in the matter of the presidential successor? The answer is that there is reason to fear that a bad man may be elected president by manipulations carried out with a masterly hand, thereby jeopardizing the national welfare.

This fear has influenced the const.i.tution-makers to settle upon three candidates from among whom the president must be elected. Then it may be asked why not fix upon one man instead of upon three since you have already deprived the people of part of their freedom? The answer is that: there is not a single man whose qualifications are high enough to be the successor. As it is, three candidates of equal qualifications are put forward for the people to their selection. No matter how one may argue this important question from the legal point of view, there is the fact that the law makers fixed upon three candidates for the presidency, believing that we do not possess a suitable presidential successor. The vital question of the day setting aside all paper talk, is whether or not China has a suitable man to succeed President Yuan Shih-kai. Whether or not the const.i.tutional compact can be actually carried out in future I do not know; but I do know that that instrument will eventually become ineffective.

Mr. Ko: I desire a true picture of the chaos which you have hinted will ensue in this country. Can you tell me anything along that line?

Mr. Hu: In a time of confusion, the soldiers play the most important part, virtuous and experienced and learned statesmen being unable to cope with the situation. The only qualification which a leader at such a time needs to possess is the control of the military, and the ability to suppress Parliament. Should such a person be made the president, he cannot long hold his enviable post in view of the fact that he cannot possess sufficient influence to control the troops of the whole country. The generals of equal rank and standing will not obey each other, while the soldiers and politicians, seeing a chance in these differences for their advancement, will stir up their feelings and incite one another to fight. They will fight hard among themselves. The rebels, who are now exiles in foreign lands, taking advantage of the chaos in China, will return in very little time to perpetrate the worst crimes known in human history. The royalists who are in retirement will likewise come out to fish in muddy waters. Persons who have the qualifications of leaders will be used as tools to fight for the self-aggrandizement of those who use them. I do not wish to mention names, but I can safely predict that more than ten different parties will arise at the psychological moment. Men who will never be satisfied until they become president, and those who know they cannot get the presidency but who are unwilling to serve others, will come out one after another. Confusion and disturbance will follow with great rapidity. Then foreign countries which have entertained wild ambitions, availing themselves of the distressful situation in China will stir up ill-feelings among these parties and so increase the disturbances. When the proper time comes, various countries, unwilling to let a single country enjoy the privilege of controlling China, will resort to armed intervention. In consequence the eastern problem will end in a rupture of the international peace. Whether China will be turned at that time into a battleground for the Chinese people or for the foreign Powers I cannot tell you.

It is too dreadful to think of the future which is enshrouded in a veil of mystery. However, I can tell you that the result of this awful turmoil will be either the slicing of China like a melon or the suppression of internal trouble with foreign a.s.sistance which will lead to dismemberment. As to the second result some explanation is necessary. After foreign countries have helped us to suppress internal disturbances, they will select a man of the type of Li w.a.n.g of Korea, who betrayed his country to j.a.pan, and make him Emperor of China. Whether this man will be the deposed emperor or a member of the Imperial family or the leader of the rebel party, remains to be seen. In any event he will be a figurehead in whose hand will not be vested political, financial and military power, which will be controlled by foreigners. All the valuable mines, various kinds of industries and our abundant natural resources will likewise be developed by others. China will thus disappear as a nation. In selecting a man of the Li w.a.n.g type, the aforesaid foreign countries will desire merely to facilitate the acquisition of China's territory. But there can be easily found such a man who bears remarkable resemblance to Li w.a.n.g, and who will be willing to make a treaty with the foreigners whereby he unpatriotically sells his country in exchange for a throne which he can never obtain or keep without outside a.s.sistance. His procedure will be something like this: He will make an alliance with a foreign nation by which the latter will be given the power to carry on foreign relations on behalf of his country. In the eyes of foreigners, China will have been destroyed, but the people will continue deceived and made to believe that their country is still in existence. This is the first step. The second step will be to imitate the example of Korea and make a treaty with a certain power, whereby China is annexed and the throne abolished. The imperial figurehead then flees to the foreign country where he enjoys an empty t.i.tle. Should you then try to make him devise means for regaining the lost territory it will be too late. For China will have been entirely destroyed by that time. This is the second procedure in the annexation of Chinese territory. The reason why that foreign country desires to change the republic into the monarchy is to set one man on the throne and make him witness the whole process of annexation of his country, thereby simplifying the matter. When that time has come, the people will not be permitted to make any comment upon the form of government suitable for China, or upon the destruction of their country. The rebels who raised the standard of the republic have no principles and if they now find that some other tactics will help to increase their power they will adopt these tactics. China's republic is doomed, no matter what happens. If we do not change it ourselves, others will do it for us. Should we undertake the change ourselves we can save the nation: otherwise there is no hope for China to remain a nation. It is to be regretted that our people now a.s.sume an att.i.tude of indifference, being reluctant to look forward to the future, and caring not what may happen to them and their country. They are doomed to become slaves after the loss of their national independence.

Mr. Ko: I am very much frightened by what you have said. You have stated that the adoption of a const.i.tutional monarchy can avert such terrible consequences; but is there not likely to be disturbance during the change of the republic to monarchy, since such disturbance must always accompany the presidential election?

Mr. Hu: No comparison can be formed between these two things. There may be tumult during the change of the form of government, but it will be better in comparison with the chaos that will some day ensue in the republic. There is no executive head in the country when a republic endeavours to select a presidential successor. At such a time, the ambitious try to improve their future, while the patriotic are at a loss now to do anything which will a.s.sist in the maintenance of order. Those who are rebellious rise in revolt while those who are peace-loving are compelled by circ.u.mstances to join their rank and file. Should the form of government be transformed into a monarchical one, and should the time for change of the head of the state come, the successor having already been provided for, that will be well-known to the people. Those who are patriotic will exert their utmost to preserve peace, and as result the heir-apparent can peacefully step on the throne. There are persons who will contend for the office of the President, but not for the throne. Those who contend for the office of President do not commit any crime, but those who try to seize the throne are rebels. Who dares to contend for the Throne?

At the time of the change of the president in a republic, ambitious persons arise with the intention of capturing this most honourable office, but not so when the emperor is changed. Should there be a body of persons hostile to the heir-apparent, that body must be very small. Therefore I say that the enemies of a succeeding Emperor are a few, whilst there are many in the case of a presidential successor. This is the first difference.

Those who oppose the monarchy are republican enthusiasts or persons who desire to make use of the name of the republic for their own benefit. These persons will raise trouble even without the change of the government. They do not mind disturbing the peace of the country at the present time when the republic exists. It is almost certain that at the first unfurling of the imperial flags they will at once grasp such an opportune moment and try to satisfy their ambition.

Should they rise in revolt at the time when the Emperor is changed the Government, supported by the loyal statesmen and officials, whose interests are bound up with the welfare of the imperial family and whose influence has spread far and wide, will be able to deal easily with any situation which may develop. Therefore I declare that the successor to the throne has more supporters while the presidential successor has few. This is the second difference between the republic and the const.i.tutional monarchy.

Why certain persons will contend for the office of the President can be explained by the fact that there is not a single man in the country whose qualifications are above all the others. Succession to the throne is a question of blood-relation with the reigning Emperor, and not a question of qualifications. The high officials whose qualifications are unusually good are not subservient to others but they are obedient to the succeeding Emperor, because of their grat.i.tude for what the imperial family has done for them, and because their well-being is closely a.s.sociated with that of the imperial household. I can cite an historical incident to support my contention. Under the Manchu Dynasty, at one time General Chu Chung-tang was entrusted with the task of suppressing the Mohammedan rebellion. He appointed General Liu Sung San generalissimo. Upon the death of General Liu, Chu Chung-tang appointed his subordinate officers to lead the army but the subordinate officers competed for power. Chu Chung-tang finally made the step-son of General Liu the Commander-in-Chief and the officers and soldiers all obeyed his order as they did his father's. But it may be mentioned that this young man was not more able than any of his father's subordinate commanders. Nevertheless prestige counted. He owed his success to his natural qualification, being a step-son to General Liu. So is the case with the emperor whose successor n.o.body dares openly to defy--to say nothing of actually disputing his right to the throne.

This is the third difference between the republic and the monarchy.

I will not discuss the question: as to whether there being no righteous and able heir-apparent to succeed his Emperor-father, great danger may not confront the nation. However, in order to provide against any such case, I advocate that the formation of a const.i.tutional government should go hand in hand with the establishment of the monarchy. At first it is difficult to establish and carry out a const.i.tutional government, but once it is formed it will be comparatively easy. When the const.i.tutional government has been established, the Emperor will have to seek his fame in such useful things as the defence of his country and the conquest of his enemy. Everything has to progress, and men possessing European education will be made use of by the reigning family. The first Emperor will certainly do all he can to capture the hearts of the people by means of adopting and carrying out in letter as well as in spirit const.i.tutional government. The heir-apparent will pay attention to all new reforms and new things. Should he do so, the people will be able to console themselves by saying that they will aways be the people of a const.i.tutional monarchy even after the succession to the throne of the heir-apparent. When the time comes for the heir-apparent to mount the throne the people will extend to him their cordial welcome, and there will be no need to worry about internal disturbances.

Therefore, I conclude that the successor to the presidential chair has to prevent chaos by wielding the monarchical power, while the new emperor can avert internal disquietude forever by means of his const.i.tutional government. This is the fourth difference between the republic and the monarchy. These four differences are accountable for the fact that there will not be as much disturbance at the time of the change of emperors as at the time when the president is changed.

Mr. Ko: I can understand what you have said with regard to the advantages and disadvantages of the republic and the monarchy, but there are many problems connected with the formation of a const.i.tutional monarchy which we have to solve. Why is it that the attempt to introduce const.i.tutional government during the last years of the Manchu Dynasty proved a failure?

Mr. Hu: The const.i.tutional government of the Manchu Dynasty was one in name only, and as such the forerunner of the revolution of 1911.

Towards the end of the Manchu Dynasty, the talk of starting a revolution to overthrow the imperial regime was in everybody's mouth, although the const.i.tutional party endeavoured to accomplish something really useful. At that time His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai was the grand chancellor, and realizing the fact that nothing except the adoption of a const.i.tutional government could save the throne of the Manchus, he a.s.sumed the leadership of the const.i.tutional party, which surpa.s.sed in strength the revolutionary party as a result of his active support. The people's hearts completely turned to the const.i.tutional party for salvation, while the revolutionary party lost that popular support which it had formerly enjoyed. Then it seemed that the imperial household would soon adopt the const.i.tutional monarchy and the threatening revolution could be averted. Unfortunately, the elaborate plans of His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai regarding the adoption of the const.i.tutional government were not carried out by the imperial household. A great change took place: His Excellency retired to his native province; and after losing this powerful leader the const.i.tutional party was pitilessly shattered. A monarchist party suddenly made its appearance on the political arena to a.s.sist the imperial family, which pretended to do its very best for the development of a const.i.tutional government, but secretly exerted itself to the utmost for the possession and retention of the real power. This double-dealing resulted in bringing about the revolution of 1911. For instance, when the people cried for the convening of a parliament, the imperial family said "No." The people also failed to secure the abolition of certain official organs for the imperialists. They lost confidence in the Reigning House, and simultaneously the revolutionary party raised its banner and gathered its supporters from every part of the country. As soon as the revolt started at Wuchang the troops all over the country joined in the movement to overthrow the Manchu Dynasty. The members of the Imperial Senate, most of whom were members of the const.i.tutional party, could not help showing their sympathy with the revolutionists. At last the imperial household issued a proclamation containing Nineteen Articles--a veritable _magna charta_--but it was too late. The const.i.tutional government which was about to be formed was thus laid aside. What the imperial family did was the mere organization of an advisory council. A famous foreign scholar aptly remarked: "A false const.i.tutional government will eventually result in a true revolution." In trying to deceive the people by means of a false const.i.tutional government the imperial house encompa.s.sed its own destruction. Once His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai stated in a memorial to the throne that there were only two alternatives: to give the people a const.i.tutional government or to have them revolt. What happened afterwards is a matter of common knowledge. Therefore I say that the government which the imperial family attempted to form was not a const.i.tutional government.

Mr. Ko: Thank you for your discussion of the attempt of the imperial household to establish a const.i.tutional government; but how about the Provisional Const.i.tution, the parliament and the cabinet in the first and second years of the Republic? The parliament was then so powerful that the government was absolutely at its mercy, thereby disturbing the peaceful condition of the country. The people have tasted much of the bitterness of const.i.tutional government. Should you mention the name of const.i.tutional government again they would be thoroughly frightened. Is that true?

Mr. Hu: During the first and second years of the Republic, in my many conversations with the members of the Kuo Ming Tang, I said that the republic could not form an efficient method of control, and that there would be an over centration of power through the adoption of monarchical methods of ruling, knowing as well as I did the standards of our people. When the members of the Kuo Ming Tang came to draw up the Provisional Const.i.tution they purposely took precisely the opposite course of action and ignored my suggestion.

It may, however, be mentioned that the Provisional Const.i.tution made in Nanking was not so bad, but after the government was removed to Peking, the Kuo Ming Tang people tied the hand and foot of the government by means of the Cabinet System and other restrictions with the intention of weakening the power of the central administration in order that they might be able to start another revolution. From the dissolution of the Nanking government to the time of the second revolution they had this one object in view, namely to weaken the power of the central administration so that they could contend for the office of the president by raising further internal troubles in China. Those members of the Kuo Ming Tang who made the const.i.tution know as well as I that China's republic must be governed through a monarchical administration; and therefore the unreasonable restrictions in the Provisional Const.i.tution were purposely inserted.

Mr. Ko: What is the difference between the const.i.tutional government which you have proposed and the const.i.tutional government which the Manchu Dynasty intended to adopt?

Mr. Hu: The difference lies in the proper method of procedure and in honesty of purpose, which are imperative if const.i.tutional government expects to be successful.

Mr. Ko: What do you mean by the proper method of procedure?

Mr. Hu: The Provisional Const.i.tution made in Nanking, which was considered good, is not suitable for insertion in the future const.i.tution, should a const.i.tutional monarchy be established. In making a const.i.tution for the future const.i.tutional monarchy we have to consult the const.i.tutions of the monarchies of the world. They can be divided into three cla.s.ses which are represented by England, Prussia and j.a.pan. England is advanced in its const.i.tutional government, which has been in existence for thousands of years, (_sic_) and is the best of all in the world. The English king enjoys his empty t.i.tle and the real power of the country is exercised by the parliament, which makes all the laws for the nation. As to Prussia, the const.i.tutional monarchy was established when the people started a revolution. The ruler of Prussia was compelled to convene a parliament and submitted to that legal body a const.i.tution.

Prussia's const.i.tution was made by its ruler together with the parliament. Its const.i.tutional government is not so good as the English. As to the j.a.panese const.i.tutional monarchy, the Emperor made a const.i.tution and then convened a parliament. The const.i.tutional power of the j.a.panese people is still less than that of the Prussian people. According to the standard of our people we cannot adopt the English const.i.tution as our model, for it is too advanced. The best thing for us to do is to adopt part of the Prussian and part of the j.a.panese in our const.i.tution-making. As our people are better educated now than ever before, it is decidedly unwise entirely to adopt the j.a.panese method, that is, for the Emperor to make a const.i.tution without the approval of the parliament and then to convoke a legislative body. In the circ.u.mstances China should adopt the Prussian method as described above with some modifications, which will be very suitable to our conditions. As to the contents of the const.i.tution we can copy such articles as those providing the right for the issue of urgent orders and appropriation of special funds, etc., from the j.a.panese Const.i.tution, so that the power of the ruler can be increased without showing the slightest contempt for the legislative organ. I consider that this is the proper method of procedure for the formation of a const.i.tutional monarchy for China.

Mr. Ko: Can I know something about the contents of our future const.i.tution in advance?

Mr. Hu: If you want to know them in detail I recommend you to read the Const.i.tutions of Prussia and j.a.pan. But I can tell you this much. Needless to say that such stipulations as articles guaranteeing the rights of the people and the power of the parliament will surely be worked into the future const.i.tution. These are found in almost every const.i.tution in the world. But as the former Provisional Const.i.tution has so provided that the power of the parliament is unlimited, while that of the president is very small, the Chief Executive, besides conferring decorations and giving Orders of Merit, having almost nothing to do without the approval of the Senate, it is certain that nothing will be taken from that instrument for the future const.i.tution. Nor will the makers of the future const.i.tution take anything from the nineteen capitulations offered by the Manchu Government, which gave too much power to the legislative organ. According to the Nineteen Articles the Advisory Council was to draw up the const.i.tution, which was to be ratified by the parliament; the Premier being elected by the parliament; whilst the use of the army and navy required the parliament's sanction; the making of treaties with foreign countries have likewise to be approved by the parliament, etc., etc. Such strict stipulations which are not even known in such an advanced country in matters const.i.tutional as England were extorted from the imperial family by the advisory council. Therefore it is most unlikely that the makers of the future const.i.tution will take any article from the nineteen capitulations of "confidence." They will use the Const.i.tutions of j.a.pan and Prussia as joint model and will always have in their mind the actual conditions of this country and the standard of the people. In short, they will copy some of the articles in the j.a.panese const.i.tution, and adopt the Prussian method of procedure for the making of the const.i.tution.

Mr. Ko: What do you mean by honesty?

Mr. Hu: It is a bad policy to deceive the people. Individually the people are simple, but they cannot be deceived collectively. The Manchu Government committed an irretrievable mistake by promising the people a const.i.tutional government but never carrying out their promise. This att.i.tude on the part of the then reigning house brought about the first revolution. As the standard of our people at the present time is not very high, they will be satisfied with less power if it is properly given to them. Should any one attempt to deceive them his cause will finally be lost. I do not know how much power the people and the parliament will get in the const.i.tutional monarchy, but I would like to point out here that it is better to give them less power than to deceive them. If they are given less power, and if they want more, they will contend for it. Should the government deem it advisable to give them a little more, well and good. Should they be unfit for the possession of greater power, the government can issue a proclamation giving the reasons for not complying with their request, and they will not raise trouble knowing the true intention of the government. However, honesty is the most important element in the creation of a const.i.tutional monarchy. It is easy and simple to practise it. The parliament must have the power to decide the laws and fix the budgets. Should its decision be too idealistic or contrary to the real welfare of the country, the Government can explain its faults and request it to reconsider its decision. Should the parliament return the same decision, the Government can dissolve it and convoke another parliament. In so doing the Government respects the parliament instead of despising it. But what the parliament has decided should be carried out strictly by the Government, and thus we will have a real const.i.tutional Government. It is easy to talk but difficult to act, but China like all other countries has to go through the experimental stage and face all kinds of difficulties before a genuine const.i.tutional government can be evolved. The beginning is difficult but once the difficulty is over everything will go on smoothly. I emphasize that it is better to give the people less power at the beginning than to deceive them. Be honest with them is my policy.

Mr. Ko: I thank you very much for what you have said. Your discussion is interesting and I can understand it well. The proper method of procedure and honesty of purpose which you have mentioned will tend to wipe out all former corruption.

Mr. Ko, or the stranger, then departed.

On this note the pamphleteer abruptly ends. Having discussed _ad nauseam_ the inadequacy of all existing arrangements, even those made by Yuan Shih-kai himself, to secure a peaceful succession to the presidency; and having again insisted upon the evil part soldiery cannot fail to play, he introduces a new peril, the certainty that the foreign Powers will set up a puppet Emperor unless China solves this problem herself, the case of Korea being invoked as an example of the fate of divided nations. Fear of j.a.pan and the precedent of Korea, being familiar phenomena, are given a capital position in all this debate, being secondary only to the crucial business of ensuring the peaceful succession to the supreme office. The transparent manner in which the history of the first three years of the Republic is handled in order to drive home these arguments will be very apparent. A fit crown is put on the whole business by the final suggestion that the Const.i.tutional Government of China under the new empire must be a mixture of the Prussian and j.a.panese systems, Yang Tu's last words being that it is best to be honest with the people!

No more d.a.m.ning indictment of Yuan Shih-kai's regime could possibly have been penned.

CHAPTER IX

THE MONARCHY PLOT

THE MEMORANDUM OF DR. GOODNOW

Although this extraordinary pamphlet was soon accepted by Chinese society as a semi-official warning of what was coming, it alone was not sufficient to launch a movement which to be successful required the benign endors.e.m.e.nt of foreign opinion. The Chinese pamphleteer had dealt with the emotional side of the case: it was necessary to reinforce his arguments with an appeal which would be understood by Western statesmen as well as by Eastern politicians. Yuan Shih-kai, still pretending to stand aside, had kept his attention concentrated on this very essential matter; for, as we have repeatedly pointed out, he never failed to understand the superlative value of foreign support in all his enterprises,--that support being given an exaggerated value by the public thanks to China's reliance on foreign money. Accordingly, as if still unconvinced, he now very navely requested the opinion of his chief legal adviser, Dr. Goodnow, an American who had been appointed to his office through the instrumentality of the Board of the Carnegie Inst.i.tute as a most competent authority on Administrative Law.

Even in this most serious matter the element of comedy was not lacking.

Dr. Goodnow had by special arrangement returned to Peking at the psychological moment; for having kicked his heels during many weary months in the capital, he had been permitted in 1914 to take up the appointment of President of an American University on condition that he would be available for legal "advice" whenever wanted. The Summer vacation gave him the opportunity of revisiting in the capacity of a transient adviser the scenes of his former idleness; and the holiday-task set him by his large-hearted patron was to prove in as few folios as possible that China ought to be a Monarchy and not a Republic--a theme on which every schoolboy could no doubt write with fluency. Consequently Dr. Goodnow, arming himself with a limited amount of paper and ink, produced in very few days the Memorandum which follows,--a doc.u.ment which it is difficult to speak of dispa.s.sionately since it seems to have been deliberately designed to play into the hands of a man who was now openly set on betraying the trust the nation reposed in him, and who was ready to wade through rivers of blood to satisfy his insensate ambition.

[Ill.u.s.tration: President Li Yuan-Hung and the General Staff watching the Review.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: March-past of an Infantry Division.]

Nothing precisely similar to this Goodnow Memorandum has ever been seen before in the history of Asia: it was the ultramodern spirit impressed into the service of mediaeval minds. In any other capital of the world the publication of such a subversive doc.u.ment, following the Yang Tu pamphlet, would have led to riot and tumult. In China, the home of pacifism, the politicians and people bowed their heads and bided their time. Even foreign circles in China were somewhat nonplussed by the insouciance displayed by the peripatetic legal authority; and the Memorandum was for many days spoken of as an unnecessary indiscretion.[16] Fastening at once on the point to which Yang Tu had ascribed such importance--the question of succession--Dr. Goodnow in his arguments certainly shows a detachment from received principles which has an old-world flavour about it, and which has d.a.m.ned him for ever in the eyes of the rising generation in China. The version which follows is the translation of the Chinese translation, the original English Memorandum having been either mislaid or destroyed; and it is best that this argument should be carefully digested before we add our comments.

DR. GOODNOW'S MEMORANDUM

A country must have a certain form of government, and usually the particular form of government of a particular country is not the result of the choice of the people of that country. There is not any possibility even for the most intellectual to exercise any mental influence over the question. Whether it be a monarchy or republic, it cannot be the creation of human power except when it is suitable to the historical, habitual, social and financial conditions of that country. If an unsuitable form of government is decided upon, it may remain for a short while, but eventually a system better suited will take its place.

In short, the form of government of a country is usually the natural and only result of its circ.u.mstances. The reasons for such an outcome are many, but the princ.i.p.al one is Force. If we study the monarchical countries we will find that usually a dynasty is created by a person who is capable of controlling the force of the entire country and overthrowing other persons opposed to him, working towards his goal with an undaunted spirit. If this man is capable of ruling the nation and if he is a rare genius of the day, and the conditions of the country are suited for a monarchical government, he as a rule creates a new dynasty and his descendants inherit the same from generation to generation.

If this is so, then the solution of a difficult position of a country is to be found in a monarchy rather than a republic. For on the death of a monarch no doubt exists as to who shall succeed him, and there is no need of an election or other procedure. Englishmen say, "The King is dead, Long live the King." This expresses the point. But in order to attain this point it is necessary that the law of succession be definitely defined and publicly approved; otherwise there will not be lacking, on the death of the monarch, men aspiring to the throne; and as no one is qualified to settle the dispute for power, internal disturbance will be the result.

Historically speaking no law of succession is so permanently satisfactory as that used by the nations of Europe. According to this system the right of succession belongs to the eldest son of the monarch, or failing him, the nearest and eldest male relative. The right of succession, however, may be voluntarily surrendered by the rightful successor if he so desires; thus if the eldest son declines to succeed to the throne the second son takes his place. This is the rule of Europe.

If instead of this law of a succession a system is adopted by which the successor is chosen by the monarch from among his sons or relatives without any provision being made for the rights of the eldest son, disturbance will be the inevitable result. There will not be a few who would like to take possession of the throne and they will certainly plot in the very confines of the palace, resulting in an increase of the sufferings of an aged monarch; and, even if the disaster of civil war be avoided, much dispute will arise owing to the uncertainty of the successor--a dangerous situation indeed.

Such is the lesson we learn from history. The conclusion is, speaking from the viewpoint of the problem of transmission of power, that the superiority of the monarchical system over the republican system is seen in the law of succession,--that is the eldest son of the ruler should succeed to the throne.

Leaving out the nations of ancient times, the majority of countries in Europe and Asia have adopted the monarchical system. There are, however, exceptions such as _Wen-ni-shih_ (Venice) and Switzerland, which adopted the republican form of government; but they are in the minority while most of the great nations of the world have adopted the monarchical form of government.

During the recent century and a half the att.i.tude of Europe has undergone a sudden change and the general tendency is to discredit monarchism and adopt republicanism. The one great European power which first attempted to make a trial of republicanism is Great Britain. In the Seventeenth Century a revolution broke out in England and King Charles I. was condemned to death by Parliament and executed as a traitor to the nation. A republic was established and the administration was called republican with Cromwell as regent, _i.e._ President. Cromwell was able to control the power of government because at the head of the revolutionary army he defeated the King. This English republic, however, only existed for a few years and was finally defeated in turn. The reason was that the problem of succession after the death of Cromwell was difficult to solve. Cromwell had a desire to place his son in his place as regent after his death, but as the English people were then unsuited for a republic and his son had not the ability to act as chief executive, the republic of England suddenly disappeared. The British people then abandoned the republican system and readopted the monarchical system. Thus Charles II., the son of Charles I., was made King not only with the support of the army but also with the general consent of the country.

The second European race which attempted to have a republic was the American. In the Eighteenth Century the United States of America was established in consequence of the success of a revolution. But the American revolution was not at first intended to overthrow the monarchy. What it sought to do was to throw off the yoke of the monarchy and become independent. The revolution, however, succeeded and the circ.u.mstances were such that there was no other alternative but to have a republic: for there was no royal or Imperial descendant to shoulder the responsibilities of the state. Another factor was the influence of the advocates of republicanism who came to America in the previous century from England and saturated the minds of the Americans with the ideas of republicanism. The minds of the American people were so imbued with the ideas of republicanism that a republican form of government was the ideal of the entire race. Had General Washington--the leader of the revolutionary army--had the desire to become a monarch himself he would probably have been successful. But Washington's one aim was to respect republicanism and he had no aspiration to become King. Besides he had no son capable of succeeding him on the throne. Consequently on the day independence was won, the republican form of government was adopted without hesitation, and it has survived over a hundred years.