The Evidence in the Case Part 16

[Footnote 70: English _White Paper_, No. 84.]

Later in the day Sir Edward again repeated his suggestion to the German Amba.s.sador in London and urged that Germany should,

_propose some method_ by which the four Powers should be able to work together to keep the peace of Europe. I pointed out, however, that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation, regarded it as a condition that the military operations against Servia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only drag on matters _and give Austria time to crush Servia_. It was of course too late for all military operations against Servia to be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Servian territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction from Servia, stated that she would not advance further, pending an effort of the Powers to mediate between her and Russia.

The only reply that England received to this reiterated request that Germany take the lead in suggesting some acceptable peace formula was set forth in a dispatch from Sir E. Goschen from Berlin to Sir Edward Grey:

I was informed last night that they (the German Foreign Office) had not had time to send an answer yet. To-day, in reply to an inquiry from the French Amba.s.sador as to whether the Imperial Government had proposed any course of action, _the [German] Secretary of State said that he felt that time would be saved by communicating with Vienna direct, and that he had asked the Austro-Hungarian Government what would satisfy them. No answer had, however, yet been returned._

The Chancellor told me last night that he was "pressing the b.u.t.ton" as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather than otherwise.[71]

[Footnote 71: See English _White Paper_, No. 84.]

The Court of Public Opinion unfortunately is not favored in the German _White Paper_ with the text of its communication on this subject to Vienna, nor is it given any specifications as to the manner in which the German Chancellor "pressed the b.u.t.ton."

What the world knows without doc.u.mentary proof is that Austria continued its military preparations and operations and that Russia then ordered a general mobilization. The only a.s.surance which Russia received from Austria as a result of the alleged "pressing of the b.u.t.ton" is set forth in the following dispatch from the Russian Amba.s.sador at Vienna to Sazonof, dated July 31st:

In spite of the general mobilization I continue to exchange views with Count Berchtold and his collaborators. All insist on the absence of aggressive intentions on the part of Austria against Russia and of ambitions of conquest in regard to Servia, _but all equally insist on the necessity for Austria of pursuing to the very end the action begun and of giving to Servia a serious lesson which would const.i.tute a certain guarantee for the future_.

This was in effect a flat refusal of all mediatory or otherwise pacific suggestions, for the right of Austria to crush Servia by giving it "a serious lesson"--what such a lesson is let Louvain, Liege, and Rheims witness!--was the crux of the whole question.

Concurrently Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that Germany had declared that day the "_Kriegsgefahr_" and that the German Chancellor had expressed the opinion that "all hope of a peaceful solution of the crisis" was at an end. The British Amba.s.sador then asked the Chancellor,--

whether he could not still put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in the general interests to rea.s.sure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis. He replied that last night he had begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter.[72]

[Footnote 72: English _White Paper_, No. 112.]

Here again the world is not favored with the text of the message, in which the Chancellor "begged Austria to reply," nor with that of the Austrian Foreign Minister's reply.

While these events were happening in Berlin and London, the Russian Amba.s.sador in Vienna advised Sazonof "that Austria has determined not to yield to the intervention of the powers and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as Servia."[73]

[Footnote 73: English _White Paper_, No. 113.]

Russia thereupon, on July 31, ordered a general mobilization of her army.

Concurrently with these interviews, the English Amba.s.sador in Vienna had a conversation with the Austrian Under-Secretary of State and

called his attention to the fact that during the discussion of the Albanian frontier at the London Conference of Amba.s.sadors the Russian Government had stood behind Servia, and that a compromise between the views of Russia and Austria-Hungary resulted with accepted frontier line.

Although he[74] spoke in a conciliatory tone, and did not regard the situation as desperate, _I could not get from him any suggestion for a similar compromise in the present case_. Count Forgach is going this afternoon to see the Russian Amba.s.sador, whom I have informed of the above conversation.[75]

[Footnote 74: The Austrian Under-Secretary of State.]

[Footnote 75: English _White Paper_, No. 118.]

Notwithstanding all these discouragements and rebuffs, Sir Edward Grey, that unwearying friend of peace, still continued to make a last attempt to preserve peace by instructing the British Amba.s.sador in Berlin to sound the German Foreign Office, as he would sound the Russian Foreign Office,

whether it would be possible for the four disinterested Powers to offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided that they did not impair Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory. As your Excellency is aware, Austria has already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be informed by the four Powers that they would undertake to prevent Austrian demands from going the length of impairing Servian sovereignty and integrity. All Powers would of course suspend further military operations or preparations.

He further instructed Sir Edward Goschen to advise the German Foreign Office that he, Sir Edward Grey, had that morning proposed to the German Amba.s.sador in London,

_that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward, which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace_, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, _I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris_, and go the length of saying that, if Russia and France would not accept it, _his Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences_; that, otherwise, I told the German Amba.s.sador that if France became involved we should be drawn in.[76]

[Footnote 76: English _White Paper_, No. 111.]

What, then, was the position when the last fatal step was taken? The Czar had pledged his personal honor that no provocative action should be taken by Russia, while peace parleys were in progress, and the Russian Foreign Minister had agreed to cease all military preparations, provided that Austria would recognize that the question of Servia had become one of European interest, and that its sovereignty would be respected.

On July 31st, Austria _for the first time_ in the negotiations agreed to discuss with the Russian Government the merits of the Servian note.

Until this eleventh hour Austria had consistently contended that her difficulty with Servia was her own question, in which Russia had no right to intervene, and which it would not under any circ.u.mstances even discuss with Russia. For this reason it had refused any time for discussion, abruptly declared war against Servia, commenced its military operations, and repeatedly declined to discuss even the few questions left open in the Servian reply as a basis for further peace parleys.

As recently as July 30th, the Austrian Government had declined or refused any "direct exchange of views with the Russian Government."

But late on July 31st, a so-called "conversation" took place at Vienna between Count Berchtold and the Russian Amba.s.sador, and as a result, the Austrian Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg was instructed to "converse"

with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. This important concession of Austria was conveyed to Sazonof by the Austrian Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg, who expressed

the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. M. Sazonof replied by expressing his satisfaction and said it was desirable that the discussions should take place in London with the partic.i.p.ation of the Great Powers.

M. Sazonof hoped that the British Government would a.s.sume the direction of these discussions. The whole of Europe would be thankful to them. It would be very important that Austria should meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian territory.[77]

[Footnote 77: English _White Paper_, No. 133.]

_It is important to note that Austria's change of heart preceded by some hours the Kaiser's ultimatum to Russia._ The former took place some time during the day on July 31st. The latter was sent to St.

Petersburg on the midnight of that day. It must also be noted that while Austria thus agreed at the eleventh hour to "discuss the substance of the ultimatum," it did not offer to suspend military preparations or operations and this obviously deprived the concession of its chief value.[78]

[Footnote 78: _See_ Addendum, p. 191-2.]

The cause and purpose of Austria's partial reversal of its policy at present writing can be only a matter of conjecture. When Austria publishes its correspondence with Germany, we may know the truth.

Two theories are equally plausible:

Austria may have taken alarm at the steadfast purpose of Russia to champion the cause of Servia with the sword. If so, its qualified reversal of its bellicose att.i.tude may have induced the war party at Berlin to precipitate the war by the ultimatum to Russia. In that event, Germany's mad policy of war at any cost is even more iniquitous.[79]

[Footnote 79: _See_ Addendum, p. 190, _et seq._]

The supposition is equally plausible that Austria had been advised from Berlin that that night Germany would end all efforts to preserve the peace of Europe by an ultimatum to Russia, which would make war inevitable. The case of Germany and Austria at the bar of the world would be made morally stronger if, at the outbreak of hostilities, the att.i.tude of Austria had become more conciliatory. This would make more plausible their contention that the mobilization of Russia and not Austria's flat rejection of all peace overtures had precipitated the conflict.

_This much is certain that the Kaiser, with full knowledge that Austria had consented to renew its conferences with Russia_, and that a ray of light had broken through the lowering war clouds, either on his own initiative or yielding to the importunities of his military camarilla, directed the issuance of the ultimatum to Russia and thus blasted the last hope of peace.

On midnight of July 31st, the German Chancellor sent the following telegram to the German Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg:

In spite of still pending mediatory negotiations, and although we ourselves have up to the present moment taken no measures for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy; in other words, mobilized against us also.

By these Russian measures we have been obliged, for the safeguarding of the Empire, to announce that danger of war threatens us, which does not yet mean mobilization.

Mobilization, however, must follow _unless Russia ceases within twelve hours all warlike measures against us and Austria-Hungary_ and gives us definite a.s.surance thereof.

Kindly communicate this at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of its communication to him.

At midnight the fateful message was delivered. As Sazonof reports the interview:

At midnight the Amba.s.sador of Germany declared to me, by order of his Government, that if within twelve hours, that is at midday of Sat.u.r.day, we did not commence demobilization, _not only in regard to Germany but also in regard to Austria_, the German Government would be forced to give the order of mobilization. To my question if this was war the Amba.s.sador replied in the negative, but added that we were very near it.

It will be noted by the italicized portion that Germany did not restrict its demand that Russia cease its preparations against Germany, but it should also desist from any preparations to defend itself or a.s.sert its rights against Austria, although Austria had made no offer to suspend either its preparations for war or recall its general mobilization order.