The Evidence in the Case Part 13

Herr von Schoen recognized the justice of these considerations and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked him if we should give to the Austrian note the character of a simple _mise en demeure_, which permitted a discussion, or an ultimatum, he answered that personally he had no views.[53]

[Footnote 53: French _Yellow Book_, No. 28.]

On the following day the German Amba.s.sador again called at the French Foreign Office and protested against an article, which had appeared in a Paris newspaper and which had characterized his communication of the preceding day as the "German menace." The German Amba.s.sador again gave an unequivocal a.s.surance

that there was no agreement between Austria and Germany over the Austrian note, _of which the German Government was ignorant_, although the German Government had subsequently approved it on receiving communication of it _at the same time as the other Powers_.[54]

[Footnote 54: _Ibid._, No. 36.]

The hardihood of this statement, in view of the fact that on the preceding day, simultaneously with the service of the ultimatum, the threatening demand had been delivered by Germany to the leading European chancelleries that the quarrel between Austria and Servia must be localized, is apparent. Baron von Schoen, the German Amba.s.sador, then denied that his suggestion of "incalculable consequences," if the dispute were not localized, was a "menace." This statement, repeated by German diplomats in other capitals, approaches the ludicrous. The first military power of Europe formally advises other nations that unless they waive their legitimate claims and interests, "incalculable consequences" will follow, and it is gravely suggested that this is not a "menace."

On the following day Baron von Schoen made two visits at the French Foreign Office and a.s.sured the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that

Germany _was on the side of France in the ardent desire for the maintenance of peace_, and she earnestly hoped that France would use her influence in a soothing manner in St.

Petersburg.

I replied to this suggestion that Russia was moderate, that she had committed no act throwing doubt upon her moderation, and that we were in agreement with her in seeking for a peaceful solution of the struggle. It therefore appeared to me that in counterpart Germany should act in Vienna, _where the efficacy of her action was sure_, with a view to avoiding military operations tending to the occupation of Servia.

The Amba.s.sador having pointed out to me that that was irreconcilable with the position adopted by Germany, "that the question only concerned Austria and Servia," I said to him that mediation in Vienna and St. Petersburg might be made by the four Powers who were less directly interested in the matter.

Baron von Schoen then sheltered himself behind his lack of instructions on this point, and I told him that in these circ.u.mstances I did not feel able to act in St. Petersburg alone.

Our conversation concluded with the renewed a.s.surance by the Amba.s.sador as to the peaceful intentions of Germany, who, he declared, was with France on this point.[55]

[Footnote 55: French _Yellow Book_, No. 56.]

The incident now followed, which suggested to the French Foreign office a subtle attempt of Germany to compromise the relations of France with Russia by imputing disloyalty to the former. On his second visit a few hours later, Baron von Schoen desired the French Foreign Office to give to the public a statement with reference to the preceding interview, and suggested the following, which he dictated to the French official:

"The German Amba.s.sador and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had a further interview in the course of the afternoon, during which they examined, _in_ _the most friendly spirit and with a feeling of pacific solidarity, the means which might be employed for the maintenance of general peace_."

The Acting Political Director at once replied: "Then, in your mind, everything is settled, and you give us the a.s.surance that Austria accepts the Servian note, or will be willing to converse with the Powers with regard to it?"

The Amba.s.sador appeared to be taken aback, and made a vigorous denial. It was therefore pointed out to him that if nothing had changed in the negative att.i.tude of Germany, the terms of the suggested "note to the Press" were excessive, and likely to give French opinion a false feeling of security by creating illusions as to the actual situation, the dangers of which were but too evident.[56]

[Footnote 56: French _Yellow Book_, No. 57.]

It is not surprising that the French Foreign Office looked askance at these German suggestions of "pacific solidarity" with France, which contrasted so strangely with Germany's refusal to work for peace and its sinister menaces to other countries. France's suspicion that Baron von Schoen was thus attempting to compromise its loyalty in the eyes of Russia cannot be said to be without some foundation, although it is as reasonable to a.s.sume that these professions of the German Amba.s.sador were only an incident to the general plan of lulling France and its allies into a false sense of security. Here again the full truth can only be ascertained when Germany is willing to submit to the scrutiny of the world the records of its Foreign Office.

On July 26th, M. Jules Cambon had an interview with the German Secretary of State and earnestly supported Sir Edward Grey's suggestion that a conference be called in which England, France, Germany, and Italy should partic.i.p.ate for the preservation of peace.

This interview is at once so dramatic, and almost prophetic, that it justifies quotation _in extenso_:

To Cambon's proposition, von Jagow replied, as he did to the British Amba.s.sador, that he could not accept a proposal to charge the Italian, French, and German Amba.s.sadors with the task of seeking, with Sir Edward Grey, a means of solving the present difficulties, for that would be to establish a regular conference to deal with the affairs of Austria and Russia. I replied to Herr von Jagow that I regretted his response, but that the great object, which Sir Edward Grey had in view, _was above a question of form_, and what was important was the a.s.sociation of England and France with Germany and Italy in laboring for peace; that this a.s.sociation could show itself in common action in St.

Petersburg and Vienna; that he had frequently expressed to me his regret at seeing the two groups of alliances always opposed to each other in Europe, and that here he had an opportunity of proving that there was a European spirit, by showing four Powers belonging to the two groups acting in common agreement to prevent a struggle. Herr von Jagow evaded the matter by saying that Germany had her engagements with Austria. _I pointed out that the relations of Germany with Vienna were no more close than those of France with Russia, and that it was he himself who raised the question of the two opposed groups of alliances._

The Secretary of State then said that he did not refuse to act with a view to avoiding an Austro-Russian conflict, but that he could not intervene in the Austro-Servian conflict.

"One is the consequence of the other," I said, "and it would be well to prevent the creation of any new state of affairs calculated to bring about the intervention of Russia."

As the Secretary of State persisted in saying that he was obliged to observe his engagements with regard to Austria, _I asked him if he had pledged himself to follow Austria everywhere blindfold_, and if he had made himself acquainted with the Servian reply to Austria, which had been handed to him that morning by the Servian Charge d'Affaires. "_I have not yet had time_," he said. "I regret it," I replied. "You will see that except on points of detail Servia has yielded completely. It would seem, however, that since Austria has obtained the satisfaction, which your support procured her, you might to-day advise her to be content, or to examine with Servia the terms of the Servian reply."

As Herr von Jagow did not answer me clearly, I asked him if Germany wanted war. He protested energetically, saying that he knew that that was my idea but that it was completely incorrect. "You must then," I replied, "act in consequence.

_When you read the Servian reply, weigh the terms with your conscience, I beg you in the name of humanity, and do not personally a.s.sume a portion of the responsibility for the catastrophe, whose preparation you are allowing._" Herr von Jagow protested again, adding that he was ready to join England and France in any common effort, but that some form must be found for this intervention which he could accept and that the Cabinets should agree among themselves upon the matter. "Moreover," he added, "direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg are begun and are proceeding. I expect much good of them, and I have hope."[57]

[Footnote 57: French _Yellow Book_, No. 74.]

In his solemn injunction to von Jagow "_in the name of humanity_" _to weigh the terms in his conscience_, Cambon struck a loftier note than any of the diplomatic disputants. Macaulay has said that the "French mind has always been the interpreter between national ideas and those of universal mankind," and at least since the French Revolution the tribute has been deserved.

He, who carefully and dispa.s.sionately reads the diplomatic correspondence which preceded the war, must be impressed with the different point of view of the two groups of disputants. Both the written and oral communications of the German and Austrian representatives failed to suggest at any time a note other than one of selfish nationalism. We search in vain for the most distant recognition of the fact that the world at large had any legitimate interest in the controversy. The insistent note, which Austria sounded, was that its interests required its punitive action against Servia, even though the peace of the world were thereby sacrificed, and that of Germany repeated with equal insistence that its "closest interests" summoned it to the side of Austria.

In marked contrast to this spirit of national selfishness is the repeated admonition of Sir Edward Grey that the whole question should be considered in its "larger aspects," thereby meaning the peace and welfare of Europe; while the Czar, with evident sincerity, suggested to the Kaiser that "with the aid of G.o.d it must be possible to our long tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood," and proposed a reference of the question to the Hague. Similarly the appeal of Jules Cambon to von Jagow, "in the name of humanity" was more than the ordinary exchange of diplomatic views. Von Jagow's conception of his duty is shown by the fact that he had taken a position involving "incalculable consequences" without even reading the Servian reply.

Cambon approved himself a worthy "yoke fellow in equity" with Sir Edward Grey, and no loftier tone was sounded by any partic.i.p.ant in this great controversy, unless we except Goschen's solemn statement to von Bethmann-Hollweg in the equally dramatic interview, which succeeded the rupture of relations between England and Germany, when Goschen stated that "it was so to speak a matter of life and death for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked," and added, "that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn promises."

CHAPTER VIII

THE INTERVENTION OF THE KAISER

The Kaiser now appears upon the scene with a fatal result to the peace of Europe. One fact in this controversy is too clear for dispute.

When peace proposals were still under consideration and some slight progress had been made by the eleventh-hour consent of Austria on July 31 to discuss with Russia the merits of the Servian question, the Kaiser--like Brennus with his _vae victis_--threw his sword into the trembling scales and definitely turned the balance against the peace of the world.

Was it a reluctant Caesar who thus crossed the Rubicon, at whose fateful margin he had stood at other crises of his peaceful reign without destroying that peace?

Our information is still too meager to justify a satisfactory answer at this time. Not only are the premises in dispute, but the inferences from admitted premises are too conflicting.

At the time the Austrian Archduke was murdered the Kaiser was in Berlin, and he at once showed an intense interest in the event and in all that it portended. It was officially announced that he planned to attend the funeral in Vienna, but later the world was advised that he had suffered a "chill," which would prevent such attendance. Perhaps it was a diplomatic chill. He then left for Norway, where he remained in the enjoyment of his annual holiday until the evening of July 26th, when he suddenly returned to his Capitol.

Evidently his return was unexpected, for we learn from a telegram from Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 26th, that,

the Emperor returned suddenly to-night and [the German]

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that the Foreign Office _regrets this step which was taken on His Majesty's own initiative_. They fear that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and excitement.

As the refusal of Austria to accept the Servian reply and its severance of all diplomatic relations with that country had already thrown the entire world into a state of feverish anxiety, it is difficult to understand why the German Foreign Office should have felt that the very natural return of the Kaiser to his Capitol at one of the greatest crises in the history of his country and of the world should be regarded as giving rise to "speculation and excitement,"

especially as the President of the French Republic was hastening back to Paris.

The Under-Secretary of State's deprecation of the Kaiser's return suggests the possibility that the German Foreign Office, which had already made substantial progress in precipitating the crisis, did not wish the Kaiser's return for fear that he might again exert, as in the Moroccan crisis, his great influence in the interests of peace.

It felt that it had the matter well in hand, but never before did a foreign office blunder so flagrantly and with such disastrous results.

From beginning to end every antic.i.p.ation that the German Chancellor had was falsified by events. This discreditable and blundering chapter of German diplomacy is enough to make the bones of the sagacious Bismarck turn in his grave.

As appears from Sir M. de Bunsen's dispatch to Sir Edward Grey, dated July 26th, it was the confident belief of the German diplomats that "Russia will keep quiet during the chastis.e.m.e.nt of Servia," and that "France too was not at all in a position for facing the war."[58]

[Footnote 58: English _White Paper_, No. 32.]

When the full history of this imbroglio is written, it will probably be found that the extensive labor troubles in St. Petersburg, the military unpreparedness of Russia and France, and the political schism in England, then verging to civil war, had deeply impressed both Vienna and Berlin that the dual alliance could impose its will upon Europe with reference to Servia without any serious risk of a European war.

While for these reasons Germany and Austria may not have regarded such a war or the intervention of England therein as probable, yet the dual alliance recognized from the outset such a possibility. The uncertainty as to the Kaiser's att.i.tude with respect to such a war may therefore explain the "regret," with which the German Foreign Office witnessed his sudden and uninvited return.