The End Of Secrecy_ The Rise And Fall Of WikiLeaks Part 13

2. (C/NF) For the next ten months, the UK faces the challenge of adopting deficit-reduction measures, controlling inflation and addressing rising unemployment ... Businesses will cut jobs faster this year and eliminate many part-time positions, as employers realize that economic recovery will be a long, drawn-out process, said King ... Businesses will cut jobs faster this year and eliminate many part-time positions, as employers realize that economic recovery will be a long, drawn-out process, said King ...

Conservatives - Not Prepared

4. (C/NF) Conservative leaders David Cameron and George Osborne do not fully grasp the pressures they will face when attempting to cut back on spending, when "hundreds of government officials will make pleas of why their budgets should not be reduced," David Cameron and George Osborne do not fully grasp the pressures they will face when attempting to cut back on spending, when "hundreds of government officials will make pleas of why their budgets should not be reduced," stated King. In recent meetings with them, he has pressed for details about how they plan to tackle the debt, but received only generalities in return. Both Cameron and Osborne have a tendency to think about issues only in terms of politics, and how they might affect Tory electorability. King also raised concerns that Osborne's dual roles as Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer but also as the Party's general election coordinator could create potential problems in the approach on economic issues. stated King. In recent meetings with them, he has pressed for details about how they plan to tackle the debt, but received only generalities in return. Both Cameron and Osborne have a tendency to think about issues only in terms of politics, and how they might affect Tory electorability. King also raised concerns that Osborne's dual roles as Shadow Chancellor of the Exchequer but also as the Party's general election coordinator could create potential problems in the approach on economic issues.

5. (C/NF) King also expressed concern about the Tory party's lack of depth. Cameron and Osborne have only a few advisors, and seemed resistant to reaching out beyond their small inner circle. Cameron and Osborne have only a few advisors, and seemed resistant to reaching out beyond their small inner circle. The Cameron/Osborne partnership was not unlike the Tony Blair/Gordon Brown team of New Labour's early years, when both worked well together when part of the opposition party, but fissures developed - for many reasons - once Labour was in power. Similar tensions could arise if Cameron and Osborne disagreed on how to handle the deficit. The Cameron/Osborne partnership was not unlike the Tony Blair/Gordon Brown team of New Labour's early years, when both worked well together when part of the opposition party, but fissures developed - for many reasons - once Labour was in power. Similar tensions could arise if Cameron and Osborne disagreed on how to handle the deficit.

7. (C/NF) The euro-zone's move to greater political cohesion could poise some disadvantages for the UK, King speculated. During the February 16 ECOFIN meeting, euro-zone governments politely listened to Chancellor Darling when he commented on the situation in Greece, but he was not invited to attend internal discussions since the UK is not part of the euro-zone. It would be inc.u.mbent for the UK to demonstrate that it has something meaningful to say and to be constructively engaged in the EU, should this greater political cohesion among the euro-zone governments occur, commented King.

NICOLAS SARKOZY STRIKES FEAR.

INTO HIS ADVISORS.

Friday, 04 December 2009, 11:49 CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001638.

NOFORN.

Cla.s.sified By: Amba.s.sador Charles Rivkin for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (C/NF) Summary. At the mid-point of his five-year term, French President Sarkozy continues to be the dominant, virtually unchallenged, political force in France. Slowed in domestic reform efforts by entrenched interests and the world-wide financial crisis, Sarkozy is increasingly focused on successfully leveraging France's foreign policy influence on the global stage. Ambitious and action-oriented, Sarkozy doesn't hesitate to break traditional French policies and reach out to new partners, from Saudi Arabia and Syria to India and Brazil. His impatience for results and desire to seize the initiative with or without the support of international partners and his own advisors challenges us to channel his impulsive proposals into constructive directions with an eye to long-term results. Sarkozy himself is firmly convinced of the need for a strong transatlantic partnership and he has long desired to be THE major partner to the U.S. in Europe, whether on climate change and non-proliferation or Iran and the Middle East. Our effort to secure increased French contributions in Afghanistan offers an interesting perspective on the centralization of key decision-making powers in the French President and how to best work with Sarkozy as a valued, and valuable, partner. With high-profile events like the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) prep-com next spring, and Sarkozy preparing to lead France's chairmanship of the G-8/G-20 in 2011, we believe we can best secure our interests across a broad front through continued close consultations with our French partners (including, and perhaps especially, at the highest levels), with an eye to leveraging Sarkozy's strong political standing, desire for action, and willingness to make difficult decisions into force multipliers for our foreign policy interests. End Summary.

DOMESTIC DRAMA BUT NO DOMESTIC OPPOSITION.

2. (C/NF) Sarkozy's domestic standing is virtually unchallenged despite lagging opinion polls which place his personal approval ratings at 39 percent. His center-right UMP party controls both houses of parliament, and opposition leaders in France have spent the past two years fighting among themselves rather than mounting any serious political challenge to the inc.u.mbent president. Sarkozy's policy of "openness" in appointing opposition politicians to high-profile positions has contributed to the leadership drain on the left. IMF President Dominique Strauss-Kahn and FM Kouchner are just two examples of this successful political ploy. Despite this political security or perhaps because of it there is some internal grumbling about Sarkozy's high handed style within his own party, revealed by the recent attempt to name his 23-year-old son Jean Sarkozy, who is still an undergraduate student, to a position at the head of Paris's most prestigious business development commission. A brilliant political tactician, Sarkozy is raising the profile of the March 2010 regional elections to rally his base and steal voters from the far right as part of a ramp-up to his re-election bid in 2012. While this makes him more sensitive to the near-term domestic political impact of certain foreign policy issues (like Afghanistan), his domestic stature remains fundamentally secure, freeing him to focus on his goal of leveraging French power in Europe and globally.

FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES.

3. (C/NF) The net result of Sarkozy's dominance of the domestic political scene is that he is also one of the most secure leaders in Europe, with no awkward coalition partner or imminent presidential elections to distract or hinder him. Sarkozy occasionally recognizes that to be heard on the world stage whether on strategic questions or the global financial crisis France's voice is amplified when speaking in concert with others. Sarkozy has worked hard to successfully parlay an initially awkward personal relationship with German Chancellor Merkel into a smoothly PARIS 00001638 002 OF 004.

coordinated tandem that drives much of European policy. Likewise, he will frequently pair with Merkel and UK PM Brown to add needed clout to messages in Brussels and Washington. Sarkozy's ability to leverage his (and France's) voice on the world stage by building on strategic partnerships is one of his greatest strengths; one of his greatest weaknesses, however, may be his impatience and penchant to launch proposals with insufficient consultation with other major players.

4. (C/NF) Sarkozy's most visible successes to date are largely in the foreign affairs domain, with his greatest achievements within Europe. He championed the Lisbon treaty in his first months in office, helping to end the stalemate over reform of EU inst.i.tutions. This was succeeded by his leadership of the rotating EU presidency in the second half of 2008, which included the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the launch of the EU's counter-piracy operation, and his negotiation of a cease-fire after the Russian invasion of Georgia. Characteristically, he didn't hesitate to disregard European sensitivities by attempting to retain the lead on specific portfolios where he doubted the Czech ability to provide the necessary follow-on EU lead after Prague took over the rotating presidency in January 2009. On security issues, Sarkozy is equally bold. He personally authorized additional French troops for Afghanistan at the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit and this year he fought to bring France back into NATO's integrated military command, reversing more than 40 years of bipartisan French policy, in spite of strong skepticism within his own party and intense opposition from others.

NEW PARTNERS, NEW IDEAS.

5. (C/NF) In a departure from previous French leaders, Sarkozy has also devoted a great deal of effort to reaching out bilaterally to countries like Israel, Saudi Arabia and Syria, recognizing that they are major players in the Middle East where French ambitions have been frustrated. French officials are convinced that Sarkozy's outreach to Syria has made Syrian President al Asad a more productive partner in resolving Middle East issues (although they are hard-pressed to provide concrete examples of a change). Sarkozy fully recognizes the growing role played by emerging powers like Brazil (he has meet with Brazilian President Lula nine times in the past two years) and India (whose troops he invited to star in the July 14, 2009 military parade). He lobbied successfully for the G-20 meeting in Washington to address the global financial crisis, and he supports an expanded UN Security Council, which earns him additional popularity among rising powers. The Elysee has also looked to Brazil as a partner in climate change negotiations and a buyer of French defense equipment including potentially the first overseas sale of the Rafale fighter aircraft. All of these outreach efforts stem from genuine convictions as well as an eye to the image of France at the center of a global network of influential leaders.

6. (C/NF) Sarkozy is most p.r.o.ne to disappoint when, in his impatience for action, he effectively "gets ahead" of other key players and his own advisors. Sarkozy is firmly convinced that the most intractable diplomatic problems can only be solved by getting leaders together in person to cut through bureaucratic red tape and make bold decisions hence his predilection for proposing summits. He has little patience for the incremental steps of diplomacy and once he latches onto an idea he is loath to let it go. Impatient for progress in the Middle East, he has sought ways to make France a player, first through creation of the UfM and second by championing a summit, either in the guise of the UfM or now through other partners (such as the U.S., the Quartet, etc) to achieve his goals. In another example, his surprise announcement last June in support of a new treaty on European security architecture took many allies, and his own staff, by surprise. Although that debate has been channelled into the OSCE Corfu process for the present, Sarkozy is already chafing at what he considers lack of progress on this strategic issue and is continuously tasking his staff to come up with new proposals to address the impa.s.se of CFE, improve the partnership with Russia, and provide other ideas to overcome blocked initiatives.

PARIS 00001638 003 OF 004.

NO ONE TO SAY "NO"

7. (C/NF) Sarkozy has few restraints political, personal or ideological to act as a brake on his global ambitions. Domestically, he rewards party leaders prepared to adopt his policies and marginalizes any opponents with a diverse view. Several "favored" cabinet ministers with high profiles early in his administration including Rama Yade and Rachida Dati were subsequently b.u.mped into secondary jobs after having disagreed with Sarkozy. On the other hand, State Secretary for European Affairs, Pierre Lellouche, willingly muzzled his long-term outspoken support for Turkish Accession to the EU in exchange for his current post. While Diplomatic Advisor (NSA-equivalent) Jean-David Levitte remains a key player, with an extensive background in diplomacy and a calming personality, other advisors like Secretary General Claude Gueant are playing an increasingly public role. Despite having Sarkozy's ear to various degrees, few appear to exercise any significant degree of influence over the activist president. (C/NF) Sarkozy has few restraints political, personal or ideological to act as a brake on his global ambitions. Domestically, he rewards party leaders prepared to adopt his policies and marginalizes any opponents with a diverse view. Several "favored" cabinet ministers with high profiles early in his administration including Rama Yade and Rachida Dati were subsequently b.u.mped into secondary jobs after having disagreed with Sarkozy. On the other hand, State Secretary for European Affairs, Pierre Lellouche, willingly muzzled his long-term outspoken support for Turkish Accession to the EU in exchange for his current post. While Diplomatic Advisor (NSA-equivalent) Jean-David Levitte remains a key player, with an extensive background in diplomacy and a calming personality, other advisors like Secretary General Claude Gueant are playing an increasingly public role. Despite having Sarkozy's ear to various degrees, few appear to exercise any significant degree of influence over the activist president.

8. (C/NF) Sarkozy's own advisors likewise demonstrate little independence and appear to have little effect on curbing the hyperactive president, even when he is at his most mercurial. Elysee contacts have reported to us the great lengths they will go to avoid disagreeing with him or provoking his displeasure even recently reportedly re-routing the President's plane to avoid his seeing the Eiffel Tower lit up in Turkey's colors on the visit of PM Erdogan (a decision made by the Paris city hall). After two years in office, many seasoned key Elysee staff are leaving for prestigious onward a.s.signments as a reward for their hard work, raising questions as to whether new faces will be any more willing to point out when the emperor is less than fully dressed.

WORKING TOGETHER IN THE FUTURE.

9. (C/NF) When he was elected in 2007, Sarkozy was among the first French leaders to openly embrace the United States, despite a U.S. administration very unpopular in Europe at the time. This was due to Sarkozy's conviction that France can accomplish more in cooperation with, rather than opposition to, the United States. When then-Senator and presidential candidate Obama came to France in July 2008, Sarkozy cleared his schedule to meet with him and further broke his own protocol rules and held a joint press conference (a privilege normally reserved exclusively for visiting heads of state). Sarkozy is prepared to be the U.S.'s key partner in Europe and is hoping for intense regular contact with President Obama (which enhances Sarkozy's domestic stature and therefore directly increases his ability to make hard decisions). French journalists are pointing out with increasing frequency that Sarkozy has not paid a White House call on President Obama, and French officials are beginning to express concern over this perceived lack of high-level visits and other regular consultations. Journalists and officials alike are expressing the concern that France, and Europe as a whole, may be of less strategic importance to the United States today (a view that, all things being equal, does not enhance their incentives to work closely with us).

10. (C/NF) On strategic questions, Paris is frequently willing to back U.S. positions, even in the face of general European reluctance. Paris has welcomed U.S. efforts to "re-set" relations with Russia and has consistently emphasized developing a common approach with Washington toward Moscow. On Iran, President Sarkozy remains personally engaged and is willing to work intensely within Europe (both inst.i.tutionally in the EU and through efforts to persuade individual countries to adopt national measures). On non-proliferation and disarmament issues, the GOF has urged regular consultations in the run up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and launch of discussions on a FMCT treaty. The most important thing for French officials and Sarkozy himself is to feel like they are part of the decision-making process and not simply called in to ratify decisions after they have been made in Washington.

AFGHANISTAN: AN ILl.u.s.tRATIVE CASE.

PARIS 00001638 004 OF 004.

11. (C/NF) Our effort to secure increased French contributions to Afghanistan underlines how much decision-making power is vested in the French president and how best we can work with him to achieve desired results. Last year, on our request, President Sarkozy went against all of his political and military advisors to deploy a French OMLT to a.s.sist the Dutch forces in Uruzgan, a critical reinforcement of a key ally. It was also Sarkozy alone who made the decision to deploy an additional 700 troops at last year's Bucharest summit at the time of the announcement, even key staff were still unsure what the final decision would be. This year, in intense exchanges with all the major French players including FM Kouchner, NSA-equivalent Levitte and French CHOD Georgelin, each one expressed support for U.S. policy but were doubtful about additional French financial or military resources, frequently citing Sarkozy's earlier statement of "no additional troops."

12. (C/NF) However, following a direct conversation with President Obama, President Sarkozy dropped the formerly firm "no" position and moved forward more quickly and proactively than we envisioned, opening the door to military reinforcements "in time" and promising increased financial and training a.s.sistance. Although the specifics are not yet provided, the personal outreach to President Sarkozy made the difference between getting a cautious bureaucratic response and a genuine commitment from a key ally when we needed it. The French press led their reports noting Sarkozy was the first foreign leader on Obama's call sheet, thereby increasing the pressure on Sarkozy to respond favorably.

COMMENT.

13. (C/NF) Comment: As one of Europe's most politically secure leaders at the head of a country with significant ability to contribute more to global problem-solving across a broad front, from Afghanistan to climate change, economic stabilization, Iran, and the Middle East Peace Process, Sarkozy represents a key actor in the fulfillment of our shared policy goals. We will not always see eye-to-eye, and differences on key issues (such as non-proliferation and disarmament, which are seen as critical to French national interests) are looming. However, through enhanced consultation (including, and perhaps especially, at the highest levels), I believe we can address these differences, minimize unhelpful proposals and foster increased collaboration to better leverage French interests to fulfill ours. France is a like-minded country with a major economy and the second-largest deployed military and diplomatic forces in the world. By striking the right note in our bilateral relationship, we can leverage Sarkozy's strengths, including his willingness to take a stand on unpopular issues, to be a major contributor to U.S. goals. We must also recognize that Sarkozy has an extraordinary degree of decision-making power which is vested in him alone as the French president. In my opinion it will necessitate periodic Presidential intervention to rea.s.sure Sarkozy of our commitment as an ally and partner and, in many cases, to close the deal. Sarkozy will remain a power to be reckoned with in France and a significant driver of Europe for the foreseeable future. It is clearly in our interest to work hard to channel his energy and initiatives into a constructive form of cooperation that enhances our ability to solve global issues together. End comment. RIVKIN

'BP IS STEALING OUR OIL', AZERBAIJAN PRESIDENT TELLS US.

Tuesday, 09 October 2007, 14:14 CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 001227.

SIPDIS.

SIPDIS.

VILNIUS PLEASE Pa.s.s TO MATT BRYZA.

EO 12958 DECL: 10/09/2017.

TAGS ENRG, PREL, PGOV, RS">RS, TU, UP, KZ, PL, GG, LH, TX, AJ SUBJECT: PRESIDENT ALIYEV ON ENERGY ISSUES IN ADVANCE OF THE VILNIUS ENERGY SUMMIT.

REF: A. (A) BAKU 1224 B. (B) TBILISI 2498.

Cla.s.sified By: Amba.s.sador Anne E. Derse. Reason: 1.4 (B)(D) 1. (C) SUMMARY: In a one-hour one-on-one meeting with the Amba.s.sador on October 8, President Aliyev outlined with frustration current problems on energy in advance of the Vilnius Summit. British Petroleum (BP) is "stealing our oil," he a.s.serted sharply, seeking to put pressure on Azerbaijan to delay to 2010 the advent of an 80/20 profit split due next year under the Azeri Chirag Guneshli (ACG) Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) by threatening to cut back on gas it provides to the GOAJ from the ACG field from 3 bcm to 1.4 bcm. "Only Georgia will suffer" if BP continues down this path, he warned, noting Azerbaijan's commitment, otherwise, to help Georgia on gas this winter. He said the Georgian PM had promised him to enlist Washington's help with BP. He said BP had asked for time, until October 19, to resume talks. If a good response is not found, Azerbaijan "will make public that BP is stealing our oil," Aliyev stated. If a good response is not found, Azerbaijan "will make public that BP is stealing our oil," Aliyev stated. Similarly, he said, Turkey's 15 percent netback pricing scheme for gas transit is "unacceptable" as it would require Azerbaijan to disclose to Turkey sales agreements with customers in Europe and allow Turkey to sell 15 percent of Azerbaijan's gas to European markets. A transit agreement is "not so urgent for us that we will accept unjustified conditions from Turkey." Similarly, he said, Turkey's 15 percent netback pricing scheme for gas transit is "unacceptable" as it would require Azerbaijan to disclose to Turkey sales agreements with customers in Europe and allow Turkey to sell 15 percent of Azerbaijan's gas to European markets. A transit agreement is "not so urgent for us that we will accept unjustified conditions from Turkey."

2. (C) Summary Continued: Azerbaijan has an MOU with Greece, will soon launch talks with Italy, and will not allow Turkey to "block the Azerbaijan-Europe partnership." He said Turkmenistan seems to want the trans-Caspian option to be implemented but "to hide it from Russia." Azerbaijan has shown "maximum constructiveness" offering its infrastructure to Turkmenistan and pledging to serve as purely a transit country but Azerbaijan will not initiate next steps with Turkmenistan "We cannot want it more than they do." Azerbaijan does support the Odessa-Brody- Plotsk oil pipeline for political reasons ("Ukraine, Poland, Georgia are friends to us.") and will present a concrete plan on next steps at a meeting in Vilnius with Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and Georgia with the aim of making the project commercially feasible. Aliyev asked that the U.S. try to deliver the message on the unacceptability of the 15 percent netback pricing proposal to Turkey. He continues to support Nazarbayev's idea of a 3-way summit between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan as a good signal and a way to strengthen 3-way relations, but will not initiate the meeting. End Summary.

Georgian Winter Gas

3. (C) President Aliyev opened the discussion on energy by saying that Azerbaijan will help Georgia this winter as it has in the past. He said he confirmed this to the visiting Georgian PM during his September 27 visit to Baku. The GOAJ, however, is having some difficulties with BP, he said. Because the GOAJ halted negotiations on PSA extension and Shah Deniz development, BP is now "trying to put political pressure on us by cutting back on gas it is giving to Azerbaijan, from 3 bcm to 1.4 bcm." The GOAJ, however, is having some difficulties with BP, he said. Because the GOAJ halted negotiations on PSA extension and Shah Deniz development, BP is now "trying to put political pressure on us by cutting back on gas it is giving to Azerbaijan, from 3 bcm to 1.4 bcm." But "only Georgia will suffer" from this step because the Shah Deniz gas they will receive from Azerbaijan will not be enough. "If BP reduces the gas it is giving Azerbaijan, Georgia will get less." The Georgian PM, Aliyev said, had told him he is aware of this danger, and had said he would talk to Washington to "get them to help us." (See Ref. A for background on Azerbaijan-BP negotiations.) But "only Georgia will suffer" from this step because the Shah Deniz gas they will receive from Azerbaijan will not be enough. "If BP reduces the gas it is giving Azerbaijan, Georgia will get less." The Georgian PM, Aliyev said, had told him he is aware of this danger, and had said he would talk to Washington to "get them to help us." (See Ref. A for background on Azerbaijan-BP negotiations.) 4. (C) Aliyev continued that "these things are inter-connected. If BP is supportive and helpful, there will be no problem supplying Georgia." But the situation with BP is "unpleasant they are cheating us on the PSA profit split according to our calculations." The GOAJ believes that the profit split should have changed in the second quarter of this year. "They are stealing our oil they are unilaterally changing the formula on the ROR (rate of return) so the profit split will take place in 2010. SOCAR spoke to (BP Azerbaijan head) Bill Schrader. BP asked for time, until October 19, to come back to discussions."

BAKU 00001227 002 OF 003.

(Comment: BP Azerbaijan on October 9 had no news of an impending visit by BP CEO, per Ref. B. End comment.) If there is not a good response, "we'll make public that BP is stealing our oil ... oil that belongs to Azerbaijan, because BP wants the 80/20 profit split that should occur next year to be pushed to 2010." The Georgian situation, Aliyev repeated, "is connected to that."

Turkey Transit Agreement

5. (C) Aliyev said that Azerbaijan rejects the Turks' 15 percent netback proposal. The Turkish formula would require Azerbaijan to disclose to the GOT its commercial agreements with Greece, Italy, and other European countries "anywhere our gas goes." The netback pricing proposal is "not acceptable it does not exist in any other transit agreement. We would lose money and Turkey could sell 15 percent of our oil to our markets. This is not fair. We'll pay an agreed transit tariff. We want to do it on the basis of best international practice. Our position with Turkey is pretty strong. If they block an agreement, they are responsible. The Minister always says Turkey will do the necessary, but then does nothing. We will not accept pressure."

6. (C) Aliyev noted that it is Turkey and European consumers who need the transit agreement. "It is not so urgent for us that we will agree to unjustified conditions with Turkey." Azerbaijan has existing and adequate markets for its gas in Georgia and Turkey, he noted. Aliyev asked that the U.S. "deliver (to Turkey) if it can, this message. Turkey wants to get everything." Turkey does not understand that Azerbaijan has signed an MOU with Greece and will soon start negotiations with Italy. "Turkey cannot block the Azerbaijan-Europe partnership." Aliyev said Finance Minister Samir Sharifov's proposal for USTDA technical a.s.sistance to review best international practice in transit agreements was a good one. Azerbaijan wants the transit agreement with Turkey to be based on best international practice, not to "invent something new." He encouraged the U.S. to consider the technical a.s.sistance.

Turkmenistan and Trans-Caspian Gas

7. (C) Aliyev pointed to Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov's statement that he would "sell gas to Europe at Turkmenistan's border," adding, however, that he had failed to specify which border he was referring to that with Russia, Iran, or the Caspian Sea? Aliyev said it was his sense that Turkmenistan wants the trans-Caspian option to be implemented but "wants to hide it from Russia." Azerbaijan, he said, has shown "maximum constructiveness we offered all our infrastructure; we said we'd be a purely transit country, not do like Turkey is trying to do. But we will not be more interested than they. I will not initiate a meeting with Berdimuhamedov it is not right to do." Azerbaijan, he repeated, "will not initiate discussions with Turkmenistan because we do not need its gas we cannot be seen to want it (the trans-Caspian option) more than they do."

Odessa-Brody-Plotsk

8. (C) Azerbaijan has finalized its energy plan, Aliyev said. Azerbaijan supported the Krakow Summit and the proposed Odessa- Brody-Plotsk oil pipeline "even though the project is seen as anti-Russian" because Ukraine, Poland and Georgia are friendly to Azerbaijan. Aliyev said that the key is for Odessa-Brody-Plotsk to be "commercially feasible." For this reason, he had asked Energy Minister Natiq Aliyev to prepare a concrete proposal for discussion in Vilnius. This will include Azerbaijan's joining as a shareholder in the Sarmitia pipeline, and the launch of a feasibility study. In addition, a joint trading company for Black Sea oil will be created. With Supsa and Novorossisk, there is a great deal of Black Sea oil available, Aliyev said. The key, he repeated, is to make the Odessa- Brody-Plotsk project commercially feasible. Azerbaijan supports it "more to show political support than any urgent need" economically.

BAKU 00001227 003 OF 003.

Three-way Summit

9. (C) Aliyev said that Lithuanian PM Adamkus had told him in Vilnius last month that Kazakhstan would not attend the Vilnius Summit. He said, again with some frustration, that the idea of a 3- way Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan-Kazakhstan summit was Nazarbayev's idea, but there has been no further progress on taking it forward to his knowledge. With the clear implication that Kazakhstan should take its idea forward, Aliyev said he still believes such a trilateral meeting "would send a good signal, strengthening our relations and could be a positive thing."

10. (C) Comment: Aliyev was clearly frustrated and uncharacteristically sharp in discussing Turkey, Turkmenistan and especially BP, and disappointed with what he sees as Kazakhstan's equivocation. He repeated throughout the conversation that Azerbaijan's interest in delivering gas to Europe is strategic, driven by Azerbaijan's desire for a deeper partnership with Europe. He also underscored, in a clear reference to Russia, that Azerbaijan "cannot be seen" to be more in the lead than others in the region on gas issues. It will be important to rea.s.sure Aliyev in Vilnius of the USG's commitment to the southern corridor and to working closely with Azerbaijan to realize it, and to encourage him to find a productive way forward, in practical terms, with Turkey, Turkmenistan and BP. Septel will provide further insights from both BP and SOCAR on both the state of GOAJ-AIOC negotiations and Azerbaijan's ability to provide gas to Georgia this winter. End comment.

FEARS OVER SAFETY OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

Tuesday, 22 September 2009, 14:13 SECRET SECTION 01 OF 05 LONDON 002198.

NOFORN.

Cla.s.sified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) Summary: Under Secretary Tauscher held meetings in London on September 2-4 on the margins of the P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards Nuclear Disarmament with Foreign Secretary David Miliband, Simon McDonald, Head of the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat at the Cabinet Office, Mariot Leslie, Director General, Defence and Intelligence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and Jon Day, MOD Director General for Security Policy. The UK interlocutors expressed broad support for USG goals with regard to nonproliferation and disarmament and highlighted the need for close P3 and P5 coordination in the lead-up to the UNSC Heads of Goverment Summit and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Confererence (RevCon). They also predicted that UK arms control policy would not be affected either by next year's elections or the upcoming Strategic Defense Review. McDonald cited the need to get tough with Iran if it did not respond to overtures by the end of September. U/S Tauscher expressed continued commitment to ratification of the Defense Trade Treaty and noted that she is working with the Senate to resolve questions concerning implementation. End Summary Welcoming U.S. Leadership