The End Of Secrecy_ The Rise And Fall Of WikiLeaks Part 11

1. (S) The Amba.s.sador and his wife had dinner with Mohammad Sakher El Materi and his wife, Nesrine Ben Ali El Materi, at their Hammamet home July 17. During the lavish dinner El Materi raised the question of the American Cooperative School of Tunis and said he would seek to "fix the problem prior to the Amba.s.sador's departure" as a gesture to a "friend." He praised President Obama's policies and advocated a two-state solution for Israel and the Palestinians. He also expressed interest in opening a McDonald's franchise and complained about the government's delay in pa.s.sing a franchise law. He expressed pride in his Islamic Zaitouna radio and in the interviews with opposition party leaders published in his newly purchased newspaper publishing group. During the evening, El Materi was alternately difficult and kind. He seemed, on occasion, to be seeking approval. He was living, however, in the midst of great wealth and excess, ill.u.s.trating one reason resentment of President Ben Ali's in-laws is increasing. End Summary.

The ACST Situation

2. (S) Presidential son-in-law and wealthy businessman Mohamed Sakher El Materi, and his wife, Nesrine Ben Ali El Materi hosted the Amba.s.sador and his wife for dinner at their Hammamet beach residence July 17. El Materi raised the American Cooperative School of Tunis (ACST), asking what was happening. The Amba.s.sador explained the situation and emphasized that there is anger and concern in Washington and the English-speaking American/international community in Tunis. He said if the school is closed, there would be serious consequences in our relations. El Materi said he could help and would seek to resolve the situation immediately, i.e., prior to the Amba.s.sador's departure. He wished, he said, to do so for a "friend." He noted that he had helped the UK Amba.s.sador secure several appointments (including a lunch with the Prime Minister) for UK Prince Andrew during his recent visit. Before his intervention, El Materi said, the Prince had only one appointment with a single Minister.

Freedom of Expression

3. (S) Amba.s.sador raised the need for more freedom of expression and a.s.sociation in Tunisia. El Materi agreed. He complained that, as the new owner of Dar a.s.saba, the largest private newspaper group in the country, he has been getting calls from the Minister of Communications complaining about articles he has been running (Comment: This is doubtful). He laughed and suggested that sometimes he wants to "give Dar a.s.saba back." El Materi noted the interviews his newspapers have been running with opposition leaders (he mentioned FDTL Secretary General Mustapha Ben Jaafar). He was clearly proud of the interviews.

4. (S) El Materi said it was important to help others, noting that was one reason he had adopted a son. The Amba.s.sador mentioned the Emba.s.sy's humanitarian a.s.sistance projects, noting they could not get media coverage. El Materi said forcefully they should be covered, that it was important the Emba.s.sy seek such coverage. He said it would counteract some of the negative US image. The Amba.s.sador asked if El Materi would send reporters to do stories on the US a.s.sistance projects. El Materi said yes, absolutely.

5. (S) El Materi complained at length about Tunisian bureaucracy, saying it is difficult to get things done. He said communication inside the bureaucracy is terrible. He said people often "bring wrong information" to the President implying he had to get involved sometimes to get things corrected.

El-Materi Unplugged: Home/Personal Life

11. (S) El-Materi's house is s.p.a.cious, and directly above and along the Hammamet public beach. The compound is large and well guarded by government security. It is close to the center of Hammamet, with a view of the fort and the southern part of the town. The house was recently renovated and includes an infinity pool and a terrace of perhaps 50 meters. While the house is done in a modern style (and largely white), there are ancient artifacts everywhere: Roman columns, frescoes and even a lion's head from which water pours into the pool. El Materi insisted the pieces are real. He hopes to move into his new (and palatial) house in Sidi Bou Said in eight to ten months. El-Materi's house is s.p.a.cious, and directly above and along the Hammamet public beach. The compound is large and well guarded by government security. It is close to the center of Hammamet, with a view of the fort and the southern part of the town. The house was recently renovated and includes an infinity pool and a terrace of perhaps 50 meters. While the house is done in a modern style (and largely white), there are ancient artifacts everywhere: Roman columns, frescoes and even a lion's head from which water pours into the pool. El Materi insisted the pieces are real. He hopes to move into his new (and palatial) house in Sidi Bou Said in eight to ten months.

12. (S) The dinner included perhaps a dozen dishes, including fish, steak, turkey, octopus, fish couscous and much more. The quant.i.ty was sufficient for a very large number of guests. Before dinner a wide array of small dishes were served, along with three different juices (including Kiwi juice, not normally available here). After dinner, he served ice cream and frozen yoghurt he brought in by plane from Saint Tropez, along with blueberries and raspberries and fresh fruit and chocolate cake. (NB. El Materi and Nesrine had just returned from Saint Tropez on their private jet after two weeks vacation. El Materi was concerned about his American pilot finding a community here. The Amba.s.sador said he would be pleased to invite the pilot to appropriate American community events.) 13. (S) El Materi has a large tiger ("Pasha") on his compound, living in a cage. He acquired it when it was a few weeks old. The tiger consumes four chickens a day. El Materi has a large tiger ("Pasha") on his compound, living in a cage. He acquired it when it was a few weeks old. The tiger consumes four chickens a day. (Comment: The situation reminded the Amba.s.sador of Uday Hussein's lion cage in Baghdad.) El Materi had staff everywhere. There were at least a dozen people, including a butler from Bangladesh and a nanny from South Africa. (NB. This is extraordinarily rare in Tunisia, and very expensive.) (Comment: The situation reminded the Amba.s.sador of Uday Hussein's lion cage in Baghdad.) El Materi had staff everywhere. There were at least a dozen people, including a butler from Bangladesh and a nanny from South Africa. (NB. This is extraordinarily rare in Tunisia, and very expensive.) 14. (S) They have three children, two girls and a boy. Leila is four and another daughter that is about 10 months. Their boy is adopted and is two years old. The youngest daughter is a Canadian citizen, by virtue of birth in Canada. The family's favorite vacation destination spot is the Maldives Islands.

15. (S) El Materi said he has begun an exercise and diet regime. He has, he said, recently lost weight (it was visibly true). El Materi said he eats in a "balanced" way. He had just spent an hour on a bike, he claimed. Nesrine said she gets no exercise.

16. (S) Both El Materi and Nesrine speak English, although their vocabulary and grammar are limited. They are clearly eager to strengthen their English. Nesrine said she loves Disney World, but had put off a trip this year because of H1N1 flu. Nesrine has, for sometime, had Tamiflu nearby (even taking it on trips). Originally it was out of fear of bird flu. She packs it for El Materi too when he travels. Nesrine said she has visited several US cities. El Materi had only been to Illinois recently in connection with the purchase of a plane.

Comment

17. (S) Throughout the evening, El Materi often struck the Amba.s.sador as demanding, vain and difficult. He is clearly aware of his wealth and power, and his actions reflected little finesse. He repeatedly pointed out the lovely view from his home and frequently corrected his staff, issued orders and barked reprimands. Despite this, El Materi was aware of his effect on the people around him and he showed periodic kindness. He was unusually solicitous and helpful to the Amba.s.sador's wife, who is disabled. Occasionally, he seemed to be seeking approval. One western Amba.s.sador in Tunis, who knows El Materi, has commented that he has western-style political skills in his willingness to engage with ordinary citizens. It is an uncommon trait here.

18. (S) El Materi, in recent months, has been ever more visible in the local diplomatic community. He has clearly decided (or been told) to serve as a point of contact between the regime and key amba.s.sadors. Nesrine, at age 23, appeared friendly and interested, but naive and clueless. She reflected the very sheltered, privileged and wealthy life she has led. As for the dinner itself, it was similar to what one might experience in a Gulf country, and out of the ordinary for Tunisia.

19. (S) Most striking of all, however, was the opulence with which El Materi and Nesrine live. Their home in Hammamet was impressive, with the tiger adding to the impression of "over the top." Even more extravagant is their home still under construction in Sidi Bou Said. That residence, from its outward appearance, will be closer to a palace. It dominates the Sidi Bou Said skyline from some vantage points and has been the occasion of many private, critical comments. The opulence with which El Materi and Nesrine live and their behavior make clear why they and other members of Ben Ali's family are disliked and even hated by some Tunisians. The excesses of the Ben Ali family are growing.

Please visit Emba.s.sy Tunis' Cla.s.sified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/tunis/index.c fm G.o.dEC fm G.o.dEC

SAUDI KING URGES US STRIKE ON IRAN.

Sunday, 20 April 2008, 08:47 SECRET SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000649.

SIPDIS.

SIPDIS.

WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP, DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AND S/I SATTERFIELD.

EO 12958 DECL: 04/19/2018.

TAGS EAID, ECON, EFIN, IZ, PGOV, PREL, MOPS, SA, IR.

SUBJECT: SAUDI KING ABDULLAH AND SENIOR PRINCES ON SAUDI POLICY TOWARD IRAQ.

Cla.s.sified By: CDA Michael Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 1. (S) Summary: US Amba.s.sador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus met with Saudi King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz, Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, General Presidency of Intelligence Chief Prince Muqrin bin Abd al-Aziz, and Interior Minister Nayif bin Abd al-Aziz during their April 14-15 visit to Riyadh. The Saudi King and senior Princes reviewed Saudi policy toward Iraq in detail, all making essentially the same points. They said that the Kingdom will not send an amba.s.sador to Baghdad or open an emba.s.sy until the King and senior Saudi officials are satisfied that the security situation has improved and the Iraqi government has implemented policies that benefit all Iraqis, reinforce Iraq's Arab ident.i.ty, and resist Iranian influence. The Saudis evinced somewhat greater flexibility regarding the issues of economic and humanitarian a.s.sistance for Iraq and debt forgiveness. In a conversation with the Charge' on April 17, Saudi Amba.s.sador to the US Adel al-Jubeir indicated that the King had been very impressed by the visit of Amba.s.sador Crocker and General Petraeus, and al-Jubeir hinted that the Saudi government might announce changes to its Iraq policy before the President's visit to Riyadh in mid-May. End Summary.

Positive Signs in Iraq

2. (S) In all their meetings with the Saudi royals, both Amba.s.sador Crocker and General Petraeus conveyed the progress in Iraq and confirmed the negative role Iran is playing in Iraq. They characterized the recent ISF-led operations in Basra and Baghdad as having a striking effect against the Shia militias, most importantly turning Iraqi public opinion away from the militias. While Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's decision to take action against the militias was described as hasty and not well-planned, Amba.s.sador Crocker and General Petraeus emphasized that any tactical shortfalls were overshadowed by the greater positive effect of unifying Iraq and demonstrating the GOI's, and most specifically al-Maliki's, determined resolve to take on the Shia militias, especially Jaysh al-Madhi. Concurrently, these operations unequivocally demonstrated Iran's subversive activities in Iraq and its broader regional ambitions. Throughout all their discussions, Amba.s.sador Crocker and General Petraeus stressed the importance and urgent need for the Saudis to join us in supporting Iraq.

The Saudi Emba.s.sy Issue

3. (S) King Abdullah, the Foreign Minister, and Prince Muqrin all stated that the Saudi government would not send an amba.s.sador to Baghdad or open an emba.s.sy there in the near future, citing both security and political grounds in support of this position. The Foreign Minister stated that he had considered dispatching an amba.s.sador and had sent Saudi diplomats to Baghdad to identify a site for the Saudi emba.s.sy. However, he said. "the King simply forbade us to go any farther." King Abdullah confirmed this account in a separate meeting with Amba.s.sador Crocker and General Petraeus. The King a.s.serted that the security situation in Baghdad was too dangerous for him to risk sending a Saudi amba.s.sador there. "He would immediately become a target for the terrorists and the militias," he said.

4. (S) The King also rejected the suggestion that by sending a Saudi amba.s.sador to Baghdad he could give essential political support to the Iraqi government as it struggles to resist Iranian influence and subversion. He expressed lingering doubt on the Iraqi government's willingness to resist Iran. He also repeated his frequently voiced doubts about Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki himself by alluding to his "Iranian connections." The Saudi monarch stated that he does not trust al-Maliki because the Iraqi Prime Minister had "lied" to him in the past by promising to take certain actions and then failing to do so. The King did not say precisely what these allegedly broken promises might have been. He repeated his oft heard view that al-Maliki rules Iraq on behalf of his Shiite sect instead of all Iraqis.

5. (S) However, in a potentially significant move, the King did not reject the idea of dispatching a Saudi amba.s.sador to Baghdad completely. Instead, he said that he would consider RIYADH 00000649 002 OF 003.

doing so after the Iraqi provincial elections are held in the autumn. The conduct of these elections would indicate whether or not the Iraqi government is truly interested in ruling on behalf of all Iraqis or merely in support of the Shia, King Abdullah a.s.serted.

Grudging Acknowledgment of Change in Iraq

6. (S) The Foreign Minister signaled another potential softening in Saudi policy by saying that the Kingdom's problem was not with al-Maliki as a person but rather with the conduct of the Iraqi government. The King himself admitted that the Iraqi government's performance has improved in recent months and grudgingly accepted the point that al-Maliki and his security forces have indeed been fighting extremists, specifically Shia extremists in both Basra and Baghdad and Sunni extremists and Al Qaeda in Mosul. However, the King and the senior Princes argued that more time would be required to judge whether the recent change in Iraqi behavior was lasting and sincere. The King suggested that much of the Iraqi government's improved performance is attributable to US prodding rather than change in Iraqi att.i.tudes.

7. (S) The Foreign Minister also suggested that the USG should prod Ayatollah Sistani to speak out in favor of a unified Iraq and national reconciliation among different Iraqi sects and groups. "You have paid a heavy price in blood and treasure, and Sistani and his people have benefited directly. You have every right to ask this of him," Prince Saud al-Faisal said.

Possible Saudi Economic a.s.sistance

8. (S) The King, Prince Muqrin, and the Foreign Minister all suggested that the Saudi government might be willing to consider the provision of economic and humanitarian a.s.sistance to Iraq. Prince Muqrin asked Amba.s.sador Crocker and General Petraeus to send him a list of the kinds of a.s.sistance that the US government would like to see the Kingdom provide Iraq. Al-Jubeir later told the Charge' that this a.s.sistance would be separate from the USD 1 billion in aid that the Saudi government had promised at the Madrid Conference but still not delivered due to security worries. He said that the Madrid commitment consisted of $500 million in trade credits and $500 million in project a.s.sistance with strict conditionality, along the lines of what the World Bank would require. Al-Jubeir added that the a.s.sistance the Saudi government might provide via Prince Muqrin would initially be in the range of $75-$300 million.

Possible Debt Relief

9. (S) The King noted that Saudi debt relief for Iraq "will come at some point," although he did not say when. Al-Jubeir told the Charge' that debt relief is a real possibility. He also noted that the Saudi government might make changes to its Iraq policy, perhaps including both a.s.sistance and debt relief, prior to the President's visit to Riyadh.

The Need to Resist Iran

10. (S) The King, Foreign Minister, Prince Muqrin, and Prince Nayif all agreed that the Kingdom needs to cooperate with the US on resisting and rolling back Iranian influence and subversion in Iraq. The King was particularly adamant on this point, and it was echoed by the senior princes as well. Al-Jubeir recalled the King's frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear weapons program. "He told you to cut off the head of the snake," he recalled to the Charge', adding that working with the US to roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority for the King and his government. Al-Jubeir recalled the King's frequent exhortations to the US to attack Iran and so put an end to its nuclear weapons program. "He told you to cut off the head of the snake," he recalled to the Charge', adding that working with the US to roll back Iranian influence in Iraq is a strategic priority for the King and his government.

11. (S) The Foreign Minister, on the other hand, called instead for much more severe US and international sanctions on Iran, including a travel ban and further restrictions on bank lending. Prince Muqrin echoed these views, emphasizing that some sanctions could be implemented without UN approval. The Foreign Minister also stated that the use of military pressure against Iran should not be ruled out.

RIYADH 00000649 003 OF 003.

12. (S) Comment: Saudi att.i.tudes toward Iraq, from the King on down, remain marked by skepticism and suspicion. That said, the Saudis have noticed recent events in Iraq and are eager to work with the US to resist and reverse Iranian encroachment in Iraq. The King was impressed by Amba.s.sador Crocker's and General Petraeus' visit, as were the Foreign Minister, GPI Chief, and Interior Minister. Cautious as ever, the Saudis may nevertheless be willing to consider new measures in the areas of a.s.sistance and debt relief, although further discussions will be required to make these ideas a reality. End Comment.

13. (U) This cable was reviewed and cleared by Amba.s.sador Crocker and General Petraeus. GFOELLER

CHINA 'WOULD ACCEPT' KOREAN REUNIFICATION.

SECRET SEOUL 000272.

SIPDIS.

EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2034.

TAGS PREL, PGOV, KNNP, ECON, SOCI, KS, KN, JA">JA">JA, CH SUBJECT: VFM CHUN YOUNG-WOO ON SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS.

Cla.s.sified By: AMB D. Kathleen Stephens. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary

1. (S) Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo told the Amba.s.sador February 17th that China would not be able to stop North Korea's collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically and would collapse politically two to three years after the death of Kim Jong-il. Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North's economy. Beijing had "no will" to use its modest economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang's policies and the DPRK characterized as "the most incompetent official in China" had retained his position as chief of the PRC's 6PT delegation. Describing a generational difference in Chinese att.i.tudes toward North Korea, Chun claimed x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x believed Korea should be unified under ROK control. Chun acknowledged the Amba.s.sador's point that a strong ROK-j.a.pan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula. End summary.

VFM Chun on Sino-North Korean Relations...

2. (S) During a February 17 lunch hosted by Amba.s.sador Stephens that covered other topics (septel), ROK Vice Foreign Minister and former ROK Six-Party Talks (6PT) Head of Delegation Chun Yung-woo predicted that China would not be able to stop North Korea's collapse following the death of Kim Jong-il (KJI). The DPRK, Chun said, had already collapsed economically; following the death of KJI, North Korea would collapse politically in "two to three years." Chun dismissed ROK media reports that Chinese companies had agreed to pump 10 billion USD into the North's economy; there was "no substance" to the reports, he said. The VFM also ridiculed the Chinese foreign ministry's "briefing" to the ROK emba.s.sy in Beijing on w.a.n.g Jiarui's visit to North Korea; the unidentified briefer had "basically read a Xinhua press release," Chun groused, adding that the PRC interlocutor had been unwilling to answer simple questions like whether w.a.n.g had flown to Hamhung or taken a train there to meet KJI.

3. (S) The VFM commented that China had far less influence on North Korea "than most people believe." Beijing had "no will" to use its economic leverage to force a change in Pyongyang's policies and the DPRK leadership "knows it." Chun acknowledged that the Chinese genuinely wanted a denuclearized North Korea, but the PRC was also content with the status quo. Unless China pushed North Korea to the "brink of collapse," the DPRK would likely continue to refuse to take meaningful steps on denuclearization. x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x 4. (S) Turning to the Six Party Talks, Chun said it was "a very bad thing" that Wu Dawei had retained his position as chief of the PRC's delegation. x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x said it appeared that the DPRK "must have lobbied extremely hard" for the now-retired Wu to stay on as China's 6PT chief. x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x complained that Wu is the PRC's x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x an arrogant, Marx-spouting former Red Guard who "knows nothing about North Korea, nothing about nonproliferation and is hard to communicate with because he doesn't speak English." Wu was also a hardline nationalist, loudly proclaiming to anyone willing to listen that the PRC's economic rise represented a "return to normalcy" with China as a great world power.

...China's "New Generation" of Korea-Hands...

5. (S) Sophisticated Chinese officials x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x stood in sharp contrast to Wu, according to VFM Chun.x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x Chun claimed x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xX believed Korea should be unified under ROK control.x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x, Chun said, were ready to "face the new reality" that the DPRK now had little value to China as a buffer state a view that since North Korea's 2006 nuclear test had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC leaders.

...PRC Actions In A DPRK Collapse Scenario...

6. (S) Chun argued that, in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly "not welcome" any U.S. military presence north of the DMZ. x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x Chun x.x.xx.x.xx.x.xx.x.x said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anch.o.r.ed to the United States in a "benign alliance" as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labor-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help salve PRC concerns about living with a reunified Korea. Chun dismissed the prospect of a possible PRC military intervention in the event of a DPRK collapse, noting that China's strategic economic interests now lie with the United States, j.a.pan, and South Korea not North Korea. Moreover, Chun argued, bare-knuckle PRC military intervention in a DPRK internal crisis could "strengthen the centrifugal forces in China's minority areas."

...and j.a.pan

7. (S) Chun acknowledged the Amba.s.sador's point that a strong ROK-j.a.pan relationship would help Tokyo accept a reunified Korean Peninsula under Seoul's control. Chun a.s.serted that, even though "j.a.pan's preference" was to keep Korea divided, Tokyo lacked the leverage to stop reunification in the event the DPRK collapses. STEPHENS