The Empire Project_ The Rise And Fall Of The British World-System, 1830-1970 Part 2

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THE BRITANNIC EXPERIMENT.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Britain's global expansion was the limited influence exerted over its course by the imperial government in London. Most of the energy behind British expansion was private, not public. Of course, it was true that it usually needed a mixture of private and public resources: capital, manpower, but also protection against external and sometimes internal opponents. Governments could withhold that protection and refuse to annex when the political risks they entailed seemed out of proportion. They could also strike bargains with rival imperialists that frustrated the plans of British settlers, merchants or missionaries. But only up to a point. The promoters of British expansion could usually mobilise both public and private 'investment' at home (both material and emotional), and use it to leverage additional resources on the local or colonial 'spot'. It was this combination that made them so versatile; and that versatility was what made the British presence so ubiquitous.

The result by the later nineteenth century was the creation of a British world-system. Its system-like character can be seen in two ways. First, private and public activity had combined (most visibly in the strategic and technological achievement of long-distance sea-lanes) to encourage the growth of a single vast network centred on Britain, to distribute credit, capital, goods, information, manpower and protection on a global basis, and not into a set of closed 'mercantilist' zones each with its own rules. The result was to lower the cost of defence and reduce the transaction costs of a global pattern of trade. Secondly, by a series of incremental adjustments, the main spheres of British enterprise came to play different but complementary roles in the larger process of British expansion. The shipping and property empire, much of it active in non-British territory, provided an income that sustained high levels of imports, the domestic balance of payments, and new exports of capital. The 'sub-empire' of India a.s.sumed after c.1870 a primarily (but not exclusively) military function, meeting the ordinary costs of almost two-thirds of the Empire's regular land forces: its British garrison and its own Indian army. By contrast, the settlement colonies were not expected to pay for their strategic strategic defence and were allowed (unlike India) to protect local industry. Their contribution instead was to borrow and trade on a scale (proportionately) far greater than India. And, increasingly, by the end of the century, they began to take up the part of Britain's most reliable allies, bound to her 'system' by deep ties of self-interest and self-identification. defence and were allowed (unlike India) to protect local industry. Their contribution instead was to borrow and trade on a scale (proportionately) far greater than India. And, increasingly, by the end of the century, they began to take up the part of Britain's most reliable allies, bound to her 'system' by deep ties of self-interest and self-identification.

The Britannic idea This 'Britannic' solidarity was a crucial dimension of the British world-system, and one of the keys to its tenacious survival in the twentieth century. It would have greatly surprised the early Victorians. Indeed, it is easy to see why opinion in Britain in the earlier part of the century had shown little enthusiasm for the settlement colonies. They seemed liabilities scattered broadcast across the world. With the exception of the two 'Canadas' (modern Ontario and Quebec) and New South Wales, their populations were tiny and their prospects uncertain. Far from forming solid territorial blocs, British North America, British South Africa and the British South Pacific were fragmented and fissiparous. The Canadas had been forced into uneasy union in 1840, but the 'Lower' or Maritime provinces remained stubbornly separate: indeed, overland travel between them and the Canadas was dauntingly difficult.1 In the 1850s, six separate governments ruled over the one million or so settlers in Australia, while geographical separation (on a much smaller scale) encouraged a similar trend in New Zealand. Although London had recognised that local self-government ('responsible government') could not be resisted in most settlement colonies (but not in Cape Colony), their financial fragility and p.r.o.neness to faction rather than party-based politics cast doubt on how far self-reliance could be carried. In the 1850s, six separate governments ruled over the one million or so settlers in Australia, while geographical separation (on a much smaller scale) encouraged a similar trend in New Zealand. Although London had recognised that local self-government ('responsible government') could not be resisted in most settlement colonies (but not in Cape Colony), their financial fragility and p.r.o.neness to faction rather than party-based politics cast doubt on how far self-reliance could be carried.2 Worse still, in too many cases, the risk of foreign invasion or local 'native' wars had made them a drain on Britain's limited military manpower. In the 1840s, frontier conflicts in South Africa and New Zealand, as well as the tension provoked by the Oregon crisis with the United States, dispersed British forces from one end of the world to the other. Worse still, in too many cases, the risk of foreign invasion or local 'native' wars had made them a drain on Britain's limited military manpower. In the 1840s, frontier conflicts in South Africa and New Zealand, as well as the tension provoked by the Oregon crisis with the United States, dispersed British forces from one end of the world to the other.

Nevertheless, by around 1850, a more positive estimate of the settlement colonies had begun to take root. The 'Colonial Reformers' attributed the colonists' failings to interference from London, not the inherent defectiveness of colonial societies. Edward Gibbon Wakefield's idea that the British were especially adapted to colonise became more influential. The irresistible flow of Gladstonian rhetoric was deployed in support of British colonisation. 'The object [of colonization]', he began to tell audiences, 'was to reproduce the likeness of England, as they were doing in Australia, New Zealand, North America and the Cape, thereby contributing to the general happiness of mankind.'3 Far from being seen as tiresome dependants, they were increasingly thought of, in some circles at least, as little Americas, from whom separation was certain at some foreseeable point. In the world of free trade, the balance of colonial costs and benefits could only be negative. But there was also gradual acceptance that the settler communities could be a valuable adjunct to British wealth and power, and a 'healthy' extension of British society. Far from being seen as tiresome dependants, they were increasingly thought of, in some circles at least, as little Americas, from whom separation was certain at some foreseeable point. In the world of free trade, the balance of colonial costs and benefits could only be negative. But there was also gradual acceptance that the settler communities could be a valuable adjunct to British wealth and power, and a 'healthy' extension of British society.

Three separate developments may have strengthened this view. The first (and perhaps the most important) was the effect of railway construction. Railways connected large British interests to settler expansion. Railway-building offered much more definite proof that the colonies could achieve dense and continuous settlement, replicating the pattern of British society at home, and sustaining a similar level of inst.i.tutions and culture. Above all, perhaps, investment in railways created loud vested interests with an obvious motive in selling the colonies' future to British opinion.4 The second development was the growing belief from mid-century onwards that industrialisation in Britain had imposed high social costs some of which could be redeemed in the colonies. This was the idea that colonial life, free from the contagion of urban industrialism, offered a physically and morally healthier climate. Here British social virtues could be preserved and revived; the perils of decadence, degeneration and 'Caesarism' a populist dictatorship averted. The second development was the growing belief from mid-century onwards that industrialisation in Britain had imposed high social costs some of which could be redeemed in the colonies. This was the idea that colonial life, free from the contagion of urban industrialism, offered a physically and morally healthier climate. Here British social virtues could be preserved and revived; the perils of decadence, degeneration and 'Caesarism' a populist dictatorship averted.5 This perception coincided with the steady advance of emigration (and return migration) to become key social features not just of the Celtic 'periphery' but of English society as well. Thirdly, with the rising sense of a world that was linked by fast and regular movement by wire, steamship and rail the settlement colonies came to look less like the random results of demographic opportunism and more like the links in an imperial 'chain', part of a system of global power. The message of John Robert Seeley's This perception coincided with the steady advance of emigration (and return migration) to become key social features not just of the Celtic 'periphery' but of English society as well. Thirdly, with the rising sense of a world that was linked by fast and regular movement by wire, steamship and rail the settlement colonies came to look less like the random results of demographic opportunism and more like the links in an imperial 'chain', part of a system of global power. The message of John Robert Seeley's Expansion of England Expansion of England (1883), that the settlement colonies should be seen as an organic extension of Britain not part of the burdensome empire of rule, was the cogent expression of an emerging idea, not a sudden new insight. (1883), that the settlement colonies should be seen as an organic extension of Britain not part of the burdensome empire of rule, was the cogent expression of an emerging idea, not a sudden new insight.6 The late Victorians experienced an enlargement of their mental horizons, and also perhaps in their sense of ident.i.ty. The late Victorians experienced an enlargement of their mental horizons, and also perhaps in their sense of ident.i.ty.

In late-Victorian Britain, this shift of att.i.tudes was part of a new imperial outlook. It was matched by a change in the colonies of white settlement, soon to be called the 'white dominions'. There too the imperial idea was transformed and made popular. Yet, by the latter part of the century, in all the settlement colonies, there was a growing sense of self-conscious nationhood and (especially after 1900) a buoyant view of their economic future as 'young nations'. This paradox was resolved by the special quality of settler nationalism. In Canada, Australia, New Zealand and (as we shall see) among the British minority in South Africa, national ident.i.ty was a.s.serted by rejecting subservience to the British government government, but by affirming equality with Britain as 'British peoples' or 'nations'. It was this 'Britannic nationalism' which underpinned the commitment of all the white dominions to the imperial enterprise, and the British world-system, until its eventual disintegration in the 1940s and 1950s. It was not an unthinking observance of old imperial loyalty, nor an unconsummated pa.s.sion for an impractical imperial federation. It was stronger, subtler and deeply rooted in the needs of the dominions themselves. Socially, it derived from the feeling that creating modern large-scale societies demanded inst.i.tutions and habits private and public on the model already familiar in Britain, the great exemplar of a 'modern' community, but improved and adapted to local requirements. Politically it sprang up when two great imperatives converged in the later nineteenth century: the urge for expansion and need for cohesion. Expansion in an age of rival empires and 'world-states' could only be secure under the aegis of British power, and so long as the imperial centre acknowledged the claims of its Britannic outposts. So Britannic nationalism meant a.s.serting settler influence at the heart of the empire. Secondly, as settler society grew more urban and industrial, more divided by wealth and cla.s.s, more conscious of deficiencies of education and welfare, Britannic ethnicity offered the promise of social cohesion, and a charter for social renewal. A reformed and purified local Britishness went hand in hand with was the domestic counterpart to a grander role as 'British nations', partners, not subjects, of imperial Britain.

Canada The oldest self-governing settler societies in the British Empire were in British North America. They were also the first to federate as the Dominion of Canada in 1867. With the acquisition of Rupertsland the vast northern domain of the Hudson's Bay Company in 1869, adhesion of British Columbia (in 1871) and Prince Edward Island (in 1873), Canada became a transcontinental state rivalling in territorial scale the great republic to the south. But in wealth and population it was puny. There was the rub. A second second transcontinental state in North America flew in the face of commercial and geographical logic. Along its whole length, the new dominion was bound to feel the immense gravitational pull of American enterprise. The builders of confederation embarked upon a staggeringly grandiose venture for a small colonial community, deeply divided by ethnicity, region and religion, and already strung out along a ribbon of cultivation between Lake Huron and Halifax. Measured by ambition, the 'Fathers of Confederation' (princ.i.p.ally John A. Macdonald and George Brown) were among the greatest of Victorian empire-builders, planning a vast new colony anch.o.r.ed by 'British connection', transcontinental state in North America flew in the face of commercial and geographical logic. Along its whole length, the new dominion was bound to feel the immense gravitational pull of American enterprise. The builders of confederation embarked upon a staggeringly grandiose venture for a small colonial community, deeply divided by ethnicity, region and religion, and already strung out along a ribbon of cultivation between Lake Huron and Halifax. Measured by ambition, the 'Fathers of Confederation' (princ.i.p.ally John A. Macdonald and George Brown) were among the greatest of Victorian empire-builders, planning a vast new colony anch.o.r.ed by 'British connection',7 loyal to the British Crown and drawing on British migrants and capital to fuel its expansion. They looked forward to the day, declared George Brown in the confederation debates in 1865, 'when one united government under the British flag shall extend from sh.o.r.e to sh.o.r.e'. loyal to the British Crown and drawing on British migrants and capital to fuel its expansion. They looked forward to the day, declared George Brown in the confederation debates in 1865, 'when one united government under the British flag shall extend from sh.o.r.e to sh.o.r.e'.8 From the beginning, the politics of the new dominion were dominated by two interlocking priorities. The first was to make the new federal const.i.tution workable. That meant reconciling the Maritime provinces to the burden of debt that the old Canadian provinces (now Ontario and Quebec) had acc.u.mulated building railways and ca.n.a.ls, and to the tariff that had been imposed to pay for them. It meant the careful management of Quebec with its French Canadian majority and its vocal minority of English Canadians in Montreal and the 'Eastern Townships'. Federation had separated the two Canadian provinces previously locked in legislative union, but did little to reduce the mutual antipathy of Protestant Ontario and Catholic Quebec. It meant heading off the opposition among Ontario farmers to the railway and banking interests from whose headquarters in St James Street, Montreal, the first prime minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, was widely believed to take his orders and his party funds. It meant an uphill struggle to broaden the power and authority of the new 'general government' in Ottawa against provincial pressure for devolution or even (in the case of Nova Scotia) for secession.

These teething problems were constantly entangled with the second great issue that absorbed both Macdonald and his Reform (or 'Grit', later Liberal) opponents: how to make good the dominion's claim to the vast western empire beyond the Great Lakes, the key to its future as a separate 'British' North American state. The imperial government in London had been eager to transfer 'Rupertsland' to Canada, believing that the Hudson's Bay Company could no longer rule a vast inland colony now thought ripe for agricultural development. But the conveyance was not as easy as it seemed. For one thing, the best organised community in the west, the mixed-race (French and Indian) Metis Metis in the Red River Valley (near modern Winnipeg), objected to a transfer that they feared would bring a flood of British settlers from Ontario. in the Red River Valley (near modern Winnipeg), objected to a transfer that they feared would bring a flood of British settlers from Ontario.9 Under the charismatic leadership of Louis Riel, they staged the first of two northwestern rebellions whose suppression required the despatch of imperial troops under Sir Garnet Wolseley, the ubiquitous generalissimo of the Empire's smaller wars. The Under the charismatic leadership of Louis Riel, they staged the first of two northwestern rebellions whose suppression required the despatch of imperial troops under Sir Garnet Wolseley, the ubiquitous generalissimo of the Empire's smaller wars. The Metis Metis were routed and the new province of Manitoba set up. were routed and the new province of Manitoba set up.10 But, as Macdonald well knew, a much greater challenge awaited. Only with a railway across the continent could he hope to transform the northwestern interior from an economic desert into a great agrarian a.s.set and Canada from a stagnant eastern colony into a dynamic continental state. But, as Macdonald well knew, a much greater challenge awaited. Only with a railway across the continent could he hope to transform the northwestern interior from an economic desert into a great agrarian a.s.set and Canada from a stagnant eastern colony into a dynamic continental state.

In the first decade of confederation, there was little to show for the high hopes of 1867. Macdonald's first attempt to commission a railway across the continent was a failure, and the ensuing 'Pacific scandal' blew him out of office in 1873. His Reform party opponents, suspicious of the Montreal capitalists, and hobbled by economic depression, made no headway. Canada was in the doldrums. The immigrants it did attract were as likely to pa.s.s on to the United States as to stay; many more Canadians moved south of the border in search of better times: nearly one million between 1881 and 1891.11 Macdonald came back to office in 1878. In the thirteen years that followed, he fashioned a surprisingly durable political regime, presided over the completion of the eastwest railway and pushed through Canada's transformation into a separate northern economy with a tariff wall to guard its railways, trade, finance and infant industry. Together, the 'Macdonaldian state', the Canadian Pacific Railway and the 'national policy' turned the prospectus of confederation into something like reality. The question was whether the 'Canada' that Macdonald had made could survive the disappearance of his master touch. Macdonald came back to office in 1878. In the thirteen years that followed, he fashioned a surprisingly durable political regime, presided over the completion of the eastwest railway and pushed through Canada's transformation into a separate northern economy with a tariff wall to guard its railways, trade, finance and infant industry. Together, the 'Macdonaldian state', the Canadian Pacific Railway and the 'national policy' turned the prospectus of confederation into something like reality. The question was whether the 'Canada' that Macdonald had made could survive the disappearance of his master touch.

By the time of his death in 1891, Macdonald had been the dominant figure in Canadian politics for fifty years. In the black arts of patronage, 'Old Tomorrow' was a virtuoso, reconciling Canada's complex dualities English and French, monarchy and populism, liberal and clerical, protestant and catholic, provincial and federal by the systematic use of every office under federal control in a spoils system for party purposes.12 Perhaps instinctively, he grasped the irreducible conditions of Canadian unity. British inst.i.tutions and a shared allegiance to the British Crown formed the only ideological glue between the regions and peoples that made up the federation. The mercantile and financial nexus at Montreal was the natural (indeed only) focus of a 'northern economy'. The transcontinental hinterland, and a railway to serve it, offered the only escape from the economic failure and encirclement that threatened Eastern Canada. Macdonald's 'national policy' had fused these into a rough and ready programme and a loyal political following. Together, they were robust enough to overcome the challenge of 'reciprocity' in 1891 the call for commercial union with the United States championed by the Liberal opposition. 'The old flag, the old policy and the old leader' (Macdonald's slogan in 1891) fended off the critics of the 'northern economy', despite deepening depression and the lack of any sign that the west would relieve it. But, by the mid-1890s, the political system that had been built round Macdonald's personal ascendancy was on the brink of collapse. The provinces were in revolt and determined to win back from the centre some of the rights and revenues conceded in 1867. More ominously still, the coalition that Macdonald had forged between Montreal business, the protestant and loyalist tradition in Ontario and the clerical conservatives (the Perhaps instinctively, he grasped the irreducible conditions of Canadian unity. British inst.i.tutions and a shared allegiance to the British Crown formed the only ideological glue between the regions and peoples that made up the federation. The mercantile and financial nexus at Montreal was the natural (indeed only) focus of a 'northern economy'. The transcontinental hinterland, and a railway to serve it, offered the only escape from the economic failure and encirclement that threatened Eastern Canada. Macdonald's 'national policy' had fused these into a rough and ready programme and a loyal political following. Together, they were robust enough to overcome the challenge of 'reciprocity' in 1891 the call for commercial union with the United States championed by the Liberal opposition. 'The old flag, the old policy and the old leader' (Macdonald's slogan in 1891) fended off the critics of the 'northern economy', despite deepening depression and the lack of any sign that the west would relieve it. But, by the mid-1890s, the political system that had been built round Macdonald's personal ascendancy was on the brink of collapse. The provinces were in revolt and determined to win back from the centre some of the rights and revenues conceded in 1867. More ominously still, the coalition that Macdonald had forged between Montreal business, the protestant and loyalist tradition in Ontario and the clerical conservatives (the Bleus Bleus) in Quebec the electoral basis of Conservative predominance since the 1870s began to break up. The growth of ma.s.s politics in Quebec weakened the elite on whom Macdonald had relied.13 The vitriolic disagreement between Ontario and Quebec politicians over the execution of Louis Riel (convicted of murder after the second northwest rebellion in 1885) and over separate schools for Manitoba Catholics The vitriolic disagreement between Ontario and Quebec politicians over the execution of Louis Riel (convicted of murder after the second northwest rebellion in 1885) and over separate schools for Manitoba Catholics14 widened the breach and exposed Macdonald's successors to criticism from all sides. When the Conservatives were swept away by a new system-builder, the Liberal Wilfrid Laurier, the result was not only a new party regime. To many Canadians, a new definition of the Canadian state and its bond with Britain now seemed necessary. widened the breach and exposed Macdonald's successors to criticism from all sides. When the Conservatives were swept away by a new system-builder, the Liberal Wilfrid Laurier, the result was not only a new party regime. To many Canadians, a new definition of the Canadian state and its bond with Britain now seemed necessary.

The challenge had already been posed by the radical historian Goldwin Smith, sometime professor in Oxford, now the resident sage in Toronto. In his widely read Canada and the Canadian Question Canada and the Canadian Question (1891), Smith denounced the dominion as the artificial product of tariffs, (subsidised) railways and political corruption. The 'primary forces' in Canadian life, he insisted, were pulling it towards a continental future as part of the United States a future Smith welcomed as the fulfilment of Anglo-Saxon race unity. Towards French Canada and its claims, he displayed, by contrast, a mixture of contempt and dislike. French Canadians were irredeemably backward. But English Canada alone was too weak to swamp, swallow and digest them. Continental union with the United States, among other benefits, would break the obstacle they posed to social progress. (1891), Smith denounced the dominion as the artificial product of tariffs, (subsidised) railways and political corruption. The 'primary forces' in Canadian life, he insisted, were pulling it towards a continental future as part of the United States a future Smith welcomed as the fulfilment of Anglo-Saxon race unity. Towards French Canada and its claims, he displayed, by contrast, a mixture of contempt and dislike. French Canadians were irredeemably backward. But English Canada alone was too weak to swamp, swallow and digest them. Continental union with the United States, among other benefits, would break the obstacle they posed to social progress.15 Smith's argument may have been extreme, but he evoked many of the prejudices of Protestant, Liberal Ontario against the Macdonald state and Quebec. His book drew a carefully argued riposte from O. A. Howland, a Toronto lawyer from one of the city's leading families.16 The 'natives of this country' said Howland, would not accept the extinction of their 'separate nationality'. The St Lawrence river system gave Canada the means for a separate statehood, but within the Empire 'a term which should be transferred from the island of Great Britain to the whole of our modern union of const.i.tutionally governed English nations'. The 'natives of this country' said Howland, would not accept the extinction of their 'separate nationality'. The St Lawrence river system gave Canada the means for a separate statehood, but within the Empire 'a term which should be transferred from the island of Great Britain to the whole of our modern union of const.i.tutionally governed English nations'.17 'The free men of the Empire', he went on, claimed 'equal Imperial citizenship, whether our homes are in Great Britain, or Canada or Australia.' 'The free men of the Empire', he went on, claimed 'equal Imperial citizenship, whether our homes are in Great Britain, or Canada or Australia.'18 As part of the Empire, Howland insisted, Canada would enjoy greater freedom and security than the United States could offer. It would keep its own const.i.tution and escape the crushing embrace of Chicago and New York. And, within fifty years, the Empire would 'comprise not less than three mighty states...more than equal in population and resources to the United States [in 1860]...What Armageddon of history would threaten the integrity of that vast alliance?' As part of the Empire, Howland insisted, Canada would enjoy greater freedom and security than the United States could offer. It would keep its own const.i.tution and escape the crushing embrace of Chicago and New York. And, within fifty years, the Empire would 'comprise not less than three mighty states...more than equal in population and resources to the United States [in 1860]...What Armageddon of history would threaten the integrity of that vast alliance?'19 In Howland's tract, we can see the emerging themes of Britannic nationalism in its Canadian version. As elsewhere in the settler colonies, this was a complex political emotion. Its appeal ranged far beyond the small minority who looked forward to an imperial federation or called themselves 'imperialists'. In Canada, it was a cross-party sentiment that was strongest between 1890 and 1920, but continued to shape the English-Canadian outlook until c.1960. It was an echo of Macdonald's old war cry: 'A British subject I was born, a British subject I will die.'20 It affirmed that Canada was a 'British' country in allegiance, inst.i.tutions and values. But it was not to be mistaken for the Macdonaldite Toryism which Britannic nationalism rejected as a shabby, inadequate compromise bringing internal disunity and external impotence. Indeed, just because it was based on the endless 'squaring' of rapacious interests, chief among them the clerical conservatives of Quebec, Macdonald's 'system' so its critics maintained would bar, not open, the way to a Britannic future. It affirmed that Canada was a 'British' country in allegiance, inst.i.tutions and values. But it was not to be mistaken for the Macdonaldite Toryism which Britannic nationalism rejected as a shabby, inadequate compromise bringing internal disunity and external impotence. Indeed, just because it was based on the endless 'squaring' of rapacious interests, chief among them the clerical conservatives of Quebec, Macdonald's 'system' so its critics maintained would bar, not open, the way to a Britannic future.

In the early 1890s, a variety of political fears coalesced into the informal programme at whose heart lay the 'Britannicising' of Canada. The election of 1891 and the wide appeal of commercial integration with the United States showed that Smith's attack on the idea of Canada could not be taken lightly. If Canada was to survive as a 'separate nationality', patriotic sentiment would have to be founded on something more durable than Macdonald's fixes, fudges and fiddles. Politics must be cleaned up and modernised. Political leadership should be based on a covenant with the people and be seen to respond to their needs. This was the Gladstonian model whose influence in and beyond the English-speaking world has been insufficiently recognised.21 Its realisation was made all the more urgent by recognition that urbanisation, industrialisation and (after 1900) the flood of immigration had created new social problems and demanded new moral and social action, including factory laws, education and temperance. A populist gospel of social duty, moral uplift and physical improvement laid stress, as elsewhere across the 'British' world, upon ethnic solidarity: 'Britishness' was to be the building block of a more efficient, better-disciplined as well as more mobile society. Its realisation was made all the more urgent by recognition that urbanisation, industrialisation and (after 1900) the flood of immigration had created new social problems and demanded new moral and social action, including factory laws, education and temperance. A populist gospel of social duty, moral uplift and physical improvement laid stress, as elsewhere across the 'British' world, upon ethnic solidarity: 'Britishness' was to be the building block of a more efficient, better-disciplined as well as more mobile society.

To the champions of reform, it seemed obvious that a new-style dominion must be built up as a protestant, secular state, guided by a progressive liberalism and governed (through its parliamentary inst.i.tutions) by an enlightened public opinion. Equally, that, while Canada's 'separate nationality' could only be guaranteed as a 'British' nation, national dignity and self-esteem demanded an equality of status with Britain in what Howland had provocatively called a 'federal Republic...united under a hereditary president'.22 But equality of status meant not indifference to the wider concerns of Empire, but much fuller partic.i.p.ation in them. Only in that way could Canadians guard their national interests against the danger of Anglo-American agreement at their expense. 'Britannic nationalism' in short meant neither subservience to Britain nor a repudiation of Canadian nationhood. It was a programme to achieve a Canadian nation by drawing more deeply (if selectively) on recent British political practice, and by a.s.serting Canada's claims (as Britannic nation not colonial dependency) on the imperial centre in London. But equality of status meant not indifference to the wider concerns of Empire, but much fuller partic.i.p.ation in them. Only in that way could Canadians guard their national interests against the danger of Anglo-American agreement at their expense. 'Britannic nationalism' in short meant neither subservience to Britain nor a repudiation of Canadian nationhood. It was a programme to achieve a Canadian nation by drawing more deeply (if selectively) on recent British political practice, and by a.s.serting Canada's claims (as Britannic nation not colonial dependency) on the imperial centre in London.

Much of the bitterness in Canadian politics after 1890 sprang from the fear that the pursuit of Britannic nationhood for Canada would be frustrated by French Canadian opposition. Until the 1890s, the willingness of English Canadians to 'tolerate' the 'peculiar inst.i.tutions' of French Canada especially the entrenched power of the Catholic church rested on the a.s.sumption that Quebec was (largely) an inward-looking 'reserve' whose population (a minority in the dominion) would not obstruct the 'progress' of the British majority. That was the English-Canadian version of the 'compact' of 1867. The Riel affair, the fillip it gave to French Canadian feeling, and the emergence of the 'parti national' under Honore Mercier first belied this hope. The Jesuit Estates Act (1886) that Macdonald refused to veto seemed to show that in Quebec the clerical influence so hateful to Ontario Liberals and protestants was growing more a.s.sertive. It led to the virulently protestant Equal Rights a.s.sociation in Ontario.23 Then, in the 1890s, as settlers moved into Manitoba from Ontario, a furious row broke out over the right of the province's Catholic, French-speaking minority to maintain separate schools against the will of the provincial government. In Ontario especially, the dithering of the Macdonald government was ample proof that it was willing to sacrifice the vital ingredients of nationhood secular education and popular democracy to the corrupt dictates of its coalition with the Quebec Then, in the 1890s, as settlers moved into Manitoba from Ontario, a furious row broke out over the right of the province's Catholic, French-speaking minority to maintain separate schools against the will of the provincial government. In Ontario especially, the dithering of the Macdonald government was ample proof that it was willing to sacrifice the vital ingredients of nationhood secular education and popular democracy to the corrupt dictates of its coalition with the Quebec Bleus Bleus. Indeed, the 'schools question' seemed the crux of Canada's future. Settlement of Western Canada, long delayed by depression, was expected to break the deadlock between English and French Canada. Vast, new, and English-speaking, provinces in the West would form, politically, a 'Greater Ontario'. But not if their politics were fractured and corrupted by the entrenchment of clerical and French-Canadian influence.

Indeed, Ontario was the heartland of Britannic nationalism which was rooted in the province's Liberal and protestant ethos. It was the creed of the Orange Order, the most powerful a.s.sociation in the province.24 In Ontario, the shift from agrarian society towards urbanisation and industrialisation had gone furthest and fastest, and the need for new kinds of political solidarity was felt most deeply. Ontario politicians and publicists like Clifford Sifton (soon to be Laurier's main Liberal henchman in English Canada), Newton Rowell and John Willison, editor of the great Liberal organ, the In Ontario, the shift from agrarian society towards urbanisation and industrialisation had gone furthest and fastest, and the need for new kinds of political solidarity was felt most deeply. Ontario politicians and publicists like Clifford Sifton (soon to be Laurier's main Liberal henchman in English Canada), Newton Rowell and John Willison, editor of the great Liberal organ, the Toronto Globe Toronto Globe,25 were adamant that British values must prevail in Ontario, and Ontario values in Canada. 'Upon the English and Protestant people', declared Sifton in 1895, 'most largely rests the duty of developing that province [Manitoba] in a manner consonant with British inst.i.tutions to take all this heterogeneous ma.s.s and make [it] into one.' were adamant that British values must prevail in Ontario, and Ontario values in Canada. 'Upon the English and Protestant people', declared Sifton in 1895, 'most largely rests the duty of developing that province [Manitoba] in a manner consonant with British inst.i.tutions to take all this heterogeneous ma.s.s and make [it] into one.'26 And nowhere did the Britannic programme strike a louder chord than in Toronto, the provincial capital. Toronto aspired to be the true capital of a modern, progressive (and therefore British) Canada. And nowhere did the Britannic programme strike a louder chord than in Toronto, the provincial capital. Toronto aspired to be the true capital of a modern, progressive (and therefore British) Canada.27 By the 1890s, industry and the mining boom in Northern Ontario were boosting its wealth and self-confidence. It was no coincidence that its social elite combined an intense civic consciousness with political views resembling those in Howland's manifesto. The new cla.s.s of bankers (like G. A. c.o.x and Byron Walker), financiers like Pellatt By the 1890s, industry and the mining boom in Northern Ontario were boosting its wealth and self-confidence. It was no coincidence that its social elite combined an intense civic consciousness with political views resembling those in Howland's manifesto. The new cla.s.s of bankers (like G. A. c.o.x and Byron Walker), financiers like Pellatt28 and general merchants like Flavelle and general merchants like Flavelle29 were eager to give Toronto the inst.i.tutions of a dynamic, cohesive urban community. A university, to be a national university for Canada, were eager to give Toronto the inst.i.tutions of a dynamic, cohesive urban community. A university, to be a national university for Canada,30 a modern hospital, a museum and an art gallery were key elements in the grand design. So too were a new railway to the West to rival Montreal's Canadian Pacific; a modern hospital, a museum and an art gallery were key elements in the grand design. So too were a new railway to the West to rival Montreal's Canadian Pacific;31 the westward expansion of Walker's Canadian Bank of Commerce by 1915 nearly half the bank's branches were west of the Great Lakes; the westward expansion of Walker's Canadian Bank of Commerce by 1915 nearly half the bank's branches were west of the Great Lakes;32 and the takeover of Manitoba by Ontario men. When Lord Milner was invited to Canada to preach the doctrine of closer imperial union, his old friend Glazebrook, now a Toronto banker, pressed the claims of the city in revealing terms: and the takeover of Manitoba by Ontario men. When Lord Milner was invited to Canada to preach the doctrine of closer imperial union, his old friend Glazebrook, now a Toronto banker, pressed the claims of the city in revealing terms: The vital and most important part of Canada is the West...[I]t is there...that the new type of Canadian is being developed. Toronto is really...the eastern extremity of the North-West; the new enterprises of the West are being financed in Toronto, and the type of man in the West shades off as you go East into the Ontario type. The vital and most important part of Canada is the West...[I]t is there...that the new type of Canadian is being developed. Toronto is really...the eastern extremity of the North-West; the new enterprises of the West are being financed in Toronto, and the type of man in the West shades off as you go East into the Ontario type.33 The outbreak of the South African War in October 1899 was the occasion for an outburst of this Britannic sentiment. Laurier's Liberal government, resting on electoral support in both Ontario and Quebec, tried to steer a middle course. It expressed sympathy with the Uitlander grievances in Johannesburg. But Laurier was also determined to avoid direct involvement in the war and not to send a military contingent.34 This stance infuriated much Ontario opinion. Laurier's Liberal allies in the province begged him to take the lead. 'We must not let this patriotic feeling be headed by the Tories', one warned him. 'You must head it and guide it yourself.' This stance infuriated much Ontario opinion. Laurier's Liberal allies in the province begged him to take the lead. 'We must not let this patriotic feeling be headed by the Tories', one warned him. 'You must head it and guide it yourself.'35 Under intense pressure from Ontario Liberals, Laurier caved in to the outrage of his most ardent supporters in Quebec. Was Canada returning to 'l'etat primitif du colonie de la Couronne', demanded his erstwhile protege, Henri Boura.s.sa. Under intense pressure from Ontario Liberals, Laurier caved in to the outrage of his most ardent supporters in Quebec. Was Canada returning to 'l'etat primitif du colonie de la Couronne', demanded his erstwhile protege, Henri Boura.s.sa.36 'The English Canadians have two countries', complained the Montreal paper 'The English Canadians have two countries', complained the Montreal paper La Presse La Presse, 'one here and one across the sea.'37 But the weight of opinion bore down inexorably on Laurier. 'You will not, you cannot deny', a fellow Quebecois told Boura.s.sa, But the weight of opinion bore down inexorably on Laurier. 'You will not, you cannot deny', a fellow Quebecois told Boura.s.sa, that the will of an overwhelming majority of the Canadian people expressed through its press, the mouthpiece of a free people...not only justified but practically compelled the action of the Executive...Canada cannot be indifferent to anything which may affect the honour and prestige of the British flag. that the will of an overwhelming majority of the Canadian people expressed through its press, the mouthpiece of a free people...not only justified but practically compelled the action of the Executive...Canada cannot be indifferent to anything which may affect the honour and prestige of the British flag.38 The choice for French Canada, Laurier himself told Boura.s.sa, was whether to march at the head of the Confederation or to retreat into isolation.39 French Canadians had to choose between English and American imperialism. The contingent was sent. French Canadians had to choose between English and American imperialism. The contingent was sent.40 For Laurier's 'system' and for the leadership of both main parties, Liberal and Conservative, in French Canada, the rise of Britannic sentiment was a dangerous challenge. As prosperity and immigration increased from 1896, the simultaneous rise of the West and of 'industrial Canada' threatened to dominate Quebec and unravel the compromise of 1867.41 Laurier had always parried the claim that Canada was a 'British' country, preferring to argue that while Canada 'must be British' that meant 'British in allegiance and Canadian in sentiment'. Laurier had always parried the claim that Canada was a 'British' country, preferring to argue that while Canada 'must be British' that meant 'British in allegiance and Canadian in sentiment'.42 Laurier's popularity in Ontario rested partly on his reputation as an anti-clerical in Quebec, partly on his regard for 'provincial rights' and partly on the belief that he was best qualified to reconcile French Canadians to a progressive 'Britannic' future. He was a French Canadian 'moderniser' whose constant professions of imperial loyalty rea.s.sured Britannic sentiment in English Canada. That and the same laborious attention to federal patronage that had kept Macdonald in power for so long were enough to win a Liberal majority in the elections of 1900, 1904 and 1908. But behind these electoral successes an earthquake was under way in Ontario. There, much Liberal opinion had been incensed by Laurier's apparent willingness to entrench separate catholic schools in the two new prairie provinces set up in 1905. Laurier's popularity in Ontario rested partly on his reputation as an anti-clerical in Quebec, partly on his regard for 'provincial rights' and partly on the belief that he was best qualified to reconcile French Canadians to a progressive 'Britannic' future. He was a French Canadian 'moderniser' whose constant professions of imperial loyalty rea.s.sured Britannic sentiment in English Canada. That and the same laborious attention to federal patronage that had kept Macdonald in power for so long were enough to win a Liberal majority in the elections of 1900, 1904 and 1908. But behind these electoral successes an earthquake was under way in Ontario. There, much Liberal opinion had been incensed by Laurier's apparent willingness to entrench separate catholic schools in the two new prairie provinces set up in 1905.43 Then, in 1910, the navy question and reciprocity blew apart the alliance of Quebec and Ontario Liberalism, and signalled the partial and uneasy triumph of 'Britannic' politics in Canada. Then, in 1910, the navy question and reciprocity blew apart the alliance of Quebec and Ontario Liberalism, and signalled the partial and uneasy triumph of 'Britannic' politics in Canada.

Since 1902, Laurier had tenaciously opposed the call by the Australian and New Zealand governments for closer partic.i.p.ation in the making of British defence and foreign policy fearing that any deeper imperial commitment would revive the damaging controversy with Boura.s.sa in 1899. But, in 1909, with the rising alarm over German naval rivalry, Laurier found that more was required than professions of imperial loyalty. As the 'naval scare' spread like a virus along the telegraph lines and through the news agencies, the newspapers of English Canada took up the call for a Canadian contribution to imperial defence.44 Canada should give two dreadnoughts to the Royal Navy, declared the Canada should give two dreadnoughts to the Royal Navy, declared the Manitoba Free Press Manitoba Free Press, the voice of prairie Liberalism.45 Laurier's Conservative opponents took up the cry, urging immediate help in Britain's naval 'emergency'. Laurier's response was canny. His naval service bill in January 1910 proposed a small Canadian navy, under Canadian control. As Laurier conceded, Canada's const.i.tutional status meant that, if Britain was at war, Canada would follow automatically. But the extent of Canada's contribution would be for ministers in Ottawa to decide. Laurier's Conservative opponents took up the cry, urging immediate help in Britain's naval 'emergency'. Laurier's response was canny. His naval service bill in January 1910 proposed a small Canadian navy, under Canadian control. As Laurier conceded, Canada's const.i.tutional status meant that, if Britain was at war, Canada would follow automatically. But the extent of Canada's contribution would be for ministers in Ottawa to decide.

Laurier's formula was shrewdly calculated to appease Britannic sentiment among Liberal supporters. He also knew that Conservative demands for direct subvention to the Royal Navy would divide their supporters, especially in Quebec. Instead, by conceding his 'tin pot navy', Laurier intended to consolidate his unwieldy coalition across Quebec, Ontario and the West. It was a drastic miscalculation. In Quebec, the navy bill became the hated emblem of English-Canadian hegemony in Canada and of the growing dominance of 'English' capitalism in the province where urbanisation and industrialism threatened to deracinate the Canadiens Canadiens crowding into the anglicised cities. crowding into the anglicised cities.46 To Boura.s.sa, whose nationalism was rooted in religious and social conservatism, and to the Quebec Conservatives with their clerical connections, the enemy became 'imperialism'; the collaborator Laurier; the stake the survival (' To Boura.s.sa, whose nationalism was rooted in religious and social conservatism, and to the Quebec Conservatives with their clerical connections, the enemy became 'imperialism'; the collaborator Laurier; the stake the survival ('survivance') of French Canada as a distinct, Catholic society.47 On its own, the navy question might have weakened Laurier but not unseated him. His second miscalculation was more dangerous. Historically, the Liberals were the party of free trade, who had opposed the protectionism of Macdonald's 'national policy'. After the defeat of reciprocity in 1891, Laurier had given up the idea of regional free trade with the United States, adopting instead a tariff preference towards Britain in 1897 a shrewd sop to freer trade and Britannic feeling. But there were powerful economic interests that still hankered after free entry into the American market for Canada's staple products. Above all, there was the West. By 1910, the three prairie provinces were growing at phenomenal speed as immigrants and capital flooded in to develop the wheat economy.48 Here was a 'new' Canada whose support would be decisive in the political struggle hitherto confined to the three sections of eastern Canada. The grievances of the prairie West against high land prices, high transport costs and grain prices lower than those just across the American border Here was a 'new' Canada whose support would be decisive in the political struggle hitherto confined to the three sections of eastern Canada. The grievances of the prairie West against high land prices, high transport costs and grain prices lower than those just across the American border49 became focused in 1910 in a campaign against the tariff as Laurier learnt at first hand during a prolonged tour of the region. When the American government offered mutual free entry in natural products, Laurier jumped at the chance to win over the West and the farming interests in Eastern Canada eager to sell to or export through the United States. It might offset the Western dislike of his naval programme. became focused in 1910 in a campaign against the tariff as Laurier learnt at first hand during a prolonged tour of the region. When the American government offered mutual free entry in natural products, Laurier jumped at the chance to win over the West and the farming interests in Eastern Canada eager to sell to or export through the United States. It might offset the Western dislike of his naval programme.50 Being confined to natural products, reciprocity posed, apparently, no threat to the industrial interests in Eastern Canada sheltered by the national policy tariff. And, in an era of 'good feelings' between Britain and the United States, the danger of an imperialist backlash seemed slight. Opposition to reciprocity he dismissed contemptuously as 'froth'. Being confined to natural products, reciprocity posed, apparently, no threat to the industrial interests in Eastern Canada sheltered by the national policy tariff. And, in an era of 'good feelings' between Britain and the United States, the danger of an imperialist backlash seemed slight. Opposition to reciprocity he dismissed contemptuously as 'froth'.51 Instead, the result was indifference in Quebec where the naval question was all52 but an explosion of rage in Ontario. The signal was given by Clifford Sifton, Laurier's sometime lieutenant in English Canada, and the proprietor of the but an explosion of rage in Ontario. The signal was given by Clifford Sifton, Laurier's sometime lieutenant in English Canada, and the proprietor of the Manitoba Free Press Manitoba Free Press. Sifton denounced reciprocity as a threat to Canadian nationality.53 He was quickly followed by the 'Toronto Eighteen', the cream of Toronto's Liberal elite, the bankers, financiers and merchants at whose head stood Byron E. Walker and Zebulon Lash. He was quickly followed by the 'Toronto Eighteen', the cream of Toronto's Liberal elite, the bankers, financiers and merchants at whose head stood Byron E. Walker and Zebulon Lash.54 Their defection began a full-scale revolt in Ontario against official Liberalism. Laurier's opponents made play with the claim that the limited reciprocity on offer would soon be extended, under American pressure, to complete free trade. It was a short step to argue that 'British connection' was in danger and Canada's own freedom at risk. 'On the day British connection fails us', roared the Their defection began a full-scale revolt in Ontario against official Liberalism. Laurier's opponents made play with the claim that the limited reciprocity on offer would soon be extended, under American pressure, to complete free trade. It was a short step to argue that 'British connection' was in danger and Canada's own freedom at risk. 'On the day British connection fails us', roared the Montreal Star Montreal Star, 'Canadian independence is lost.'55 Rejecting reciprocity meant 'self-reliance and allegiance to the Empire'. Rejecting reciprocity meant 'self-reliance and allegiance to the Empire'.56 Critics at the time were quick to see the campaign against reciprocity as naked self-interest masquerading as imperial loyalty. Critics at the time were quick to see the campaign against reciprocity as naked self-interest masquerading as imperial loyalty.57 Indeed, it was true that, as Canada's industrial zone, Ontario depended heavily on the 'national policy'. The Toronto plutocracy was bound to fear that freeing the West to trade south rather than east would endanger the new rail links being built from Toronto to the West and (consequentially) the prospects of the Canadian Bank of Commerce of which Walker was president. But it was also no coincidence that the Liberal defectors included those most ardently committed to the union of Ontario and the West as the heartland of a British Canada: Sifton, Walker and John Willison. To weaken prematurely the ties binding the prairies to Eastern Canada would shatter this dream. Reciprocity had been rejected in 1891 at a time when the West was unoccupied, Willison told a Toronto audience. Now it was filling up with Americans and a mult.i.tude of foreigners (i.e. non-British immigrants). 'Even the very optimistic will admit that the national problem is very different from that which we faced even ten years ago...[I]t is a mighty problem to fuse these [new people] into a common citizenship.' Indeed, it was true that, as Canada's industrial zone, Ontario depended heavily on the 'national policy'. The Toronto plutocracy was bound to fear that freeing the West to trade south rather than east would endanger the new rail links being built from Toronto to the West and (consequentially) the prospects of the Canadian Bank of Commerce of which Walker was president. But it was also no coincidence that the Liberal defectors included those most ardently committed to the union of Ontario and the West as the heartland of a British Canada: Sifton, Walker and John Willison. To weaken prematurely the ties binding the prairies to Eastern Canada would shatter this dream. Reciprocity had been rejected in 1891 at a time when the West was unoccupied, Willison told a Toronto audience. Now it was filling up with Americans and a mult.i.tude of foreigners (i.e. non-British immigrants). 'Even the very optimistic will admit that the national problem is very different from that which we faced even ten years ago...[I]t is a mighty problem to fuse these [new people] into a common citizenship.'58 When reciprocity was defeated, Sifton told the Ottawa When reciprocity was defeated, Sifton told the Ottawa Citizen Citizen: 'the national development of Canada along British lines will go on.'59 The result was a disaster for Laurier. Instead of fighting a Conservative party divided over the navy, he fought it with a Liberal party divided over trade. In riding the tiger of Britannic sentiment on the navy question, he lost Quebec. By unintentionally confronting it over reciprocity, he lost Ontario. His place as premier was taken by Robert Borden and his careful policy by an eager commitment to help with Britain's naval 'emergency' and claim a voice in London's defence and foreign policy. To Laurier, it was obvious that he had been defeated by the insurgent force of Britannic sentiment. He told the South African premier, Louis Botha, that the defection in Quebec had been large 'though not abnormal'. But, in Ontario, 'it was not a defeat, but a landslide. In the latter Province the jingo spirit was the cause.' He went on: 'You are quite right in supposing that there will be a revival of the Jingo element.'60 Botha had sympathised, as well he might: 'I very much fear that the result will be a revival of the jingo spirit in all parts of the British Empire.' Botha had sympathised, as well he might: 'I very much fear that the result will be a revival of the jingo spirit in all parts of the British Empire.'61 Between 1890 and 1914, the most forceful and articulate champions of Canadian nationhood were those who insisted that Canada's future lay as a British or 'Britannic' country. Only as a British country, they argued, could Canada forge a cohesive ident.i.ty at home around a common language, inst.i.tutions and history. Only as a senior partner in the Britannic a.s.sociation (i.e. Empire) could Canada transcend its colonial status and begin to take responsibility for the defence of its national interests. This Britannic nationalism was less than the full-blown imperialism of those who favoured imperial federation;62 but much more than support for 'British connection'. 'British connection' was politically anodyne. In French Canada, loyalty to the monarch and to British inst.i.tutions as the guarantee of liberty was proverbial. Even Henri Boura.s.sa, the scourge of British imperialism, proclaimed his loyalty to 'British connection'. But, to the Britannic nationalists, if it meant no more than the sectional compromises invented by Macdonald and refined by Laurier, then it was a feeble subst.i.tute for a real nation-state. Their priority was uniting the three great English-speaking sections: 'backward' French Canada could stumble on behind, perhaps, in due course, to be annexed in spirit. It would, perhaps, be wrong to exaggerate the extent to which Canadian opinion was preoccupied with nation-building and the imperial tie, especially in an age of such rapid economic change. But the linked crisis over the navy question and reciprocity showed that Britannic nationalism was the strongest political sentiment in Canada. It was fanned by economic buoyancy and the sense of a tightening commercial, strategic and demographic bond with Britain. In 1911, with the Borden premiership, it seemed to hold the initiative. Its finest hour, and its greatest trial, were yet to come. but much more than support for 'British connection'. 'British connection' was politically anodyne. In French Canada, loyalty to the monarch and to British inst.i.tutions as the guarantee of liberty was proverbial. Even Henri Boura.s.sa, the scourge of British imperialism, proclaimed his loyalty to 'British connection'. But, to the Britannic nationalists, if it meant no more than the sectional compromises invented by Macdonald and refined by Laurier, then it was a feeble subst.i.tute for a real nation-state. Their priority was uniting the three great English-speaking sections: 'backward' French Canada could stumble on behind, perhaps, in due course, to be annexed in spirit. It would, perhaps, be wrong to exaggerate the extent to which Canadian opinion was preoccupied with nation-building and the imperial tie, especially in an age of such rapid economic change. But the linked crisis over the navy question and reciprocity showed that Britannic nationalism was the strongest political sentiment in Canada. It was fanned by economic buoyancy and the sense of a tightening commercial, strategic and demographic bond with Britain. In 1911, with the Borden premiership, it seemed to hold the initiative. Its finest hour, and its greatest trial, were yet to come.

'Britannic' Australia The Australian communities, wrote Edward Shann in 1930 wrote Edward Shann in 1930, festooned along a coastline of ten thousand miles are nowadays strangely uniform in social structure. In each port...you will find a group of importers' warehouses, some big wool-stores, a railway terminus, a wharf-lumpers' union and a number of public houses tied to breweries. If there is a capital-city in the near-background, it is inhabited largely by a civil service connected with Crown lands, public works and education. Its environs will boast some industries engaged on the simpler manufactures or on the repair and maintenance of the mechanism of land transport. Ships, if they can, seek cheaper repair elsewhere...Over the range is the scene of the peculiarly Australian work done by a scattered population of miners, farmers and station-hands, who turn out staple raw-products on a rough, grand scale with labour-saving machinery... Brooding over the coastal capital and browbeating...the mercantile and professional cla.s.ses...stand the federated trade unions. Their Trades Hall is the scene of a fluctuating contest between the capable leaders of three groups: (i) the shearers, miners and timber-workers of the bush, (ii) the town artisans, and (iii) the transport workers and public works employees. These contend for mastery...through the primaries or 'selection-ballots' that name the labour candidates for the local or national parliament...The farmers, with some aid from pastoralists and the middle cla.s.s, are learning political organization from the workers, but are still clumsy and inarticulate. This social structure varies little with the minor staples that differences in local climate may add to the dominant wool and wheat. The Australian communities have set in these forms with a surprising uniformity. In the politics of each the drive comes mainly from a hard-eyed, hard-headed, hard-mouthed working democracy. Brooding over the coastal capital and browbeating...the mercantile and professional cla.s.ses...stand the federated trade unions. Their Trades Hall is the scene of a fluctuating contest between the capable leaders of three groups: (i) the shearers, miners and timber-workers of the bush, (ii) the town artisans, and (iii) the transport workers and public works employees. These contend for mastery...through the primaries or 'selection-ballots' that name the labour candidates for the local or national parliament...The farmers, with some aid from pastoralists and the middle cla.s.s, are learning political organization from the workers, but are still clumsy and inarticulate. This social structure varies little with the minor staples that differences in local climate may add to the dominant wool and wheat. The Australian communities have set in these forms with a surprising uniformity. In the politics of each the drive comes mainly from a hard-eyed, hard-headed, hard-mouthed working democracy.63 Shann was describing (in prose reminiscent of Joseph Conrad) a society that had crystallised in the 1890s when Australia entered her imperial age. In the 1850s, the Australian colonies had been transformed economically by the gold rush, politically by self-government and socially by the end of convict transportation (the exception to all three was Western Australia). In the thirty years after 1860, they had expanded (at 5 per cent a year) in an atmosphere of boom.64 The population rose from one to three million, some 40 per cent of the increase by immigration. The number of sheep rocketed from 40 million in 1870 to 106 million twenty years later. The population rose from one to three million, some 40 per cent of the increase by immigration. The number of sheep rocketed from 40 million in 1870 to 106 million twenty years later.65 Wheat farming sprang up in South Australia. Pastoralism and mining developed in the vast s.p.a.ces of Queensland. Wheat farming sprang up in South Australia. Pastoralism and mining developed in the vast s.p.a.ces of Queensland.66 Huge deposits of s