The Egyptian campaigns, 1882 to 1885 Part 26

THE SOUDAN AND THE MAHDI.

Scarcely had the Arabi revolt been suppressed, than troubles which had arisen in another quarter called for attention. Towards the end of October, 1882, Abdel Kader Pasha, Governor-General of the Soudan, telegraphed from Khartoum that the troops which he had sent against the Mahdi had been cut off, and that a force of 10,000 men should be sent as a reinforcement, otherwise he would be unable to defend the town. He stated that, without a large force at his disposal, the insurrection would spread through all parts of the Soudan, in which case the pacification of the country would require an army of at least four times the number asked for.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

The Soudan is a vast tract of Africa, stretching from Egypt on the north to the Nyanza Lakes on the south, and from the Red Sea on the east to the farthest boundary of Darfur on the west. Khartoum, at the junction of the Blue and White Niles, is about equally distant from the northern boundary of Egypt (the Mediterranean) and from the southern limit of the Khedive's Equatorial dominions, Lake Victoria Nyanza, and Uganda. From Khartoum to the ports of Souakim and Ma.s.sowah, on the Red Sea, the eastern limit of the Soudan, the distance is about 480 miles, and to the westward limit, which is the most indefinite of all, but is generally fixed at the western boundary of Darfur, it is nearly 800 miles. This country is as large as India. It extends 1,600 miles in one direction and 1,300 in another. There were at this time neither railways, ca.n.a.ls, nor, except the Nile at some periods of the year, navigable rivers, and the only roads were camel tracks.

The sovereignty of the Soudan was first seized by Egypt in the year 1819, when Mehemet Ali, hearing of the anarchy prevailing there, and wishing to introduce the benefits of a regular government and of civilization, and at the same time to occupy his troops, ordered his son Ismail, with a large army of regulars and irregulars, to invade the country. Ismail reached Khartoum, and for a time governed the Soudan, but he and all his followers were burnt alive by a native ruler, who first made them drunk at his own table and then burned the house over their heads. For this a terrible vengeance was taken, and Egyptian sovereignty was established over Sennar and Kordofan.

In 1856 the Viceroy, Said Pasha, visited the Soudan, and almost decided to abandon the country, but desisted in deference to the representation of the sheikhs and notables, who laid great stress upon the anarchy which would result from such an abandonment. He decreed reforms, most of which appear to have been punctually neglected. One Governor-General succeeded another, their chief duties being border-warfare with Abyssinia and the suppression of the rebellions which periodically broke out. In 1866 Ma.s.sowah and Souakim were given to Egypt by the Sultan of Turkey. In 1870 Sir Samuel Baker set out to conquer the Equatorial Provinces, returning in 1873. Colonel Gordon, afterwards Gordon Pasha, was appointed Governor-General of the Equatorial Provinces in the following year.

When, by authority of Ismail Pasha, Gordon became absolute ruler of the Soudan, he established a system of just and equitable government, which led, after his departure, to the revolt against the misgovernment of Egyptian officials. Gordon had warned the Khedive, before his appointment, that he would render it impossible for the Turks to govern the Soudan again. He was as good as his word. By treating the people justly, by listening to their grievances, and mercilessly punishing all those who defied the law, he accustomed the Soudanese to a higher standard of government than any which had prevailed in those regions before.

After Gordon's departure a horde of Turks were once more let loose to harry the Soudanese. All his old officials were marked men, and his policy was reversed. Ilias, one of the greatest slave-owners of Obeid, was allowed to return to Khartoum; and this man, in concert with Zubehr, the king of the slave dealers (afterwards interned at Gibraltar), took advantage of the wide-spread discontent occasioned by mis-government to foment the rebellion which, under the Mahdi's leadership, a.s.sumed such serious proportions.

The chief causes of the rebellion were: the venality and oppression of the officials; the suppression of the slave-trade, and military weakness. Of the first it is unnecessary to say much. The same kind of oppression that goes on in Turkey prevailed in the Soudan, though, perhaps, not to the same extent. Here, as there, all over the country there was a cla.s.s of small officials on salaries of from 2 to 4 a month, who had the responsible duty of collecting the taxes. The officials were mostly Bashi-Bazouks, irregular soldiers of Turkish descent. As there could be but little supervision over such an immense area, these men had it much their own way and squeezed the people to their hearts' content. There were instances where a Bashi-Bazouk on his salary maintained twelve horses, twenty servants, and a number of women, and this in places where the payment for water for his cattle alone would have cost more than three times his salary. It was no uncommon thing for a peasant to have to pay his taxes to the collector four or five times over without the Treasury being any the richer.

That the suppression of the slave trade, or rather the difficulties thrown in its way, was also a potent cause is evident from the list of the tribes who followed the Mahdi. Many, if not the majority, of these tribes were Baggara, or owners of cattle. These tribes were all of Arab descent, and from time immemorial had been inveterate slave-hunters. The Gallabahs were, also, to a man, against the Government, slave-trading being both their princ.i.p.al and by far most profitable business.

As to the military weakness, there can be no doubt that the Arabi revolt also had its effect on the Soudan population. Telegrams were actually sent them by Arabi, ordering them not to recognize the authority of the Khedive. At the same time all the available troops were withdrawn, and the revolt followed almost as a matter of course.

Mahomet Ahmed, the Mahdi, was a native of the province of Dongola. His father was Abdullahi, by trade a carpenter. In 1852 this man left and went to Shendy, a town on the Nile south of Berber. As a boy, Mahomet Ahmed was apprenticed to his uncle, a boatman, residing at Shakabeh, an island opposite Sennar. Having one day received a beating from his uncle, he ran away to Khartoum and joined the free school of a fakir, the head of a sect of dervishes, who lived at a village close by. This school was attached to the tomb of the patron saint of Khartoum, who was greatly revered by the inhabitants of that town and district. Here Mahomet Ahmed remained for some time, studying religion, but did not make much progress in the more worldly accomplishments of reading and writing. After a time he left and went to Berber, where he joined another free school. This school was also attached to a shrine much venerated by the natives. Here Mahomet Ahmed remained six months, completing his religious education. Thence he went to a village south of Kana, on the White Nile, where, in 1870, he became a disciple of another fakir, who subsequently ordained him fakir, and he then left to take up his home in the island of Abba, near Kana. Here he began by making a subterranean excavation into which he made a practice of retiring to repeat for hours one of the many names of the Deity, and accompanied this by fasting, incense-burning, and prayers. His fame and sanct.i.ty by degrees spread far and wide, and Mahomet Ahmed became wealthy, collected disciples, and married several wives, all of whom he was careful to select from among the daughters of the most influential Baggara sheikhs and other notables. To keep within the lawful number (four) he was in the habit of divorcing the surplus and taking them on again according to his fancy. About the end of May, 1881, he began to write to his brother fakirs, and to teach that he was the "Mahdi" foretold by Mahomet, and that he had a Divine mission to reform Islam, to establish a universal equality, a universal law, a universal religion, and a community of goods; also that all who did not believe in him would be destroyed, were they Christian, Mahommedan, or Pagan. Among others he wrote to Mahomet Saleh, a very learned and influential fakir of Dongola, directing him to collect his dervishes, followers, and friends, and to join him at Abba.

This sheikh, instead of complying with his request, informed the Government, declaring the man to be mad.

In the beginning of Ramadan, 1298 (2nd July, 1881), the Governor-General of the Soudan, Reouf Pasha, heard that on the island of Abba, on the White Nile, in the Fashoda district, there was a certain religious sheikh, Mahomet Ahmed, who had publicly declared that he was the Mahdi; further, that this sheikh had been for some time very busy in extending his influence among the tribes by means of emissaries and letters. Reouf became somewhat alarmed, fearing the consequences which might result from such teaching among the credulous and superst.i.tious people of the Soudan, and sent a party of notables and learned men, with a Government official and a small military escort, to interview Mahomet Ahmed, and request him to give up agitating and come to Khartoum. Mahomet declined to do either, and boldly declared that he was the Mahdi, by which name he will be hereinafter referred to.

On the failure of his first attempt, the Pasha, on the 11th August, despatched by steamer an expedition of 200 regular soldiers, with orders to use force, if necessary, in bringing the pretender to reason. At 3 a.m. on the following day the party reached Abba, where a discussion arose between two of the officers, each of whom claimed to be in command. Before the difficulty could be settled, the Mahdi and his followers turned out, some 4,000 strong, attacked the force and drove them back to the river, killing no less than 120 of their number. The rest of the expedition succeeded in reaching their steamer, and returned to Khartoum. After this further failure, Reouf Pasha organized a new expedition. The officer in command was Mahomet Pasha Said, from the regular army. Not finding the Mahdi at Abba, the Pasha followed him leisurely on to Talka. On arriving there it was discovered that the Mahdi had retreated into the hills of Jeb el Nuba, and the Pasha, deeming it useless to follow him further, withdrew to Kordofan, and the enterprise was abandoned.

In December, 1881, the Governor of Fashoda heard that the chief of the Tajalle (a district of the Jeb el Nuba), who was friendly to the Government, had driven out the Mahdi, and that the latter had taken refuge in the mountains of Gheddeer. The Governor decided to follow up this advantage and attack the Mahdi in his new position. Taking with him a force of 400 men, the Governor left Fashoda on the 4th December. On the morning of the 9th he reached Gheddeer after marching all night. The troops, fatigued by the march, following their usual custom, on nearing the wells broke their ranks and rushed to the water. At this moment they were attacked by the Mahdists and nearly all killed, including the Governor.

The Mahdi, seeing that he could defy the Government with impunity, was encouraged to believe in his mission, and the various sects of dervishes throughout the country began to think that Mahomet Ahmed might really be the true Mahdi. The Mahdi himself, though he did not venture to leave the shelter of the Gheddeer hills, occupied himself in fomenting the rebellion by his emissaries and adherents.

On the 4th March, 1882, Abdel Kader Pasha was appointed Governor-General of the Soudan, in place of Reouf Pasha.

During the interval between the departure of Reouf and the arrival of his successor, Giegler Pasha, a German, acted as the latter's deputy.

This official formed a new expedition of 3,500 men, starting from three points, namely, from Khartoum, Kordofan, and Sennar. By the 22nd of April the entire force, Nubir Yussef Pasha, a Berberine, being in command, was concentrated at Kaha, for the purpose of attacking Gheddeer, where, as was above stated, the Mahdi had taken refuge.

In consequence of these movements, the garrisons all over the country were left very weak, and at Sennar there were but 100 soldiers remaining. Amr-el-Makashef, a prominent agent of the Mahdi, collecting a force of disaffected natives and dervishes, attacked and burnt a part of the town, killed most of the small garrison, and besieged the remainder in the Government House. Fortunately, Saleh Aga, an irregular officer sent by Giegler Pasha, arrived on the 13th with 300 men, and after a hard fight defeated Amr-el-Makashef and compelled him to raise the siege.

On the 15th of April Giegler Pasha started south from Khartoum by steamer with 300 irregulars. On reaching the neighbourhood of Mesalamieh, on the Blue Nile, he learned that a notable sheikh, called Ahmed Saha, was raising men for the Mahdi at a village close by. He sent a detachment of fifty of his men to attack the place, with the result that the expedition was repulsed and most of the men killed. Giegler then telegraphed for reinforcements of six companies of regulars from Galabat, on the Abyssinian frontier, and while awaiting their arrival, having received some small reinforcements, renewed his attack on Ahmed Saha, but was once more defeated, with a further loss of 200 men.

On the 5th of May, however, Giegler was joined by the six companies of regulars from Galabat, and no less than 2,500 of the great Shukuri tribe, headed by their emir, Awad-el-Kerim, and a number of chiefs, clad in coats of mail and steel helmets, as in the days of the Crusaders, and riding thoroughbred Arab horses. This was a grateful sight for Giegler, as the emir was a personal friend of his own, and had, moreover, taken sides with the Government. Encouraged by this accession of strength, the Pasha renewed the attack on the 6th--this time with success--and Ahmed Saha was defeated with great slaughter.

After the victory the troops were directed on Sennar, where, on the 24th of May, they joined hands with the forces of Saleh Agha. Giegler at once attacked the rebels at a village in the neighbourhood of the town, and succeeded in driving them into the river, with a loss of 800 men.

Giegler then returned to Khartoum in triumph, leaving Saleh Agha in command. On the 3rd June the latter, with four companies of regulars, attacked Amr-el-Makashef at Tegu, whither he had retired after his defeat. The rebels were again defeated and dispersed, and Amr-el-Makashef fled across the White Nile by the ford of Aboo Zed and joined the Mahdi.

Shortly after these events the rebels again collected--it is said to the number of 10,000 (probably an exaggeration)--at a place called Eddi Binat, on the White Nile. Abdel Kader (who had by this time taken up his command) got together a body of troops from Duem, Kana, and Marabieh, on the White Nile, and despatched them, under the command of Zeyd Bey, against the rebels. About October 5th these troops reached the neighbourhood of Eddi Binat, where they were attacked by Sedi Habbi and his men. The Egyptians formed a hollow square, three sides of regulars and the fourth of Aburoff Arabs. The regulars repulsed the attack, but some 40 or 50 rebels got in on the fourth side, and the result was a defeat, with the loss of 800 men. Although successful, Sedi Habbi was unable to follow up his victory, owing to his heavy losses.

This disaster was followed by an almost unbroken series of defeats for the Egyptian forces at Shaha Fozia, Shatt, and other places.

In April, as already stated, the Gheddeer field force of 3,500 men was concentrated at Kaha, under Nubir Yussef Pasha. His original intention was to march at once to attack the Mahdi at Gheddeer. Finding, however, that the direct route was difficult and water scarce, he brought his force to Fashoda on the 22nd of April. Here they halted till the 20th of May, thereby allowing themselves to be overtaken by the rainy season, which much increased the difficulty of advancing through the marshy and thickly wooded country which lay between them and their destination. On the 7th of June the force came in contact with the enemy. The Egyptian troops formed a square, which was a.s.sailed by the Mahdi's followers. It was broken, and the whole force annihilated.

The situation throughout the Soudan was now very critical, but fortunately the Mahdi, instead of following up his success and marching on Obeid or Khartoum, remained at Gheddeer, thus giving Abdel Kader, who had by this time taken charge at Khartoum, a chance of organizing new means of resistance.

Abdel Kader, by drawing upon the garrisons at a distance from the scene of operations, by forming battalions of black slaves, and other like measures, managed, though with the greatest difficulty, to get together a fairly respectable force. This, as soon as it was somewhat organized, was applied in strengthening the various garrisons at the more exposed places, and in preparing for eventualities in general.

For a short time the Government forces had a fair share of good fortune, and in various engagements, of no great importance, came off victorious over the Mahdists. This, however, did not last long. On the 17th of July a force sent to attack the Hamar Arabs, on the Darfur frontier, had, although victorious, to be recalled to Obeid to strengthen the garrison, news having come in that the Mahdi had broken up his camp at Gheddeer and was marching to attack that important town. The Mahdi reached Obeid on the 3rd of September with an enormous force, and at once summoned the garrison of about 6,000 soldiers to surrender. Many of the inhabitants flocked to his standard, believing the defence to be hopeless; but the garrison resolved to hold out, and intrenched themselves in the Government buildings. Here they were attacked on the morning of the 14th, the a.s.sault lasting from 6 a.m. to 11 p.m. Though repulsed, the attack was renewed on each of the two succeeding days, with the same result. Eventually the Mahdi, after having sustained heavy losses, withdrew, and devoted his energies to the blockade of both Obeid and Bara.

The success of the Government troops at Obeid was, however, doomed to be followed by disasters in other directions. When Obeid and Bara were known to be in peril, a relief expedition of two regular battalions[86]

and some Bashi-Bazouks started on the 24th of September from Duem, on the White Nile, for Bara. After two days' march they were attacked, but defeated the enemy with heavy loss. On the 6th October the expedition reached a place called Kan, where there was a well, situated in the midst of a thick forest. The soldiers, after making a weak "zeriba," or breastwork of bushes, rushed, according to their custom, to the well for water. They were at once attacked, and over a thousand of them killed, the remainder escaping to Bara. On the 9th Bara was attacked, but the enemy were repulsed, and the same thing happened the following day; after which the a.s.sault was not renewed.

The Mahdi then, to prevent a.s.sistance being sent to Obeid, despatched emissaries to cross the White Nile, to stir up the embers of rebellion and secure more adherents to his cause.

The foregoing brings the narrative down to the time of Abdel Kader's pressing demand for reinforcements. At this period the relief expedition had been all but annihilated. Obeid was held by 3,500 men and Bara by 2,000. Both garrisons were short of food and in a depressed condition.

Many of the officers and men had deserted to the enemy. The Mahdi, with the bulk of his forces, had encamped round Bara, and Amr-el-Makashef was at the same time operating on the Nile.

The latest reports from Darfur were six months old, and the Governor reported that the province was disaffected, and that he could not maintain order without the aid of additional troops.

CHAPTER XXVII.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE FUTURE.

The att.i.tude of the European Powers towards the English occupation of Egypt was, at the opening of the year 1883, one of acquiescence tempered by expediency.

On the 3rd of January, 1883, Lord Granville issued a Circular Note to the Powers on the Egyptian question. In it he recalled the fact that events had compelled Her Majesty's Government to undertake the task of repressing the Egyptian rebellion, a task which England would have willingly shared with other Powers. His Lordship added that, although for the present a British force remained in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquillity, the British Government wished to withdraw its troops as soon as a system capable of protecting the authority of the Khedive should be organized. In the meantime, they considered it a duty to give the Khedive advice, with the object of securing that the order of things to be established should be of a satisfactory character and possess the elements of stability and progress.

Lord Granville further declared that the danger which threatened the Suez Ca.n.a.l during Arabi's revolt, its occupation by British troops in the name of the Khedive, its employment as a base of operations against the rebels, as well as the att.i.tude of the Ca.n.a.l Company at a critical moment in the campaign, const.i.tuted strong reasons for seeking an international settlement of this question in order to avoid similar dangers in the future. Her Majesty's Government thought that free navigation on the Ca.n.a.l, and its protection against damage and obstruction resulting from military operations, were questions of general interest. His Lordship, in consequence, proposed to the Powers to come to a common understanding to insure the freedom of pa.s.sage through the Ca.n.a.l for every description of vessel, under all circ.u.mstances, with this reserve in the event of war, that the ships of war belonging to one of the belligerent nations which might be in the Ca.n.a.l while hostilities were proceeding could disembark neither troops nor warlike munitions.

As regards financial arrangements, Her Majesty's Government thought it possible to arrange for greater economy and greater simplicity in the administration by modifications which would not in any way diminish the guarantees of the creditors. His Lordship hoped that he would soon be able to submit definite proposals on this subject to the Powers. The Government relied on the co-operation of the Powers to place foreigners on the same footing as natives as regards taxation.

The public papers contain no reply or acknowledgment of the communication on the part of the French Government.

The first of the other Powers to express any opinion on the despatch was Austria. Sir Henry Elliot called on Count Kalnoky on the 16th of January to ask what impression had been made upon him by the doc.u.ment; and his reply was to the effect that, though he could not be expected to p.r.o.nounce upon it off-hand, he would repeat a.s.surances already given that his Government continued to be animated by the most sincere wish not to embarra.s.s Her Majesty's Government in the reorganization of the administration of Egypt. A week later the Austrian Foreign Minister had another interview with the British Amba.s.sador, and the conversation left on Sir Henry Elliot's mind the impression that Count Kalnoky would make no observations upon the Circular except with reference to the proposal to subject Europeans to the same taxation as natives. He admitted the justice of this proposal, and Sir Henry believed he would not object to it; but it was, he said, a subject that required full examination before it was decided. The suggestions of Her Majesty's Government about the Suez Ca.n.a.l appeared quite to satisfy him.

On the 25th, Count Herbert Bismarck, the German _charge d'affaires_ in London, called on Lord Granville, and stated that his Government accepted generally the arrangement regarding Egypt and the Suez Ca.n.a.l proposed in the despatch, and was prepared to await the further information promised respecting the internal reorganization of Egypt. He went on to say that the German Government would continue to preserve the same friendly att.i.tude towards Her Majesty's Government in regard to Egyptian affairs which they had maintained during the summer.

On the 24th January, Count Hatzfeldt informed Lord Ampthill that he was about to instruct Count Herbert Bismarck to inform Lord Granville that the German Government accepted and agreed in principle to the policy laid down in the Circular of the 3rd respecting the reorganization of Egypt.

The Italian Government took much longer time before giving any answer.

It was not till the 7th February that Count Nigra called on Lord Granville to state their opinion. It was to the effect that they wished to reserve any detailed expression of their views till the English proposals were communicated in a more definite shape; but he was able to say at once that they concurred generally in those proposals.

The Russian reply was yet later and very indefinite. Sir Edward Thornton asked M. de Giers on the 7th February what he had to say, and the reply was that the Imperial Government considered the views expressed in the circular despatch as "generally satisfactory," and "they had not for the present any objection to make to them."

The minor Powers were addressed in a Circular dated the 24th January, and enclosing Lord Granville's despatch of the 3rd. The respective Foreign Ministers were informed that, as their Governments were interested in the condition of Egypt, and in the questions relating to the Suez Ca.n.a.l, Her Majesty's Government had thought that it might be agreeable to them "to have cognizance of the communication which has been made by Great Britain on these subjects to the Porte and the other Powers represented in the recent Conference at Constantinople."