The Ego and His Own Part 18

Only against a sacred thing are there criminals; you against me can never be a criminal, but only an opponent. But not to hate him who injures a sacred thing is in itself a crime, as St. Just cries out against Danton: "Are you not a criminal and responsible for not having hated the enemies of the fatherland?"--

If, as in the Revolution, what "Man" is is apprehended as "good citizen," then from this concept of "Man" we have the well-known "political offences and crimes."

In all this the individual, the individual man, is regarded as refuse, and on the other hand the general man, "Man," is honored. Now, according to how this ghost is named,--as Christian, Jew, Mussulman, good citizen, loyal subject, freeman, patriot, etc.,--just so do those who would like to carry through a divergent concept of man, as well as those who want to put _themselves_ through, fall before victorious "Man."

And with what unction the butchery goes on here in the name of the law, of the sovereign people, of G.o.d, etc.!

Now, if the persecuted trickily conceal and protect themselves from the stern parsonical judges, people stigmatize them as "hypocrites," as St.

Just, _e. g._, does those whom he accuses in the speech against Danton.[148] One is to be a fool, and deliver himself up to their Moloch.

Crimes spring from _fixed ideas_. The sacredness of marriage is a fixed idea. From the sacredness it follows that infidelity is a _crime_, and therefore a certain marriage law imposes upon it a shorter or longer _penalty_. But by those who proclaim "freedom as sacred" this penalty must be regarded as a crime against freedom, and only in this sense has public opinion in fact branded the marriage law.

Society would have _every one_ come to his right indeed, but yet only to that which is sanctioned by society, to the society-right, not really to _his_ right. But _I_ give or take to myself the right out of my own plenitude of power, and against every superior power I am the most impenitent criminal. Owner and creator of my right, I recognize no other source of right than--me, neither G.o.d nor the State nor nature nor even man himself with his "eternal rights of man," neither divine nor human right.

Right "in and for itself." Without relation to me, therefore! "Absolute right." Separated from me, therefore! A thing that exists in and for itself! An absolute! An eternal right, like an eternal truth!

According to the liberal way of thinking, right is to be obligatory for me because it is thus established by _human reason_, against which _my reason_ is "unreason." Formerly people inveighed in the name of divine reason against weak human reason; now, in the name of strong human reason, against egoistic reason, which is rejected as "unreason." And yet none is real but this very "unreason." Neither divine nor human reason, but only your and my reason existing at any given time, is real, as and because you and I are real.

The thought of right is originally my thought; or, it has its origin in me. But, when it has sprung from me, when the "Word" is out, then it has "become flesh," it is a _fixed idea_. Now I no longer get rid of the thought; however I turn, it stands before me. Thus men have not become masters again of the thought "right," which they themselves created; their creature is running away with them. This is absolute right, that which is absolved or unfastened from me. We, revering it as absolute, cannot devour it again, and it takes from us the creative power; the creature is more than the creator, it is "in and for itself."

Once you no longer let right run around free, once you draw it back into its origin, into you, it is _your_ right; and that is right which suits you.

Right has had to suffer an attack within itself, i. e. from the standpoint of right; war being declared on the part of liberalism against "privilege."[149]

_Privileged_ and _endowed with equal rights_--on these two concepts turns a stubborn fight. Excluded or admitted--would mean the same. But where should there be a power--be it an imaginary one like G.o.d, law, or a real one like I, you--of which it should not be true that before it all are "endowed with equal rights," _i. e._ no respect of persons holds? Every one is equally dear to G.o.d if he adores him, equally agreeable to the law if only he is a law-abiding person; whether the lover of G.o.d and the law is humpbacked and lame, whether poor or rich, and the like, that amounts to nothing for G.o.d and the law; just so, when you are at the point of drowning, you like a negro as rescuer as well as the most excellent Caucasian,--yes, in this situation you esteem a dog not less than a man. But to whom will not every one be also, contrariwise, a preferred or disregarded person? G.o.d punishes the wicked with his wrath, the law chastises the lawless, you let one visit you every moment and show the other the door.

The "equality of right" is a phantom just because right is nothing more and nothing less than admission, _i. e._ a _matter of grace_, which, be it said, one may also acquire by his desert; for desert and grace are not contradictory, since even grace wishes to be "deserved" and our gracious smile falls only to him who knows how to force it from us.

So people dream of "all citizens of the State having to stand side by side, with equal rights." As citizens of the State they are certainly all equal for the State. But it will divide them, and advance them or put them in the rear, according to its special ends, if on no other account; and still more must it distinguish them from one another as good and bad citizens.

Bruno Bauer disposes of the Jew question from the standpoint that "privilege" is not justified. Because Jew and Christian have each some point of advantage over the other, and in having this point of advantage are exclusive, therefore before the critic's gaze they crumble into nothingness. With them the State lies under the like blame, since it justifies their having advantages and stamps it as a "privilege" or prerogative, but thereby derogates from its calling to become a "free State."

But now every one has something of advantage over another,--_viz._, himself or his individuality; in this everybody remains exclusive.

And, again, before a third party every one makes his peculiarity count for as much as possible, and (if he wants to win him at all) tries to make it appear attractive before him.

Now, is the third party to be insensible to the difference of the one from the other? Do they ask that of the free State or of humanity? Then these would have to be absolutely without self-interest, and incapable of taking an interest in any one whatever. Neither G.o.d (who divides his own from the wicked) nor the State (which knows how to separate good citizens from bad) was thought of as so indifferent.

But they are looking for this very third party that bestows no more "privilege." Then it is called perhaps the free State, or humanity, or whatever else it may be.

As Christian and Jew are ranked low by Br. Bauer on account of their a.s.serting privileges, it must be that they could and should free themselves from their narrow standpoint by self-renunciation or unselfishness. If they threw off their "egoism," the mutual wrong would cease, and with it Christian and Jewish religiousness in general; it would be necessary only that neither of them should any longer want to be anything peculiar.

But, if they gave up this exclusiveness, with that the ground on which their hostilities were waged would in truth not yet be forsaken. In case of need they would indeed find a third thing on which they could unite, a "general religion," a "religion of humanity," and the like; in short, an equalization, which need not be better than that which would result if all Jews became Christians, by which likewise the "privilege" of one over the other would have an end. The _tension_[150] would indeed be done away, but in this consisted not the essence of the two, but only their neighborhood. As being distinguished from each other they must necessarily be mutually resistant,[151] and the disparity will always remain. Truly it is not a failing in you that you stiffen[152] yourself against me and a.s.sert your distinctness or peculiarity: you need not give way or renounce yourself.

People conceive the significance of the opposition too _formally_ and weakly when they want only to "dissolve" it in order to make room for a third thing that shall "unite." The opposition deserves rather to be _sharpened_. As Jew and Christian you are in too slight an opposition, and are contending only about religion, as it were about the emperor's beard, about a fiddlestick's end. Enemies in religion indeed, _in the rest_ you still remain good friends, and equal to each other, _e. g_. as men. Nevertheless the rest too is unlike in each; and the time when you no longer merely _dissemble_ your opposition will be only when you entirely recognize it, and everybody a.s.serts himself from top to toe as _unique_.[153] Then the former opposition will a.s.suredly be dissolved, but only because a stronger has taken it up into itself.

Our weakness consists not in this, that we are in opposition to others, but in this, that we are not completely so; _i. e._ that we are not entirely _severed_ from them, or that we seek a "communion," a "bond,"

that in communion we have an ideal. One faith, one G.o.d, one idea, one hat, for all! If all were brought under one hat, certainly no one would any longer need to take off his hat before another.

The last and most decided opposition, that of unique against unique, is at bottom beyond what is called opposition, but without having sunk back into "unity" and unison. As unique you have nothing in common with the other any longer, and therefore nothing divisive or hostile either; you are not seeking to be in the right against him before a _third_ party, and are standing with him neither "on the ground of right" nor on any other common ground. The opposition vanishes in complete--_severance_ or singleness.[154] This might indeed be regarded as the new point in common or a new parity, but here the parity consists precisely in the disparity, and is itself nothing but disparity, a par of disparity, and that only for him who inst.i.tutes a "comparison."

The polemic against privilege forms a characteristic feature of liberalism, which fumes against "privilege" because it itself appeals to "right." Further than to fuming it cannot carry this; for privileges do not fall before right falls, as they are only forms of right. But right falls apart into its nothingness when it is swallowed up by might, _i. e._ when one understands what is meant by "Might goes before right."

All right explains itself then as privilege, and privilege itself as power, as--_superior power_.

But must not the mighty combat against superior power show quite another face than the modest combat against privilege, which is to be fought out before a first judge, "Right," according to the judge's mind?

Now, in conclusion, I have still to take back the half-way form of expression of which I was willing to make use only so long as I was still rooting among the entrails of right, and letting the word at least stand. But, in fact, with the concept the word too loses its meaning.

What I called "my right" is no longer "right" at all, because right can be bestowed only by a spirit, be it the spirit of nature or that of the species, of mankind, the Spirit of G.o.d or that of His Holiness or His Highness, etc. What I have without an ent.i.tling spirit I have without right; I have it solely and alone through my _power_.

I do not demand any right, therefore I need not recognize any either.

What I can get by force I get by force, and what I do not get by force I have no right to, nor do I give myself airs, or consolation, with my imprescriptible right.

With absolute right, right itself pa.s.ses away; the dominion of the "concept of right" is canceled at the same time. For it is not to be forgotten that hitherto concepts, ideas, or principles ruled us, and that among these rulers the concept of right, or of justice, played one of the most important parts.

Ent.i.tled or unent.i.tled--that does not concern me; if I am only _powerful_, I am of myself _empowered_, and need no other empowering or ent.i.tling.

Right--is a wheel in the head, put there by a spook; power--that am I myself, I am the powerful one and owner of power. Right is above me, is absolute, and exists in one higher, as whose grace it flows to me: right is a gift of grace from the judge; power and might exist only in me the powerful and mighty.

II.--MY INTERCOURSE

In society the human demand at most can be satisfied, while the egoistic must always come short.

Because it can hardly escape anybody that the present shows no such living interest in any question as in the "social," one has to direct his gaze especially to society. Nay, if the interest felt in it were less pa.s.sionate and dazzled, people would not so much, in looking at society, lose sight of the individuals in it, and would recognize that a society cannot become new so long as those who form and const.i.tute it remain the old ones. If, _e. g._, there was to arise in the Jewish people a society which should spread a new faith over the earth, these apostles could in no case remain Pharisees.

As you are, so you present yourself, so you behave toward men: a hypocrite as a hypocrite, a Christian as a Christian. Therefore the character of a society is determined by the character of its members: they are its creators. So much at least one must perceive even if one were not willing to put to the test the concept "society" itself.

Ever far from letting _themselves_ come to their full development and consequence, men have hitherto not been able to found their societies on _themselves_; or rather, they have been able only to found "societies"

and to live in societies. The societies were always persons, powerful persons, so-called "moral persons," _i. e._ ghosts, before which the individual had the appropriate wheel in his head, the fear of ghosts. As such ghosts they may most suitably be designated by the respective names "people" and "peoplet": the people of the patriarchs, the people of the h.e.l.lenes, etc., at last the--people of men, Mankind (Anacharsis Clootz was enthusiastic for the "nation" of mankind); then every subdivision of this "people," which could and must have its special societies, the Spanish, French people, etc.; within it again cla.s.ses, cities, in short all kinds of corporations; lastly, tapering to the finest point, the little people of the--_family_. Hence, instead of saying that the person that walked as ghost in all societies. .h.i.therto has been the people, there might also have been named the two extremes,--to wit, either "mankind" or the "family," both the most "natural-born units." We choose the word "people"[155] because its derivation has been brought into connection with the Greek _polloi_, the "many" or "the ma.s.ses," but still more because "national efforts" are at present the order of the day, and because even the newest mutineers have not yet shaken off this deceptive person, although on the other hand the latter consideration must give the preference to the expression "mankind," since on all sides they are going in for enthusiasm over "mankind."

The people, then,--mankind or the family,--have hitherto, as it seems, played history: no _egoistic_ interest was to come up in these societies, but solely general ones, national or popular interests, cla.s.s interests, family interests, and "general human interests." But who has brought to their fall the peoples whose decline history relates? Who but the egoist, who was seeking _his_ satisfaction! If once an egoistic interest crept in, the society was "corrupted" and moved toward its dissolution, as Rome, _e. g._, proves with its highly developed system of private rights, or Christianity with the incessantly-breaking-in "rational self-determination," "self-consciousness," the "autonomy of the spirit," etc.

The Christian people has produced two societies whose duration will keep equal measure with the permanence of that people: these are the societies _State_ and _Church_. Can they be called a union of egoists?

Do we in them pursue an egoistic, personal, own interest, or do we pursue a popular (_i. e._ an interest of the Christian _people_), to wit, a State and Church interest? Can I and may I be myself in them? May I think and act as I will, may I reveal myself, live myself out, busy myself? Must I not leave untouched the majesty of the State, the sanct.i.ty of the Church?

Well, I may not do as I will. But shall I find in any society such an unmeasured freedom of maying? Certainly no! Accordingly we might be content? Not a bit! It is a different thing whether I rebound from an ego or from a people, a generalization. There I am my opponent's opponent, born his equal; here I am a despised opponent, bound and under a guardian: there I stand man to man; here I am a schoolboy who can accomplish nothing against his comrade because the latter has called father and mother to aid and has crept under the ap.r.o.n, while I am well scolded as an ill-bred brat, and I must not "argue": there I fight against a bodily enemy; here against mankind, against a generalization, against a "majesty," against a spook. But to me no majesty, nothing sacred, is a limit; nothing that I know how to overpower. Only that which I cannot overpower still limits my might; and I of limited might am temporarily a limited I, not limited by the might _outside_ me, but limited by my _own_ still deficient might, by my _own impotence_.

However, "the Guard dies, but does not surrender!" Above all, only a bodily opponent!

I dare meet every foeman Whom I can see and measure with my eye, Whose mettle fires my mettle for the fight,--etc.

Many privileges have indeed been cancelled with time, but solely for the sake of the common weal, of the State and the State's weal, by no means for the strengthening of me. Va.s.salage, _e. g._, was abrogated only that a single liege lord, the lord of the people, the monarchical power, might be strengthened: va.s.salage under the one became yet more rigorous thereby. Only in favor of the monarch, be he called "prince" or "law,"

have privileges fallen. In France the citizens are not, indeed, va.s.sals of the king, but are instead va.s.sals of the "law" (the Charter).

_Subordination_ was retained, only the Christian State recognized that man cannot serve two masters (the lord of the manor and the prince, etc.); therefore one obtained all the prerogatives; now he can again _place_ one above another, he can make "men in high place."