The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume X Part 56

The Minister told the committee, that whatever might be the resolution of Congress, respecting a peace or a truce, it was necessary to carry on the war with the utmost vigor. He urged reasons too well known to Congress to be related.

He desired the committee to inform Congress, that in case the offer of mediation from the two Imperial Courts should become so serious and so pressing, as to oblige the King to give a decisive answer, his Majesty would accept of it conditionally for himself and for the United States. The taking this resolution would have no inconvenience, as the Court of France knew no reasons, which could prevent them from following the example of the King, by trusting their interests in the hands of just and wise mediators, and the refusal being liable to very dangerous consequences. The Minister concluded the conference by observing, that a great object was to secure the United States from the proposition of _uti possidetis_; that the surest way to obtain that end was to reduce the English to confess, that they are not able to conquer them. That present circ.u.mstances require great exertions from the consideration, and that it was plain that every success gained by the army of Congress would infinitely facilitate the negotiations of their Plenipotentiaries.[44]

FOOTNOTE:

[44] _June 6th._ "Resolved, That the Minister Plenipotentiary, be authorised and instructed to concur, in behalf of these United States, with his Most Christian Majesty, in accepting the mediation proposed by the Empress of Russia and the Emperor of Germany; but to accede to no treaty of peace, which shall not be such, as may effectually secure the independence and sovereignty of the Thirteen States, according to the form and effect of the treaties subsisting between the said States and his Most Christian Majesty, and in which the said treaties shall not be left in their full force and validity."

CONGRESS TO THE KING OF FRANCE.

The United States in Congress a.s.sembled, to their Great Faithful and Beloved Friend and Ally, Lewis the Sixteenth, King of France and Navarre.

Great, Faithful, and Beloved Friend and Ally,

We have received your Majesty's letter of the 10th of March. The measures adopted by your Majesty in consequence of the representation made of the situation of our finances, the repeated testimonies of your Majesty's unalterable determination to render the cause of the United States triumphant, and also the affection, which your Majesty has been pleased to express for the United States in general, and for each State in particular, demand from us the strongest sentiments of grat.i.tude.

The important communications made by your Majesty's Plenipotentiary have been considered by us with the greatest attention. The result of our deliberations will be made known to your Majesty by our Minister Plenipotentiary at your Court, and will evince the entire confidence we have in your Majesty's friendship and perseverance in the principles, which have directed your conduct in maintaining the interest of the United States to this time.

We pray G.o.d, that he will keep your Majesty, our great, faithful, and beloved friend and ally, in his holy protection.

Done at Philadelphia, the 13th day of June, in the year of our Lord, 1781, and in the fifth year of our independence.

By the United States in Congress a.s.sembled.

Your Faithful Friends and Allies.

SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, _President_.

CHARLES THOMSON, _Secretary_.

TO GEORGE WASHINGTON.

Translation.

Philadelphia, June 1st, 1781

Sir,

I have received the letter, which your Excellency did me the honor to write on the 23d of the past month, and that of the Count de Rochambeau, with which it was accompanied.

I wait with extreme impatience the news of the arrival of the French division before New York, and no one can desire more earnestly than I do to see it under your immediate command. I hoped that you would have been this spring in the command of a more considerable body of auxiliaries. The causes, which have hindered the execution of that plan, have been so urgent and so decisive, that I am sure you will approve them, after I shall have had the honor of making you acquainted with them. I have nevertheless been much pained, that I could not explain to you this change of measures, and my attachment to the cause, which you defend, has made me feel as sensibly as any citizen of America all the delays, that could happen to the a.s.sistance, which we wish to give to the Thirteen States.

I am impressed with the necessity of maintaining a perfect confidence with your Excellency upon these different points, and I shall seize the first occasion which presents itself to visit your army.

In the meantime I shall transmit to the Count de Gra.s.se what your Excellency did me the honor to communicate. Be persuaded that I shall use the most pressing motives to determine him, and I shall do it with so much the more zeal, as I feel the necessity of it. I shall transmit to that General an extract of your letter, and I know nothing more likely to give weight to the demand, which I shall make of him.

The King has charged me, Sir, to inform Congress, that he grants them a gratuitous subsidy to enable them to make the greatest efforts in the course of this campaign. This subsidy, amounting to _six millions of livres tournois_, is to be employed in the purchase of arms, ammunition, and clothing, and it is the intention of the King, that the surplus shall be at the disposal of Congress. I have not been instructed as to what will be the exact amount of this surplus, but it is determined, that one million and a half shall be employed by the Superintendent of Finance, according to the directions, which you shall give him, after the arrangements you shall make with him in the visit, which he intends paying you.

I have informed Congress, and I intrust it to your Excellency, that the Emperor of Austria, and the Empress of Russia, have offered their mediation to the Court of London, who has accepted it. The same has also been offered to the Court of Versailles, and that of Madrid. But they have given for answer, that time must be left for Congress to determine, if it suits them to put the interests of the Thirteen United States into the hands of the mediators. In any event, it is of the greatest importance, that the allies make all their efforts to drive the enemy from this continent, and nothing will be more likely, than the success of the confederate arms, to make a successful negotiation.

I have the honor to be, &c.

LUZERNE.

GEORGE WASHINGTON TO M. DE LA LUZERNE.

Head Quarters, New Windsor,} June 13th, 1781.}

Sir,

His Excellency the Count de Rochambeau having requested me to forward the despatches herewith transmitted, by the safest possible conveyance, I now do myself the honor to send them by a gentleman of the Quarter Master General's department.

Having been made acquainted by the Count de Rochambeau with the designs of the Count de Gra.s.se, to come to this coast with his fleet, I cannot forbear expressing to your Excellency my ardent wishes, that a body of land forces might also attend this naval armament; as I am apprehensive such a decided superiority of men may not be drawn together by us, by the time the Count de Gra.s.se will be here, as to insure our success against the enemy's most important posts; as his continuance in these seas may be limited to a short period, and as the addition of a respectable corps of troops from the West Indies would, in all human probability, terminate the matter very soon in our favor.

If these should likewise be your sentiments, and if this plan should not interfere with the intentions and interests of his Most Christian Majesty elsewhere, I entreat your Excellency, by the first good conveyance, to represent the propriety and necessity of the measure to the commanders in the West Indies; that by one great decisive stroke the enemy may be expelled from the continent, and the independence of America established at the approaching negotiation.

I have the honor to be, &c.

GEORGE WASHINGTON.

REPORT OF A CONFERENCE WITH THE FRENCH MINISTER.

In Congress, June 18th, 1781.

The committee appointed to confer with the Minister Plenipotentiary of France, report,

That on the second conference with the Minister of France, he communicated some parts of a despatch, dated the 7th of August, 1780, the first part relating to losses suffered by French merchants, either trading with private houses in America, or engaged in transactions of commerce for Congress, or the several States. He informed the committee that several papers, which should have accompanied this despatch, were not come to hand, so that he could not state what kind of compensation the merchants might expect. The Minister, however, mentioned in the conference, that without waiting the arrival of those papers, which may have been lost, or may be delayed for a long time, some recommendation might be thought proper to be sent from Congress to the several States, in order to prevent forever the effect of the tender laws operating against foreign merchants; that this would be an encouragement to commerce, and remove the fears of foreign traders in their transactions with the citizens of the United States. The Minister communicated that part of the Count de Vergennes' letter relating to the discussion between him and Mr John Adams, with respect to the depreciation of the paper money, and the effect this had produced on the French trade; however, he did not enter fully into the matter, not being furnished with the proper papers.

The other objects of the communications of the Minister of France were the measures taken by the Court of Russia, and the northern powers, on account of the rights of neutrality, and the conduct to be observed by the belligerent powers towards subjects of neutral powers; and he informed the committee, that those northern Courts had made formal declarations to the powers at war respecting the principles of neutrality; and that they had concluded a convention for the security of their navigation and of their fair trade. That this convention was particularly obnoxious to the Court of London, as it was now obliged to respect neutral flags, which it had till then treated with the greatest severity, exercising against them every kind of depredation, according to its former practice. That France fully approved of that convention, the consequence of which was, that all the powers concerned, while they did justice to the principles of the King's Council, considered the British more and more as the tyrants of the sea.

The King's Council, therefore, thought it proper to transmit this intelligence to Congress, leaving it to their wisdom to adopt the principles of the neutral powers laid down so long ago as the 26th of July, 1778, in an ordinance of the King, which the Minister of France delivered several months ago, with other printed papers on the same subject, to the Board of Admiralty. The Minister thought it the more important for the United States to conform their maritime laws to that system, as they would thereby conciliate to themselves the benevolence of the neutral powers. He observed, that American privateers had presumed to stop neutral vessels loaded with English merchandise, which had given rise to unfavorable observations and complaints against the United States. He observed, that Holland had taken a part in the a.s.sociation of the northern Courts; and that therefore she ought to be comprehended in the orders of Congress, if it should be thought proper in those orders to mention the names of particular powers. But if Congress adopted a conduct similar to that of France, they would extend their orders in favor of all neutral powers generally.

The Minister then gave a short historical account of the negotiation of Mr c.u.mberland, observing that the matter being now obsolete, it was sufficient to mention that this agent, having made proposals of peace to the King of Spain, the first question he was asked was, what were the intentions of the Court of London respecting the United States?

That he, having no instructions on this subject, or pretending to have none, had sent an express to London. That the express had not returned when this letter was written.

The Minister informed the committee, that the Court of Versailles had neglected nothing to procure arms, ammunition, and clothing, for Congress. That the good intentions of the Court had not been well seconded by the American agents; that it was their fault if these articles had not been forwarded in time; that the Ministers did not intend to accuse any one in particular; but were of opinion, that Congress should inquire into the cause of the delay, in order to inflict such punishment as would prevent the like conduct in future.

The Minister then communicated the substance of a despatch of the 9th of March, 1781; and entering fully into the subject, he told us, that so early as the beginning of the year 1780, he had informed Congress, that a mediation might be opened in Europe. That the mediators might propose the _uti possidetis_ as the basis of the negotiation. That it was of the utmost importance to prevent the effect of a proposition, so inconsistent with the independence of the United States. That the Court of France wished to give them every a.s.sistance in their power; but he had observed at the same time, that the political system of the kingdom, being closely connected with that of other European powers, France might be involved in difficulties, which would require the greatest attention, and a considerable part of her resources. That he had informed Congress confidentially, that the death of the Sovereigns of some of the European States, with whom the Court of France had the most intimate connexion, might oblige her to employ the greatest part of her resources to secure her against the dangers, which might be occasioned by such an event. That since that communication was made to Congress, both those cases had happened. That the Empress Queen was dead. That the Court of Versailles flattered itself, that this will not at this time give rise to any material change in the politics of the Courts of Vienna and Berlin. That circ.u.mstances, however, are such, that prudence dictates not to leave the frontier of France bordering on Germany unprovided for defence. That the character the King bears of guarantee or protector of the liberties of the German empire, obliges him to be ready to a.s.sist effectually the members of that body, whose safety may be endangered, and of consequence occasions extraordinary expenses. That France is at the same time obliged to spare the land forces of the kingdom, and at the present crisis not to keep them at too great a distance. That this, however, is only a point of caution and prudence. That the Court of France still hopes the issue will be peaceable and agreeable to her wishes; but has thought it proper to inform Congress of it.

That matters are different with respect to the Dutch. That they are now in a state of war with the English; but there is among them a party in favor of England; and notwithstanding the accession of the two opposing provinces to the resolution of the States for making reprisals, a mediation has been entered into between London and the Hague; and the Empress of Russia acts as mediatrix. That it is evident the Court of London, by opening this negotiation, designs to draw the Seven Provinces to her side; and even goes so far as to expect, that she may employ the resources of the Dutch against France, either directly or indirectly. That the disposition of that Republic is still such as friends would wish. But the strongest argument, which the British party make use of to separate the Seven Provinces from France is, that they are dest.i.tute of a naval force; that their seamen are captured by the British; that all their riches will likewise fall a sacrifice; and that their settlements in the East and West Indies are in the greatest danger. That under these circ.u.mstances it was become necessary for France to afford immediate protection to the Dutch in Europe; and to make without delay a diversion, which may possibly save their East India possessions. That these measures had rendered it actually impossible to send to the United States the reinforcement, which was announced.

The Minister of France thinks, that this confidential and friendly explanation of the situation of France will convince Congress, that the King could not pursue a different line of conduct; and that the consequences of the measures he has taken must at last turn to their advantage. That, however, Count de Rochambeau and M. Barras will receive some reinforcements, and will inform the Chevalier de la Luzerne how considerable they are.