The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume X Part 17

Every public proceeding in England, since the commencement of our present negotiation for opening the intercourse and commerce between our two countries, will, I am sure, support me in saying, that we have very liberally taken the lead; that we have not waited for any a.s.surance of reciprocity, but have given orders for almost a universal admission of American articles, before we even know that any vessel from Great Britain will find admission into any American ports. What do we ask in return? No more than this; that while we gratuitously, and without stipulation, give advantages and favors to the American States, which we deny to all other nations, they would so far justify our liberal way of proceeding, as to receive us in the same manner as other nations, which are foreign, and to permit us to carry to North America, what it is evidently for their interest that we should carry thither.

I need hardly add, that it is of infinite importance, that some temporary convention should be finished without loss of time. I hope and trust that we shall not find much more difficulty in this business. You must see the advantage of an immediate renewal of intercourse, and from the candor of your dispositions, I am sure you must likewise be convinced, that to give us some facility in the outset, is the sure road to such an equitable arrangement for the future, as you must have at heart. The reasons, which I have given in the Memorial appear to me to be cogent and convincing, upon the natural alliance between our two countries. And when the intercourse has once begun, everything will go in its natural road. It is, therefore, of infinite consequence to begin that intercourse. Great Britain, by all public proceedings of repeals, proclamations, &c. &c.

has made the first advances, with warmth and confidence, and, therefore, I conclude, with the fullest a.s.surance, that you will meet those advances with cordial reciprocity.

I have the honor to be, &c.

D. HARTLEY.

DAVID HARTLEY'S MEMORIAL TO THE COMMISSIONERS.

The proposition, which has been made for a universal and unlimited reciprocity of intercourse and commerce, between Great Britain and the American United States, requires a very serious consideration on the part of Great Britain, for the reasons already stated in a Memorial, dated May 19th, 1783, and for many other reasons, which in the future discussion of the proposition will appear. To the American States, likewise, it is a matter of the deepest importance, not only as a proposition of commercial intercourse, which is the least part, but most princ.i.p.ally, as a political basis and guarantee for their newly established const.i.tutions. The introduction of British interests into a communion of intercourse, will bring forward a universal guarantee on the part of Great Britain, in the future progress of political events, which may affect the United States of America in their national capacity. The proposition is fertile in future prospects to Great Britain; and America also may wisely see in it a solid foundation for herself.

All circ.u.mstances are most fortunately disposed between Great Britain and the American States, to render them useful friends and allies to each other, with a higher degree of suitableness between themselves than any other nations can pretend to. France cannot interchange reciprocities with the American States, by reason of numberless impediments in her system of government, in her monopolies, and her system of commerce. France has the great disability of difference in language to contend with; and the inst.i.tution of the present French manufactures has never, at any time heretofore, been trained or adapted to American commerce. The only particular and pacific facility which France ever possessed for American intercourse, has for many years been transferred into the British scale by the cession of Canada to Great Britain. The future commerce, between France and America, will chiefly be regulated by such conveniences as France can draw to herself from America, without much apt.i.tude on the part of France, to accommodate her manufactures and commerce to American demands. In short, an interchange of reciprocities between France and America, would run against the stream on both sides; and all established habits, manners, language, together with the principles of government and commerce, would militate against such a system.

Conformably to this reasoning, it appears, that France has not at any time entertained any systematical design of forming any union or consolidation of interests with America. She took up the American cause, as instrumental to her political views in Europe. America likewise accepted the alliance with France, for her separate views, viz. for the establishment of her independence. The alliance, therefore, is completed and terminated, without leaving behind it any political principle of future permanent connexion between them.

Occasional circ.u.mstances produced a temporary alliance. Similar circ.u.mstances may, on any future occasion, produce a similar event of a temporary compact. Dissimilar circ.u.mstances, arising from any future political views of the Court of France in Europe, may without any inconsistency of principle, throw the power of that kingdom into a scale adverse to the future interests of the American States. In such case, therefore, where there cannot exist any permanent political connexion between France and America, and where the commercial attachments can be but feeble, it would be vain to expect in the French nation any such ally, as newly established States ought to look out for, to give maturity and firmness to their const.i.tutions.

As to Spain, every argument which has been stated respecting diversity of language, manners, government, monopolies, and system of commerce, from those which prevail in the United States of America, obtains in a superior degree. And much more to add besides, for Spain is not only incompetent to interchange reciprocities with the American States, but likewise her own situation in America will at all times render her extremely jealous of her neighbors. The only activity which Spain has exerted in the war, has been to procure a barrier against the American States, by annexing West Florida to her former acquisition of New Orleans; thereby embracing the mouth of the Mississippi, and by means of that river, jointly with her landed possessions, establishing a strong and jealous boundary against any future progress of the American States in those parts. Spain, therefore, cannot be looked upon by the American States as a suitable object of their election, to become a permanent ally and friend to them. Portugal, likewise, labors under all the disabilities of language, manners, monopolies, government and system of commerce. Her national power and importance would be likewise insufficient to const.i.tute a strong and permanent ally to the American States. All these nations will undoubtedly be found to have many commodious qualities for partic.i.p.ation in commerce; but the permanent facilities necessary to const.i.tute a firm and permanent ally to the American States, will be found deficient in them.

As to the Italian States, or any other powers in the Mediterranean, they are certainly not adequate to any compet.i.tion of political alliance with the rising States of America. They will also form very commodious links and connexions in the general circuit of commerce; but beyond these considerations, they have no share in the present question. The several States in the Germanic body are in the same predicament.

As to the Northern powers, viz. those in the Baltic, they are not favored either by vicinity, or climate, for a frequent or facile intercourse of commerce with America. And even respecting several material articles of commerce, jealousies and compet.i.tions might arise. As to political alliances, there are no such in prospect from them to the American States. Even if there were any superfluity of force in any of them beyond the necessities of their respective domestic situations, the extreme distance would be conclusive against any possible application of such power, as a political alliance favorable to the establishment and conformation of the American States.

The only maritime state on the continent of Europe remaining to be discussed, as a competent candidate for commerce, or connexion with America, is the Republic of the United Netherlands, commonly called Holland. In respect to American commerce, the Dutch have among themselves every facility combined, which the separate States of Europe, possess distinctly in their own concerns, or nearly. Their industry, frugality, and habits of commerce, may even carry them so far, as to make them rivals to the Americans themselves, in the transportation of European merchandise to America. These faculties of commerce would have been of infinite importance to the American States, if the war had continued between Great Britain and them. But upon the event of peace, it becomes a matter of the most perfect indifference to America, whether each European State navigates its own commerce into the ports of America, which will open to all, or whether the commercial faculties of Holland enable her to exceed in rivalship her European neighbors, and thereby to navigate European goods to America beyond the proportion of her national share. The faculties of a nation of carriers may be fortunate for the marine of that nation; but considered in themselves, and with respect to other nations, they are but secondaries in commerce. They give no ground of reciprocities, or partic.i.p.ation. That one nation should say to another, you shall navigate all our rivers, harbors, lakes, ports, and places, if we may do the same in yours, is a proposition of reciprocity; but that Holland should say to America, we will bring European goods to you, or you may be your own carriers, is neither concession nor reciprocity.

Holland is not a nation of rivers, harbors, lakes, ports, and places, for the distribution of goods and manufactures for internal consumption, and, therefore, her reciprocities must be very scanty.

Holland is the market-place of Europe, and the Dutch seamen are the carriers appertaining to that market-place. The admission of American ships to that market-place, freely to import and to export, is, undoubtedly, an act of reciprocity on the part of Holland as far as it goes, but in no degree adequate to the unlimited partic.i.p.ation of American commerce throughout the rivers, harbors, lakes, ports, and places of that vast continent. The commercial reciprocities of Holland, therefore, being inferior, on her part, towards America, the next point of view in which Holland is to be considered, as relevant to this question, is, as a nation of power, capable of becoming an effectual and permanent ally and guarantee to the American States, for that is the great object, which America, as a wise nation, recently arisen into independence, ought to keep in view. Holland has certainly been a nation of great and celebrated naval force. She remains so still; but having for many years suspended her exertions of force, and having directed the faculties of her people into the commercial line, she seems not to have any superfluity of force beyond the necessity of providing for her own security; and, certainly, no such redundance of power, as to extend to the protection of distant nations, as allies or guarantees. It appears, therefore, upon the whole of this argument, that Holland, although a commercial nation, cannot even interchange commercial reciprocities with America upon an equal footing, and that her faculties of force are inadequate to those, which America ought to expect in the permanent allies and guarantees of her country.

The independence of the American States being established, their first consideration ought to be, to determine with what friendships and alliances they will enter into the new world of nations. They will look round them, and cast about for some natural, permanent, and powerful ally, with whom they may interchange all cementing reciprocities, both commercial and political. If such an ally be to be found anywhere for them, it is still in Great Britain; at least, it is certain, that, in looking round Europe, no other is to be found.

There is no inherent impossibility to prevent such a connexion from taking place; it must depend on the free will and common interest of the parties. There are all possible faculties on both sides, to give and to receive all adequate and beneficial reciprocities, which are practicable and more likely to be permanent between independent parties, than between two parties, of which one is dependent on the other. Great Britain is, undoubtedly, the first of European nations, in riches, credit, faculties, industry, commerce, manufactures, internal consumption, and foreign export, together with civil liberty, which is the source of all, and naval power, which is the support of all. The dominions appertaining to the Crown of Great Britain are large and fertile; its Colonies still extensive, and in close vicinity to the American States, Great Britain being an American, as well as an European power, and all her empire connected by her naval force.

The territories of the American States, from the Atlantic ocean to the Mississippi, contain an inexhaustible source of riches, industry, and future power. These will be the foundations of great events in the new page of life. Infinite good, or infinite evil, may arise according to the principles upon which the intercourse between Great Britain and America shall be arranged in its foundation. Great Britain and America must be still inseparable, either as friends or foes. This is an awful and important truth. These are considerations not to be thought of slightly; not to be prejudged in pa.s.sion, nor the arrangements of them to be hastily foreclosed. Time given for consideration may have excellent effects on both sides. The pause of peace, with friendly intercourse, returning affection, and dispa.s.sionate inquiry, can alone decide these important events, or do justice to the anxious expectations of Great Britain and America.

THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS TO THE COMMISSIONERS.

Philadelphia, June 16th, 1783.

Gentlemen,

I am sorry to inform you, that by the resignation of Mr Livingston as Minister for Foreign Affairs, it has become necessary that you should receive the resolutions of Congress, relative to your mission through my hands. The disadvantage arising from this necessity, until a successor to that worthy gentleman is appointed, will be yours, as it is impossible for me to do more than barely to transmit the acts of Congress necessary for your information.

Enclosed you have one of the 1st of May last, and another of the 12th instant, which I hope will get safe to hand time enough for your government. The commission and instructions referred to in the first, not being ready, it was thought best to forward the resolution without delay, that you might know what was intended in the present important period of your negotiation. We have been much surprised, that we have not received any communications from you since the cessation of hostilities, except a letter of the 5th of April, from Mr Laurens.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ELIAS BOUDINOT, _President_.

HENRY LAURENS TO THE COMMISSIONERS.

London, June 17th, 1783.

Gentlemen,

I had the honor of addressing you on the 10th, immediately after my landing at Dover. As early as possible after my arrival here, I obtained an interview with Mr Secretary Fox, who was pleased to read to me part of his latest despatches to Mr Hartley, which he supposed would reach Paris on the 14th. It is probable, therefore, that before this time, as much of the contents as is proper for your knowledge has been communicated.

"Reciprocity," since the 10th of April, has undergone a certain degree of refinement. The definition of that term appears now to be possession of advantages on one side, and restrictions on the other.

"The navigation act is the vital of Great Britain, too delicate to bear a touch." The sudden and unexpected, perhaps illicit, arrival of ships and cargoes from America, may have caused this change of tone.

But you have heard in detail, and are more competent to judge.

From a desire of forming an opinion, I asked Mr Fox, whether he thought I might venture for a few days, to take the benefit of Bath, and yet be in time enough at Paris for the intended commercial agreement? He replied, "I rather think you may." One need not be a conjurer to draw an inference; you will either have finished the business before I could travel to Paris, or without being missed there I may go to Bath and repair my nerves.

In this state of uncertainty, when it is easy to perceive affections are not as we could wish them, nor quite so warm as we had been taught to believe, it would not be wise to commit the United States; wherefore I shall rest the business till I hear from you, or until a more favorable prospect; flattering myself with hopes of your surmounting the late seeming difficulties. An inconvenience on your side is preferable to the hazard of a disgrace.

I am, with great regard and respect, &c.

HENRY LAURENS.

THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS TO B. FRANKLIN.

Philadelphia, June 18th, 1783.

Sir,

I have the honor of enclosing you an official letter, directed to our Ministers Plenipotentiary at Paris.

The resignation of the late Secretary for Foreign Affairs, (occasioned by his preference of the Chancellorship of the State of New York, which he could not hold longer and retain his Secretaryship,) has cast the business of his office on me, till a successor is elected, which I hope will speedily take place.

As part of the resolution of Congress of the 12th instant, enclosed in that letter, is of a secret nature, I have written it in cyphers, but not having that of Mr Livingston's, I thought it best to use Mr Morris's to you, which he has obligingly supplied me with; so that the Ministers will be indebted for your decyphering it.

Your letter to Mr Livingston of the 15th of April, enclosing the two medals, came to hand this morning. I am sorry to find, that you have cause for similar complaints to those we have been making for two months past, on the subject of want of intelligence. We have not heard from any of our Commissioners at Paris, since February, excepting a letter from Mr Laurens, though our anxiety and expectations have been wound up to the highest pitch.

I feel myself much indebted for your polite compliment of the medal; it is thought very elegant, and the device and workmanship much admired. You will be pleased, Sir, to accept my acknowledgments on this occasion. As I doubt not but the copper one was designed for Mr Livingston personally, I shall send it to him by the first convenient opportunity. He is a worthy deserving character, and the United States will suffer greatly by his resignation, though I think him justified in attending to the calls of his private affairs.

You will receive herewith a number of our late newspapers, in which are inserted many resolves, a.s.sociations, &c. from all parts of the country, which I earnestly wish could be kept out of sight. But the truth is, that the cruelties, ravages, and barbarisms of the refugees and loyalists, have left the people so sore, that it is not yet time for them to exercise their good sense and cooler judgment. And that cannot take place, while the citizens of New York are kept out of their city, and despoiled daily of their property, by the sending off their negroes by hundreds, in the face of the treaty. It has been exceedingly ill judged in the British to retain New York so long, and to persist in sending away the negroes, as it has irritated the citizens of America to an alarming degree.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ELIAS BOUDINOT.

HENRY LAURENS TO THE COMMISSIONERS.