The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume VIII Part 37

Philadelphia, May 22d, 1782.

Sir,

Your letters, from the 28th of July to October 15th, have been read in Congress. I have reported an answer,[24] but they have not yet agreed on it, and I do not care to let this vessel go without a line, however hastily written, to you. You will receive with this the newspapers, which contain some information upon a delicate point. The administration of Britain having been changed, they will endeavor to represent themselves as popular in America, to induce a belief that we will, under their auspices, be desirous of returning to our connexion with them. Be a.s.sured, that the change in their administration has produced none in the sentiments of America; they are immovably fixed in their determination to support their independence, and not to violate their alliance with France. The a.s.sembly of Maryland and the Council of this State have pa.s.sed resolutions to that effect; it will be the language of all, as soon as they meet. Congress have refused a pa.s.sport to Sir Guy Carleton's Secretary, which was asked in order that he might be the bearer of a letter to Congress. Neither army has taken the field, of course I have no military operations to communicate.

Your salary will in future be paid here, where your agent will vest it in bills on Dr Franklin, quarterly, upon whom you will draw accordingly. I shall consider myself as agent for all our foreign Ministers, and transact the business accordingly for you, unless you should choose to appoint some other.

I enclose a cypher, which you will use if it arrives safe, till I have leisure to send you a better.

I am, Sir, your most humble servant,

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

FOOTNOTES:

[24] This refers to the preceding letter of May 10th.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO FRANCIS DANA.

Philadelphia, May 29th, 1782.

Sir,

You will receive herewith a letter of the 10th instant, which having been submitted to Congress, was returned yesterday to this office, together with the resolution, which I have the honor to enclose expressive of their sense of the sentiments contained in the letter, and of the line of conduct you ought to pursue. Having written to you lately, I have little to add.

We have not been able to settle a cartel with the British for the exchange of prisoners, of whom we have a balance in our hands to the amount of ten thousand. They refuse to pay the great sums, that we have advanced for their maintenance, which we make a preliminary to an exchange. It is not improbable, that the Germans will be made free of the country, sold for three years, to defray this expense, which they most of them wish, as they express a great inclination to settle here.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, June 28th, 1782.

Sir,

Immediately after we had received intelligence here of the important change in the councils, and in the system of Great Britain, I consulted my correspondent (the Marquis de Verac) upon the expediency of disclosing my public character, without further delay to her Majesty's princ.i.p.al Minister. He gave me his opinion freely and candidly. For your information, I need only say, that it is the same in every respect with his former one, which you will find in his letter to me, of the 12th of September last, and in mine of September 15th to the President of Congress.

I cannot take upon me to say, that his opinion is not well founded. My private sentiment then was, that that event could not fail to occasion a correspondent change in her Majesty's system also; but I knew my means of information were not as good as those of my correspondent, and that though every one seems to think the mediation of her Majesty, between Great Britain and Holland, was in effect at an end, yet in form it was still kept up, so that the reasons against disclosing my character, mentioned to you in my letter of March 5th, might still be supposed to have some influence. This determined me to conform to his advice.

However, I could not think of resting totally inactive in this state of things; though I thought it not prudent to make any official communications, yet it could not be amiss to endeavor at this time to turn, if possible, the thoughts of those in government upon our affairs, and to refute certain a.s.sertions of our enemies, which had remained without contradiction here, and by this means to prepare the way for the former. It might at least serve to sound the sentiments of the Ministers. With these views I have thrown the few following reflections upon paper, three translations of which into French, have, I am a.s.sured, been placed in the very hands I wished to place them, and that they have not been unacceptable.

_Reflections._

"When Great Britain engaged in a war with her late Colonies, either to obtain allies, or to prevent new enemies rising up against her, she was desirous to have it believed that she was contending in the common cause of all the maritime powers of Europe. Spain she endeavored to alarm by suggesting, that the revolt in America would be a fatal example to all her Colonies in the new world, and if it had not such an effect upon them, they would at least be liable to be conquered one after another, by their new neighboring empire, so that in one way or the other Spain would lose her American Colonies, if the independence of the United States should be established. To Holland she held up the danger her peculiar commerce, and her navigation would be exposed to, from the enterprising spirit of the Americans, who would not fail to become soon her rivals throughout all Europe. To the nations about the Baltic she alleged, that the free commerce of America would be highly prejudicial to their commerce, _because many of the commodities of America, being of the same nature with theirs, they would everywhere in the markets of Europe come into concurrence with them_. She has been more particular with regard to Russia, and a.s.serted, that this empire can derive no possible benefit from a free and direct commerce with America, and that with or without this commerce, Russia will be in the same circ.u.mstances, _because Great Britain who now takes off, will continue to take off, all the superfluous productions, and manufactures of Russia_.

"The conduct of Spain, and of Holland, is the best comment upon the declarations of the British, which respect those nations. I shall confine myself, therefore, to those which respect the nations about the Baltic, and particularly Russia. A few short reflections upon these reasonings, or rather a.s.sertions, may perhaps show the mere fallacy of them.

"Let it be admitted, that Great Britain will in fact continue to take off all the superfluous productions and manufactures of Russia. Does it follow from hence, that Russia can have no interest in a free and direct commerce with America? Will it make no difference to the interests of Russia whether she disposes of her commodities to Great Britain alone, or to Great Britain and America at the same time? Will not the concurrence of America in her ports give an additional advantage to Russia? Will it not enhance the price of her commodities?

Will it not increase the demand for them? And will not this increased demand be the means also of increasing the quant.i.ty of her productions and manufactures? If these things do not follow, all the reasonings of the best writers upon the principles of commerce, showing the great benefits every nation derives from the concurrence of purchasers of her commodities, are false and delusive. Besides, how is Russia paid for her productions and manufactures? Is it not by exchange in a very great proportion for foreign commodities? Are not many of these foreign commodities of the peculiar production or manufacture of America, such as rice, indigo, sugar, coffee, cocoa, pimento, cochineal, and all sorts of dyeing woods? Does it make no difference to the interest of Russia, whether she receives those articles directly from the countries, which produce them, or in circuitous voyages through Great Britain, and consequently from a third hand?

Does not this course draw along with it double freight, double insurance, double commissions, and are not all the other charges attending a voyage (to say nothing of additional duties,) ordinarily doubled by means of this circuitous course? Will not the price of such American commodities be increased by these means when they arrive in Russia, at the most moderate computation, at the rate of twentyfive per cent? Will not Russia, therefore, necessarily lose at that same rate, upon all her commodities sold to Great Britain in exchange for such American commodities? And will not this contribute in a great measure to keep the course of exchange against her? And will she not lose also the advantages she would infallibly derive from the concurrence of the Americans in her ports? Is it not worthy of consideration, whether this extra price of materials, necessary for the manufactures of Russia, will not render them so much dearer to foreign nations, and whether this circ.u.mstance will not expose her to the danger of being rivalled in those very commodities in other countries? In one word, is it not of the last importance to a nation to draw all such foreign commodities as she wants from the first hand, or from their proper source? What credit, then, is to be given to the a.s.sertion of the British, viz. that this empire can derive no benefit from a free and direct commerce with America and that, without this commerce, Russia will be in the same circ.u.mstances.

"Further, if it is true, that many of the productions of America are of the same nature with those of Russia, and that a concurrence of those articles on the part of America, in the markets of Europe, would be prejudicial to the commerce of Russia, does it follow from hence, that it would not be the interest of Russia to have a free and direct commerce with America? Let us take one article by way of example; hemp, which is the foundation of the princ.i.p.al commerce of Russia.

That within some parts of the extensive territories of the United States, both the soil and climate may be adapted to the cultivation of hemp of the best quality, cannot reasonably be doubted. Is it not then of the highest importance to Russia, to turn the thoughts of the Americans from the cultivation of this plant, or in other words, to make it their interests not to cultivate it? That Russia can do this; by means which may be pointed out, and in the use of which both nations may promote their general interests, is certain. But will the exclusion of the Americans from a free and direct commerce have this effect? Will the sending them to Great Britain, or to any other country in Europe than Russia, for the commodities of Russia, but especially for her hemp, have a tendency to that effect? Will not the Russian hemp, in consequence of such measures, be burthened with all the charges abovementioned when it comes to the hands of the Americans, that is to say, with the extraordinary charge of twentyfive per cent? And will not this twentyfive per cent in fact operate in the nature of a bounty to that amount, to encourage the cultivation of American hemp?

"Besides if America should find a combination to exclude her from the benefit of a free and direct commerce with Russia, is it not natural to suppose she would endeavor to relieve herself from the effects of such an inequitable system, by vigorously adopting proper measures for that purpose? And could she not do it? Might she not begin by profiting of the errors of such an exclusive system, to the encouragement that system would give to the cultivation of her hemp, could she not superadd a duly upon all Russian hemp, which should be imported into America? The effects of such a policy on the one part and on the other, cannot possibly escape the penetration of those whose business it is maturely to consider these things. But may it not be asked, if the mischiefs pointed out above should in fact take place, are there any benefits which Russia could derive from such a system, which would more than counterbalance them? And what are these benefits? What, for instance, could compensate Russia for the damage she would sustain by losing the supply of hemp for the great American market, a market which will be rapidly increasing, while that of Great Britain, to say the least, has come to a full stand? Would not two other important supplies be in danger of sharing the same fate, viz, sailcloth and cordage? All these three articles have hitherto been imported in great quant.i.ties into America; sailcloth for the use of all their navigation, and there is scarce any kind of Russian manufactures, which they have not imported, and which they do not want. Finally, it is certain, that if America had continued under the dominion of Great Britain, that very concurrence in the markets of Europe, which the British pretend will be a consequence of the independence of America, would have taken place, especially in the articles of pitch, tar, turpentine, iron, ship timber, masts, spars, bowsprits, and in general of all naval stores.

"Every one knows that Great Britain drew great quant.i.ties of all these commodities from the northern nations. It is not less certain, that she drew some of all of them from her late Colonies. But these commodities are so bulky, and of so little intrinsic value, that it was utterly impossible for the Americans to transport them across the Atlantic so cheap as the nations of Europe, which wanted them, and Great Britain in particular, could import them from the northern nations. This kind of commerce, therefore, would long since have utterly failed, and been left free for those nations, if, to prevent this, Great Britain had not adopted the policy of granting large bounties upon all those commodities, iron alone excepted, when imported into Great Britain from America. It was her interest to do this, because at the same time, that she was thereby encouraging the commerce of her Colonies, she was rendering a great benefit to her own manufactures, in which she paid the Americans for those commodities, so that her bounties turned to the account of both parts of the Empire at once. Besides, they made her less dependent upon any foreign nations for those commodities, and she was too well acquainted with her commercial and political interests ever to lose sight of that object. She could not grant a bounty upon iron without injuring her own mines; she therefore adopted the method of exempting the iron of America from duties, which she imposed upon all the iron imported from any foreign country, and these duties being considerable, they had a like effect upon American iron, as the bounties had upon the other commodities. This system was calculated gradually to destroy the commerce of the northern nations with Great Britain.

"Now is it not certain, take away the dependence of America upon the empire of Great Britain, and you take away at the same time the interest of Great Britain, to give the preference to those American commodities? She will then procure them where she can procure them cheapest, that is from the northern nations. When the British bounties therefore cease, the commerce of America with Europe in those articles will cease with them. And thus those nations will nowhere be troubled with the dangerous concurrence in the markets of Europe on the part of America, which has been so much talked of by the British, and may have influenced the political systems of those powers. During the time America was dependent upon the British empire, she has always imported great quant.i.ties of iron and steel from Sweden through Great Britain. She will certainly continue to import those articles when she can obtain them so much cheaper by a direct commerce with Sweden or Russia. Is it not then clear, that the independence of the United States, in whatever view it is properly considered, will turn to the benefit of all Europe, Great Britain alone excepted; that the nations about the Baltic, Russia above all, if they adopt in season a wise policy towards America, have everything to hope and nothing to fear from the commerce of that country?"

As these reflections were not in my hand writing, or signed, or delivered by me, so there was no danger of exposing Congress or myself in this business. Though no great doubt could be entertained from what hand they came, yet they might have been disavowed by me if it should be thought advisable. I pretend not to have suggested any new matter upon the subject, or to have urged the whole that might have been said upon it. Brevity was a thing indispensably necessary. They are perhaps more adapted to the local state of affairs, than anything the Ministers here may have seen. On the whole, I have no reason to repent of the measure. Although it should not be attended with any immediate good effects, yet I flatter myself it may not be wholly fruitless.

I have prepared a second part, which enforces the first, enters more into political matter, and is chiefly designed as an answer to certain ostensible objections, which I understand have been made against her Imperial Majesty's forming at present any political connexion with the United States, but have made no use of it yet, because since the delivery of the first, accounts of the advantages gained by the British fleet over the French in the West Indies, have arrived here, and seem a little to have changed the face of affairs in this quarter; though it seems to me whoever reflects upon that unfortunate action, cannot really suppose the relative force of the two nations essentially altered by it. The British it is true may have thereby saved the most valuable of their possessions in those parts, for this year at least, the loss of which would have reduced them nearly to despair, and compelled them to solicit a universal peace upon such terms as they know it is to be obtained. In this view it has its serious consequences.

I would very willingly comply with your request, and make my letters more numerous and more minute, but the want of a safe conveyance from hence, (having no other than the post, and not having any cypher from your office) obliges me to remain totally silent upon some matters, and to use so much caution in others, that I fear none of them will afford you much satisfaction, or can be of any real service. I have not been honored with any letter from you since that of the 22d of October last, the duplicate of which has never come to hand. When you write me, please to send your letters to the care of Mr Adams. I pray you to acquaint Congress, that I shall not fail to exert my small abilities to the utmost, and to improve every favorable opportunity to promote the end of my mission. I should be happy if I could give them any reasonable a.s.surances, that my success was at hand.

I am, with much respect and esteem, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, August 30th, 1782.

Sir,

I cannot suffer the post of this day to depart without acknowledging the receipt of the quadruplicate of the 2d of last March, and another of the 22d of May. They were received last evening. Neither the original of the first, nor either of the other copies has reached me, so that I have been a long time without any intelligence about affairs in our country from you. The reason you a.s.signed for this surprised me. I thought it had been next to impossible, that my letters written from hence, in August, September and October last, should not have reached you long before that time. The only channel through which you can write me with the least security, is Holland. If your letters are sent to the care of Mr Adams, they will come on under every possible caution; but no letter should be sent addressed immediately to me. In such a case, there is no doubt but they would all be opened at the office here. I send all my own letters under cover to friends in Holland, which, though it doubles the postage, is a caution which ought not to be dispensed with.

Your letter has eased me of much anxiety, particularly that paragraph of it, which begins with the word "_you_" and ends with "_acknowledged_," as it has cleared up the point of most importance, and upon which I wanted more explicit directions than are contained in my instructions. Though this letter has been so long on its way, yet it has arrived in good season to answer every purpose of it. I have hitherto been governed by sentiments exactly conformable to those you have expressed in the clause which begins with "_all_" and ends with "_insecure_." But my anxiety arose from an apprehension, that the expectations of Congress might possibly have been different, for want of some local information, which I have never ventured to communicate.

I have reason to believe, that at this time, the ill.u.s.trious Sovereign of this empire, and her princ.i.p.al Ministers are fully convinced, that the affairs of the United States have acquired a consistency, which renders their independence perfectly secure, particularly that they are not distracted by internal divisions, that Congress are everywhere highly respected, freely obeyed, and firmly supported; that the governments of the several States harmonise with them and with each other, in all great political points, and in their turn are equally respected, obeyed, and supported by their respective citizens. On these points there is no danger of our suffering from the misrepresentations of our enemies. If I have been able to collect any part of the sentiments of this Court, it is that the independence of the United States is established beyond all question, and that its political measures, so far as they may take our country into view, will be formed upon that supposition. Indeed, they have long since been formed on that ground.

Sir, as I propose to forward two copies of this letter by the post of the day, I should miss of the opportunity if I enlarged here. I will take up the subject in my next by the next post. I am sorry to find the ordinance you mention does not accompany your letter, though you say you enclosed it. I wrote to Mr Adams for it as soon as I heard of it, but have not received it from him.

I have the honor to be, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.