The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume VII Part 48

VI.

"The United States shall relinquish to his Catholic Majesty, and in future forbear to use, or attempt to use, the navigation of the river Mississippi from the thirtyfirst degree of north lat.i.tude, that is, from the point where it leaves the United States, down to the ocean.

REMARKS. "The impression made upon the United States by the magnanimity of his Majesty's conduct towards them; the a.s.sistance they hope to receive from the further exertions of the same magnanimity; the deep wound which an alliance with so great a monarch would give to the hopes and efforts of the enemy; the strong support it would afford to their independence; the favorable influence which the example of such a King would have on other nations, and the many other great and extensive good consequences which would result at this interesting period from his Majesty's taking so n.o.ble and decided a part in their favor, have all conspired in prevailing upon Congress to offer to relinquish in his favor, the enjoyment of this territorial and national privilege, the importance of which, to their const.i.tuents, can only be estimated by the value they set upon his Majesty's friendship.

"By this proposition, the United States offer to forego all the advantages and conveniences, which nature has given to the country bordering on the upper parts of that river, by ceasing to export their own, and receiving in return the commodities of other countries by that only channel, thereby greatly reducing the value of that country, r.e.t.a.r.ding its settlement, and diminishing the benefits which the United States would reap from its cultivation.

"Mr Jay thinks it his duty frankly to confess, that the difficulty of reconciling this measure to the feelings of their const.i.tuents, has appeared to Congress in a serious light, and they now expect to do it, only by placing in the opposite scale the grat.i.tude due to his Catholic Majesty, and the great and various advantages, which the United States will derive from the acknowledgment and generous support of their independence by the Spanish monarchy, at a time when the vicissitudes, dangers, and difficulties of a distressing war, with a powerful, obstinate, and vindictive nation, renders the friendship and avowed protection of his Catholic Majesty in a very particular manner interesting to them. The offer of this proposition, therefore, being dictated by these expectations and this combination of circ.u.mstances, must necessarily be limited by the duration of them, and consequently, that if the acceptance of it should, together with the proposed alliance, be postponed to a general peace, the United States will cease to consider themselves bound by any propositions, or offers, which he may now make in their behalf.

"Nor can Mr Jay omit mentioning the hopes and expectations of Congress, that his Majesty's generosity and greatness of mind will prompt him to alleviate, as much as possible, the disadvantages to which this proposition subjects the United States, by either granting them a free port, under certain restrictions, in the vicinity, or by such other marks of his liberality and justice, as may give him additional claims to the affection and attachment of the United States.

VII.

"That his Catholic Majesty shall guaranty to the United States all their respective territories.

VIII.

"That the United States shall guaranty to his Catholic Majesty all his dominions in North America.

Lastly.

"As the aforegoing propositions appear to Mr Jay the most essential, he omits proposing those less and subordinate ones, which seem to follow of course. He therefore concludes this subject with a general offer and propositions to make and admit all such articles as, in the course of this negotiation, shall appear conducive to the great objects of the proposed treaty.

REMARKS. "Nothing on Mr Jay's part shall be wanting to expedite the happy conclusion of this business, by adhering constantly to the dictates of candor, frankness, and unsuspecting confidence.

"He is ready to receive the treaty between the United States and his Christian Majesty, as a model for this, or with such alterations as, founded on the principles of reciprocity, may be more agreeable to his Catholic Majesty, it being his earnest desire to arrive at the important objects of his mission in any way his Majesty may be pleased to prefer.

"The subject of aids, either by subsidy or loan as may be most convenient to his Majesty, will require a particular convention, but as the manner, extent, and terms depend on his Majesty's pleasure, it is impossible for Mr Jay, without some knowledge of it, to offer propositions adapted thereto.

All that he can at present say on that subject is, that Congress are ready to do everything in their power. He will not, however, endeavor to conceal their incapacity to do much in the way of compensation, while the enemy shall continue to make the United States the theatre of a desolating war, and the object of their predatory operations. But when those obstacles shall cease, it will be in their power, as well as their inclination, to make retribution, and render important services to his Majesty. Mr Jay will therefore continue to decline attempting to induce his Majesty to take any measures, however favorable to his country, by delusive promises, or rash engagements; but on the other hand, he is ready to enter into such reasonable ones, as he may have good reason to say shall be faithfully and punctually performed.

"A particular treaty regulating the conduct to be observed by his Catholic Majesty, and the United States, towards each other during the war, also appears to Mr Jay important to both; but as the proper plans and articles of such a treaty can only result from a free conference on the subject, he can upon this occasion only express his readiness to concur in every provision, which may be calculated to give energy and success to the operations and objects of both.

JOHN JAY."

Your Excellency will be pleased to observe, that among my remarks on the sixth proposition, I have limited the duration of the offer contained in it. I did this from a persuasion, that such limitation was not only just and reasonable in itself, but absolutely necessary to prevent this Court's continuing to delay a treaty to a general peace. Besides what the Minister dropped upon this head in his conference with me at Aranjues, I think it probable that they still wish to adhere to that idea. To me they appear desirous of avoiding the expense that the aids, which a treaty we should expect would render unavoidable, and which at present would not be very convenient for them. They wish to see our independence established, and yet not be among the first to subscribe a precedent, that may one day be turned against them. They wish not to exclude themselves, by any present engagements, from taking advantage of the chances and events of the war, not choosing on the one hand, that in case we sink, that we should be fastened to them by any particular ties, nor on the other hand, in case we survive the storm, to be so circ.u.mstanced as not to make the most of us. I think it is their design, therefore, to draw from us all such concessions as our present distress, and the hopes of aid may extort, and by protracting negotiations about the treaty, endeavor to avail themselves of these concessions at a future day, when our inducements to offer them shall have ceased. As this would evidently be unjust, I think the limitation in question can give them no offence, and I hope Congress will be pleased to communicate to me their sentiments on the subject.

I must also remark, that after what has pa.s.sed, and considering how well they are acquainted with my instructions, it would not only have been useless, but absurd, to have made these propositions otherwise than agreeably to those instructions.

Congress may at first view be a little surprised at the extent of the fifth proposition, but when they compare it with the second, I am persuaded they will find it sufficiently restrained.

In forming these propositions, it was my determination to leave them so free from disputed, or disputable points, as that no plausible pretexts for delay should arise from the face of them. I am well apprised, nevertheless, that in the course of the negotiation, it will be impossible for me to prevent their practising as much procrastination as they may find convenient. Almost the only hope I have of their seriously doing business arises from their fearing, that the instruction respecting the Mississippi will be recalled the moment that either any very decided successes on our part in America may render a treaty with Spain of less importance to us, or a general treaty of peace give us different views and prospects.

These are my conjectures and opinions. Perhaps they may prove erroneous; as facts accompany them, Congress will be enabled to judge for themselves. I will add, that from everything I can hear, the King is honestly disposed to do us good, and were he alone to be consulted in this business, I believe it would soon be concluded.

On the 23d of September, the foregoing propositions were to be laid before the King. I heard nothing further from the Minister until the 27th, when he sent me the following note.

Translation.

"Although the last letter of Mr Jay, accompanied with a certain plan, was transmitted on Sat.u.r.day in the evening to the Count de Florida Blanca, and although he could not inform himself of their contents until translated from the English, he nevertheless did not fail to render an account thereof to the King in his despatch of Sunday. His Majesty having then shown himself disposed to appoint some person to confer with Mr Jay, it is become necessary to prepare a suitable instruction, and present it to the King for his approbation.

The Count de Florida Blanca flatters himself, that he shall be able to arrange this affair before the departure of the Count for the Escurial, and in the meanwhile, he has the honor to transmit to Mr Jay a pa.s.sport for Major Franks.

"_Thursday, September 27th, 1781._"

I have been given to understand, though not officially, that M. Del Campo, the Minister's Secretary, is the person who will be appointed to confer with me, and though that gentleman is constantly about the Minister, yet it seems, that a set of formal instructions are to be prepared for him. When the Minister will be able to find either time or health to complete them is uncertain.

There is reason to believe, that still less progress would have been made in this affair, had Major Franks not have arrived. I regret his detention, but hope the reasons a.s.signed for it will be deemed sufficient; I am perfectly satisfied with him.

Notwithstanding Congress had given me reason to expect, that the plan of drawing bills upon me had been laid aside, I have now bills to the amount of between seventy and eighty thousand dollars to pay, and no funds provided. What am I to do? Dr Franklin writes me, that so far from being able to give me further aids, he does not expect to have it in his power even to pay our salaries in future.

From the facts stated in this letter, Congress will perceive that this Court neither refuse nor promise to afford us further aid. Delay is their system; when it will cease I cannot conjecture, for that is a question which I doubt whether they themselves have as yet determined.

I am indebted largely to Mr Harrison for money advanced by him to distressed seamen. He ought to be paid, and it is so far from being in my power to do it, that I have been reduced to the mortifying necessity of desiring him for the present to hold his hand. A great many of this valuable cla.s.s of people are confined in English gaols, without other means of obtaining their enlargement than by entering into the enemy's service. They complain bitterly of being neglected by their country, and I really think not without reason. Retaliation ought to be practised, and if we have not a sufficient number of marine officers and seamen in our power to make the objects of it, why would it be improper to subst.i.tute landsmen?

As to Portugal, I have more than once spoken to the Minister on the subject. He admits the justice of our being treated by that as by other neutral nations. He has promised to interfere in our behalf, but nothing efficacious has yet been done. To send an agent there, could do no harm, and might do good; I am therefore for it. The Amba.s.sador of France thinks with me, that before that step is taken, it ought to be confidentially communicated to this Court, and I am persuaded difficulties will arise from it. I shall do my best.

M. Gardoqui's departure is uncertain. He is still attending the orders of the Court. I doubt his receiving them till the campaign closes, and perhaps not then.

I do not despair of seeing some good result, finally, from all this complication of political solecisms. It would not surprise me if we should in the end be the gainers by them. My greatest fears are about the fate of the bills. If protested, for want of payment, they will become the source of much evil.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY.

_P. S._ I have this instant received a letter from Commodore Gillon, dated at Corunna, the 28th of September, and one from Colonel Searle of the 26th of September. I herewith enclose copies of them. Their contents are interesting. J. J.

FOOTNOTES:

[30] See these letters at large in the _Secret Journal of Congress_, Vol. II. pp. 323, 326. The latter was drawn up by Mr Madison.

[31] Secret Journal of Congress, Vol. II. p. 393.

[32] Secret Journal of Congress, Vol. II. p. 404.

[33] See this letter above, p. 449.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Madrid, October 18th, 1781.

Sir,

Major Franks delivered me the despatches committed to his care on the 30th of August. He set out for France the 5th instant. My letters by him to your Excellency will account for his remaining here so long. I also beg leave to refer to them for other more interesting particulars.

Congress will doubtless be informed that I have refused to accept some of their bills. As the enemies of America in Europe had, with some success, endeavored to render the credit of our paper suspected, it appeared to me expedient to state the reasons for these refusals very particularly, and I caused them to be recited at large in the protests. I have sent copies of them to Dr Franklin and Mr Adams, that in case these transactions should be represented to our disadvantage, either in France or Holland, they might be enabled to set the matter right. I now send copies to Congress, to prevent their being alarmed at any general report that may arrive in America, of my having refused to accept their bills drawn upon me.