The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume VII Part 44

I must, nevertheless, take the liberty of observing, that however our situation may in the opinion of Congress render it necessary to relax their demands on every side, and even to direct their Commissioners ultimately to concur (if nothing better could be done) in any peace or truce not subversive of our independence, which France determined to accede to, yet that this instruction, besides breathing a degree of complacency not quite republican, puts it out of the power of your Ministers to improve those chances and opportunities, which in the course of human affairs happens more or less frequently to all men.

Nor is it clear, that America, thus casting herself into the arms of the King of France, will advance either her interest or reputation with that or other nations.

What the sentiments of my colleagues on this occasion may be, I do not as yet know, nor can I foresee how far the negotiation of the ensuing winter may call for the execution of this commission. Thus circ.u.mstanced, at such a distance from America, it would not be proper to decline this appointment. I will, therefore, do my best endeavors to fulfil the expectations of Congress on this subject, but, as for my own part, I think it improbable, that serious negotiations for peace will soon take place. I must entreat Congress to take an early opportunity of relieving me from a station, wherein, in character of their Minister, I must necessarily receive (and almost under the name of opinions) the directions of those on whom I really think no American Minister ought to be dependent, and to whom, in love for our country and zeal for her service, I am sure that my colleagues and myself are at least equal.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY.

_P. S._ I had an interview last evening with the Minister. Nothing was promised or denied. A person is to be named on Sunday to confer in earnest, as it is said, with me about the treaties. I do not despair, though having so many bills to pay, and no money, perplexes me extremely. The treasury of Spain is very low; much of the money for the expenses in this war costs them between thirty and forty per hundred, by mismanagement and want of credit. This ought not to be public. His Excellency still looks at your ships on the stocks, but I shall, without refusing, not consent to their changing masters. J. J.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

St Ildefonso, October 3d, 1781.

Sir,

My letter of the 25th of April last, by Mr Toscan, informed Congress, that on the 30th day of January preceding, I had the honor of receiving their letters of the 6th and 17th of October, 1780, the latter of which states particularly and ably the right of the United States to the free navigation of the river Mississippi, and enumerates the various reasons which induce them to decline relinquishing it.[30]

Among these reasons is the guarantee contained in the treaty with France. I hinted to Congress, that it was more than probable, that the contents of this interesting letter were well known to the French Court before it came to my hands. I am well persuaded, that this was the case. Shortly after receiving it, I took occasion to converse generally with the Amba.s.sador on the subject of the Spanish pretensions to that navigation, and remarked, as it were inadvertently, how unreasonable it was for them to expect, that we should relinquish a territorial right, which both justice and the guarantee of France enabled us to retain. The thought did not appear new to him, but he strongly combated this construction of the treaty, and endeavored to explain it away by observing, that the guarantee could not comprehend claims, whose objects we had never possessed, &c.

&c. I mention this only to show how improper it would have been for me to have communicated this part of your Excellency's letter to the Spanish Minister. It could have answered no good purpose, because, as France would have disputed this construction, Spain could with propriety have refused to admit the force of any argument drawn from it, and it might have done much mischief, not only by bringing on an unseasonable explanation between France and us, but also between Spain and France.

If I had given the Spanish Minister a copy of every other part of this letter, except those paragraphs which contain the reasoning in question, the omission might in future have been urged by France, who I verily believe has a copy of that whole letter, as an argument for my having yielded that point as not tenable; and though my opinion might not be of much consequence, it appeared to me most prudent to avoid doubts about it. For my own part I really did, and do think, that this guarantee does comprehend the navigation in question, though I also think, that no question should be raised about it at present.

So circ.u.mstanced, I thought it most advisable to make no written communications of any parts or part of this letter, but from time to time to press every argument contained in it in the course of conversations with the Spanish Minister, except those drawn from the guarantee.

The Minister, however, did not at any time enter into the merits of these arguments, nor appear in the least affected by them. His answer to them all was, that the King of Spain must have the Gulf of Mexico to himself, that the maxims of policy adopted in the management of their colonies required it; and that he had hoped the friendly disposition shown by this Court towards us would have induced a compliance on the part of Congress.

As to a free port below the northern limits of West Florida, or anywhere else in the vicinity, the Minister sometimes wished certain regulations, some middle line might be devised, to reconcile the views of both parties, but he did not see how it could be done. The King had always been accustomed to consider the exclusive navigation of the Gulf of Mexico as a very important object to Spain, more so indeed than even Gibraltar, and he was persuaded, that his Majesty would never be prevailed upon to change his ideas on that subject. At other times he spoke clearly, and decidedly against it, saying, that it was their desire to exclude all nations from the Gulf, and that it made little or no difference, whether they admitted all nations or only one.

In my letter of the 25th of April last, I informed your Excellency, that on the 25th of March preceding, the Minister sent me word, that the money necessary to pay the bills due in April could not be advanced to me. The constant inconsistency I experienced between the Minister's promises and conduct often surprised, as well as embarra.s.sed me. This last instance appeared to me to be really cruel; for if he had intended to withhold the necessary supplies, he ought to have given me notice of it, and not by keeping up my expectations to within a few days before the holders of the bills were to call upon me for their money, (and the bills of April amounted to eightynine thousand and eightythree dollars,) reduce me to such imminent danger of being obliged to protest them. Speaking on this subject with the French Amba.s.sador, he intimated, that the Court expected I should have made them some further overtures respecting the Mississippi. I told him I had no authority to make any others than what I had already made. He replied, that the Minister believed I had. At that time I had received no letters, public or private, which gave me the least reason to suspect, that Congress had pa.s.sed the resolution of the 15th of February last,[31] and it was not before the 18th of May, that a letter, I then received from Mr Lovell, enabled me to understand the reason of the Minister's belief. I then recalled to mind his frequent a.s.surances of frankness, and of his speaking without reserve, often adding, that he was well informed of our affairs, and had minute information of what was pa.s.sing at Philadelphia. There can be no doubt but that some copies of the President's letters to me have fallen into his hands, and that he supposed I had received others, though this was not in fact the case. Hence it appears, that the double miscarriage, if I may so call it, of these letters, had an unfavorable influence on our hopes of pecuniary aids, for it is highly probable, that in this instance they were so critically withheld on purpose to extort overtures from me, which the Minister, though mistaken, had reason to believe I was in a capacity to make.

Your Excellency will perceive from this, how important it is, that your letters, to and from your Ministers, be transmitted in a manner not subject to these inconveniences.

It was not, as I said before, until the 18th of May, that Mr Lovell's letter, enclosing a copy of the resolution of Congress of the 15th of February, reached me. It was brought to Cadiz by the Virginia, and it is remarkable, that none of the journals, or gazettes, nor the letter from Congress, which Mr Lovell gave me reason to expect, ever came to my hands. But as all the papers brought by the Virginia pa.s.sed through the hands of the Governor of Cadiz, and afterwards through the Post Office, the suppression of some of them may be easily accounted for.

As Mr Lovell's letter did not appear to be official, nor the copy of the instruction of the 15th of February authenticated, I was much at a loss to determine how far it was to be considered as a measure finally concluded upon, and this difficulty was increased by another, viz.

whether my having no letter on the subject from the President was to be imputed to the miscarriage of it, or to a reconsideration of the instruction in question; for I recollected, that resolutions had in some former instances been reconsidered, and either altered or repealed a few days after their date; for these reasons it appeared to me imprudent immediately to hazard overtures on the ground of this instruction.

The next day, the 19th of May, I thought it expedient to wait upon the Minister, and again renew the subject of our proposed treaty, expecting that if he was acquainted with the contents of my letter, something might drop from him in the course of conversation, which would lead me to judge of what he might, or might not know on that subject, and others connected with it.

He received me with more than usual cordiality. The conversation turned at first on the situation of the southern States, the late combat between the fleets in the Chesapeake, and General Greene's retreat. He appeared to apprehend much danger from what he called the delicate situation of our army there, and the blockade of the reinforcement intended for it, under the Marquis de la Fayette. I endeavored to remove such of his fears as appeared to be ill-founded, and (though without leaving room to suppose that the operations of Spain were indispensable to our safety,) represented to him the good policy and probable success of France and Spain's seriously turning their attention and force to the expulsion of the enemy from America.

I then repeated what I had often before remarked to him, respecting the influence which the hesitations and delays of Spain in forming a treaty with us must naturally have on the hopes and fears of Britain.

I announced to him formally the completion of our confederation by the accession of Maryland, and after dwelling on the advantages, which the States and their allies might expect from it, I endeavored to impress him with an opinion, that a cordial union between France, Spain, Holland, and America, supported by vigorous measures, would soon reduce the enemy to the necessity of listening to reasonable terms of peace.

The Count replied, generally, that he was very minutely informed of the state of our affairs. That the good dispositions of Congress towards Spain had not as yet been evinced in a manner the King expected, and that no one advantage had hitherto been proposed by America to Spain, to induce the latter to come into the measures we desired. That the views of Congress were such as would not permit his Majesty to form a treaty with the States, but that the King was an honest man, and I might again and again a.s.sure Congress, that he would never suffer them to be sacrificed to Britain, but on the contrary would with constancy maintain the friendship he had professed for them. That Britain had in vain attempted to deceive Spain; that Mr c.u.mberland had been sent here for that express purpose, but that, however possible it might be for Britain to vanquish, she would never be able to deceive Spain; that he wished Congress had been more disposed to oblige the King. He knew indeed that opposition in sentiments must necessarily prevail in public bodies, but that he hoped for the best. That I ought to preach to them forcibly, for that he thought a good preacher (_un bon predicateur_,) would do much good, thereby intimating, as I understood it, that Congress were not sufficiently apprised of the importance of Spain, and the policy of complying with her demands.

To all this I briefly remarked, that his Excellency's knowledge of American affairs must convince him, that it was not in their power to give his Majesty other proofs of their attachment than what they had already done, and that if he alluded to the affair of the Mississippi, I could only add one remark to those which I had often made to him on that head, viz. that even if a desire of gratifying his Majesty should ever incline Congress to yield to him a point so essential to their interest, yet it still remained a question whether new delays and obstacles to a treaty would not arise to postpone it.

The Count smiled, said he always spoke frankly, and that whenever I should announce to him my having authority to yield that point, I might depend on his being explicit, and candid, but as matters stood at present, he could say nothing on that head. He then informed me, that M. Gardoqui would set out for America the beginning of June. He said it might be in my power to furnish some useful hints and observations relative to the objects and conduct of his mission, adding that he reposed full confidence in me, and wished that I would also consider whether there were any particular reasons which might render it advisable, either to hasten or r.e.t.a.r.d his going.

I suspected there was too much meaning in all this to admit of my entering into these discussions without time for further reflection; and, therefore, without seeming to avoid it, I told the Count I was happy to hear, that M. Gardoqui was so near his departure. That I considered myself much honored by his requesting my remarks relative to it, and that I was sure Congress would draw agreeable conclusions from his mission. That I should write by him to Congress, and as they would expect to learn from me the precise character in which they were to receive, and consider him, it became necessary, that his Excellency should favor me with that information, as well to enable me to transmit the proper advices to Congress, as to make the remarks which he had done me the honor to request. That I conceived this to be the more indispensable, because if M. Gardoqui should carry no public testimonials from this Court to Congress, he could only be considered by them as a private gentleman, and all his intercourse with Congress would of consequence be subjected to all the inconveniences resulting from it.

This topic carried the conversation off the delicate ground to which the Count had led it. He admitted the propriety of my being exactly apprized of the nature of M. Gardoqui's commission, said that as yet it was not decided, and therefore for the present could only give me his opinion of what it would probably be.

He observed that circ.u.mstances did not render it proper, that he should go as Minister, though perhaps it might he proper to give him contingent powers. That it was the common practice, where Courts sent to each other persons charged with their affairs, in a character below that of Minister, to give no other credentials than a letter of advice from the Minister of the Court sending to the Minister of the Court receiving the person in question. That the same practice was about to be pursued by Spain towards Prussia, and had been observed in other instances; therefore, he believed the like method would be adopted in this case. That if it should be purposed to give M.

Gardoqui a letter authenticating his being an agent of Spain, it would be either to the President, or the Secretary of Congress, and asked me which of the two would be the most proper.

Whether he really was uninformed on this point, or whether he asked the question merely to try my candor, cannot easily be determined. I told him honestly, that Congress had no Secretary or Minister of State for general purposes, nor for foreign affairs particularly, and that neither the President nor Secretary of Congress could regularly be considered in that light. That there was a committee of Congress, whose appointment came near to that of Secretary for foreign affairs, but that I had heard Congress were about establishing a more proper and regular mode of conducting the affairs committed to that committee, and had perhaps already done it. That therefore it was difficult for me to give his Excellency a clear and decided opinion on the subject, and the more so as the letters which I daily expected to receive from the President, and which probably contained exact information relative to this very matter, had not yet come to my hands. He seemed very well satisfied, and extended his civilities so far as to say, that if at any time the warmth of his temper had led him into any harshness of expression, he hoped I would forget it. I told him, and that was the fact, that I did not recollect any part of his behavior to me, which required that apology. He desired me to wait upon him again on the Wednesday next.

As to the instructions of the 15th of February, I had every reason to wish it had been a secret to the Ministry. The propriety of them is a subject without my province. To give decided opinions of the views and designs of Courts always appeared to me hazardous, especially as they often change, and as different men will often draw different conclusions from the same facts. This consideration has constantly induced me to state facts accurately and minutely to Congress, and leave them to judge for themselves, and be influenced only by their own opinions.

I could not forbear, however, seeing the danger to which the proviso contained in that instruction exposed me. I have no reason to flatter myself, that, more fortunate than others, the propriety and policy of my conduct will not be drawn, at least impliedly, into doubt. If I should, on a persuasion that this cession would be unalterably insisted upon by Spain, yield that point, I am certain that many little half-created doubts and questions would be cast into, and cultivated in America. If, on the other hand, I should be of opinion that this point could be gained, and the event prove otherwise, it would soon be whispered, what rich supplies and golden opportunities the United States had lost by my obstinacy.

I permitted my mind to dwell on these considerations, merely that I might, by the utmost degree of circ.u.mspection, endeavor to render the uprightness and propriety of my conduct as evident as possible.

My only difficulty arose from this single question. Whether I could prudently risk acting on a presumption, either that Spain did not already, or would not soon be acquainted with the contents of this instruction. If such a presumption had been admissible, I should, without the least hesitation, have played the game a little further, keeping this instruction in my hand as a trump card, to prevent a separate peace between Spain and Britain, in case such an event should otherwise prove inevitable. Had Spain been at peace with our enemies, and offered to acknowledge, guaranty, and fight for our independence, provided we would yield them this point, (as once seemed to be the case) I should, for my own part, have no more hesitation about it now than I had then. But Spain being now at war with Great Britain, to gain her own objects, she doubtless will prosecute it full as vigorously as if she fought for our objects. There was and is little reason to suppose that such a cession would render her exertions more vigorous, or her aids to us much more liberal. The effect, which an alliance between Spain and America would have on Britain and other nations, would certainly be in our favor, but whether more so than the free navigation of the Mississippi is less certain. The cession of this navigation will, in my opinion, render a future war with Spain unavoidable, and I shall look upon my subscribing to the one as fixing the certainty of the other.

I say I should have played this game a little further, if the presumption before mentioned had been admissible, because it has uniformly been my opinion, that if after sending me here Congress had constantly avoided all questions about the Mississippi, and appeared to consider that point as irrevocable, Spain would have endeavored to purchase it by money, or a free port, but as her hopes of a change in the opinion of Congress were excited, and kept alive by successive accounts of debates, and intended debates on that question, and as Congress by drawing bills without previous funds had painted their distress for want of money in very strong colors, Spain began to consider America as a pet.i.tioner, and treated her accordingly. But as by the intervention of Dr Franklin, our bills for near six months were safe, and as after this resolution of the 15th of February, there was reason to expect that the subject of it would not soon be resumed in Congress, I should, in case I could have depended on this instruction's being and remaining a secret, have thought it my duty to have given the United States a fair trial for the Mississippi, or at least for a free port near it. With this view I should have appeared to give myself no concern about the bills, applied for no aids, made no offers, and on all proper occasion have treated an alliance with Spain as an event, which, though wished for by us, was not essential to our safety, and as the price demanded for it appeared to us unreasonable, it was not probable we should agree. I think we should then have been courted in our turn, especially as the Minister was very desirous of having our men-of-war on the stocks, and that thus dealing with them on terms of equality, would have produced some concessions on their part, as inducements to greater ones on ours. I am persuaded in my own mind, that prudent self-respect is absolutely necessary to those nations, who would wish to be treated properly by this Court, and I have not the least doubt but that almost any spirit will prosper more here, than that of humility and compliance. I had no doubt but that this plan of conduct would have been perfectly consistent with that part of the instruction, which orders me to make every possible effort to obtain from his Catholic Majesty the use of the river aforesaid, &c. For whatever might have been, or may be, my private sentiments, they shall never in mere questions of policy influence me to deviate from those of Congress.

But on the other hand there being abundant circ.u.mstantial evidence to induce a firm persuasion, that the Ministry were well acquainted with the contents of this instruction, this plan would have been idle. The moment they saw that the cession of this navigation was made to depend upon their persevering to insist upon it, it became absurd to suppose, that they would cease to persevere. All that remained for me therefore to do was, in the next conference to break this subject as decently as possible, and in such a manner as would account for my not having mentioned this instruction at our last meeting.

On Wednesday evening, the 23d of May, I waited upon the Count agreeably to his appointment. The Count seemed a little hurried in his spirits, and behaved as if he wished I had not come. He asked me rather abruptly, if I had anything particular to communicate to him, and whether I had received any further letters. I told him I had received some private ones from L'Orient, but that none from the President of Congress had as yet, reached me, though I had reason to expect one by that opportunity, as well as by the vessel lately arrived at Cadiz. I informed him of my having received from Mr Harrison a copy of his memorial to the Governor of Cadiz, complaining that letters brought for him by the Virginia, from Philadelphia, had been stopped at the gates, on pretence, that they must agreeably to an ordinance for that purpose be put into the post office, and charged with the like postage as if brought from Spanish America. He said he had not yet received a copy of the memorial, but that there was such an ordinance, and that it was highly proper the admission of letters into the kingdom, especially in time of war, should be under the direction of government. That letters from North America rendered new regulations necessary, and that he would turn his thoughts to this subject, and do what should appear equitable. This was another proof of what I before suspected, and looked like an indirect apology for opening my letters.

It surprised me a little that he said nothing of the remarks he had desired me to make on M. Gardoqui's going to America, especially as he had appointed this meeting for that purpose. To give him further time, I started a new subject, and begged he would take the earliest opportunity of completing the business of the Dover cutter.

Notwithstanding all that had before pa.s.sed between us about this affair, he affected to be very ignorant of it, and asked me a number of questions. I recapitulated the circ.u.mstances of the capture, my several applications to him on the subject, his promise finally to order the prize to be appraised, and the value to be paid to the captors, the arrival of one of them at Madrid, &c. &c. He replied, with some degree of quickness and perplexity, that it was not a lawful prize, the crew not having authority to do what they did; that he had sent to the Canaries for particular information respecting the value, &c. that two of the packet boats had been taken; that he would pay some gratuity to the captors, and wished I would give him another state of the whole case in writing, to refresh his memory, which I promised to do, and have since done.

He then resumed the subject of the letter, which I expected from Congress. He expressed his regret at its not having arrived, said he was preparing instructions for M. Gardoqui, who would certainly depart in June, and that until I could give him precise information of the dispositions of Congress, he could not enter into any further conversations on the subject of the proposed treaty. I joined in regretting the miscarriage of my public letter, and the more so, as my private ones gave me reason to expect instructions, which would enable me to comply so far with his Majesty's views, as that I hoped no further delays would intervene to prevent a perfect union between Spain and the United States. That my correspondence had given me to understand that Congress viewed the speedy accomplishment of this union as very important to the common cause; and, therefore, if Spain would consent forthwith to come into it, in that case they would gratify his Majesty by ceding to him the navigation of the Mississippi, below their territories, on reasonable terms.

He replied, that he earnestly desired to see all difficulties on this point removed, but that the treaties subsisting between Spain and other nations, as well as the particular policy and determination of Spain, rendered it necessary that she should possess the exclusive navigation of the Gulf of Mexico. After a variety of other remarks of little importance, he made a very interesting observation, which will help us to account for the delays of the Court, viz. That all these affairs could with more facility be adjusted at a general peace than now, for that such a particular, and even secret treaty with us might then be made, as would be very convenient to both. That he nevertheless wished to know exactly the views and intentions of Congress, but that I must wait for the arrival of my letters, and that he would in the meantime finish M. Gardoqui's instructions, whose going to America, he did not doubt, would make a useful impression on the English Court. I was beginning to reply to what he said when he interrupted me, by mentioning his not having time at present to prolong the conference.

Throughout the whole of this conversation, the Count appeared much less cordial than in the preceding one; he seemed to want self-possession, and to that cause I ascribe his incautiously mentioning the general peace as the most proper season for completing our political connexions. I had, nevertheless, no reason to suspect that this change in his behavior arose from any cause more important than those variations in temper and feelings, which they, who are unaccustomed to govern themselves often experience from changes in the weather, in their health, from fatigue of business, or other such like accidental causes.

As I had not as yet received any letter from the President, either by the Virginia, or the vessel lately arrived at L'Orient, nor by Colonel Laurens, who, I was informed, had brought letters for me, I concluded it would be most prudent to wait ten days, or a fortnight, before I proceeded to act on the copy of my instruction received from Mr Lovell, expecting that such other letters as might then have arrived in France or Spain for me, would reach me in the course of that interval, if at all. And I determined, in case I should receive none, to proceed, without further loss of time, to make a formal overture to the Minister for a treaty on the ground of this instruction. It happened, however, that the Minister was so occupied during the remaining time that the Court staid at Aranjues, by the expedition preparing to sail from Cadiz, under the Duke of Crillon, and other matters, that it was impossible to engage a moment of his attention to American affairs. The removal of the Court to Madrid necessarily consumed some time, and as soon as they were well settled there, I wrote the Count the following letter; none of the letters expected from America having come to my hands.

TO THE COUNT DE FLORIDA BLANCA.

Madrid, July 2d, 1781.

"Sir,

"When Congress were pleased to order me to Spain, with the commission of which I have had the honor of presenting a copy to your Excellency, I left my country with the most sanguine expectations, that the important objects of it would be speedily accomplished. The proofs they had received of his Majesty's friendship for them, the interests of a common cause, and the information they had received from persons whom they conceived in capacity to give it, all conspired to infuse these hopes.

"On my arrival, your Excellency gave me to understand, that the realising these expectations would turn on one point, and I have uniformly since been informed, that this point was the navigation of the Mississippi below the territories of the United States, in which Congress desired to retain a common right, but of which the maxims of policy adopted by his Majesty required the exclusive use.

"I have now the honor of informing your Excellency, that Congress, in order to manifest in the most striking manner the sincerity of their professions to his Majesty, and with a view that the common cause may immediately reap all the advantages naturally to be expected from a cordial and permanent union between France, Spain, and the United States, have authorised me to agree to such terms relative to the point in question, as to remove the difficulties to which it has. .h.i.therto given occasion.

"Permit me, therefore, to hope, that his Majesty will now be pleased to become the ally of the United States, and for that purpose authorise some person or persons to adjust with me the several points of compact necessary to form a union, which, by being founded on mutual interest, may be no less satisfactory than it certainly will be important to both countries.