The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume VI Part 40

The instructions from Congress, which direct us to pay so strict an attention to the French Ministry, and to follow their advice, are conceived in terms so universal and unlimited, as to give a great deal of anxiety to my mind.

There is no man more impressed with the obligation of obedience to instructions; but, in ordinary cases, the princ.i.p.al is so near the Deputy, as to be able to attend to the whole progress of the business, and to be informed of every new fact, and every sudden thought.

Amba.s.sadors in Europe can send expresses to their Courts, and give and receive intelligence in a few days, with the utmost certainty. In such cases there is no room for mistake, misunderstanding, or surprise. But, in our case, it is very different. We are at an immense distance. Despatches are liable to foul play, and vessels are subject to accidents. New scenes open, the time presses, various nations are in suspense, and necessity forces us to act.

What can we do? If a French Minister advises us to cede to the Spaniards the whole river of the Mississippi, and five hundred miles of territory to the eastward of it, are we bound by our instructions to put our signature to the cession, when the English themselves are willing we should extend to the river, and enjoy our natural right to its navigation? If we should be counselled to relinquish our right to the fishery on the Grand Bank of Newfoundland, when the British Ministry are ready, by treaty, to acknowledge our right to it, are we obliged to relinquish it? If we are advised to restore and compensate the tories, are we to comply? If we know, or have reasons to believe, that things, which will have weight upon the minds of the British Ministry against us upon some points, will be communicated to them in some way or other, secret or open, if we communicate it to this Court, are we bound to do it?

I cannot think, that a construction, so literal and severe, was ever intended to be put upon it; and, therefore, I see no way of doing my duty to Congress, but to interpret the instruction, as we do all general precepts and maxims, by such restrictions and limitations, as reason, necessity, and the nature of things demand.

It may sometimes be known to a deputy, that an instruction from his princ.i.p.al was given upon information of mistaken facts, what is he to do? When he knows, that if the truth had been known, his princ.i.p.al would have given a directly contrary order, is he to follow that, which issued upon mistake? When he knows, or has only good reason to believe, that, if his princ.i.p.al were on the spot, and fully informed of the present state of facts, he would give contrary directions, is he bound by such as were given before? It cannot be denied, that instructions are binding, that it is a duty to obey them, and that a departure from them cannot be justified; but I think it cannot be denied on the other hand, that in our peculiar situation, cases may happen, in which it might become our duty to depend upon being excused, (or, if you will, pardoned) for presuming, that if Congress were upon the spot, they would judge as we do.

I presume not to dictate, nor to advise, but I may venture to give my opinion, as I do freely, and with much real concern for the public, that it would be better, if every instruction in being were totally repealed, which enjoins upon any American Minister to follow, or ask the advice, or even to communicate with any French, or other Minister, or Amba.s.sador in the world. It is an inextricable embarra.s.sment everywhere. Advice would not be more seldom asked, nor communication less frequent. It would be more freely given. A communication of information, or a request of council would then be received as a compliment, and a mark of respect; it is now considered as a duty and a right. Your Ministers would have more weight, and be the more respected through the world. Congress cannot do too much to give weight to their own Ministers, for, they may depend upon it, great and unjustifiable pains are taken to prevent them from acquiring reputation, and even to prevent an idea taking root in any part of Europe, that anything has been, or can be done by them. And there is nothing, that humbles and depresses, nothing that shackles and confines, in short, nothing that renders totally useless all your Ministers in Europe, so much as these positive instructions, to consult and communicate with French Ministers, upon all occasions, and follow their advice. And I really think it would be better to const.i.tute the Count de Vergennes, our sole Minister, and give him full powers to make peace and treat with all Europe, than to continue any of us in the service, under the instructions in being, if they are to be understood in that unlimited sense, which some persons contend for.

I hope, that nothing indecent has escaped me upon this occasion. If any expressions appear too strong, the great importance of the subject, and the deep impression it has made on my mind and heart, must be my apology.

I am, Sir, your humble servant,

JOHN ADAMS.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, November 24th, 1782.

Sir,

We live in critical moments. Parliament is to meet, and the King's speech will be delivered on the 26th. If the speech announces Mr Oswald's commission, and the two Houses in their answers thank him for issuing it, and there should be no change in the Ministry, the prospect of peace will be flattering. Or if there should be a change in the Ministry, and the Duke of Portland, with Mr Fox and Mr Burke, should come in, it will be still more so. But if Richmond, Cambden, Keppel, and Townshend should retire, and my Lord North and company come in, with or without the Earl of Shelburne, the appearances of peace will be very unpromising. My Lord North, indeed, cannot revoke the acknowledgment of our independence, and would not probably renounce the negotiations for peace, but ill will to us is so habitual to him and his master, that he would fall in earnestly with the wing-clipping system; join in attempts to deprive us of the fisheries and the Mississippi, and to fasten upon us the tories, and in every other measure to cramp, stint, impoverish and enfeeble us. Shelburne is not so orthodox as he should be, but North is a much greater heretic in American politics.

It deserves much consideration what course we should take, in case the old Ministry should come in wholly, or in part. It is certain, at present, that to be obnoxious to the Americans, and their Ministers, is a very formidable popular cry against any Minister or candidate for the Ministry in England, for the nation is more generally for recovering the good will of the Americans than they ever have been.

Nothing would strike such a blow to any Ministry, as to break off the negotiations for peace; if the old Ministry come in, they will demand terms of us, at first, probably, that we can never agree to.

It is now eleven or twelve days, since the last result of our conferences were laid before the Ministry in London. Mr Vaughan went off on Sunday noon, the 17th. So that he is, no doubt, before this time with my Lord Shelburne. He is possessed of an ample budget of arguments to convince his Lordship, that he ought to give up all the remaining points between us. Mr Oswald's letters will suggest the same arguments in a different light, and Mr Strachey, if he is disposed to do it, is able to enlarge upon them all in conversation.

The fundamental point of the sovereignty of the United States being settled in England, the only question now is, whether they shall pursue a contracted, or a liberal, a good natured, or an ill natured plan towards us. If they are generous, and allow us all we ask, it will be the better for them; if stingy, the worse. That France does not wish them to be very n.o.ble to us, may be true. But we should be dupes indeed, if we did not make use of every argument with them, to show them that it is their interest to be so. And they will be the greatest bubbles of all, if they should suffer themselves to be deceived by their pa.s.sions, or by any arts, to adopt an opposite tenor of conduct.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, December 4th, 1782.

Sir,

It is with much pleasure, that I transmit you the preliminary treaty between the King of Great Britain and the United States of America.

The Mississippi, the western lands, Sagadehock, and the fisheries, are secured as well as we could, and I hope what is done for the refugees will be pardoned.

As the objects, for which I ever consented to leave my family and country, are thus far accomplished, I now beg leave to resign all my employments in Europe. They are soon enumerated; the first, is my commission to borrow money in Holland, and the second, is my credence to their High Mightinesses. These two should be filled up immediately, and as Mr Laurens was originally designed to that country, and my mission there was merely owing to his misfortune, I hope that Congress will send him a full power for that Court.

The commission for peace I hope will be fully executed before this reaches you. But, if it should not, as the terms are fixed, I should not choose to stay in Europe, merely for the honor of affixing my signature to the definitive treaty, and I see no necessity of filling up my place; but if Congress should think otherwise, I hope they will think Mr Dana the best ent.i.tled to it.

With great esteem, I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

EXTRACTS FROM A JOURNAL.

_Sat.u.r.day, November 2d, 1782._--Almost every moment of this week has been employed in negotiation with the English gentlemen, concerning peace. We have two propositions, one, the line of fortyfive degrees, the other, a line through the middle of the Lakes. And for the boundary between Ma.s.sachusetts and Nova Scotia, a line from the mouth of St Croix to its source, and from its source to the Highlands.

_Sunday, November 3d._--In my first conversation with Dr Franklin, on Tuesday last, he told me of Mr Oswald's demand of the payment of debts, and compensation to the tories; he said their answer had been, that we had not power, nor had Congress. I told him, I had no notion of cheating anybody. The question of paying debts, and compensating tories, were two. I had made the same observation that forenoon to Mr Oswald and Mr Strachey, in company with Mr Jay, at his house. I saw it struck Mr Strachey with peculiar pleasure; I saw it instantly smiling in every line of his face. Mr Oswald was apparently pleased with it too. In a subsequent conversation with my colleagues, I proposed to them, that we should agree that Congress should recommend it to the States, to open their courts of justice for the recovery of all just debts. They gradually fell into this opinion, and we all expressed these sentiments to the English gentlemen, who were much pleased with it, and with reason; because it silences the clamors of all the British creditors against the peace, and prevents them from making common cause with the refugees. Mr Jay came in and spent two hours in conversation upon our affairs, and we attempted an answer to Mr Oswald's letter. He is perfectly of my opinion, or I am of his, respecting Mr Dana's true line of conduct, as well as his with Spain, and ours with France, Spain, and England.

Vergennes has endeavored to persuade him to treat with d'Aranda, without exchanging powers. He refuses. Vergennes also p.r.o.nounced Oswald's first commission sufficient, and was for making the acknowledgment of American independence, the first article of the treaty. Jay would not treat; the consequence was, a complete acknowledgment of our independence by Oswald's new commission, under the great seal of Great Britain, to treat with the Commissioners of the United States of America. Thus a temperate firmness has succeeded everywhere, but the base system nowhere.

D'Estaing has set off for Madrid and Cadiz; _reste a savoir_ what his object is, whether to take the command of a squadron, and in that case, where to go, whether to Rhode Island, to join Vaudreuil, and go against New York, or to the West Indies. Will they take New York, or only prevent the English from evacuating it? Oswald proposed solemnly to all three of us yesterday, at his house, to agree not to molest the British troops in the evacuation; but we did not. This, however, shows they have it in contemplation. Suppose they are going against West Florida. How far are we bound to favor the Spaniards? Our treaty with France must, and shall be sacredly fulfilled, and we must admit Spain to accede when she will; but until she does, our treaty does not bind us to France to a.s.sist Spain.

The present conduct of England and America, resembles that of the eagle and cat. An eagle, scaling over a farmer's yard, espied a creature that he thought a hare. He pounced upon and took him up in the air, the cat seized him by the neck with her teeth, and round the body with her fore and hind claws. The eagle, finding himself scratched and pressed, bids the cat let go, and fall down. No, says the cat, I will not let go and fall, you shall stoop and set me down.

_Monday, November 4th._--All the forenoon, from eleven till three, at Mr Oswald's, Mr Jay and I. In the evening there again, until near eleven. Strachey is as artful and insinuating a man as they could send; he pushes and presses every point as far as it can possibly go; he has a most eager, earnest, pointed spirit.

_Tuesday, November 5th._ Mr Jay told me our allies did not play fair.

They were endeavoring to deprive us of the fishery, the western lands, and the navigation of the Mississippi. They would even bargain with the English, to deprive us of them. They want to lay the western lands, Mississippi, and the whole Gulf of Mexico into the hands of Spain.

Oswald talks of Pultney, and a plot to divide America between France and England. France to have New England. They tell a story about Vergennes, and his agreeing that the English might propose such a division, but reserving a right to deny it all. These whispers ought not to be credited by us.

_Sat.u.r.day, November 9th._--M. de Lafayette came in, and told me he had been at Versailles, and in consultation about the affair of money, as he and I agreed he should. He said he found, that the Count de Vergennes and their Ministry were of the same opinion with me, that the English were determined to evacuate New York. After some time, he told me, in a great air of confidence, that he was afraid the Count took it amiss, that I had not been to Versailles to see him. The Count told him, that he had not been officially informed of my arrival, he had only learned it from the returns of the police. I went out to Pa.s.sy to dine with Dr Franklin, who had been to Versailles, and presented his Memorial, and the papers accompanying it. The Count said he would have the papers translated to lay them before the King, but the affair would meet with many difficulties. Franklin brought the same message to me from the Count, and said he believed it would be taken kindly if I went. I told both the Marquis and the Doctor, that I would go tomorrow morning.

_Sunday, November 10th._--Accordingly, at eight this morning, I went and waited on the Count. He asked me how we went on with the English.

I told him we divided upon two points, the tories and Pen.o.bscot, two ostensible points; for it was impossible to believe, that my Lord Shelburne, or the nation, cared much about such points. I took out of my pocket, and showed him, the record of Governor Pownal's solemn act of burying a leaden plate, with this inscription; 'May 23d, 1759.

Province of Ma.s.sachusetts Bay. Pen.o.bscot dominions of Great Britain.

Possession confirmed by Thomas Pownal, Governor.' This was planted on the east side of the river of Pen.o.bscot, three miles above marine navigation. I showed him also all the other records, the laying out of Mount Desert, Machias, and all the other towns to the east of Pen.o.bscot river, and told him, that the grant of Nova Scotia, by James the First, to Sir William Alexander, bounded it on the river St Croix, and that I was possessed of the authorities of four of the greatest Governors the King of England ever had, Shirley, Pownal, Bernard, and Hutchinson, in favor of our claim, and of learned writings of Shirley and Hutchinson in support of it. The Count said, that Mr Fitzherbert told him they wanted it for the masts. But the Count said, that Canada had an immense quant.i.ty. I told him I thought there were few masts there, but, that I fancied it was _not masts, but tories_, that again made the difficulty. Some of them claimed lands in that territory, and others hoped for grants there.

The Count said, it was not astonishing, that the British Ministry should insist upon compensation to them, for that all the precedents were in favor of it; that there had been no example of an affair like this terminated by a treaty, without re-establishing those who had adhered to the old government, in all their possessions. I begged his pardon in this, and said, that in Ireland at least there had been a mult.i.tude of confiscations without rest.i.tution. Here we ran into some conversation concerning Ireland, &c. M. Rayneval, who was present, talked about the national honor, and the obligation they were under to support their adherents. Here I thought I might indulge a little more lat.i.tude of expression, than I had done with Oswald and Strachey, and I answered, if the nation thought itself bound in honor to compensate these people, it might easily do it, for it cost the nation more money to carry on this war one month, than it would cost it to compensate them all. But I could not comprehend this doctrine of national honor.

Those people, by their misrepresentations had deceived the nation, who had followed the impulsion of their devouring ambition, until it had brought an indelible stain on the British name, and almost irretrievable ruin on the nation, and now that very nation was thought to be bound in honor to compensate its dishonorers and destroyers.

Rayneval said it was very true.

The Count invited me to dine; I accepted. When I came, I found M. de Lafayette in conference with him. When they came out, the Marquis took me aside, and told me he had been talking with the Count upon the affair of money. He had represented to him Mr Morris's arguments, and the things I had said to him, as from himself, &c. That he feared the arts of the English, that our army would disband, and our governments relax, &c. That the Count feared many difficulties; that France had expended two hundred and fifty millions in this war, &c. That he talked of allowing six millions, and my going to Holland with the scheme I had projected, and having the King's warranty, &c. to get the rest; that he had already spoken to some of M. de Fleury's friends, and intended to speak to him, &c.

We went up to dinner. I went up with the Count alone. He showed me into the room where were the ladies and the company. I singled out the Countess, and went up to her to make her my compliment. The Countess, and all the ladies rose up. I made my respects to them all, and turned and bowed to the rest of the company. The Count, who came in after me, made his bows to the ladies, and to the Countess last. When he came to her, he turned round and called out, _Mons. Adams, venez ici, voila la Comtesse de Vergennes_. A n.o.bleman in company said, Mr Adams has already made his court to Madame la Comtesse. I went up again, however, and spoke again to the Countess, and she to me. When dinner was served, the Count led Madame de Montmorin, and left me to conduct the Countess, who gave me her hand with extraordinary condescension, and I conducted her to table. She made me sit next to her, on her right hand, and was remarkably attentive to me the whole time. The Count, who sat opposite, was constantly calling out to me, to know what I would eat, and to offer me _pet.i.ts gateaux_, claret, and Madeira, &c. &c. In short, I was never treated with half the respect at Versailles in my life. In the antichamber, before dinner, some French gentlemen came to me, and said they had seen me two years ago, and that I had shown in Holland, that the Americans understood negotiation, as well as war.

_Monday, November 11th._ Mr Whiteford the Secretary of Mr Oswald, came a second time, not having found me at home yesterday, when he left a card, with a copy of Mr Oswald's commission, attested by himself (Mr Oswald). He delivered the copy, and said Mr Oswald was ready to compare it with the original with me. I said Mr Oswald's attestation was sufficient, as he had already shown me the original. He sat down, and we fell into conversation about the weather, and the vapors and exhalations from Tartary, which had been brought here last spring by the winds, and given us all the influenza. Thence to French fashions and the punctuality, with which they insist upon people's wearing thin clothes in spring and fall, though the weather is ever so cold, &c. I said it was often carried to ridiculous lengths, but that it was at bottom an admirable policy, as it rendered all Europe tributary to the city of Paris, for its manufactures.

We fell soon into politics. I told him, that there was something in the minds of the English and French, which impelled them irresistibly to war every ten or fifteen years. He said the ensuing peace would, he believed, be a long one. I said it would, provided it was well made, and nothing left in it to give future discontents. But if anything was done, which the Americans should think hard or unjust, both the English and French would be continually blowing it up, and inflaming the American minds with it, in order to make them join one side or the other in a future war. Suppose for example, they should think the tories men of monarchical principles, or men of more ambition than principle, or men corrupted and of no principle, and should therefore think them more easily seduced to their purposes, than virtuous republicans, is it not easy to see the policy of a French Minister in wishing them amnesty and compensation? Suppose a French Minister foresees, that the presence of the tories in America will keep up perpetually two parties, a French party, and an English party, and that this will compel the patriotic and independent party to join the French party, is it not natural for him to wish them restored? Is it not easy to see, that a French Minister cannot wish to have the English and Americans perfectly agreed upon all points before they themselves, the Spaniards and the Dutch are agreed too? Can they be sorry then to see us split upon such a point as the tories? What can be their motives to become the advocates of the tories?

The French Minister at Philadelphia has made some representations to Congress, in favor of a compensation to the royalists, and the Count de Vergennes no longer than yesterday said much to me in their favor.