The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume VI Part 18

This nation is not blind; it is bound and cannot get loose. There is great reason to fear, that they will be held inactive, until they are wholly ruined. Cornwallis' fate, however, has somewhat emboldened them, and I have received unexpected visits of congratulation from several persons of note; and there are appearances of a growing interest in favor of an alliance with France and America. If I were now to make the proposition, I think it would have a great effect. I must, however, wait for the approbation of the Duke, and he, perhaps, for instructions from Versailles, and, indeed, a little delay will perhaps do no harm, but give opportunity to prepare the way. The general cry at this time in pamphlets and public papers, is for an immediate connexion with France and America.

The consent of Zealand is expected immediately to the loan of five millions for his Most Christian Majesty. My loan rests as it was, at a few thousand guilders, which, by the advice of Dr Franklin, I reserve for the relief of our countrymen, who escape from prison in England in distress. I have ordered a hundred pounds for President Laurens in the Tower, at the earnest solicitation of his daughter, who is in France, and of some of his friends in England; but for further supplies have referred them to Dr Franklin. I some time since had an intimation that the British Ministry were endeavoring to form secret contracts with traitorous Americans to supply the masts for the royal navy. According to my information, the British navigation in all parts of the world is at present distressed for masts, especially those of the largest size.

Congress will take such measures as to their wisdom shall appear proper to prevent Americans from this wicked and infamous commerce, I wrote to Dr Franklin upon the subject, who communicated my letter, as I requested, at Court, and his Excellency supposes that the Count de Vergennes will write to Congress, or to the Chevalier de la Luzerne upon the subject.

The Continental goods left here by Commodore Gillon, are detained for freight and damages, and very unjustly as I conceive. I am doing all in my power to obtain possession of them, and send them to America, or dispose of them here, at as little loss as possible, according to the desire and advice of Dr Franklin. It is not necessary to trouble Congress to read a volume of letters upon the subject of these goods.

All that can be done by me, has been and shall be done to save the public interest. This piece of business has been managed as ill as any that has ever been done for Congress in Europe, whether it is owing to misfortune, want of skill, or anything more disagreeable.

The Court of Russia does not at present appear to be acting that n.o.ble part, which their former conduct gave cause to expect. Mr Dana is at Petersburg, but he prudently avoids writing. If he sees no prospect of advantage in staying there, he will be very silent, I believe, and not stay very long.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

FOOTNOTE:

[5] For these instructions, and Mr Adams' new commission to form a treaty of alliance with the United Provinces, see the _Secret Journals of Congress_, Vol. II pp. 470, 472.

THE DUC DE LA VAUGUYON TO JOHN ADAMS.

Translation.

The Hague, December 7th, 1781.

Sir,

I have received the letter you did me the honor to write me, and the copy of the resolutions of Congress, of the 16th of August last. I flatter myself, that you will not doubt of my zeal to concert with you the ulterior measures, which they may require, as soon as the King has authorised me. But until his Majesty has transmitted to me his orders on this point, I can only repeat to you the a.s.surances of my zeal for everything interesting to the common cause of France and North America, and the peculiar satisfaction I shall derive from my connexions with you in all circ.u.mstances.

I have the honor to be, &c.

DE LA VAUGUYON.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Amsterdam, December 13th, 1781.

Sir,

The answer of my Lord Stormont to M. Simolin is as follows.

"The alliance, which has subsisted so many years between Great Britain and the States-General, has always been considered by his Majesty as a connexion founded on the most natural relations, and which was not only conformable to the interests of the two nations, but as essential to their mutual well-being. The King has done everything on his part to maintain these connexions and to strengthen them; and if the conduct of their High Mightinesses had been answerable to that of his Majesty, they would have subsisted at this hour in all their force.

But from the commencement of the present troubles, the single return with which the Republic has requited the constant friendship of the King, has been the renunciation of the principles of an alliance, the primary object of which was the mutual defence of the two nations; an obstinate refusal to fulfil the most sacred obligations; a daily violation of the most solemn treaties; an a.s.sistance given to those very enemies against whom the King had a right to demand succor; an asylum granted to American pirates in the ports of Holland, in public violation of the clearest stipulations; and to fill up the measure, a denial of justice and of satisfaction for the affront offered to the dignity of the King by a secret league with his rebel subjects.

"All these acc.u.mulated grievances have not permitted the King to act any other part, than that which he has taken with the most sensible reluctance. When we laid before the public the motives which had rendered this rupture inevitable, the King attributed the conduct of the Republic to its true cause, viz. the unfortunate influence of a faction, which sacrificed the interest of the nation to private views; but the King at the same time manifested the sincerest desire to be able to draw back the Republic to a system of strict union, efficacious alliance and reciprocal protection, which has so greatly contributed to the well-being and to the glory of the two nations.

"When the Empress of Russia offered her good offices to effectuate a reconciliation by a particular peace, the King testified his grat.i.tude for this fresh proof of a friendship, which is to him so precious, and avoided to expose the mediation of her Majesty to the danger of a fruitless negotiation; he explained the reasons which convinced him, that in the then prevailing disposition of the Republic, governed by a faction, any reconciliation during the war with France, would be but a reconciliation in appearance, and would give to the party which rule in the Republic, an opportunity to re-a.s.sume the part of a secret auxiliary of all the King's enemies, under the mask of a feigned alliance with Great Britain. But if there are certain indications of an alteration in this disposition; if the powerful intervention of her Imperial Majesty can accomplish this change, and reclaim the Republic to principles, which the wisest part of the nation has never abandoned; his Majesty will be ready to treat of a separate peace with their High Mightinesses; and he hopes that the Empress of all the Russias may be the sole mediatrix of this peace. She was the first to offer her good offices; and an intervention so efficacious and so powerful as her's, cannot gain in weight and influence by the accession of the most respectable allies. The friendship of the Empress towards the two nations, the interest which her empire has in their reciprocal welfare, her known impartiality, and her elevated views, are so many securities for the manner in which she will conduct this salutary work, and in a negotiation, which has for its end the termination of a war, caused by the violation of treaties, and an affront offered to the Crown of a King, his Majesty refers himself with equal satisfaction and confidence to the mediation of a Sovereign, who holds sacred the faith of treaties, who knows so well the value of the dignity of Sovereigns, and who has maintained her own, during her glorious reign, with so much firmness and grandeur."

Thus the mediation of Russia is accepted, and that of Sweden and Denmark refused. The instructions of Congress and their new commission of last August are arrived in most happy time, to counteract this insidious manoeuvre, and I hope the Duc de la Vauguyon will receive his instructions on the same subject before it be too late.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Amsterdam, December 14th, 1781.

Sir,

The first public body, which has proposed a connexion with the United States, is the Quarter of Oostergo, in the Province of Friesland. The proposition is in these words;

"Every impartial patriot has a long time perceived, that in the direction of affairs relative to this war with England, there has been manifested an inconceivable lukewarmness and sloth; but they discover themselves still more at this moment, by the little inclination which in general the Regencies of the Belgic Provinces testify to commence a treaty of commerce and friendship with the new Republic of the Thirteen United States of North America; and to contract engagements, at least during the continuance of this common war with the Crowns of France and Spain. Nevertheless, the necessity of these measures appears clearly, since according to our judgments, nothing was more natural, nor more conformable to sound policy, founded upon the laws of nature the most precise, than that this Republic immediately after the formal declaration of war by the English, (not being yet able to do anything by military exploits, not being in a state of defence sufficiently respectable to dare at sea to oppose one fleet or squadron to our perfidious enemy,) should have commenced by acknowledging, by a public declaration, the independence of North America.

"This would have been from that time the greatest step to the humiliation of England, and our own re-establishment, and by this measure, the Republic would have proved her firm resolution to act with vigor. Every one of our inhabitants, all Europe, who have their eyes fixed upon us, the whole world expected, with just reason, this measure from the Republic. It is true, that before the formal declaration of war by England, one might perhaps have alleged some plausible reasons to justify in some degree the backwardness in this great and interesting affair. But, as at present Great Britain is no longer our secret, but our declared enemy, which dissolves all the connexions between the two nations; and as it is the duty not only of all the Regencies, but also of all the citizens of this Republic to reduce by all imaginable annoyances this enemy, so unjust to reason, and to force him if possible, to conclude an honorable peace; why should we hesitate any longer to strike, by this measure so reasonable, the most sensible blow to the common enemy? Will not this delay occasion a suspicion, that we prefer the interest of our enemy, to that of our country? North America, so sensibly offended by the refusal of her offer; France and Spain, in the midst of a war supported with activity, must they not regard us as the secret friends and favorers of their and our common enemy? Have they not reason to conclude from it, that our inaction ought to be less attributed to our weakness, than to our affection for England? Will not this opinion destroy all confidence in our nation heretofore so renowned in this respect? And our allies, at this time natural, must they not imagine, that it is better to have in us declared enemies, than pretended friends; and shall we not be involved in a ruinous war, which we might have rendered advantageous, if it had been well directed?

"While, on the other hand, it is evident that by a new connexion with the States of North America, by engagements at least during this war with France and Spain, we shall obtain not only the confidence of these formidable powers instead of their distrust, but by this means we shall, moreover, place our Colonies in safety against every insult; we shall have a well-grounded hope of recovering with the aid of the allied powers, our lost possessions, if the English should make themselves masters of them, and our commerce, at present neglected and so shamefully pillaged, would rea.s.sume a new vigor, considering that in such case as it is manifestly proved by solid reasons, this Republic would derive from this commerce the most signal advantages.

But since our interest excites us forcibly to act in concert with the enemies of our enemy; since the Thirteen United States of North America invited us to it long ago; since France appears inclined to concert her military operations with ours, although this power has infinitely less interest to ally itself with us, whose weakness manifests itself in so palpable a manner than we are to form an alliance the most respectable in the universe; it is indubitably the duty of every regency to promote it with all its forces, and with all the celerity imaginable.

"To this effect we have thought it our duty to lay before your n.o.ble Mightinesses, in the firm persuasion that the zeal of your n.o.ble Mightinesses will be as earnest as ours, to concur to the accomplishment of this point, which is for us of the greatest importance; that consequently, your n.o.ble Mightinesses will not delay to co-operate with us, that upon this important object there may be made to their High Mightinesses a proposition so vigorous, that it may have the desired success; and that this affair, of an importance beyond all expression for our common country, may be resolved and decided by unanimous suffrages, and in preference to every particular interest."

M. Van der Capellan de Marsch was the first individual who ventured to propose in public a treaty with the United States, and the Quarter of Oostergo the first public body. This, indeed, is but a part of one branch of the sovereignty. But these motions will be honored by posterity. The whole Republic must follow. It is necessitated to it by a mechanism, as certain as clockwork; but its operations are and will be studiously and zealously slow. It will be a long time before the measure can be completed.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Amsterdam, December 18th, 1781.

Sir,

Having received an invitation to the Hague, in order to have some conversation with some gentlemen in the government, concerning the further steps proper for me to take in the present conjuncture, I had determined to have undertaken the journey today; but the arrival in town of the Duc de la Vauguyon, determined me to postpone it until tomorrow.

At noon, today, his Excellency did me the honor of a visit, and a long conversation upon the state of affairs at my house. He informed me, that upon the communication I had made to him, when he was here last, in person, and afterwards by letter, of my new commission and instructions, he had written to the Count de Vergennes; that he had explained to that Minister his own sentiments, and expected an answer.

His own idea is, that I should go to the Hague in some week, when there is a President whose sentiments and disposition are favorable, and demand an answer to my former proposition, and afterwards, that I should go round to the cities of Holland, and apply to the several Regencies.

He thinks that I may now a.s.sume a higher tone, which the late _Cornwallization_ will well warrant. I shall, however, take care not to advance too fast, so as to be unable to retreat. His advice is, to go to the Hague tomorrow, and meet the gentlemen who wish to see me there; this I shall do.

I have been very happy hitherto, in preserving an entire good understanding with this Minister, and nothing shall ever be wanting on my part, to deserve his confidence and esteem.

I have transmitted by two opportunities, one by Captain Trowbridge, from hence, another by Dr Dexter by the way of France, despatches from Mr Dana, at Petersburg, by which Congress will perceive that material advantages will arise from that gentleman's residence in that place, whether he soon communicates his mission to that Court or not.