The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution Volume VI Part 8

ARTICLE I.

The re-establishment of peace in America shall be negotiated between Great Britain and the American Colonies, but without the intervention of any of the other belligerent parties, nor even with that of the two Imperial Courts, unless their mediation should be formally asked and granted upon this object.

ARTICLE II.

This separate peace cannot, however, be signed, but conjointly, and at the same time with that of those powers whose interests shall have been negotiated by the mediating Courts, for this reason, although each peace may be separately treated, yet they cannot be concluded without each other. Care shall be taken to inform the mediators with certainty of the measures and state of that, which regards Great Britain and the Colonies, to the end, that the mediation may be able to regulate the measures intrusted to it, by the state of the negotiation relating to the colonies, and both of the pacifications, which shall have been concluded at the same time, although separately, shall be solemnly guarantied by the mediating Courts, and every other neutral power, whose guarantee the belligerent parties may think proper to claim.

ARTICLE III.

To render the negotiations for peace independent of the events of war, always uncertain, which may put a stop to, or at least r.e.t.a.r.d their progress, there shall be a general armistice between all parties during the term of a year, reckoning from ---- of the month of ---- of the present year, or of ---- years, reckoning from ---- of the month of ---- of the year 1782, should it happen that peace should not be re-established in the first period, and whilst the duration of either of these periods continue, everything shall remain in the state in which they shall be found at signing the present preliminary articles.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Paris, July 13th, 1781.

Sir,

I have the honor to enclose to your Excellency some remarks upon the articles, to serve as a basis of the negotiation for the re-establishment of peace, which you did me the honor to communicate to me.

As I am unacquainted, whether you desired my sentiments upon these articles merely for your own government, or with a design to communicate them to the Imperial Courts, I should be glad of your Excellency's advice concerning them. If your Excellency is of opinion there is anything exceptionable, or which ought to be altered, I should be glad to correct it; or if I have not perceived the points, or questions, upon which you desired my opinion, I shall be ready to give any further answers.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

ANSWER

_Of the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, to the Articles to serve as a Basis to the Negotiation for the Re-establishment of Peace._

ARTICLE I. The United States of America have no objection, provided their allies have none, to a treaty with Great Britain, concerning the re-establishment of peace in America, or to another concerning the re-establishment of commerce between the two nations, consistent with their obligations to France and Spain, without the intervention of any of the other belligerent parties, and even without that of the two Imperial Courts, at least, unless their mediation should be formally demanded and granted upon this object, according to the first article communicated to me.

ART. II. The United States have nothing to say, provided their allies have not, against the second article.

ART. III. To the armistice, and the _statu quo_, in the third article, the United States have very great objections, which indeed are so numerous and decisive, and at the same time so obvious, as to make it unnecessary to state them in detail.

The idea of a truce is not suggested in these articles; but as it is mentioned in some observations shown me by his Excellency, the Count de Vergennes, it may be necessary for me to add, that the United States are so deeply impressed with an apprehension, that any truce whatsoever would not fail to be productive of another long and b.l.o.o.d.y war at the termination of it, and that a short truce would be in many ways highly dangerous to them, that it would be with great reluctance that they should enter into any discussion at all upon such a subject.

Two express conditions would be indispensable preliminaries to their taking into consideration the subject of a truce at all. The first is, that their allies agree, that the treaties now subsisting remain in full force during and after the truce, until the final acknowledgment of their independence by Great Britain. The second is, the antecedent removal of the British land and naval armaments from every part of the United States. Upon these two express conditions as preliminaries, if a truce should be proposed for so long a period, or for an indefinite period, requiring so long notice, previous to a renewal of hostilities, as to evince that it is on the part of Great Britain a virtual relinquishment of the object of the war, and an expedient only to avoid the mortification of an express acknowledgment of the independence and sovereignty of the United States, they, with the concurrence of their allies, might accede to it.

It is requisite, however, to add; first, that the United States cannot consider themselves bound by this declaration, unless it should be agreed to before the opening of another campaign. Secondly, that it is not in the power of the Crown of Great Britain, by the const.i.tution of that kingdom, to establish any truce, or even armistice with the United States, which would not be illusory without the intervention of an act of Parliament, repealing or suspending all their statutes, which have any relation to the United States, or any of them. Without this, every officer of the navy would be bound by the laws, according to the maxims of their const.i.tution, to seize every American vessel that he should find, whose papers and distinction should not be found conformable to those statutes, and every French, Spanish, Dutch, or other foreign vessel, which he should find going to, or coming from America; notwithstanding any convention that is in the power of the Crown to make.

After all, the greatest difficulty does not lie in anything as yet mentioned. The great question is, in what character are the United States to be considered? They know themselves to be a free, sovereign, and independent State, of right and in fact.

They are considered and acknowledged as such by France. They cannot be represented in a Congress of Ministers from the several powers of Europe, whether their representative is called Amba.s.sador, Minister, or Agent, without an acknowledgment of their independence, of which the very admission of a representative from them is an avowal. Great Britain cannot agree with their representative upon a truce, or even an armistice, without admitting their freedom and independence.

As there is upon earth no judge of a sovereign State, but the nation that composes it, the United States can never consent, that their independence shall be discussed or called in question by any sovereign or sovereigns, however respectable, nor can their interests be made a question in any Congress, in which their character is not acknowledged, and their Minister admitted. If, therefore, the two Imperial Courts would acknowledge and lay down as a preliminary, the sovereignty of the United States, and admit their Minister to a Congress, after this, a treaty might be commenced between the Minister of Great Britain and the Minister of the United States, relative to a truce, or peace and commerce, in the manner proposed, without any express acknowledgment of their sovereignty by Great Britain, until the treaty should be concluded.

The sovereigns of Europe have a right to negotiate concerning their own interests, and to deliberate concerning the question, whether it is consistent with their dignity and interests, to acknowledge expressly the sovereignty of the United States, and to make treaties with them, by their Ministers in a Congress, or otherwise; and America could make no objection to it; but neither the United States nor France can ever consent, that the existence of their sovereignty shall be made a question in such Congress; because, let that Congress determine as it might, their sovereignty, with submission only to Divine Providence, never can, and never will be given up.

As the British Court, in first suggesting the idea of a Congress to the Imperial Courts, insisted upon the annihilation of the league, as they were pleased to call it, between France and their rebel subjects, as they were pleased again to phrase it, and upon the return of these to their allegiance and obedience, as preliminaries to any Congress or mediation; there is too much reason to fear, that the British Ministry have no serious intentions or sincere dispositions for peace, and that they mean nothing but amus.e.m.e.nt. Because, the support of the sovereignty of the United States was the primary object of the war, on the part of France and America; the destruction of it, that of Great Britain. If, therefore, the treaty between France and America were annulled, and the Americans returned to the domination and monopoly of Great Britain, there would be no need of troubling all Europe with a Congress to make peace. All points between France, Spain, and Great Britain, might be easily adjusted among themselves. Surely the affairs of Great Britain are, in no part of the world so triumphant, nor those of any of their enemies so adverse, as to give this Ministry any serious hopes, that France and America will renounce the object of the war. There must, therefore, be some other view.

It is not difficult to penetrate the design of the British Ministry upon this, any more than upon many former occasions. They think that a distrust of them, and a jealousy that they would not adhere with good faith to the propositions of reconciliation, which they have made from time to time, were, in the minds of the Americans, the true cause why these propositions were not accepted. They now think, that by prevailing on the two Imperial Courts, and other Courts, to warranty to the Americans any similar terms they may propose to them, they shall remove this obstacle; and by this means, although they know that no public authority in America will agree to such terms, they think they shall be able to represent things in such a light, as to induce many desertions from the American army, and many apostates from the American independence and alliance. In this way, they pursue their long practised arts of seduction, deception, and division. In these again, as in so many former attempts, they would find themselves disappointed, and would make very few deserters or apostates. But it is to be hoped, that the powers of Europe will not give to these superficial artifices, with which that Ministry have so long destroyed the repose of the United States, and of the British dominions at home and abroad, and disturbed the tranquillity of Europe, so much attention as to enable them to continue much longer such evils to mankind.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, July 15th, 1781.

Sir,

I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter to the Count de Vergennes, and of certain articles and their answers. The British Court proposed to the Imperial Courts, a Congress, upon two preliminary conditions, the rupture of the treaty with France, and the return of America to their obedience. The two Imperial Courts have since proposed the enclosed articles. Spain and France have prepared their answers. England has not answered yet, and no Ministers are yet commissioned or appointed by any power. If she accepts the terms, I should not scruple to accept them too, excepting the armistice and the _statu quo_. I mean I should not insist upon a previous explicit acknowledgment of the sovereignty of the United States, before I went to Vienna. I see nothing inconsistent with the character or dignity of the United States, in their Minister going to Vienna, at the same time when Ministers from the other powers are there, and entering into treaty with a British Minister without any explicit acknowledgment of our independence, before the conclusion of the treaty. The very existence of such a Congress would be of use to our reputation.

But I cannot yet believe that Britain will wave her preliminaries. She will still insist upon the dissolution of the treaty, and upon the return of the Americans under her government. This, however, will do no honor to her moderation or pacific sentiments, in the opinion of the powers of Europe.

Something may grow out of these negotiations in time, but it will probably be several years before anything can be done. Americans can only quicken these negotiations by decisive strokes. No depredations upon their trade, no conquests of their possessions in the East or West Indies will have any effect upon the English to induce them to make peace, while they see they have an army in the United States, and can flatter themselves with the hope of conquering or regaining America; because they think that with America under their government, they can easily regain whatever they may lose now in any part of the world. Whereas, the total expulsion of their forces in the United States would extinguish their hopes, and persuade them to peace, sooner than the loss of everything less. The belligerent powers and the neutral powers may flatter themselves with the hopes of a restoration of peace, but they will all be disappointed while the English have a soldier in America. It is amazing to me that France and Spain do not see it, and direct their forces accordingly.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Paris, July 16th, 1781.

Sir,

Since my letter of the 13th, upon further reflection, I have thought it necessary to explain myself a little more, particularly in some points, to your Excellency. If I comprehend the facts, the British Court first proposed to the Imperial Courts a Congress and a mediation, upon two conditions. 1st. The dissolution of the treaties between France and the United States. 2d. The return of the Americans under the British government.

In consequence of this proposal from the Court of St James, the two Imperial Courts have made the proposition of the articles, which were shown to me, to the Courts of France, Spain, and England, neither of which has yet given its answer. Their Imperial Majesties have omitted the two conditions, which the British Court insisted on as preliminaries, and mean to admit a representative of the United States to the Congress, to negotiate separately with the British Minister, without ascertaining the t.i.tle or character of the American representative, until the two pacifications shall be accomplished.

I am in my own mind apprehensive, though I devoutly wish I may be mistaken, that the British Court in their answer to the articles, will adhere to their two preliminaries. It is very convenient for the English to hold up the idea of peace; it serves them to relieve their credit at certain times when it is in distress; it serves to disconcert the projects of the neutral powers to their disadvantage; it enables their friends in the United Provinces, to keep the Dutch nation in that state of division, sloth and inactivity, from which they derive so much plunder, with so much safety. But I cannot persuade myself, that the English will soberly think of peace, while they have any military force in the United States, and can preserve a gleam of hope of conquering or regaining America. While this hope remains, no depredations on their commerce, no loss of dominions in the East or West Indies, will induce them to make peace; because they think, that with America reunited to them they could easily regain whatever they may now lose. This opinion of theirs may be extravagant and enthusiastical, and they would not find it so easy to recover their losses; but they certainly entertain it, and while it remains, I fear they will not make peace.

Yet it seems they have negotiated themselves into a delicate situation. If they should obstinately adhere to their two preliminaries, against the advice of the two Imperial Courts, this might seriously affect their reputation, if they have any, for moderation and for pacific dispositions, not only in those Courts, but in all the Courts and countries of Europe, and they would not easily answer it to their own subjects, who are weary of the war. Peace is so desirable an object, that humanity, as well as policy, demands of every nation at war a serious attention to every proposition, which seems to have a tendency to it, although there may be grounds to suspect, that the first proposer of it was not sincere. I think, that no power can judge the United States unreasonable in not agreeing to the _statu quo_, or the armistice. But perhaps I have not been sufficiently explicit upon another point.

The proposal of a separate treaty between the British Minister and the Representative of the United States, seems to be a benevolent invention to avoid several difficulties; among others, first, that England may be allowed to save her national pride, to think and to say, that the independence of America was agreed to voluntarily, and was not dictated to her by France and Spain; secondly, to avoid the previous acknowledgment of American independence, and the previous ascertaining the t.i.tle and character of the American Representative, which the Imperial Courts may think would be a partiality inconsistent with the character of mediators, and even of neutrals, especially as England has uniformly considered any such step as a hostility against them; though I know not upon what law of nations, or of reason.

I cannot see, that the United States would make any concession, or submit to any indignity, or do anything inconsistent with their character, if their Minister should appear at Vienna, or elsewhere, with the Ministers of other powers, and conduct any negotiation with a British Minister, without having the independence of the United States or his own t.i.tle and character acknowledged or ascertained, by any other power, except France, until the pacification should be concluded. I do not see, that America would lose anything by this, any more than by having a Minister in any part of Europe, with his character unacknowledged by all the powers of Europe. In order to remove every embarra.s.sment, therefore, as much as possible, if your Excellency should be of the same opinion, and advise me to it, I would withdraw every objection to the Congress on the part of the United States, and decline nothing but the _statu quo_, and the armistice, against which such reasons might be given, as I think would convince all men, that the United States are bound to refuse them. If your Excellency should think it necessary for me to a.s.sign these reasons particularly, I will attempt some of them; but it is sufficient for me to say to your Excellency, that my positive instructions forbid me to agree either to the armistice, or _statu quo_.

I have the honor to be, &c.