The Crisis of the Naval War Part 6

The result measured in loss of shipping (British, Allied, and neutral) from submarine and mine attack in the first half of the year was as follows in gross tonnage:

January - 324,016 February - 500,573 March - 555,991 April - 870,359 May - 589,754 June - 675,154 Because of the time required for production, it was a sheer impossibility to put into effect any fresh devices that might be adopted for dealing with submarine warfare for many months, and all that could be done was to try new methods of approach to the coast and, as the number of small craft suitable for escort duty increased, to extend gradually the convoy system already in force to a certain extent for the French coal trade and the Scandinavian trade.

In the chapters which follow the further steps which were taken to deal with the problem, and the degree of success which attended them, will be described.

CHAPTER III

ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS The previous chapters have dealt with the changes in organization carried out at the Admiralty during the year 1917 largely with the object of being able to deal more effectively with the submarine warfare against merchant ships. Mention has also been made of the submarine problem with which the Navy had to deal; particulars of the anti-submarine and other work carried out will now be examined.

A very large proportion of the successful anti-submarine devices brought into use during 1917, and continued throughout the year 1918, were the outcome of the work of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff, and it is but just that the high value of this work should be recognized when the history of the war comes to be written by future historians. As has been stated in Chapter I, Rear-Admiral A.C. Duff, C.B., was the original head of the division, with Captain F.C. Dreyer, C.B., Commander Yeats Brown, and Commander Reginald Henderson as his immediate a.s.sistants. Captain H.T. Walwyn took the place of Captain Dreyer on March 1, 1917, when the latter officer became Director of Naval Ordnance. When Admiral Duff was appointed a.s.sistant Chief of the Naval Staff, with a seat on the Board, in May, 1917, Captain W.W. Fisher, C.B., became head of the division, which still remained one of the divisions of the Staff working immediately under the A.C.N.S. It is to these officers, with their most zealous, clever and efficient staff, that the inst.i.tution of many of the successful anti-submarine measures is largely due. They were indefatigable in their search for new methods and in working out and perfecting fresh schemes, and they kept their minds open to new ideas. They received much valuable a.s.sistance from the great civilian scientists who gave such ready help during the war, the function of the naval officers working with the scientists being to see that the effort was being directed along practical lines. They were also greatly indebted to Captain Ryan, R.N., for the exceedingly valuable work carried out by him at the experimental establishment at Hawkcraig. Many brilliant ideas were due to Captain Ryan's clever brain.

I doubt whether the debt due to Admiral Duff and Captain Fisher and their staff for their great work can ever be thoroughly appreciated, but it is certainly my duty to mention it here since I am better able to speak of it than any other person. In saying this I do not wish to detract in the least from the value of the part performed by those to whose lot it fell to put the actual schemes into operation. Without them, of course, nothing could have been accomplished.

When the Anti-Submarine Division started in December, 1916, the earlier devices to which attention was devoted were:

(1) The design and manufacture of howitzers firing sh.e.l.l fitted to explode some 40 to 60 feet under water with which to attack submarines when submerged.

(2) The introduction of a more suitable projectile for use against submarines than that supplied at the time to the guns of destroyers and patrol craft.

(3) The improvement of and great increase in the supply of smoke apparatus for the screening of merchant ships from submarines attacking by gunfire.

(4) A great increase in the number of depth charges supplied to destroyers and other small craft.

(5) The development of the hydrophone for anti-submarine work, both from ships and from sh.o.r.e stations.

(6) The introduction of the "Otter" for the protection of merchant ships against mines.

(7) A very great improvement in the rapidity of arming merchant ships defensively.

(8) The extended and organized use of air craft for anti-submarine work.

(9) A great development of the special service or decoy ship.

(10) The introduction of a form of net protection for merchant ships against torpedo fire.

Other devices followed, many of which were the outcome of work in other Admiralty Departments, particularly the Departments of the Director of Naval Ordnance and the Director of Torpedoes and Mines, working in conjunction with the Anti-Submarine or the Operations Division of the Naval Staff. Some of the new features were the development of depth-charge throwers, the manufacture and use of fast coastal motor-boats for anti-submarine work, the production of mines of an improved type for use especially against submarines, very considerable developments in the use of minefields, especially deep minefields, including persistent mining in the Heligoland Bight and the laying of a complete minefield at varying depths in the Straits of Dover; also, after the United States entered the war, the laying of a very extensive minefield right across the northern part of the North Sea. The provision of "flares" for illuminating minefields at night, and a system of submarine detection by the use of electrical apparatus were also matters which were taken up and pressed forward during 1917. During the year the system of dazzle painting for merchant ships was brought into general use.

On the operational side of the Naval Staff the work of dealing with enemy submarines before they pa.s.sed out of the North Sea was taken in hand by organized hunting operations by destroyers and other patrol craft, and by the more extended use offensively of our own submarines, as vessels became available.

Considerable developments were effected in the matter of the control of mercantile traffic, and much was done to train the personnel of the mercantile marine in matters relating to submarine warfare.

Taking these subjects in detail, it will be of interest to examine the progress made during the year.

HOWITZERS The howitzer as a weapon for use against the submarine when submerged was almost non-existent at the beginning of 1917, only thirty bomb-throwers, on the lines of trench-mortars, being on order. By April of that year designs for seven different kinds of bomb-throwers and howitzers had been prepared and approved, and orders placed for 1,006 weapons, of which number the first 41 were due for delivery in May. By the end of May the number of bomb-throwers and howitzers on order had been increased to 2,056, of eight different patterns. Over 1,000 of these weapons fired a bomb or sh.e.l.l carrying a burster exceeding 90 lbs. in weight, and with a range varying between 1,200 and 2,600 yards. Later in the war, as we gained experience of the value of this form of attack, heavier bombs were introduced for use in the existing bomb-throwers and howitzers. The howitzer as an anti-submarine weapon was handicapped by the comparatively small weight of the bursting charge of its sh.e.l.l. This applied more particularly to the earlier patterns, and to inflict fatal injury it was necessary to burst the sh.e.l.l in close proximity to the submerged submarine. This weapon, although not very popular at first, soon, however, proved its value, when employed both from patrol craft and from merchant ships.

One curious instance occurred on March 28, 1918, of a merchant ship being saved by a 7.5-inch howitzer. A torpedo was seen approaching at a distance of some 600 yards, and it appeared certain to hit the ship. A projectile fired from the howitzer exploded under water close to the torpedo, deflected it from its course, and caused it to come to the surface some 60 yards from the ship; a second projectile caused it to stop, and apparently damaged the torpedo, which when picked up by an escorting vessel was found to be minus its head.

Delivery of howitzers commenced in June, 1917, and continued as follows:

Total completed, No. of Howitzers including those Date. actually issued. under proof.

July 24, 1917 35 48 October 1, 1917 92 167 December 10, 1917 377 422 The slow rate of delivery, in spite of constant pressure, which is shown by these figures gives some idea of the time required to bring new devices into existence.

PROJECTILE FOR USE AGAINST SUBMARINES In January, 1917, the Director of Naval Ordnance was requested by the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff to carry out trials against a target representing the hull of a German submarine, so far as the details were known to us, to ascertain the most suitable type of projectile amongst those then in existence for the attack of submarines by guns of 4.7-inch calibre and below.

The results were published to the Fleet in March, 1917. They afforded some useful knowledge and demonstrated the ineffectiveness of some of the sh.e.l.ls and fuses commonly in use against submarines from 12-pounder guns, the weapon with which so many of our patrol craft were armed. The target at which the sh.e.l.l was fired did not, however, fully represent a German submarine under the conditions of service. The trials were therefore continued, and as a result, in June, 1917, a further order was issued to the Fleet, giving directions as to the type of projectile to be used against submarines from all natures of guns, pending the introduction of delay action fuses for the smaller guns; this was the temporary solution of the difficulty until a new type of sh.e.l.l evolved from the experience gained at the trials could be produced and issued. The trials, which were exhaustive, were pressed forward vigorously and continuously throughout the year 1917, and meanwhile more accurate information as to the exact form of the hull and the thickness of the plating of German submarines became available. Early in 1918 the first supplies of the new fuses were ready for issue.

SMOKE APPARATUS The earlier smoke apparatus for supply to merchant ships was designed towards the end of 1916.

One description of smoke apparatus consisted of an arrangement for burning phosphorus at the stern of a ship; in other cases firework composition and other chemicals were used. A dense smoke cloud was thus formed, and, with the wind in a suitable direction, a vessel could hide her movements from an enemy submarine or other vessel, and thus screen herself from accurate sh.e.l.l fire.

In another form the apparatus was thrown overboard and formed a smoke cloud on the water.

The rate of supply of sets of the smoke apparatus to ships is shown by the following figures:

April 1, 1917 - 1,372 sets July 3, 1917 - 2,563 sets October 5, 1917 - 3,445 sets November 26, 1917 - 3,976 sets DEPTH CHARGES Depth charges, as supplied to ships in 1917, were of two patterns: one, Type D, contained a charge of 300 lb. of T.N.T., and the other, Type D*, carried 120 lb. of T.N.T. At the commencement of 1917 the allowance to ships was two of Type D and two of Type D*, and the supply was insufficient at that time to keep up the stock required to maintain on board four per destroyer, the number for which they were fitted, or to supply all trawlers and other patrol craft with their allowance. The great value of the depth charge as a weapon against submarines, and the large number that were required for successful attack, became apparent early in 1917, and the allowance was increased. Difficulty was experienced throughout the year in maintaining adequate stocks owing to the shortage of labour and the many demands on our industries made by the war, but the improvement is shown by the fact that while the average output per week of depth charges was only 140 in July, it had become over 500 by October, and that by the end of December it was raised to over 800, and was still increasing very rapidly. As a consequence, early in 1918 it was found possible to increase the supply very largely, as many as 30 to 40 per destroyer being carried.

Improvements in the details of depth charges were effected during 1917. One such improvement was the introduction of a pistol capable of firing at much greater depths than had been in use before. The result was that all vessels, whether fast or slow, could safely use the 300-lb. depth charge if set to a sufficient depth. This led to the abolition of the Type D* charges and the universal supply of Type D.

In spite of the difficulties of dropping depth charges so close to submarines as to damage them sufficiently to cause them to come to the surface, very good results were obtained from their use when destroyers carried enough to form, so to speak, a ring round the a.s.sumed position at which the submarine had dived. In order to encourage scientific attack on submarines, a system of depth charge "Battle Practice" was introduced towards the end of 1917.

It is as well to correct a common misapprehension as to the value of depth charges in destroying submarines.

Many people held very exaggerated ideas on this subject, even to the extent of supposing that a depth charge would destroy a submarine if dropped within several hundred yards of her. This is, unfortunately, very far indeed from being the case; it is, on the contrary, necessary to explode the charge near the submarine in order to effect destruction. Taking the depth charge with 300 lb. weight of explosive, ordinarily supplied to destroyers in 1917, it was necessary to explode it within fourteen feet of a submarine to ensure destruction; at distances up to about twenty-eight feet from the hull the depth charge might be expected to disable a submarine to the extent of forcing her to the surface, when she could be sunk by gun-fire or rammed, and at distances up to sixty feet the moral effect on the crew would be considerable and might force the submarine to the surface.

A consideration of these figures will show that it was necessary for a vessel attacking a submarine with depth charges to drop them in very close proximity, and the first obvious difficulty was to ascertain the position of a submarine that had dived and was out of sight.

Unless, therefore, the attacking vessel was fairly close to the submarine at the moment of the latter diving there was but little chance of the attack being successful.

HYDROPHONES The Hydrophone, for use in locating submerged submarines, although first evolved in 1915, was in its infancy, so far as supply to ships was concerned, at the commencement of 1917. Experiments were being carried out by the Board of Invention and Research at Harwich, and by Captain Ryan, R.N., at Hawkcraig, and although very useful results had been obtained and a considerable number of sh.o.r.e stations as well as some patrol vessels had been fitted with hydrophones, which had a listening range of one or two miles, all the devices for use afloat suffered from the disadvantage that it was not possible to use them whilst the ship carrying them was moving, since the noise of the vessel's own machinery and of the water pa.s.sing along the side prevented the noise made by other vessels being located. What was required was a listening instrument that could be used by a ship moving at least at slow speed, otherwise the ship carrying the hydrophone was herself, when stopped, an easy target for the submarine's torpedo. It was also essential, before an attack could be delivered, to be able to locate the direction of the enemy submarine, and prior to 1917 all that these instruments showed was the presence of a submarine somewhere in the vicinity.

Much research and experimental work was carried out during the year 1917 under the encouragement and supervision of the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff. Two hydrophones were invented in the early part of 1917, one by Captain Ryan, R.N., and one by the Board of Invention and Research, which could be used from ships at very slow speed and which gave some indication of the direction of the sound; finally, in the summer of 1917, the ability and patience of one inventor, Mr. Nash, were rewarded, and an instrument was devised termed the "fish" hydrophone which to a considerable extent fulfilled the required conditions. Mr. Nash, whose invention had been considered but not adopted by the Board of Invention and Research before he brought it to the Anti-Submarine Division of the Naval Staff, laboured under many difficulties with the greatest energy and perseverance; various modifications in the design were effected until, in October, 1917, the instrument was p.r.o.nounced satisfactory and supplies were put in hand.

The next step was to fit the "fish" hydrophone in certain auxiliary patrol vessels as well as some destroyers, "P" boats and motor launches, to enter and train men to work it, and finally to organize these vessels into "submarine hunting flotillas," drill them, and then set them to their task.

This work, which occupied some time, was carried out at Portland, where a regular establishment was set up for developing the "fish" hydrophone and for organizing and training the "hunting flotillas" in its use. A considerable amount of training in the use of the hydrophone was required before men became efficient, and only those with a very keen sense of hearing were suited to the work. The chances of the success of the hunting flotillas had been promising in the early experiments, and the fitting out of patrol craft and organizing and drilling them, proceeded as rapidly as the vessels could be obtained, but largely owing to the slow production of trawlers it was not until November that the first hunting flotilla fitted with the "fish" hydrophone was actually at work. The progress made after this date is ill.u.s.trated by the fact that in December, 1917, a division of drifters, with a "P" boat, fitted with this "fish" hydrophone hunted an enemy submarine for seven hours during darkness, covering a distance of fifty miles, kept touch with her by sound throughout this period, and finished by dropping depth charges in apparently the correct position, since a strong smell of oil fuel resulted and nothing further could be heard of the submarine, although the drifters listened for several hours. On another occasion in the same month a division of drifters hunted a submarine for five hours. The number of hydrophones was increased as rapidly as possible until by the end of the year the system was in full operation within a limited area, and only required expansion to work, as was intended, on a large scale in the North Sea and the English Channel.

Meanwhile during 1917 directional hydrophones, which had been successfully produced both by Captain Ryan and by the Board of Invention and Research, had been fitted to patrol craft in large numbers, and "hunting flotillas" were operating in many areas. A good example of the working of one of these flotillas occurred off Dartmouth in the summer of 1918, when a division of motor launches fitted with the Mark II hydrophone, under the general guidance of a destroyer, carried out a successful attack on a German submarine. Early in the afternoon one of the motor launches dropped a depth charge on an oil patch, and shortly afterwards one of the hydrophones picked up the sound of an internal combustion engine; a line of depth charges was run on the bearing indicated by the hydrophone. The motor launches and the destroyer remained listening, until at about 6.0 P.M. a submarine came to the surface not far from Motor Launch No. 135, which fired two rounds at the submarine before the latter submerged. Other motor launches closed in, and depth charges were dropped by them in close proximity to the wash of the submarine. Oil came to the surface, and more depth charges were dropped in large numbers on the spot for the ensuing forty-eight hours. Eventually objects came to the surface clearly indicating the presence of a submarine. Further charges were dropped, and an obstruction on the bottom was located by means of a sweep. This engagement held peculiar interest for me, since during my visit to Canada in the winter of 1919 the honour fell to me of presenting to a Canadian-Lieutenant G.L. Ca.s.sady, R.N.V.R.-at Vancouver the Distinguished Service Cross awarded him by His Majesty for his work in Motor Launch No. 135 on this occasion.

Motor Launches were organized into submarine hunting flotillas during the year 1917. These vessels were equipped with the directional hydrophone as soon as its utility was established, and were supplied with depth charges. In the summer of 1917 four such hunting flotillas were busy in the Channel; the work of one of these I have described already, and they certainly contributed towards making the Channel an uneasy place for submarine operations.

These results were, of course, greatly improved on in 1918, as the numbers of ships fitted with the "fish" and other hydrophones increased and further experience was gained.

The progress in supply of hydrophones is shown by the following table:

Supply of Directional Date General Service Mark I and Shark Fin Fish 1917. Portable Type. Mark II. Type. Type.

Jul 31 2,750 500 - - Aug 31 2,750 700 - - Sep 30 2,750 850 - - Oct 31 3,500 1,000 - - Dec 31 3,680 1,950 870 37 HYDROPHONE STATIONS AND TRAINING SCHOOLS At the beginning of 1917 four sh.o.r.e hydrophone stations were in use. During the year eight additional stations were completed and several more were nearing completion. The first step necessary was a considerable increase in the instructional facilities for training listeners both for the increased number of sh.o.r.e stations and for the large number of vessels that were fitted for hydrophone work during the year.