The Crisis of the Naval War Part 14

Full details were given to Admiral Mayo of the proposed North Sea Barrage on a line totalling 230 miles in length, which was divided into three parts, Areas A, B and C, of which Area A only would be dangerous to surface vessels.

It was estimated that Area A would require 36,300 mines, and it was proposed that this area should be mined by the United States forces with United States mines.

It was proposed that the British should mine Area B, the requirements being 67,500 mines, and that the United States should mine Area C, for which 18,000 United States mines would be required.

The reasons governing the selection of the mine barrage area were fully given, and the advantages arising from the use of the United States pattern of mine instead of the British mine for Areas A and C were stated.

Admiral Mayo was also informed of our intention to establish a mine barrage in the Channel, on the Folkestone-Grisnez line, as soon as mines were available, with a strong force of patrol vessels stationed there, whose duty it would be to compel enemy submarines to dive into the minefield. He was further made acquainted with our intended policy of still closer minelaying in the Heligoland Bight.

Although Admiral Mayo was not actually informed of the details of the future policy which it was hoped to adopt in the Adriatic for the improvement of the Otranto Barrage, various schemes were at the time being worked out between the British, French and Italian Admiralties, having as their object the prevention or obstruction of the exit of enemy submarines from the Adriatic, in the same way as it was hoped to obstruct German submarines from making their exit from the North Sea without incurring heavy losses. The great depth of water in the southern part of the Adriatic const.i.tuted the main difficulty facing us in the solution of this problem. In August, 1917, it was, however, definitely decided to establish a barrage of nets and mines across the Straits of Otranto, and the work was put in hand. This became effective during 1918.

The paper on Naval Air Policy showed the aim of the Admiralty to be:

To provide in sufficient numbers a type of airship which would be able to scout with the Grand Fleet, and, in this respect, to perform the duty of light cruisers. Airship stations had been established on the East Coast for this purpose.

To provide also a type of airship for coastal patrol work and for the escort of merchant ships in convoy. For these airships stations had been established on the East, South and West Coasts and at Scapa.

To provide a sufficient supply of kite balloons for the work of the Grand Fleet. Fleet kite balloon stations had already been established at Rosyth and Scapa, and the resources of the latter station were supplemented by a kite balloon ship. It was intended also to provide kite balloons for flotillas or single vessels engaged in submarine hunting or in convoy work. A large number of kite balloon stations for anti-submarine work had been or were being established round the coast for this work.

As to the future programme of rigid airships, Admiral Mayo was told that it was under consideration to construct three new rigid stations, also that three new stations for the use of non-rigids for anti-submarine work were to be established, while it was also proposed to provide sufficient resources to allow of a number of kite balloons being worked in vessels between the North of Scotland and Norway and to the eastward of the English Channel.

Admiral Mayo was also informed that it was proposed to provide sufficient "heavier than air" craft of various types for the Fleet, both to insure adequate air reconnaissance and to drive off hostile aircraft. The Grand Fleet was at the time already provided with three seaplane carriers, and the Furious and other special vessels were being fitted to carry aircraft. Many of the armoured vessels and light cruisers of the Fleet had also been fitted to carry aircraft, whilst the Harwich light cruiser force possessed one seaplane carrier; two carriers were devoted to anti-submarine work, and three were employed in the Mediterranean.

It was further stated that machines for naval reconnaissance were working from several East Coast stations, and that lighters to carry seaplanes for more extended reconnaissance and offensive work were under construction. The work carried out by our naval aircraft off the Belgian coast, comprising the duty of keeping the coast under constant observation, of spotting the gunfire of ships, of fighting aircraft and bombing objectives of importance, were also mentioned, as well as the work in the Mediterranean, where there were four bases in the Aegean.

The extensive anti-submarine patrol work round the British Isles and in the Mediterranean was touched upon, there being "heavier than air" stations at the time at

Houton Bay.

Dundee.

South Shields.

Bembridge.

Calshot.

Portland.

Killingholme.

Yarmouth.

Felixstowe.

Westgate.

Dover.

Newhaven.

Cherbourg.

Plymouth.

Newlyn.

Scilly.

Fishguard.

Steps were being taken to extend the number of stations as soon as possible, the new programme including stations at such places as

Padstow.

Wexford.

Queenstown.

Berehaven.

Loch Foyle.

Loch Ryan (or in the Hebrides).

Shetlands.

Peterhead.

In the event of the United States being in a position to co-operate in the work, it was recommended that the three main seaplane stations in Ireland should be taken over by the Americans, and equipped, manned and controlled entirely by United States personnel.

In regard to the convoy system a full description of the whole organization was given, with the results up to date, and details of the vessels available and still needed for its protection.

Full information was afforded on the subject of the arming of merchant ships and fitting other defensive measures to them, and the routeing system in use for merchant ships was described in detail.

In the remarks on our anti-submarine warfare it was pointed out that anti-submarine measures were carried out both on the surface, under water, and in the air.

The surface measures were described as follows:

In twelve of the twenty-two areas into which the waters round the United Kingdom were divided, regular hunting flotillas were at work, comprising trawlers and motor launches fitted with hydrophones. Before the inst.i.tution of the convoy system a few fast vessels, such as destroyers or "P" boats, had been formed into hunting flotillas, but the convoy work had necessitated the withdrawal of all these vessels, and the work of the flotillas had suffered in consequence, the speed of trawlers being too slow to offer the same prospect of success in such anti-submarine measures. The flotillas of motor launches which had been formed were of considerable utility in fine weather, but they could only operate in comparatively smooth water.

At the time of Admiral Mayo's visit a force of thirty-two trawlers to work with about six sloops or destroyers was being organized as vessels became available, to operate in the North Sea with a view to engaging enemy submarines on pa.s.sage in those waters.

It was also pointed out to Admiral Mayo that the coast patrol vessels which were not actually in the hunting flotillas were all engaged in anti-submarine work and did frequently come into action against the German submarines.

Finally Admiral Mayo was informed that the convoy system itself was looked upon as an offensive measure since the German submarines would, in order to attack vessels under convoy, be forced into contact with the fast craft engaged in the work of escort and thus place themselves in positions in which they could themselves be successfully attacked.

Admiral Mayo, during his stay in European waters, inspected some of our naval bases and paid a visit to the Grand Fleet.

He crossed to France in order that he might see the work being carried out at French ports by vessels of the United States Navy, and while returning from this visit he honoured the British Navy by accompanying Sir Reginald Bacon and myself in H.M.S. Broke to witness a bombardment of Ostend by the monitor Terror. On this occasion Admiral Mayo's flag was hoisted in the Broke and subsequently presented to him as a souvenir of the first occasion of a United States Admiral having been under fire in a British man-of-war. It is satisfactory to record that subsequent aerial photographs showed that much damage to workshops, etc., had been caused by this bombardment.

The Admiral and his Staff very quickly established themselves in the high regard of British naval officers, and it was with much regret that we witnessed their return to the United States. My own a.s.sociations with the Admiral had led to a feeling of great friendship. He left behind him his Chief of Staff, Captain Jackson, who to our great regret had been seriously injured in a motor accident.

Admiral Benson's visit took place later in the year. I had written to him urging him to come across so that he might have first-hand knowledge of the state of affairs and of the policy being followed. During his visit the same questions were discussed as with Admiral Mayo, and important action was taken in the direction of closer naval co-operation between the Allies by the formation of an Allied Naval Council consisting of the Ministers of Marine and the Chiefs of the Naval Staff of the Allied Nations and of the United States. This proposal had been under discussion for some little time, and, indeed, naval conferences had been held on previous occasions. The first of these during my tenure of office at the Admiralty was on January 23 and 24, 1917, and another was held during the visit of Admiral Mayo and at the instigation of the Government of the United States on September 4 and 5, 1917. On this latter occasion important discussions had taken place, princ.i.p.ally on the subject of submarine warfare, the methods of dealing with it in home waters and in the Mediterranean, and such matters as the provision of mercantile shipping for the use of our Allies.

There was, however, no regular council sitting at specified intervals, and it was this council which came into being in the early part of December. Its functions were to watch over the general conduct of the naval war and to insure co-ordination of the effort at sea as well as the development of all scientific operations connected with the conduct of the war.

Special emphasis was laid upon the fact that the individual responsibility of the respective Chiefs of the Naval Staff and of the Commanders-in-Chief at sea towards their Governments as regards operations in hand as well as the strategical and technical disposition of the forces placed under their command remained unchanged; this proviso was a necessity in naval warfare, and was very strongly insisted upon by the Admiralty.

The attention of the Council was directed at the earliest meetings to the situation in the Mediterranean, where naval forces from the British Empire, France, Greece, Italy, j.a.pan and the United States were working, and where the need for close co-operation was most urgent. The real need in the Mediterranean, as was frequently pointed out, was the inclusion of the naval forces of all the Allied nations under one single command. In 1918 strong efforts were made to carry out this policy, and indeed the actual Admiralissimo was selected, but the attempt failed in the end.

Both these distinguished American officers were reminded, as indeed they must have seen for themselves, that the successful combating of the submarine danger depended largely on the manufacture of material, and that the resources of this country, with its great fleet and its large and increasing armies, were so seriously taxed that the execution of the plans of the Admiralty were being constantly and gravely delayed. The Admiralty was, indeed, seriously embarra.s.sed by difficulties in the adequate supply of mines and other means of destroying submarines as well as of fast craft of various descriptions. The Admiralty, as was pointed out, were doing not what they would like to do, but what they could do, both in the way of offensive and defensive action. The supplies of raw material and labour controlled in large measure the character and extent of the operations at sea.

CHAPTER VII

PATROL CRAFT AND MINESWEEPING SERVICES It is difficult to give an idea of the truly magnificent work achieved by the patrol and minesweeping services during the year 1917 without showing how these services expanded after the outbreak of war in 1914.

When war was declared the only vessels immediately available for the work consisted of seven torpedo gunboats manned by officers and men of the Royal Navy, and fourteen trawlers manned by fishermen. All these vessels were fitted for regular minesweeping work, and the crews of the trawlers formed a part of what was known as the "Trawler Reserve." Other trawlers, exceeding eighty in number, became, however, almost immediately available at the outbreak of war under the organized Trawler Reserve which had been set up a year or two preceding the outbreak of war. Men belonging to this reserve had been trained in the work of minesweeping and were paid a small retaining fee.

As soon as the German methods of indiscriminate minelaying and submarine attacks upon merchant ships commenced, a great expansion of this force became necessary. The matter was handled energetically by the Admiralty at the time, and by the end of 1914 over 700 vessels (yachts, trawlers and drifters) were employed on patrol and minesweeping duties, and the Admiralty had also commenced to build vessels of the trawler type specially for this work.

By the commencement of 1917 there were in use some 2,500 yachts, trawlers and drifters, the great majority of them manned by fishermen or men of the R.N.R. or R.N.V.R. and officered by trawler or drifter skippers or officers of the R.N.R. or R.N.V.R., many of them having temporary commissions in these services.

Early in the war the coast of the United Kingdom had been divided into areas for purposes of patrol and minesweeping, and each area was under the command of a naval officer on either the active or retired list.