The Crime of the Century Part 48

"While it is your duty to carefully scrutinize and dispa.s.sionately weigh the evidence of all the witnesses in the case, still it is your sworn duty to give proper credit to the evidence of each and all of the witnesses, and, if possible, to reconcile all of the evidence in the case with the presumption that each witness has intended to speak the truth, unless by their manner of testifying on the witness-stand, or by inconsistent statements sworn to, or by the testimony inconsistent with other credible evidence in the cause you are impelled to believe that the testimony of some one or more of the witnesses is untruthful or unreliable, or unless you are led to believe, from an exhibition of interest, bias or prejudice, that such witness or witnesses have been inclined to exaggerate, color or suppress the truth, or unless they have been impeached in some of the ways known to the law.

"One of the modes of impeaching a witness is by showing that he or she has made statements out of court at variance with his or her statements on the witness-stand; and if the jury believe from the evidence that a witness has made statements at another time and place at variance with his or her evidence in this case, regarding any material matter testified to by him or her, then it is the province of the jury to determine to what extent this fact tends to impeach either his or her memory or his or her credibility, or detract from the weight which ought to be given to his or her testimony. If the jury believe from the evidence that any witness has willfully sworn falsely as to any matter or thing material to the issues in this case, then the jury are at liberty to disregard his or her entire testimony, except in so far as it has been corroborated by other credible evidence, or by the facts and circ.u.mstances proven on the trial. Testimony of verbal admissions, statements and conversations, ought to be taken by you with caution, because that sort of testimony is subject to much imperfection and mistake. And when the verbal admission of a person charged with crime is offered in evidence, the whole of the admission must be taken together, as well that part which makes for the accused as that which makes against him; and if part of the statement which is in favor of the defendant is not disproved, and is not apparently improbable or untrue, when consistent with all the other evidence in the case, then such part of the statement is ent.i.tled to as much consideration from the jury as any other part of the statement.

"Before you can be warranted in using against any one of the defendants any evidence respecting the conduct or conversation of any other defendant, you must believe to a moral certainty, from reliable and credible evidence, not only that the particular defendant whose conduct and conversation the prosecution seek to use against the defendant was a member of an unlawful conspiracy, as charged in the indictment, but that the defendant himself was also an a.s.sociate and member of such conspiracy. If, after an examination of all the evidence, which examination should be made by you in a spirit free from pa.s.sion and prejudice, there should exist in your mind any reasonable doubt as to whether or not any defendant was a member of an unlawful conspiracy as charged in the indictment, then and in such case it would be illegal and wrong for you to use against such defendant any evidence respecting the conduct or conversation of any other defendant, even if you should believe that such other defendant was a member of such alleged conspiracy.

"In no view which can be taken of this case will you be warranted in using against one defendant any evidence of the act, conduct or conversation of any other defendant occurring subsequent to the day of the alleged homicide of Dr. Cronin.

"Although you may believe that the defendant Beggs, at a meeting of Camp 20 on May 10th, remarked in substance that that committee was to report to him, and even if you should further believe that such remark possessed some criminal import, yet, in no view that can be taken of this case, will you be justified in using such remark as evidence against any other defendant.

"Although you may fully and confidently believe that one J. B.

Simonds, the person who drove Dr. Cronin away from his home on the night of May 4th, and other unknown persons were members of a conspiracy to murder Dr. Cronin as charged in the indictment, and, indeed, that they did murder him, yet you can not and ought not use any evidence respecting the conduct and conversations of such persons, or any of them, against any defendant unless you are first convinced beyond every reasonable doubt, from the evidence, that such defendant was also a member of such conspiracy to murder Dr.

Cronin.

"Although you may believe that a conspiracy existed to murder Dr.

Cronin, and although you may further believe that he was murdered in pursuance of such conspiracy, yet the fact that a defendant did some act which contributed in some measure in producing the Doctor's death will not justify you in concluding that the defendant doing such act was a member of such conspiracy, unless you further believe, from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that said defendant, at the time of doing such act, actually knew and intended that the act done by him should be one of a series of acts to be done by others in producing the Doctor's death.

"A conspiracy may be established by circ.u.mstantial evidence, the same as any other fact, and such evidence is legal and competent for that purpose; so whether an act which was committed was done by a member of a conspiracy, may be established by circ.u.mstantial evidence, whether the ident.i.ty of the individual who committed the act be established or not; and also whether the act done was in pursuance and furtherance of a common design, may be ascertained from the same cla.s.s of evidence; and if the jury believe, from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendants or any of them, conspired and agreed together, or with others, to kill and murder Patrick Henry Cronin, and that in pursuance and furtherance of that common design and by a member or members of such conspiracy the said Patrick Henry Cronin was killed and murdered in manner and form as charged in the indictment in this case, then such of these defendants, if any, whom the jury believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt were parties to such conspiracy, are guilty of the murder of the said Cronin, whether the ident.i.ty of the individual doing the killing be established or not, or whether such defendants were present at the time of the killing or not.

"Under the charge of conspiracy against any of the defendants to commit murder, it must be proven, beyond every reasonable doubt, that such defendant combined with one or more persons in the common purpose and with the common design to murder the deceased before you will be justified in believing that the conspiracy existed as charged against him. Although you may believe that the defendant Burke rented the Carlson cottage and removed the furniture and other articles mentioned in evidence from 117 South Clark street to the said cottage, and although you may further believe that Dr.

Cronin was murdered in the Carlson cottage, you are advised that these acts of the defendant Burke in themselves are insufficient to justify you in concluding that he was a party to the alleged conspiracy, unless it further appears, beyond all reasonable doubt, that such acts of the defendant Burke were deliberately and willfully intended by him to a.s.sist in the perpetration of the crime of murder.

"Although you may believe than Dinan's horse and buggy was used on May 4th to take the Doctor to his death, you are advised that the act of the defendant, Coughlin, in engaging such horse and buggy is insufficient to justify you in concluding that he was a party to the alleged conspiracy, unless it further appears beyond all reasonable doubt that such act of the defendant, Coughlin, was deliberately and willfully intended by him to a.s.sist in the perpetration of the crime of murder.

"Although you may believe that the contract between O'Sullivan and Dr. Cronin was used on May 4th to decoy the Doctor to his death, you are advised that the act of the defendant, O'Sullivan, in making such contract of itself is insufficient to justify you in concluding that he was a party to the alleged conspiracy, unless it further appears, beyond all reasonable doubt, that such act of the defendant, O'Sullivan, was deliberately and willfully intended by him to a.s.sist in the perpetration of the crime of murder, or that he knowingly and corruptly consented to the use of said contract in accomplishing the alleged murder of the deceased.

"In considering the circ.u.mstance of the contract made between Patrick O'Sullivan and Dr. Cronin, you are not permitted by the law to take into account or draw any inference from the fact that the witnesses McGarry, Capt. Schaack, Mrs. T. T. Conklin, and others testified that they expressed the opinion to Patrick O'Sullivan in conversing with him that the said contract was unbusiness-like, unusual, strange, and suspicious; such opinions furnish you no warrant for concluding that the object and purpose of Patrick O'Sullivan in making the contract was illegal or criminal.

"While it is necessary, in order to establish a conspiracy, to prove a combination of two or more persons by concerted action to accomplish the criminal or unlawful purpose alleged in the indictment, yet it is not necessary to prove that the parties ever came together and entered into any formal agreement or arrangement between themselves to effect such a purpose; the combination, or common design or object may be regarded as proved, if the jury believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the parties were knowingly willfully, and actually pursuing in concert the unlawful object stated in the indictment, whether acting separately or together, by common or different means; providing they were leading intentionally to the same unlawful result.

"The evidence in proof of a conspiracy will generally, in the nature of the case, be circ.u.mstantial. Though a common design is the nature of the charge, it is not necessary to prove that the defendants came together, and actually agreed in terms to have that design and to pursue it by common means. If it be proved to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants knowingly and intentionally pursued by their acts the same object, one pursuing one part, and another another part of the same, so as to complete it with a view to the attainment of the same object, the jury will be justified in the conclusion that they are engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object.

"If the jury believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, acting in the light of the entire charge of the Court, that the defendants now on trial, or some of them, conspired together, or together and with others who were to the Grand Jury unknown, to kill and murder Patrick Henry Cronin, and that one or more of the conspirators, in pursuance and furtherance of the conspiracy, did kill and murder the said Cronin in manner and form as charged in the indictment, then any or all of the defendants (if any) who so conspired are in law guilty of such murder, although they may not have actually killed the said Cronin, or been present at the time or place of the killing.

"The burden of proving everything essential to the establishment of the charge against the defendants, and each of them, lies on the prosecution, and even if it were conceded that somebody murdered Dr. Cronin, yet the defendants are not required nor expected to prove who committed the murder.

"The prosecution is required to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendants, and not somebody else, committed the crime charged in the indictment. It is insufficient to justify you in convicting the defendants, that the evidence disclosed that Patrick H. Cronin was murdered, and that the defendants, or somebody else, murdered him, or that the probabilities are that the defendants and not somebody else murdered him.

"You ought not, and can not legally convict the defendants, or either of them, upon the mere doctrine of chance and probability.

Although you may believe that it is highly probable and very likely that the defendants are guilty, and even that it is far more likely and probable that they are guilty than that they are innocent, yet, no amount of suspicion will warrant you in finding a verdict of 'guilty' against the defendants, or any of them.

"To warrant a conviction upon a charge of murder, the evidence must be of such kind and quant.i.ty as to convince the jury of the truth of the charge beyond every reasonable doubt, and to a moral certainty. If, therefore, when you, without pa.s.sion, prejudice, or bias, have fairly and honestly considered the entire evidence on both sides of the case, do not feel morally certain, to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt, of the guilt of the defendants, then it is your duty to acquit them.

"It is the duty of the jury to examine the evidence on both sides of the case without any feeling of resentment or revenge, and if, after such examination, you entertain any reasonable doubt as to whether the deceased was murdered by the defendants as charged in the indictment, or by somebody else, you should acquit the defendants; in other words, if the evidence, after an impartial consideration, leaves your mind in a state of reasonable doubt as to whether any particular defendant is guilty, as charged in the indictment, then such defendant should be acquitted.

"If the evidence in this case fails to show any motive on the part of the defendant to commit the crime charged against him, then this is a circ.u.mstance in favor of his innocence, which the jury ought to consider in connection with all the other evidence in the case in arriving at a verdict.

"An individual juror ought not to compromise any well-founded doubt of guilt that he may entertain respecting the defendants or any of them with his fellow-jurors. The jury can agree only to convict or acquit, and you can only properly convict when the guilt of the defendants is so fully and clearly proven to the mind of each individual juror, as to exclude every reasonable doubt of guilt.

"A reasonable doubt is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence in the case leaves the jurors in that condition that they can not say they have an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. It is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one, that the fact is more likely to be true than the contrary, but the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty; a certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of the juror who is bound to act upon it conscientiously.

"In considering the case, however, the jury are not to go beyond the evidence to hunt up doubts, nor must they entertain such doubts as are merely chimerical or conjectured. A doubt to justify an acquittal must be reasonable, and it must arise from candid and impartial investigation of all the evidence in the case, and unless it is such that were the same kind of doubt interposed in the graver transactions of life, it would cause a reasonable and prudent man to hesitate and pause, it is insufficient to authorize a verdict of not guilty. If, after considering all the evidence, you can say you have an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.

"The doubt which the juror is allowed to retain in his own mind, and under the influence of which he should frame a verdict of not guilty, must always be a reasonable one. A doubt produced by undue sensibility in the mind of any juror in view of the consequence of his verdict is not a reasonable doubt, and a juror is not allowed to create sources or materials of doubt by resorting to trivial and fanciful suppositions, and remote conjectures as to possible states of facts, differing from that established by the evidence. You are not at liberty to disbelieve as jurors, if, from the evidence, you believe as men; your oath imposes on you no obligation to doubt where no doubt would exist if no oath had been administered.

"In this case the jury may, as in their judgment the evidence warrants, find any or all of the defendants guilty, or any or all of them not guilty; and if in their judgment the evidence warrants, they may, in case they find the defendants, or any of them guilty, fix the same penalty for all the defendants found guilty, or different penalties for the different defendants found guilty.

"And in case they find the defendants, or any of them, guilty of murder, they should fix the penalty either at death or at imprisonment for life in the penitentiary, or at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of any number of years not less than fourteen."

THE JURY RETIRES.

The instructions of Judge McConnell were listened to with intense interest by the jurors, the prisoners, and the spectators. After he had concluded he made a verbal statement to the effect that if the jurors had taken any notes during the progress of the case, it would be necessary for them to disregard them in the jury-room. The oath was then administered to the bailiffs who were to take charge of the jury. Each one of them was compelled to solemnly swear by the ever-living G.o.d that they would take the jury to some private, convenient place provided by the sheriff, and keep them together, without eat or drink, water excepted, unless ordered by the court; and not to speak to them themselves nor to permit any person or persons to speak to them until they had agreed upon a verdict.

This formality concluded, a discussion arose as to the exhibits which had been offered in evidence going into the jury-room. As to the locks of hair cut from the head of the body found in the catch-basin there was no objection on the part of the counsel for the defendants. Special objection was raised however, to the O'Sullivan card, the articles of clothing found in the sewer, the b.l.o.o.d.y trunk, the satchel and hat, and the doc.u.mentary evidence which had been submitted in the course of the case. All the objections on the part of counsel for the defendants to the introduction of these articles to the jury-room were, however, overruled, and at half-past four on the afternoon of Friday, December 13th, the jury retired. It was the prevalent opinion of those who had been in attendance on the trial from its inauguration, that the deliberations of the body would be of short duration. This idea, however, proved to be erroneous. For over six hours the counsel on both sides, the friends of the prosecution, and the adherents of the defense sat around the court-room in momentary expectation that a verdict would be reached.

About an hour after the jury had retired, a request was sent into the court-room for the maps, charts and other exhibits which had been introduced in evidence, and it was complied with. At six o'clock one of the bailiffs was dispatched to procure supper for the body. Court was reconvened at nine o'clock, but, no word being received from the jury, a recess was declared until nine o'clock on the following morning. When the day broke, however, the jury was far from an agreement, and although the court remained in continuous session until night, no word was received from the twelve good men and true who held the fate of the five prisoners in the balance. Meanwhile, public excitement had reached a remarkable pitch. Large crowds had a.s.sembled outside of the court building anxiously awaiting a deliverance from the jury, and in the public resorts throughout the city the probable outcome of the trial and the fate of the defendants was the one absorbing topic of discussion.

No message from the jury was delivered to the court at any time during Sat.u.r.day, and after remaining in session until nearly midnight, a recess was ordered the following morning. In the meantime a score of ugly rumors gained currency.

It was claimed that the jury stood eleven to one in favor of convicting all of the defendants, and that the one man in question had been "fixed"

by the defense. Another rumor had it that the recalcitrant juror had been subjected to personal violence by some of his colleagues who were indignant at the course which he had seen fit to pursue. Sat.u.r.day night pa.s.sed, and the dawn of the Sabbath was broken, but still the twelve men had failed to reach a conclusion upon the evidence presented to them.

The rule of court regarding their comfort had been held in abeyance so far as to allow of their being provided with blankets and other necessaries for pa.s.sing the night, together with bounteous meals from an adjoining restaurant, whenever they felt inclined to refresh the inner man.

All through the Sabbath, throngs of people, about equally divided between the friends of the murdered physician and the adherents of the faction to which the prisoners belonged, were congregated about the streets adjacent to the Criminal Court. No word came from the jury-room, however, and Judge McConnell, who put in an appearance at six o'clock in the evening, promptly ordered a recess until ten o'clock Monday morning, as soon as it was definitely ascertained that the jury was not prepared to make any communication.

The delay afforded an opportunity of compiling some interesting statistics in connection with the famous trial. Its practical commencement was on August 30th, when the examination of veniremen for the selection of a jury was inaugurated. The first panel of four jurors was accepted on September 18th, after nearly one hundred men had been examined and had confessed that they were prejudiced against the accused, or had formed an opinion based upon the published reports of the case which could not be removed by evidence. The second panel of four was secured on October 8th, and the third and final panel on October 22d. The presentation of the case for the State occupied from October 24th to November 16th, the type-written transcript of the testimony against the defendants covering nearly 4,000 pages. The defense opened on November 16th and closed on November 30th, having in the meantime examined nearly seventy witnesses.

The speeches occupied fourteen and one-half days of which State's Attorney Longenecker consumed one and a half days in his opening address, Judge Wing one and one-half, Mr. Ingham one, Mr. Donahoe one and one-half, Mr. Hynes one and one-half, Mr. Foster one and one-half, Mr. Forrest three, and Mr. Longenecker, in his closing a.n.a.lysis of the case, one and one-half. Taken from its inception to the close, the trial was the most lengthy in the history of American jurisprudence, being only equalled by that of the celebrated Tichborne case in England, which occupied in the aggregate nearly five months. The trial of Daniel Coughlin and his a.s.sociates commenced on August 26th and ended with the rendering of the verdict on December 16th. In the effort to secure a jury 1,115 special veniremen were examined, of which number 928 were excused for cause, 97 were peremptorily challenged for the defense, 78 by the State and twelve finally chosen.

The expenses of the case were enormous. The fees of the special veniremen and the jury aggregated $8,000. The salaries of the bailiffs, special officers, and court officials reached $20,000, not including the cost of maintaining the courts. The fees of the witnesses summoned in behalf of the State reached a total of over $5,000, while the expenditures on account, of legal a.s.sistance to the State's Attorney were fully $20,000. The accounts of the stenographers and type-writers, ran into another $10,000, and on the sum total, taken in connection with the fact that the entire business of the courts was delayed during the progress of the trial, a final estimate of $100,000 as the total cost of the trial to the tax-payers, is not an exorbitant one. The outlay on the part of the defense, as far as could be ascertained, did not probably exceed $20,000.

A VERDICT AT LAST.

It was not until half past two of the afternoon of Monday, Dec. 16th, that the members of the jury, after being locked up over seventy hours, were prepared to render a verdict. Court was opened at ten o'clock in the morning, but there being no sign of any communication from the jury-room, a recess was taken until two o'clock. Shortly before that hour it was learned that a verdict had at last been reached.

Extraordinary precautions were at once taken in and about the court room.

The general public was excluded, and only counsel engaged in the case, representatives of the press, and about two score of police officers in plain clothes were admitted. Judge McConnell took his seat on the bench at 2:25, and a moment later the five prisoners were ushered in over the iron bridge leading from the jail.

John F. Beggs, a deathly pallor on his face, and his blue eyes glaring as though protruding from the bleached bones of a skeleton, headed the line. Next to him came Daniel Coughlin, with a nervous, cynical smile upon his face. Then followed O'Sullivan, his jaws set firm, and the fingers of his right hand tugging nervously at his mustache. Close behind him came Martin Burke, with the same look of stolid indifference that he had worn throughout the trial. Kunze, who brought up the line, was apparently the least concerned of the five, smiling and bowing as he pa.s.sed in to the reporters and court officials.

Just as soon as the prisoners had taken their seats and the fifteen deputy sheriffs, three to each man, had filled the s.p.a.ce behind their chairs, the jury was brought in. Breathless silence prevailed. Everyone present seemed impressed with the solemnity of the moment. Even Judge McConnell, who had maintained a calm and reserved air throughout the trial, nervously mopped his brow, from which the perspiration threatened to pour in torrents. In response to a question of the clerk Foreman Clarke responded that the jury had agreed upon a verdict, at the same time handing up a sealed paper to the bench. The painful and oppressive stillness which prevailed was only broken when the voice of the clerk, who had in the meantime unfolded the paper, rang out clear and distinct in tones that penetrated through the iron doors to the corridors beyond.

This is what he read:

We, the jury, find the defendant, John F. Beggs, not guilty.

We, the jury, find the defendant, John Kunze, guilty of manslaughter as charged in the indictment and fix his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of three years.