The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation Part 98

POWER TO ISSUE WRITS; THE ACT OF 1789

From the beginning of government under the Const.i.tution of 1789 Congress has a.s.sumed under the necessary and proper clause, its power to establish inferior courts, its power to regulate the jurisdiction of federal courts and the power to regulate the issuance of writs. The Thirteenth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the circuit courts to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts, and the Supreme Court to issue such writs to the circuit courts. The Supreme Court was also empowered to issue writs of mandamus "in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States."[53] Section 14 provided that all courts of the United States should "have power to issue writs of _scire facias_, _habeas corpus_, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of law."[54] Issuance of the writ of _habeas corpus_ was limited in that it was to extend only to persons in custody under or by color of authority of the United States. Although the act of 1789 left the power over writs subject largely to the common law, it is significant as a reflection of the belief, in which the courts have on the whole concurred, that an act of Congress is necessary to confer judicial power to issue writs.

Common Law Powers of the District of Columbia Courts

That portion of section 13 which authorized the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in the exercise of its original jurisdiction was held invalid in Marbury _v._ Madison,[55] as an unconst.i.tutional enlargement of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. After two more futile efforts to obtain a writ of mandamus, in cases in which the Court found that power to issue the writ had not been vested by statute in the courts of the United States except in aid of already existing jurisdiction,[56] a litigant was successful in Kendall _v._ United States ex rel. Stokes[57] in finding a court which would take jurisdiction in a mandamus proceeding. This was the circuit court of the United States for the District of Columbia which was held to have jurisdiction, on the theory that the common law, in force in Maryland when the cession of that part of the State which became the District of Columbia was made to the United States, remained in force in the District. At an early time, therefore, the federal courts established the rule that mandamus can be issued only when authorized by a const.i.tutional statute and within the limits imposed by the common law and the separation of powers.

Habeas Corpus

Although the writ of _habeas corpus_ has something of a special status by virtue of article I, section 9, paragraph 2, the power of a specific court to issue the writ has long been held to have its authorization only in written law.[58] In Ex parte Yerger,[59] where the pet.i.tioner was held in custody by the military authorities under the Reconstruction Acts, the Court, referring to the prohibition against the suspension of the writ of _habeas corpus_, clearly indicated that Congress is not bound to provide for the protection of federal rights by investing the federal courts with jurisdiction to protect them. Furthermore, the case also incorporates the rule that power to issue the writ may be withdrawn even in pending cases.[60] The rules pertaining to mandamus and _habeas corpus_ are applicable to the other common law and statutory writs, the power to issue which, though judicial in nature, must be derived from the statutes and cannot go beyond them.

Congress Limits the Inquisition Power

Although the speculations of some publicists and some judicial dicta[61]

support the idea of an inherent power of the federal courts sitting in equity to issue injunctions independently of statutory limitations, neither the course taken by Congress nor the specific rulings of the Supreme Court support any such principle. Congress has repeatedly exercised its power to limit the use of the injunction in the federal courts. The first limitation on the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is to be found in section 16 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided that no equity suit should be maintained where there was a full and adequate remedy at law. Although this provision did no more than declare a pre-existing rule long applied in chancery courts,[62] it did a.s.sert the power of Congress to regulate the equity powers of the federal courts. The act of March 2, 1793,[63] prohibited the issuance of any injunction by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in State courts except where such injunctions may be authorized by any law relating to bankruptcy proceedings. In subsequent statutes Congress has prohibited the issuance of injunctions in the federal courts to restrain the collection of taxes;[64] provided for a three-judge court, as a prerequisite to the issuance of injunctions to restrain the enforcement of State statutes for unconst.i.tutionality,[65] for enjoining federal statutes for unconst.i.tutionality,[66] and for enjoining orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission;[67] limited the power to issue injunctions restraining rate orders of State public utility commissions,[68] and the use of injunctions in labor disputes;[69] and placed a very rigid restriction of the power to enjoin orders of the administrator under the Emergency Price Control Act.[70]

All of these restrictions have been sustained by the Supreme Court as const.i.tutional and applied with varying degrees of thoroughness. The Court has made exceptions to the application of the prohibition against the stay of proceedings in State courts,[71] but has on the whole adhered to the statute. The exceptions raise no const.i.tutional issues, and the later tendency is to contract the scope of the exceptions.[72]

In Duplex Printing Company _v._ Deering,[73] the Supreme Court placed a narrow construction upon the labor provisions of the Clayton Act and thereby contributed in part to the more extensive restriction by Congress of the use of injunctions in labor disputes in the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 which has not only been declared const.i.tutional,[74] but has been applied liberally,[75] and in such a manner as to repudiate the notion of an inherent power to issue injunctions contrary to statutory provisions.

Injunctions Under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942

Lockerty _v._ Phillips[76] justifies the same conclusion. Here the validity of the special appeals procedure of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 was sustained. This act provided for a special Emergency Court of Appeals which, subject to review by the Supreme Court, was given exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of regulations, orders, and price schedules issued by the Office of Price Administration. The Emergency Court and the Emergency Court alone was permitted to enjoin regulations or orders of OPA, and even it could enjoin such orders only after finding that the order was not in accordance with law, or was arbitrary or capricious. The Emergency Court was expressly denied power to issue temporary restraining orders or interlocutory decrees; and in addition the effectiveness of any permanent injunction it might issue was to be postponed for thirty days.

If review was sought in the Supreme Court by certiorari, effectiveness was to be postponed until final disposition. A unanimous court speaking through Chief Justice Stone declared that there "is nothing in the Const.i.tution which requires Congress to confer equity jurisdiction on any particular inferior federal court." All federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, it was a.s.serted, derive their jurisdiction solely from the exercise of the authority to ordain and establish inferior courts conferred on Congress by article III, -- 1, of the Const.i.tution.

This power, which Congress is left free to exercise or not, was held to include the power "'of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the public good.'"[77] Although the Court avoided pa.s.sing upon the const.i.tutionality of the prohibition against interlocutory decrees, the language of the Court was otherwise broad enough to support it, as was the language of Yakus _v._ United States[78] which sustained a different phase of the special procedure for appeals under the Emergency Price Control Act.

THE RULE-MAKING POWER AND POWERS OVER PROCESS

Among the incidental powers of courts is that of making all necessary rules governing their process and practice and for the orderly conduct of their business.[79] However, this power too is derived from the statutes and cannot go beyond them. The landmark case is Wayman _v._ Southard[80] which sustained the validity of the process acts of 1789 and 1792 as a valid exercise of authority under the necessary and proper clause. Although Chief Justice Marshall regarded the rule-making power as essentially legislative in nature, he ruled that Congress could delegate to the courts the power to vary minor regulations in the outlines marked out by the statute. Fifty-seven years later in Fink _v._ O'Neil,[81] in which the United States sought to enforce by summary process the payment of a debt, the Supreme Court ruled that under the process acts the law of Wisconsin was the law of the United States and hence the Government was required to bring a suit, obtain a judgment, and cause execution to issue. Justice Matthews for a unanimous Court declared that the courts have "no inherent authority to take any one of these steps, except as it may have been conferred by the legislative department; for they can exercise no jurisdiction, except as the law confers and limits it."

Limits to the Power

The princ.i.p.al function of court rules is that of regulating the practice of courts as regards forms, the operation and effect of process, and the mode and time of proceedings. However, rules are sometimes employed to state in convenient form principles of substantive law previously established by statutes or decisions. But no such rule "can enlarge or restrict jurisdiction. Nor can a rule abrogate or modify the substantive law." This rule is applicable equally to courts of law, equity, and admiralty, to rules prescribed by the Supreme Court for the guidance of lower courts, and to rules "which lower courts make for their own guidance under authority conferred."[82] As incident to the judicial power, courts of the United States possess inherent authority to supervise the conduct of their officers, parties, witnesses, counsel, and jurors by self-preserving rules for the protection of the rights of litigants and the orderly administration of justice.[83]

The courts of the United States possess inherent equitable powers over their process to prevent abuse, oppression and injustice, and to protect their jurisdiction and officers in the protection of property in the custody of law.[84] Such powers are said to be essential to and inherent in the organization of courts of justice.[85] The courts of the United States also possess inherent power to amend their records, correct the errors of the clerk or other court officers, and to rectify defects or omissions in their records even after the lapse of a term, subject, however, to the qualification that the power to amend records conveys no power to create a record or re-create one of which no evidence exists.[86]

APPOINTMENT OF REFEREES, MASTERS, AND SPECIAL AIDS

The administration of insolvent enterprises, investigations into the reasonableness of public utility rates, and the performance of other judicial functions often require the special services of masters in chancery, referees, auditors, and other special aids. The practice of referring pending actions to a referee was held in Heckers _v._ Fowler[87] to be coeval with the organization of the federal courts. In the leading case of Ex parte Peterson[88] a United States district court appointed an auditor with power to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of testimony. The Court authorized him to conduct a preliminary investigation of facts and file a report thereon for the purpose of simplifying the issues for the jury. This action was neither authorized nor prohibited by statute. In sustaining the action of the district judge, Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, declared: "Courts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties. * * * This power includes authority to appoint persons unconnected with the Court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause."[89] The power to appoint auditors by federal courts sitting in equity has been exercised from their very beginning, and here it was held that this power is the same whether the Court sits in law or equity.

THE POWER TO ADMIT AND DISBAR ATTORNEYS

Subject to general statutory qualifications for attorneys, the power of the federal courts to admit and disbar attorneys rests on the common law from which it was originally derived. According to Chief Justice Taney, it was well settled by the common law that "it rests exclusively with the Court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed." Such power, he made clear, however, "is not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the Court, or from pa.s.sion, prejudice, or personal hostility; but it is the duty of the Court to exercise and regulate it by a sound and just judicial discretion, whereby the rights and independence of the bar may be as scrupulously guarded and maintained by the Court, as the right and dignity of the Court itself."[90] The Test-Oath Act of July 2, 1862, which purported to exclude former Confederates from the practice of law in the federal courts, was invalidated in Ex parte Garland.[91] In the course of his opinion for the Court, Justice Field discussed generally the power to admit and disbar attorneys. The exercise of such a power, he declared, is judicial power. The attorney is an officer of the Court and though Congress may prescribe qualifications for the practice of law in the federal courts, it may not do so in such a way as to inflict punishment contrary to the Const.i.tution or to deprive a pardon of the President of its legal effect.[92]

Organization of Courts, Tenure and Compensation of Judges

"ONE SUPREME COURT"

The Const.i.tution is almost completely silent concerning the organization of the federal judiciary. Although it provides for one Supreme Court, it makes no reference to the size and composition of the Court, the time or place for sitting, or its internal organization save for the reference to the Chief Justice in the impeachment provision of article I, -- 3, relating to impeachment of the President. All these matters are therefore confided to Congressional determination. Under the terms of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Court consisted of a Chief Justice and five a.s.sociate Justices. This number was gradually increased until it reached a total of ten judges under the act of March 3, 1863. Due to the exigencies of Reconstruction and the tension existing between Congress and the President the number was reduced to seven as vacancies should occur, by the act of April 16, 1866. The number never actually fell below eight, and on April 10, 1869, with Andrew Johnson out of the White House, Congress restored the number to nine, where it has since remained. There have been proposals at various times for an organization of the Court into sections or divisions. No authoritative judicial expression is available, although Chief Justice Hughes in a letter to Senator Wheeler of March 21, 1937, expressed doubts concerning the validity of such a device and stated that "the Const.i.tution does not appear to authorize two or more Supreme Courts functioning in effect as separate courts."[93] Congress has also determined the time and place of sessions of the Court, going so far in 1801 as to change its terms so that for fourteen months, between December, 1801 and February, 1803 the Court did not convene.

INFERIOR COURTS MADE AND ABOLISHED

By article I, -- 8, paragraph 9, Congress is expressly declared to have the power to const.i.tute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, and the power is repeated in a different formula in article III, -- 1, when provision is also made for tenure during good behavior and for a compensation which shall not be diminished. Since 1789 Congress, with repeated judicial acquiescence and concurrence, has interpreted both of these sections as leaving it free to establish inferior courts or not, as it deems fit in the exercise of a boundless discretion. By the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress const.i.tuted thirteen district courts which were to have four sessions annually[94] and three circuit courts which were to consist jointly of the Supreme Court judges and the district judge of such districts which were to meet annually at the time and places designated by the statute.[95] By the Judiciary Act of February 13, 1801, pa.s.sed in the closing weeks of the Adams Administration, the number of judges of the Supreme Court was to be reduced to five after the next vacancy, the districts were reorganized, and six circuit courts consisting of three judges each and organized independently of the Supreme Court and the district courts were created.[96] Whatever merits this plan of organization possessed were lost in the fierce partisanship of the period, which led the expiring Federalist Administration to appoint Federalists almost exclusively to the new judgeships to the dismay of the Jeffersonians who, upon coming into power, set plans in motion to repeal the act. In a bitter debate the major const.i.tutional issue to emerge centered about the abolition of courts once they were created in the light of the provision for tenure during good behavior. Suffice it to say, the repeal bill was pa.s.sed and approved by the President on March 8, 1802[97] without any provision for the displaced judges. The validity of the act of 1802 was questioned in Stuart _v._ Laird,[98] where Justice Paterson in a terse opinion, which hardly touched Charles Lee's argument that Congress lacked power to abolish or destroy courts and judges, held for the Court that Congress has the power to establish inferior courts from time to time as it may think proper and to transfer a cause from one tribunal to another. In answer to the argument that Supreme Court Justices could not const.i.tutionally sit as circuit judges, he pointed to practice and acquiescence contemporaneous with the Const.i.tution as an interpretation too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled.

Abolition of the Commerce Court

Since 1802 Congress has many times exercised its power to const.i.tute inferior courts, but not until 1913 did it again abolish a court. This was the unfortunately launched Commerce Court from which so much was expected and so little came. Again, as in 1802, there was a const.i.tutional debate on the power of Congress to abolish courts without providing for the displaced judges, but unlike the act of 1802 the act of 1913[99] provided for the redistribution of the Commerce Court judges among the Circuit Courts of Appeals and the transfer of its jurisdiction to the district courts.[100]

COMPENSATION

The prohibition against the diminution of judicial salaries has presented very little litigation. In 1920 in Evans _v._ Gore[101] the Court invalidated the application of the Income Tax as applied to a federal judge, over the strong dissent of Justice Holmes, who was joined by Justice Brandeis. This ruling was extended in Miles _v._ Graham[102]

to exempt the salary of a judge of the Court of Claims appointed subsequent to the enactment of the taxing act. Evans _v._ Gore was disapproved and Miles _v._ Graham in effect overruled in O'Malley, Collector of Internal Revenue _v._ Woodrough,[103] where the Court upheld section 22 of the Revenue Act of 1932 (now 26 U.S.C.A. 22 (a)) which extended the application of the Income Tax to salaries of judges taking office after June 6, 1932. Such a tax was regarded neither as an unconst.i.tutional diminution of the compensation of judges nor as an encroachment on the independence of the judiciary.[104] To subject judges who take office after a stipulated date to a nondiscriminatory tax laid generally on an income, said the Court, "is merely to recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their particular function in government does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose Const.i.tution and laws they are charged with administering."[105]

Diminution of Salaries

The Appropriations Act of 1932 reduced "the salaries and retired pay of all judges (except judges whose compensation may not, under the Const.i.tution, be diminished during their continuance in office)," by 8-1/3 per cent if below $10,000, or to $10,000 if above that figure.

While this provision presented no questions of its own const.i.tutionality, it did raise the question of what judges' salaries could be const.i.tutionally reduced. In O'Donoghue _v._ United States[106] the section was held inapplicable to the salaries of judges of the courts of the District of Columbia on the ground that as to their organization and tenure and compensation, Congress was limited by the provisions of article III. In Williams _v._ United States,[107] on the other hand, it was ruled that the reduction was applicable to the salaries of the judges of the Court of Claims, that being a legislative court created in pursuance of the power of Congress to pay the debts of the United States and to consent to suits against the United States. As such it is not within the provisions of article III respecting the tenure and compensation of judges.

COURTS OF SPECIALIZED JURISDICTION

By virtue of its power "to ordain and establish" courts Congress has occasionally created courts under article III to exercise a specialized jurisdiction. Otherwise these tribunals are like other article III courts in that they exercise "the judicial power of the United States,"

and only that power, that their judges must be appointed by the President and the Senate and must hold office during good behavior subject to removal by impeachment only, and that the compensation of their judges cannot be diminished during their continuance in office.

One example of such courts was the Commerce Court created by the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910,[108] which was given exclusive jurisdiction of all cases to enforce orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission except those involving money penalties and criminal punishment; of cases brought to enjoin, annul, or set aside orders of the Commission; of cases brought under the act of 1903 to prevent unjust discriminations; and of all mandamus proceedings authorized by the act of 1903. This court actually functioned for less than three years, being abolished in 1913, as was mentioned above.

The Emergency Court of Appeals of 1942

Another court of specialized jurisdiction but created for a limited time only was the Emergency Court of Appeals organized by the Emergency Price Control Act of January 30, 1942.[109] By the terms of the statute this court consisted of three or more judges designated by the Chief Justice from the judges of the United States district courts and circuit courts of appeal. The Chief Justice was authorized to designate one of the judges as chief judge, to designate additional judges from time to time, and to revoke designations. The chief judge in turn was authorized to divide the Court into divisions of three or more members each, with any such division empowered to render judgment as the judgment of the Court. The Court was vested with jurisdiction and powers of a district court to hear appeals filed within thirty days against denials of protests by the Price Administrator and with exclusive jurisdiction to set aside regulations, orders, or price schedules, in whole or in part, or to remand the proceeding. But no regulation or price schedule could be set aside or enjoined unless the Court was satisfied that it was contrary to law or was arbitrary or capricious. Even then the effectiveness of a restraining order was to be suspended for thirty days and, if appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty days, until its final disposition. Although the act deprived the district courts of the power to enjoin the enforcement of orders and price schedules, it vested them with jurisdiction to enforce the act and orders issued thereunder in actions brought by the Administrator to enjoin violations and to try criminal prosecutions brought by the Attorney General. Since the Emergency Court of Appeals, subject to review by the Supreme Court, was given exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of any order issued under the act, it resulted that the district courts were deprived of the power to inquire into the validity of orders involved in civil or criminal proceedings in which they had jurisdiction.[110]

Judicial Review Restrained

In Yakus _v._ United States[111] the Court held in an opinion by Chief Justice Stone that there is "no principle of law or provision of the Const.i.tution which precludes Congress from making criminal the violation of an administrative regulation, by one who has failed to avail himself of an adequate separate procedure for the adjudication of its validity, or which precludes the practice, in many ways desirable, of splitting the trial for violations of an administrative regulation by committing the determination of the issue of its validity to the agency which created it, and the issue of violation to a court which is given jurisdiction to punish violations. Such a requirement presents no novel const.i.tutional issue."[112] In a dissent Justice Rutledge took issue with this holding, saying: "It is one thing for Congress to withhold jurisdiction. It is entirely another to confer it and direct that it be exercised in a manner inconsistent with const.i.tutional requirements or, what in some instances may be the same thing, without regard to them.