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[38] Ibid. _See also_ Walsh _v._ Brewster, 255 U.S. 536 (1921).
[39] Lucas _v._ Alexander, 279 U.S. 573 (1929).
However, a litigant who, in 1915, reduced to judgment, a suit pending on February 26, 1913 for an accounting under a patent infringement, was unable to have treated as capital, and excluded from the taxable income produced by such settlement, that portion of his claim which had accrued prior to March 1, 1913. Income within the meaning of the amendment was interpreted to be the fruit that is born of capital, not the potency of fruition. All that the taxpayer possessed in 1913 was a contingent chose in action which was inchoate, uncertain, and contested.--United States _v._ Safety Car Heating & L. Co., 297 U.S. 88 (1936).
Similarly, purchasers of coal lands subject to mining leases executed before adoption of the amendment could not successfully contend that royalties received during 1920-1926 were payments for capital a.s.sets sold before March 1, 1913, and hence not taxable. Such an exemption, these purchasers argued, would have been in harmony with applicable local law whereunder t.i.tle to coal pa.s.ses immediately to the lessee on execution of such leases. To the Court, on the other hand, such leases were not to be viewed "as a 'sale' of the mineral content of the soil"
inasmuch as minerals "may or may not be present in the leased premises and may or may not be found [therein]. * * * If found, their abstraction * * * is a time consuming operation and the payments made by the lessee * * * do not normally become payable as the result of a single transaction." The result for tax purposes would have been the same even had the lease provided that t.i.tle to the minerals would pa.s.s only "on severance by the lessee."--Bankers Pocahontas Coal Co. _v._ Burnet, 287 U.S. 308 (1932); Burnet _v._ Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106-107, 111 (1932).
[40] Brushaber _v._ Union Pac. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
[41] MacLaughlin _v._ Alliance Ins. Co., 286 U.S. 244, 250 (1932).
[42] Helvering _v._ Independent L. Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934); Helvering _v._ Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 84 (1938).
[43] A tax on the rental value of property so occupied is a direct tax on the land and must be apportioned.--Helvering _v._ Independent L. Ins.
Co., 292 U.S. 371, 378-379 (1934).
[44] 292 U.S. 381.--Expenditures incurred in the prosecution of work under a contract for the purpose of earning profits are not capital investments, the cost of which, if converted, must first be restored from the proceeds before there is a capital gain taxable as income.
Accordingly, a dredging contractor, recovering a judgment for breach of warranty of the character of the material to be dredged, must include the amount thereof in the gross income of the year in which it was received, rather than of the years during which the contract was performed, even though it merely represents a return of expenditures made in performing the contract and resulting in a loss. The gain or profit subject to tax under the Sixteenth Amendment is the excess of receipts over allowable deductions during the accounting period, without regard to whether or not such excess represents a profit ascertained on the basis of particular transactions of the taxpayer when they are brought to a conclusion.--Burnet _v._ Sanford & B. Co., 282 U.S. 353 (1931).
[45] 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
[46] 42 Stat. 227, 250, 268.
[47] 274 at 263.
[48] 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
[49] 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
AMENDMENT 17
POPULAR ELECTION OF SENATORS
Page Historical origin 1207 Right to vote for Senators 1208
POPULAR ELECTION OF SENATORS
Amendment 17
Clause 1. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
Clause 2. When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: _Provided_ That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
Clause 3. This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Const.i.tution.
Historical Origin
The ratification of this amendment was the outcome of increasing popular dissatisfaction with the operation of the originally established method of electing Senators. As the franchise became exercisable by greater numbers of people, the belief became widespread that Senators ought to be popularly elected in the same manner as Representatives. Acceptance of this idea was fostered by the mounting acc.u.mulation of evidence of the practical disadvantages and malpractices attendant upon legislative selection, such as deadlocks within legislatures resulting in vacancies remaining unfilled for substantial intervals, the influencing of legislative selection by corrupt political organizations and special interest groups through purchase of legislative seats, and the neglect of duties by legislators as a consequence of protracted electoral contests. Prior to ratification, however, many States had perfected arrangements calculated to afford the voters more effective control over the selection of Senators. State laws regulating direct primaries were amended so as to enable voters partic.i.p.ating in primaries to designate their preference for one of several party candidates for a senatorial seat: and nominations unofficially effected thereby were transmitted to the legislature. Although their action rested upon no stronger foundation than common understanding, the legislatures generally elected the winning candidate of the majority, and, indeed, in two States, candidates for legislative seats were required to promise to support, without regard to party ties, the senatorial candidate polling the most votes. As a result of such developments, at least 29 States by 1912, one year before ratification, were nominating Senators on a popular basis; and, as a consequence, the const.i.tutional discretion of the legislatures had been reduced to little more than that retained by presidential electors.
Right to Vote for Senators
Very shortly after ratification it was established that if a person possessed the qualifications requisite for voting for a Senator, his right to vote for such an officer was not derived merely from the const.i.tution and laws of the State in which they are chosen but has its foundation in the Const.i.tution of the United States.[1] Consistently with this view, federal courts more recently have declared that when local party authorities, acting pursuant to regulations prescribed by a party's State executive committee, refused to permit a Negro, on account of his race, to vote in a primary to select candidates for the office of United States Senator, they deprived him of a right secured to him by the Const.i.tution and laws, in violation of this amendment.[2] An Illinois statute, on the other hand, which required that a pet.i.tion to form, and to nominate candidates for, a new political party be signed by at least 25,000 voters from at least 50 counties was held not to impair any right under Amendment XVII, notwithstanding that 52% of the State's voters were residents of one county, 87% were residents of 49 counties, and only 13% resided in the 53 least populous counties.[3]
Notes
[1] United States _v._ Aczel, 219 F. 917 (1915), citing Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
[2] Chapman _v._ King, 154 F. (2d) 460 (1946); certiorari denied, 327 U.S. 800 (1946).
[3] MacDougall _v._ Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
AMENDMENT 18
PROHIBITION OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS
Page Validity of adoption 1213 Enforcement 1213 Repeal 1213
PROHIBITION OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS
Amendment 18
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Const.i.tution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Const.i.tution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.
Validity of Adoption
Cases relating to this question are presented and discussed under article V.