The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation Part 17

On account of the large element of "fixed charges" which enters into the setting of rates by railway companies, compet.i.tion between lines for new business was from the first very sharp, and resulted in many evils which, in the early 70's, led in the Middle West to the enactment by the State legislatures of the so-called "Granger Laws"; and in the famous "Granger Cases," headed by Munn _v._ Illinois,[374] the Court at first sustained this legislation, in relation to both the commerce clause and the due process of law clause of Amendment XIV. The princ.i.p.al circ.u.mstance, however, which shaped the Court's att.i.tude toward the "Granger Laws" had, by a decade later, disappeared, the fact, namely, that originally the railroad business was largely in local hands. In consequence, first, of the panic of 1873, and then of the panic of 1885, hundreds of these small lines went into bankruptcy, from which they emerged consolidated into great interstate systems. The result for the Court's interpretation of the commerce clause was determinative. In the case of Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific R. Co. _v._ Illinois,[375] decided in 1886, it was ruled that a State may not regulate charges for the carriage even within its own boundaries of goods brought from without the State or destined to points outside it; that in this respect Congress's power over interstate commerce was exclusive. The following year, Congress, responding to a widespread public demand, pa.s.sed the original Interstate Commerce Act.[376]

By this measure a commission of five was created with authority to pa.s.s upon the "reasonableness" of all charges by railroads for the transportation of goods or persons in interstate commerce and to order the discontinuance of all such charges as it found to be "unreasonable,"

or otherwise violative of the provisions of the act. In Interstate Commerce Commission _v._ Brimson,[377] decided in 1894, the validity of the Commission as a means "necessary and proper" for the enforcement of Congress's power to regulate commerce among the States was sustained, as well as its right to enter the courts of the United States in order to secure process for the execution of its orders. Later decisions of the Court, however, including one in which the act was construed not to give the Commission power to set reasonable maximum rates in subst.i.tution for those found by it to be unreasonable, disappointed earlier expectations.[378]

The history of the Commission as an effective instrument of government dates from the Hepburn Act of 1906[379] which was followed four years later by the Mann-Elkins Act.[380] By the former the Commission was explicitly endowed with the power, after a full hearing on a complaint made to it, "to determine and prescribe just and reasonable" maximum rates. By the latter it was further authorized to set such rates on its own initiative, and without waiting for a complaint; while any increase of rates by a carrier was made subject to suspension by the Commission until its approval could be obtained. At the same time, the Commission's jurisdiction was extended to telegraphs, telephones and cables.[381]

THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION TODAY

The powers of the Commission, which has been gradually increased to a body of eleven, are today largely defined in the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920. By that act they were extended not only to all "railroads," comprehensively defined, but also to the following additional categories of "'common carriers' * * * all pipeline companies; telegraph, telephone, and cable companies operating by wire or wireless [_See_ note 3 above][Transcriber's Note: Refers to Article I, Footnote [381].]; express companies; sleeping-car companies; and all persons, natural or artificial, engaged in such transportation or transmission as aforesaid as common carriers for hire." The jurisdiction of the Commission covers not only the characteristic activities of such carriers in commerce among the States, but also the issuance of securities by them, and all consolidations of existing companies, or lines. Furthermore, for the first time, the Commission was put under the injunction, in exercising its control over rates and charges, to "give due consideration, among other things, to the transportation needs of the country and the necessity (under honest, efficient and economical management of existing transportation facilities) of enlarging such facilities in order to provide the people of the United States with adequate transportation."[382] Railway rate control itself, which was originally entered upon by the National Government exclusively from the point of view of restraint, has thus been a.s.similated to the idea of "fostering and promoting" transportation.

Two types of const.i.tutional questions have presented themselves under the legislation just pa.s.sed in review: 1. Those arising out of the safeguards which the Bill of Rights throws about property rights; 2.

Those arising out of the intermingling of the interstate and intrastate operations of the same carriers, and the resulting tangency of State with national power. Only the latter are considered at this point.

THE SHREVEPORT CASE

Section 1 of the act of 1887 contains the proviso "that the provisions of this act shall not apply to 'transportation' wholly within the State." Section 3 of the act prohibits "any common carrier subject to the provisions" of the act from giving "any unreasonable preference or advantage" to any person, firm, or locality. In the Shreveport Case,[383] decided in 1914, the Commission, reading -- 3 independently of -- 1, had ordered several Texas lines to increase certain of their rates between points in Texas till they should approximate rates already approved by the Commission to adjoining points in Louisiana. The latter rates, being interstate, were admittedly subject to the Commission. The local rates were as clearly within the normal jurisdiction of the State, and had in fact been set by the Texas Railway Commission. The Court found that the Interstate Commerce Commission had not exceeded its statutory powers. The const.i.tutional objection to the Commission's action was stated thus: "That Congress is impotent to control the intrastate charges of an interstate carrier even to the extent necessary to prevent injurious discrimination against interstate traffic." This objection the Court met, as follows: "Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so related that the government of the one involves the control of the other, it is Congress, and not the State, that is ent.i.tled to prescribe the final and dominant rule, for otherwise Congress would be denied the exercise of its const.i.tutional authority and the State, and not the Nation, would be supreme in the national field."[384] This, the Court continued, "is not to say that Congress possesses the authority to regulate the internal commerce of a State as such, but that it does possess the power to foster and protect interstate commerce, and to take all measures necessary or appropriate to that end, although intrastate transactions of interstate carriers may thereby be controlled."[385]

THE ACT OF 1920 AND STATE RAILWAY RATE REGULATION

The power of the Commission under -- 3 of the act of 1887, as interpreted in the Shreveport Case, was greatly enlarged by -- 416 of the act of 1920, which authorizes the Commission to remove "any undue, unreasonable, or unjust discrimination against interstate or foreign commerce." Thus, commerce as a whole, instead of specific firms or localities, is made the beneficiary of the restriction. In the Wisconsin R.R. Comm. _v._ Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. Co.,[386] the Court held that this section sustained the Interstate Commerce Commission in annulling intrastate pa.s.senger rates which it found to be unduly low, in comparison with rates which the Commission had established for interstate travel, and so tending to thwart, in deference to a merely local interest, the general purpose of the act to maintain an efficient transport service for the benefit of the country at large.[387]

REGULATION OF OTHER AGENTS OF CARRIAGE AND COMMUNICATION

In the Pipe Line Cases, decided in 1914,[388] the Court affirmed the power of Congress to regulate the transportation of oil and gas in pipe lines from one State to another and held that this power applies to such transportation even though the oil (or gas) in question was the property of the owner of the lines.[389] Thirteen years later, in 1927, the Court ruled that an order by a State commission fixing rates on electric current generated within the State and sold to a distributor in another State was invalid as imposing a burden on interstate commerce, thus holding impliedly that Congress' power to regulate the transmission of electric current from one State to another carried with it the power to regulate the price of such electricity.[390] Proceeding on this implication Congress, in the Federal Power Act of 1935,[391] conferred upon the Federal Power Commission the power to govern the wholesale distribution of electricity in interstate commerce; and three years later vested in the same body like power over natural gas moving in interstate commerce.[392] In Federal Power Commission _v._ Natural Gas Pipeline Company,[393] the power of the Commission to set the prices at which gas, originating in one State and transported into another, should be sold to distributors wholesale in the latter State, was sustained by the Court in the following terms: "The argument that the provisions of the statute applied in this case are unconst.i.tutional on their face is without merit. The sale of natural gas originating in the State and its transportation and delivery to distributors in any other State const.i.tutes interstate commerce, which is subject to regulation by Congress. * * * It is no objection to the exercise of the power of Congress that it is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police power of a State. The authority of Congress to regulate the prices of commodities in interstate commerce is at least as great under the Fifth Amendment as is that of the States under the Fourteenth to regulate the prices of commodities in intrastate commerce."[394]

Other acts regulative of interstate commerce and communication which belong to this period are the Federal Communications Act of 1934, which regulates, through the Federal Communications Commission,[395]

"interstate and foreign communication by wire and radio"; the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935, which, through the Interstate Commerce Commission, governs the transportation of persons and property by motor vehicle common carriers;[396] the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, enacted for the purpose of bringing under the control of a central agency, called "the Civil Aeronautics Authority" (functioning through the Civil Aeronautics Administrator and the Civil Aeronautics Board) all phases of airborne commerce, foreign and interstate.[397] None of these measures have provoked challenge to the power of Congress to enact them.

ACTS OF CONGRESS PROTECTIVE OF LABOR ENGAGED IN INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION

In the course of the years 1903 to 1908 Congress enacted a series of such measures which were notable both on account of their immediate purpose and as marking the entry of the National Government into the field of labor legislation. The Safety Appliance Act of 1893,[398] which applied only to cars and locomotives engaged in moving interstate traffic, was amended in 1903 to embrace "all trains, locomotives, tenders, cars," etc., "used on any railway engaged in interstate commerce * * * and to all other locomotives * * * cars," etc., "used in connection therewith."[399] In Southern Railway Company _v._ United States,[400] the validity of this extension of the act was challenged.

The Court sustained the measure as being within Congress's power, saying: "* * * this is so, not because Congress possesses any power to regulate intrastate commerce as such, but because its power to regulate interstate commerce is plenary and competently may be exerted to secure the safety of the persons and property transported therein and of those who are employed in such transportation, no matter what may be the source of the dangers which threaten it. That is to say, it is no objection to such an exertion of this power that the dangers intended to be avoided arise, in whole or in part, out of matters connected with intrastate commerce."[401]

Four years later the Hours of Service Act of 1907[402] was pa.s.sed, requiring, as a safety measure, that carriers engaged in the transportation of pa.s.sengers or property by railroad in interstate or foreign commerce should not work their employees for longer periods than those prescribed by the Act. In sustaining this legislation the Court, speaking through Justice Hughes, said: "The fundamental question here is whether a restriction upon the hours of labor of employes who are connected with the movement of trains in interstate transportation is comprehended within this sphere of authorized legislation. This question admits of but one answer. The length of hours of service has direct relation to the efficiency of the human agencies upon which protection of life and property necessarily depends. * * * In its power suitably to provide for the safety of the employes and travelers, Congress was not limited to the enactment of laws relating to mechanical appliances, but it was also competent to consider, and to endeavor to reduce, the dangers incident to the strain of excessive hours of duty on the part of engineers, conductors, train dispatchers, telegraphers, and other persons embraced within the cla.s.s defined by the act."[403]

But by far the most notable of these safety measures were the Federal Employers Liability Acts of 1906 and 1908,[404] the second of which merely reenacted the first with certain "unconst.i.tutional" features eliminated. What the amended act does, in short, is to modify, in the case of injuries incurred by the employees of interstate carriers while engaged in interstate commerce, the defenses that had hitherto been available to the carriers at common law. The princ.i.p.al argument against the acts was that the commerce clause afforded no basis for an attempt to regulate the relation of master and servant, which had heretofore in all cases fallen to the reserved powers of the States; that indeed the rules of common law modified or abrogated by the act existed solely under State authority, and had always been enforced, in the main, in the courts of the States.[405] Countering this argument, the Court, speaking by Justice Van Devanter, quoted the following pa.s.sage from the brief of the Solicitor-General: "Interstate commerce--if not always, at any rate when the commerce is transportation--is an act. Congress, of course, can do anything which, in the exercise by itself of a fair discretion, may be deemed appropriate to save the act of interstate commerce from prevention or interruption, or to make that act more secure, more reliable or more efficient. The act of interstate commerce is done by the labor of men and with the help of things; and these men and things are the agents and instruments of the commerce. If the agents or instruments are destroyed while they are doing the act, commerce is stopped; if the agents or instruments are interrupted, commerce is interrupted; if the agents or instruments are not of the right kind or quality, commerce in consequence becomes slow or costly or unsafe or otherwise inefficient; and if the conditions under which the agents or instruments do the work of commerce are wrong or disadvantageous, those bad conditions may and often will prevent or interrupt the act of commerce or make it less expeditious, less reliable, less economical and less secure. Therefore, Congress may legislate about the agents and instruments of interstate commerce, and about the conditions under which those agents and instruments perform the work of interstate commerce, whenever such legislation bears, or in the exercise of a fair legislative discretion can be deemed to bear, upon the reliability or promptness or economy or security or utility of the interstate commerce act."[406]

The Adair Case

But while the idea expressed here that the human agents of commerce, in the sense of transportation, are instrumentalities of it, and so, in that capacity, within the protective power of Congress, signalized the entrance of Congress into the field of labor legislation, the Court was not at the time prepared to give the idea any considerable scope.

Pertinent in this connection is the case of Adair _v._ United States,[407] which was decided between the two Employers' Liability Cases. Here was involved the validity of -- 10 of the "Erdman Act" of 1898,[408] by which it was made a misdemeanor for a carrier or agent thereof to require of an employee, as a condition of employment, that he should not become or remain a member of a trade union, or to threaten him with loss of employment if he should become or remain a member. This proviso the Court held not to be a regulation of commerce, there being no connection between an employee's membership in a labor organization and the carrying on of interstate commerce. Twenty-two years later, however, in 1930, the Court conceded that the connection between interstate commerce and union membership was a real and substantial one, and on that ground sustained the power of Congress in the Railway Labor Act of 1926[409] to prevent employers from interfering with the right of employees to select freely their own collective bargaining representatives.[410]

The Railroad Retirement Act

Still pursuing the idea of protecting commerce and the labor engaged in it concurrently, Congress, by the Railroad Retirement Act of June 27, 1934,[411] ordered the compulsory retirement of superannuated employees of interstate carriers, and provided that they be paid pensions out of a fund comprising compulsory contributions from the carriers and their present and future employees. In Railroad Retirement Board _v._ Alton R.R. Company,[412] however, a closely divided Court held this legislation to be in excess of Congress's power to regulate commerce and contrary to the due process clause of Amendment V. Said Justice Roberts for the majority: "We feel bound to hold that a pension plan thus imposed is in no proper sense a regulation of the activity of interstate transportation. It is an attempt for social ends to impose by sheer fiat noncontractual incidents upon the relation of employer and employee, not as a rule or regulation of commerce and transportation between the States, but as a means of a.s.suring a particular cla.s.s of employees against old age dependency. This is neither a necessary nor an appropriate rule or regulation affecting the due fulfillment of the railroads' duty to serve the public in interstate transportation."[413]

Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the dissenters, contended, on the contrary, that "the morale of the employees [had] an important bearing upon the efficiency of the transportation service." He added: "The fundamental consideration which supports this type of legislation is that industry should take care of its human wastage, whether that is due to accident or age. That view cannot be dismissed as arbitrary or capricious. It is a reasoned conviction based upon abundant experience.

The expression of that conviction in law is regulation. When expressed in the government of interstate carriers, with respect to their employees likewise engaged in interstate commerce, it is a regulation of that commerce. As such, so far as the subject matter is concerned, the commerce clause should be held applicable."[414] Under subsequent legislation, an excise is levied on interstate carriers and their employees, while by separate but parallel legislation a fund is created in the Treasury out of which pensions are paid along the lines of the original plan. The const.i.tutionality of this scheme appears to be taken for granted in Railroad Retirement Board _v._ Duquesne Warehouse Company.[415]

BILLS OF LADING; THE FERGER CASE

Some years earlier the Court had had occasion in United States _v._ Ferger,[416] decided in 1919, to reiterate the rule laid down in the Southern Railway Case, that Congress's protective power over interstate commerce reaches all kinds of obstructions whatever the source of their origin. Ferger and a.s.sociates had been indicted under a federal statute for issuing a false bill of lading, to cover a fict.i.tious shipment in interstate commerce. Their defense was that, since there could be no commerce in a fraudulent bill of lading, therefore Congress's power could not reach their alleged offense, a contention which Chief Justice White, speaking for the Court, answered thus: "But this mistakenly a.s.sumes that the power of Congress is to be necessarily tested by the intrinsic existence of commerce in the particular subject dealt with, instead of by the relation of that subject to commerce and its effect upon it. We say mistakenly a.s.sumes, because we think it clear that if the proposition were sustained it would destroy the power of Congress to regulate, as obviously that power, if it is to exist, must include the authority to deal with obstructions to interstate commerce (_In re Debs_, 158 U.S. 564) and with a host of other acts which, because of their relation to and influence upon interstate commerce, come within the power of Congress to regulate, although they are not interstate commerce in and of themselves. * * * That as instrumentalities of interstate commerce, bills of lading are the efficient means of credit resorted to for the purpose of securing and fructifying the flow of a vast volume of interstate commerce upon which the commercial intercourse of the country, both domestic and foreign, largely depends, is a matter of common knowledge as to the course of business of which we may take judicial notice. Indeed, that such bills of lading and the faith and credit given to their genuineness and the value they represent are the producing and sustaining causes of the enormous number of transactions in domestic and foreign exchange, is also so certain and well known that we may notice it without proof."[417]

Congressional Regulation of Commerce as Traffic

THE SHERMAN ACT; THE "SUGAR TRUST CASE"

Congress's chief effort to regulate commerce in the primary sense of "traffic" is embodied in the Sherman Ant.i.trust Act of 1890, the opening section of which declares "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise," or "conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations" to be "illegal,"

while the second section makes it a misdemeanor for anybody to "monopolize or attempt to monopolize any part of such commerce."[418]

The act was pa.s.sed to curb the growing tendency to form industrial combinations and the first case to reach the Court under it was the famous "Sugar Trust Case," United States _v._ E.C. Knight Co.[419] Here the Government asked for the cancellation of certain agreements, whereby, through purchases of stock in other companies, the American Sugar Refining Company, had "acquired," it was conceded, "nearly complete control of the manufacture of refined sugars in the United States." The question of the validity of the act was not expressly discussed by the Court, but was subordinated to that of its proper construction. So proceeding, the Court, in pursuance of doctrines of Const.i.tutional Law which were then dominant with it, turned the act from its intended purpose and destroyed its effectiveness for several years, as that of the Interstate Commerce Act was being contemporaneously impaired. The following pa.s.sage early in Chief Justice Fuller's opinion for the Court, sets forth the conception of the Federal System that controlled the decision: "It is vital that the independence of the commercial power and of the police power, and the delimitation between them, however sometimes perplexing, should always be recognized and observed, for while the one furnishes the strongest bond of union, the other is essential to the preservation of the autonomy of the States as required by our dual form of government; and acknowledged evils, however grave and urgent they may appear to be, had better be borne, than risk be run, in the effort to suppress them, of more serious consequences by resort to expedients of even doubtful const.i.tutionality."[420]

In short, what was needed, the Court felt, was a hard and fast line between the two spheres of power, and in the following series of propositions it endeavored to lay down such a line: (1) production is always local, and under the exclusive domain of the States; (2) commerce among the States does not commence until goods "commence their final movement from their State of origin to that of their destination"; (3) the sale of a product is merely an incident of its production and while capable of "bringing the operation of commerce into play," affects it only incidentally; (4) such restraint as would reach commerce, as above defined, in consequence of combinations to control production "in all its forms," would be "indirect, however inevitable and whatever its extent," and as such beyond the purview of the act.[421] Applying then the above reasoning to the case before it, the Court proceeded: "The object [of the combination] was manifestly private gain in the manufacture of the commodity, but not through the control of interstate or foreign commerce. It is true that the bill alleged that the products of these refineries were sold and distributed among the several States, and that all the companies were engaged in trade or commerce with the several States and with foreign nations; but this was no more than to say that trade and commerce served manufacture to fulfil its function.

Sugar was refined for sale, and sales were probably made at Philadelphia for consumption, and undoubtedly for resale by the first purchasers throughout Pennsylvania and other States, and refined sugar was also forwarded by the companies to other States for sale. Nevertheless it does not follow that an attempt to monopolize, or the actual monopoly of, the manufacture was an attempt, whether executory or consummated, to monopolize commerce, even though, in order to dispose of the product, the instrumentality of commerce was necessarily invoked. There was nothing in the proofs to indicate any intention to put a restraint upon trade or commerce, and the fact, as we have seen that trade or commerce might be indirectly affected was not enough to ent.i.tle complainants to a decree."[422]

THE SHERMAN ACT REVISED

Four years later occurred the case of Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. _v._ United States,[423] in which the Ant.i.trust Act was successfully applied as against an industrial combination for the first time. The agreements in the case, the parties to which were manufacturing concerns, effected a division of territory among them, and so involved, it was held, a "direct" restraint on the distribution and hence of the transportation of the products of the contracting firms. The holding, however, did not question the doctrine of the earlier case, which in fact continued substantially undisturbed until 1905, when Swift and Co. _v._ United States,[424] was decided.

THE "CURRENT OF COMMERCE" CONCEPT: THE SWIFT CASE

Defendants in the Swift case were some thirty firms engaged in Chicago and other cities in the business of buying livestock in their stockyards, in converting it at their packing houses into fresh meat, and in the sale and shipment of such fresh meat to purchasers in other States. The charge against them was that they had entered into a combination to refrain from bidding against each other in the local markets, to fix the prices at which they would sell, to restrict shipments of meat, and to do other forbidden acts. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court on defendants' contention that certain of the acts complained of were not acts of interstate commerce and so did not fall within a valid reading of the Sherman Act. The Court, however, sustained the Government on the ground that the "scheme as a whole" came within the act, and that the local activities alleged were simply part and parcel of this general scheme.[425]

Referring to the purchases of livestock at the stockyards, the Court, speaking by Justice Holmes, said: "Commerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business. When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase, in another, and when in effect they do so, with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the stockyards, and when this is a typical, constantly recurring course, the current thus existing is a current of commerce among the States, and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce."[426] Likewise the sales alleged of fresh meat at the slaughtering places fell within the general design.

Even if they imported a technical pa.s.sing of t.i.tle at the slaughtering places, they also imported that the sales were to persons in other States, and that shipments to such States were part of the transaction.[427] Thus, sales of the type which in the Sugar Trust Case were thrust to one side as immaterial from the point of view of the law, because they enabled manufacture "to fulfill its function," were here treated as merged in an interstate commerce stream. Thus, the concept of commerce as _trade_, that is, as _traffic_, again entered the Const.i.tutional Law picture, with the result that conditions which directly affected interstate trade could not be dismissed on the ground that they affected interstate commerce, in the sense of interstate _transportation_, only "indirectly." Lastly, the Court added these significant words: "But we do not mean to imply that the rule which marks the point at which State taxation or regulation becomes permissible necessarily is beyond the scope of interference by Congress in cases where such interference is deemed necessary for the protection of commerce among the States."[428] That is to say, the line that confines State power from one side does not always confine national power from the other. For even though the line accurately divides the subject matter of the complementary spheres, still national power is always ent.i.tled to take on such additional extension as is requisite to guarantee its effective exercise, and is furthermore supreme.

THE DANBURY HATTERS CASE

In this respect, the Swift Case only states what the Shreveport Case was later to declare more explicitly; and the same may be said of an ensuing series of cases in which combinations of employees engaged in such intrastate activities as manufacturing, mining, building construction, and the distribution of poultry were subjected to the penalties of the Sherman Act because of the effect or intended effect of their activities on interstate commerce.[429]

STOCKYARDS AND GRAIN FUTURES ACTS

In 1921 Congress pa.s.sed the Packers and Stockyards Act[430] whereby the business of commission men and livestock dealers in the chief stockyards of the country was brought under national supervision; and the year following it pa.s.sed the Grain Futures Act[431] whereby exchanges dealing in grain futures were subjected to control. The decisions of the Court sustaining these measures both built directly upon the Swift Case.

In Stafford _v._ Wallace,[432] which involved the former act, Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the Court, said: "The object to be secured by the act is the free and unburdened flow of livestock from the ranges and farms of the West and Southwest through the great stockyards and slaughtering centers on the borders of that region, and thence in the form of meat products to the consuming cities of the country in the Middle West and East, or, still as livestock, to the feeding places and fattening farms in the Middle West or East for further preparation for the market."[433] The stockyards, therefore, were "not a place of rest or final destination." They were "but a throat through which the current flows," and the sales there were not merely local transactions. "They do not stop the flow;--but, on the contrary" are "indispensable to its continuity."[434]

In Chicago Board of Trade _v._ Olsen,[435] involving the Grain Futures Act, the same course of reasoning was repeated. Speaking of the Swift Case, Chief Justice Taft remarked: "That case was a milestone in the interpretation of the commerce clause of the Const.i.tution. It recognized the great changes and development in the business of this vast country and drew again the dividing line between interstate and intrastate commerce where the Const.i.tution intended it to be. It refused to permit local incidents of a great interstate movement, which taken alone were intrastate, to characterize the movement as such."[436] Of special significance, however, is the part of the opinion which was devoted to showing the relation between future sales and cash sales, and hence the effect of the former upon the interstate grain trade. The test, said the Chief Justice, was furnished by the question of price.