The Common Law Part 25

121/3 Minor v. Sharon, 112 Ma.s.s. 477, 487.

122/1 See Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 577, 583; Rex v. Oneby, 2 Strange, 766, 773; Lampleigh v. Brathwait, Hobart, 105, 107; Wigram, Disc., pl. 249; Evans on Pleading, 49, 138, 139, 143 et seq.; Id., Miller's ed., pp. 147, 149.

123/1 See Detroit & Milwaukee R. R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99, 120.

123/2 In the small-pox case, Minor v. Sharon, 112 Ma.s.s. 477, while the court ruled with regard to the defendant's conduct as has been mentioned, it held that whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in not having vaccinated his children was "a question of fact, and was properly left to the jury." p.

488.

124/1 Metropolitan Railway Co. v. Jackson, 3 App. Cas. 193, 197.

125/1 See Kearney v. London, Brighton & S. Coast Ry. Co., L.R. 5 Q.B. 411, 414, 417; S.C., 6 id. 759.

125/2 Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722.

125/3 See Skinnier v. Lodon, Brighton, & S. Coast Ry. Co., 5 Exch. 787. But cf. Hammack v. White, 11 C.B. N.S. 588, 594.

127/1 7 American Law Review, 654 et seq., July, 1873.

128/1 Callahan v. Bean, 9 Allen, 401.

128/2 Carter v. Towne, 98 Ma.s.s. 567.

128/3 Lovett v. Salem & South Danvers R. R. Co., 9 Allen, 557.

128/4 Back v. Stacey, 2 C.&P. 465.

128/5 Cf. Beadel v. Perry, L.R. 3 Eq. 465; City of London Brewery Co. v. Termant, L.R. 9 Ch. 212, 220; Hackett v. Baiss, L.R. 20 Eq. 494; Theed v. Debenham, 2 Ch. D. 165.

135/1 Williamson v. Allison, 2 East, 446.

136/1 Leather v. Simpson, L.R. 11 Eq. 398, 406. On the other hand, the extreme moral view is stated in Weir v. Bell, 3 Ex. D.

238, 243.

138/1 As to actual knowledge and intent, see Lecture II. p. 57.

141/1 Cf. Knight v. German, Cro. Eliz. 70; S.C., ib. 134.

141/2 Mitch.e.l.l v. Jenkins, 5 B.&Ad. 588, 594; Turner v. Ambler, 10 Q.B. 252, 257, 261.

142/1 Redfield, C. J. in Barron v. Mason, 31 Vt. 189, 197.

142/2 Mitch.e.l.l v. Jenkins, 5 B.&Ad. 588, 595.

143/1 See Burton v. Fulton, 49 Penn. St. 151.

144/1 Rolfe, B. in Fouldes v. Willoughby, 8 Meeson & Welsby, 540.

145/1 Supra, pp. 115 et seq.

147/1 See, e.g., Cooley, Torts, 164.

147/2 Rex v. Dixon, 3 Maule & Selwyn, 11, 15; Reg. v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360; 5 C.&P. 266, n.

148/1 Aleyn, 35; Style, 72; A.D. 1648.

149/1 1 Kent (12th ed.), 467, n. 1; 6 Am. Law Rev. 723-725; 7 id.

652.

149/2 2 Wm. Bl. 892, A.D. 1773; supra, p. 92; Addison on Torts (4th ed.), 264, citing Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 37, pl. 26, which hardly sustains the broad language of the text.

151/1 Compare Crouch v. London & N. W. R. Co., 14 C.B. 255, 283; Calye's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 32; Co. Lit. 89 a, n. 7; 1 Ch. Pl. (lst ed,), 219, (6th ed.), 216, 217; 7 Am. Law Rev. 656 et seq.

151/2 But cf. The Pawashick, 2 Lowell, 142.

151/3 Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384, 398, 399; Barnett v.

Brandao, 6 Man. & Gr. 630, 665; Hawkins v. Cardy, 1 Ld. Raym.

360.

151/4 Pickering v. Barkley, Style, 132; Wegerstoffe v. Keene, 1 Strange, 214, 216, 223; Smith v. Kendall, 6 T. R. 123, 124.

155/1 Card v. Case, 5 C.B. 622, 634. Cf. Austin (3d ed.), 513.

156/1 Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330; supra, p. 116.

156/2 See Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J. (9 Vroom), 339; 2 Thompson, Negligence, 1234, n. 3.

157/1 Gorham v. Gross, 125 Ma.s.s. 232; supra, p. 117.

158/1 Mitchil v. Alestree, 1 Vent. 295; S.C., 3 Keb. 650; 2 Lev.

172; supra, p. 94.

158/2 Hammack v. White, 11 C.B. N.S. 588.

166/1 Laband, Vermogensrechtlichen Klagen, Section 16, pp. 108 et seq.; Heusler, Gewere, 487, 492. These authors correct the earlier opinion of Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, Section 37, pp. 313 et seq., adopted by Sohm in his Proc. d. Lex Salica, Section 9. Cf.

the discussion of sua in writs of trespa.s.s, &c. in the English law, at the end of Lecture VI. Those who wish short accounts in English may consult North Amer. Rev., CX. 210, and see Id., CXVIII. 416; Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law, pp. 212 et seq. Our knowledge as to the primitive form of action is somewhat meagre and dependent on inference. Some of the earliest texts are Ed.

Liutpr. 131; Lex Baiw., XV. 4; L. Frision. Add. X.; L. Visig., V.5. I; L. Burg., XLIX. I, 2. The edict of Liutprand, dealing with housebreaking followed by theft of property left in charge of the householder, lays down that the owner shall look to the bailee alone, and the bailee shall hold the thief both for the housebreaking and for the stolen goods. Because, as it says, we cannot raise two claims out of one causa; somewhat as our law was unable to divide the severing a thing from the realty, and the conversion of it, into two different wrongs. Compare, further, Jones, Bailm. 112; Exodus xxii. 10-12; LL. Alfred, 28; I Thorpe, Anc. L., p. 51; Gaii Inst., III. Sections 202-207.

167/1 x.x.xI. 16.

168/1 "Peterit enim rem suam petere [civiliter] ut adiratam per testimonium proborum hominum, et sic consequi rem suam quamvia furatam. . . Et non refert utrum res que ita subtracta fuit ext.i.terit illius appellantis propria vel alterius, dum tamen de custodia sua." Bract., fol. 150 b, 151; Britton (Nich. ed.), I.

59, 60 [23 b], De Larcyns; cf. ib. 67 [26 b]; Fleta, fol. 5i, L.

I. c. 38, Section 1.

169/1 Y.B. 21 & 22 Ed. I. 466-468, noticed in North Amer. Rev., CXVIII. 421, n. (So Britton [26 b], "Si il puse averreer la perte.") This is not trover. The declaration in detinue per inventionem was called "un newfound Haliday" in Y.B. 33 Hen. VI.

26, 27; cf. 7 Hen. VI. 22, pl. 3; Isack v. Clarke, I Rolle, R.

126, 128.

169/2 Y.B. 2 Ed. IV. 4, 5, pl. 9; 21 Hen. VII. 39, pl. 49; Bro.