The Classical World Part 7

The Roman Republic.

Rome, from the third to the second century before our era, was the most aristocratically governed city that existed in Italy or Greece... If the Senate was obliged to manage the mult.i.tude on domestic questions, it was absolute master so far as concerned foreign affairs. It was the Senate that received amba.s.sadors, that concluded alliances, that distributed the provinces and the legions, that ratified the acts of the generals, that determined the conditions allowed to the conquered all acts which everywhere else belonged to the popular a.s.sembly. Foreigners, in their relations with Rome, had therefore nothing to do with the people. The Senate alone spoke, and the idea was held out that the people had no power. This was the opinion which a Greek expressed to Flamininus, 'In your country,' he said, 'riches alone govern, and everything else submits to Rome.' N. D. Fustel de Coulanges, N. D. Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City The Ancient City (1864, English translation 1956) I reiterate that in this system (the Roman political system of the late Republic), public office could only be gained by direct election in which all (adult male) citizens, including freed slaves, had the right to vote, and all legislation was by definition the subject of direct popular voting. That being so, it is difficult to see why the Roman Republic should not deserve serious consideration not just as one type of ancient city-state, but as one of a relatively small group of historical examples of political systems that might deserve the label 'democracy'.

Fergus Millar, The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic The Crowd in Rome in the Late Republic (2002) (2002)

30.

Luxury and Licence.

'I have neither a building nor a vase nor a costly robe nor a high-priced slave or slave-girl. If there is something I have to use, I use it. If there is not, I do without. Anyone may use and enjoy what is theirs, and that is fine by me.' But then Cato goes on, 'They blame me me because I do without so many things. But I blame because I do without so many things. But I blame them them because they are unable to do without.' because they are unable to do without.'

Cato the Censor, in Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights Attic Nights 13.24 13.24 The Romans' conquests in Italy, then in Greece, were due partly to their military skill and values, partly to their superior and ever-increasing manpower and their appeal to local upper cla.s.ses or factions within them. Obedience to Rome seemed the lesser of political evils to people whose standing and property were at risk from their own lower cla.s.ses or from surrounding barbarian enemies. 'Freedom', by contrast, was late to emerge as a Roman offer to states in Greece.

As Romans and Greeks were thrown into new, closer relationships, a conflict of cultures was necessarilyinvolved. Greeks evidently interpreted offers of 'freedom' in a spirit which Romans, expecting loyalty and obligation, did not. At Rome, meanwhile, increasing exposure to Greek customs greatlyenlivened 'traditional' Roman life. By c. c. 200 200 BC BC there were quite a few senators who would have spoken and understood Greek: some modern historians reckon that as many as half were capable of it, though, in myview, that is an overestimate. Rome had been exposed to Greek artists, Greek cults and Greek-speakers for centuries now and her conquests in south Italy had long brought her up against Greek culture. But there are many levels of knowing a language and many degrees of what we call 'h.e.l.lenization'. Owning Greek objects and Greek slaves is one thing; thinking in Greek and admiring the heart of Greek culture (wherever we place it) is another. there were quite a few senators who would have spoken and understood Greek: some modern historians reckon that as many as half were capable of it, though, in myview, that is an overestimate. Rome had been exposed to Greek artists, Greek cults and Greek-speakers for centuries now and her conquests in south Italy had long brought her up against Greek culture. But there are many levels of knowing a language and many degrees of what we call 'h.e.l.lenization'. Owning Greek objects and Greek slaves is one thing; thinking in Greek and admiring the heart of Greek culture (wherever we place it) is another.

Certainly, Greek culture had started to make a transforming mark on Latin. From the 240s the Latin language had begun to acquire its own literature, directly modelled on Greek (beginning with the Odyssey Odyssey).1 The first Latin authors reflect the results of Rome's military progress southwards through Italy and beyond: the first Latin playwrights come from the Greek-speaking south including Tarentum; the first historian, the senator Fabius Pictor, was moved to write a history in order to explain the war with Carthage, and he wrote it in Greek, purelyfor a Greek audience. The great Latin comic dramatist Plautus originated from central Italy (Umbria) and also followed Greek models. Above all, the first Latin epic poet, Ennius, came from the toe of Italy and spoke two languages besides Latin. He wrote in erudite Greek poetic forms and produced a remarkable epic poem, the The first Latin authors reflect the results of Rome's military progress southwards through Italy and beyond: the first Latin playwrights come from the Greek-speaking south including Tarentum; the first historian, the senator Fabius Pictor, was moved to write a history in order to explain the war with Carthage, and he wrote it in Greek, purelyfor a Greek audience. The great Latin comic dramatist Plautus originated from central Italy (Umbria) and also followed Greek models. Above all, the first Latin epic poet, Ennius, came from the toe of Italy and spoke two languages besides Latin. He wrote in erudite Greek poetic forms and produced a remarkable epic poem, the Annals Annals, which ran from the Trojan War to the triumph of his Roman senatorial patron, Fulvius n.o.bilior. The triumph was given to n.o.bilior for conquering Rome's former allies, the Greeks of Aetolia. Ennius could no doubt elaborate on the triumph's occurrence a thousand years after the supposed fall of Troy, which was dated with misplaced learning to the 1180s BC BC.2 Nonetheless, this poetic literature was all in Latin. The most widely enjoyed, Plautus' comedies, had a strong Latin tone in their settings, even their food, and their roles for freed slaves, which were much more p.r.o.nounced than in Greece. What sort of 'Greekness' would a Roman senator most relate to? Not to the cla.s.sical Greekness of an Athenian democrat, philosophizing about difficult questions of knowledge and necessity, accepting equal votes from the peasantry and sighing for the beauty of a young male athlete. Nor to the splendour of a h.e.l.lenistic king. Roman ideals could relate more readily to the Spartan ideals of austerity and a 'peer group', but their own formation and pursuit of riches were not at all those of a good Spartiate. There was no neat overlap with any one sort of Greek life. What mattered in Rome's so-called 'h.e.l.lenization' was the social and moral context in which Greek ways were received: Romans could collect art, poets and skilled slaves, but they were not made into true Greeks merely by being philh.e.l.lenes, any more than the francophile Russian n.o.bles of Tolstoy's War and Peace War and Peace were fundamentally French. In Roman circles, the master-exponents of Greekness were kept sociallyin their place. Greek poets became onlythe clients of the Roman rich; the 'talent' from the Greek world brought yet more skills, arts and luxuries to Rome, but theyarrived as slaves and war-captives. In this respect, the Roman triumph over Macedon in 167 was seen as a turning point which brought anything from Greek musicians to Greek cooks and skilled prost.i.tutes into Roman society. After the 160s the utilitarian brothels of Plautus' plays ( were fundamentally French. In Roman circles, the master-exponents of Greekness were kept sociallyin their place. Greek poets became onlythe clients of the Roman rich; the 'talent' from the Greek world brought yet more skills, arts and luxuries to Rome, but theyarrived as slaves and war-captives. In this respect, the Roman triumph over Macedon in 167 was seen as a turning point which brought anything from Greek musicians to Greek cooks and skilled prost.i.tutes into Roman society. After the 160s the utilitarian brothels of Plautus' plays (c. 200 200 BC BC) would have seemed a poor second to the skills of the new Greek-style courtesans at Rome. h.o.m.oerotic 'Greek' s.e.x became more fashionable for Romans, although it was still not to be conducted between free citizens. These years of cultural awakening are fascinating because the new Roman context imposed such challenges on the immigrant Greek artists. In February 166, at games for a victoryover the Illyrians, famous Greek flute-players and a chorus of dancers were put up on a temporary stage in the Roman circus. As their artistic routine seemed boring to the Roman spectators, theywere told to liven it up bystarting a mock battle. The chorus split into two and obliged, whereupon four boxers climbed up onto the stage with trumpeters and horn-players. The waiting tragic actors, brought from Greece, had to change their performance, so much so that the Greek historian Polybius, probably one of the crowd, could not even bring himself to describe it for his serious Greek readership.3 Inevitably, the new fashions and new imports activated traditional Roman fears of 'luxury'. Several laws to limit it are attested within fifty years, although they were not the first in Roman history. They fitted with deeper Roman att.i.tudes. Austerity and parsimony were admired in the stories which were told about the receding seventh to fourth centuries BC BC. Roman fathers were expected to emulate them and educate their sons in restrained conduct. The censors, two magistrates, had acquired the duty of supervising public morals: when the lists of Roman citizens were periodically drawn up, they could place a 'black mark' against anyone whose behaviour had been disgraceful. In the new age of eastern conquest there was so much more to reprehend. 'Luxury' was attacked as 'Asian' and 'eastern', picking up the old stereotypes applied by Greek thinkers and historians from Herodotus onwards. But there was also truth in the stereotypes. The art and architecture, metalwork and cultural skills of the Macedonian and 'Asian' Greek monarchies were vastly more advanced than the crude levels of art and culture which had prevailed at Rome before the 180s. There was also the continuing example of the Ptolemies in Egypt, the luxury of whose kings had a quality of Dionysiac fantasy and royal splendour. At Rome, so hostile to one-man rule, such extravagance was wholly unacceptable.

Laws against luxurywere not imposed in this period bythe people's a.s.semblies so as to curb an extravagant upper cla.s.s. Rather, members of the Senate (not all of them) brought the proposals forward.4 One often-feared luxury was the excessive entertaining of guests at public banquets. It was indulgent, but it was also a way in which Roman holders of public positions could court too many supporters. Laws also tried to limit the consumption of excessive imports. Of course the laws were contested, or merely ignored, but they belonged in a wider context of concerns. The triumphs from the 180s onwards were occasions for big public feasts, and, as we shall see, for novel 'spectator sports' which provoked rivals' concerns: three times, between 187 and 179, senators tried to limit the money spent on circus-games. Theyalso tried to ban the import of animals for 'hunting' in the arena: a populist tribune frustrated them. Laws also tried to limit bribery and to regulate the stages at which men could hold public offices. Like this political opportunism, luxury could intensify compet.i.tion within the upper cla.s.s at a time of exploding opportunities. The crisis of the aristocracies in the Greek city-states during the seventh and sixth centuries One often-feared luxury was the excessive entertaining of guests at public banquets. It was indulgent, but it was also a way in which Roman holders of public positions could court too many supporters. Laws also tried to limit the consumption of excessive imports. Of course the laws were contested, or merely ignored, but they belonged in a wider context of concerns. The triumphs from the 180s onwards were occasions for big public feasts, and, as we shall see, for novel 'spectator sports' which provoked rivals' concerns: three times, between 187 and 179, senators tried to limit the money spent on circus-games. Theyalso tried to ban the import of animals for 'hunting' in the arena: a populist tribune frustrated them. Laws also tried to limit bribery and to regulate the stages at which men could hold public offices. Like this political opportunism, luxury could intensify compet.i.tion within the upper cla.s.s at a time of exploding opportunities. The crisis of the aristocracies in the Greek city-states during the seventh and sixth centuries BC BC was being replayed at Rome, but with weapons of a vastly greater scale. was being replayed at Rome, but with weapons of a vastly greater scale.

The supreme Roman voice against luxury and the accompanying tensions was the famous Cato the Elder, fragments of whose Latin writings survive. Cato emphasized his 'parsimony and austerity' and his years of working the land among its 'Sabine' stones.5 But he was certainly no peasant or spokesman for poor farmers: he was from a well-off Italian family. Beginning in 217, Cato's career ran on into 149, peaking in 184 when he served as censor and showed a famous severityeven to some of the Roman senators. Posteritywould uphold him as the strictest of all traditional Romans, but Cato's traditionalism was the conservatism of an But he was certainly no peasant or spokesman for poor farmers: he was from a well-off Italian family. Beginning in 217, Cato's career ran on into 149, peaking in 184 when he served as censor and showed a famous severityeven to some of the Roman senators. Posteritywould uphold him as the strictest of all traditional Romans, but Cato's traditionalism was the conservatism of an arriviste arriviste, a new man made good. The style of his household became legendary. Cato would sometimes retreat to the simple cottage which had formerly been used by the austere, exemplary Curius. There, his wife would suckle children of their slaves so that they would imbibe loyalty to the master with her milk; plain plates and cups were the dinner-service (not the silver and gold cups acquired in new shapes in Greece) and Cato had the unpleasant habit of turning sick or old slaves loose so as not to be a burden to his estate.6 Cato was not opposed to making money: it was a virtue, he believed, for someone to increase his inherited estate. Cato was not opposed to making money: it was a virtue, he believed, for someone to increase his inherited estate.7 Nor did he abhor trade, though he did think it horriblyrisky. What he loathed was moneylending because it was an 'unnatural' and infamous pursuit. Nor did he abhor trade, though he did think it horriblyrisky. What he loathed was moneylending because it was an 'unnatural' and infamous pursuit.8 He also feared the political effects of ill-gotten gains abroad. For that reason, he spoke against those senators who in 167 He also feared the political effects of ill-gotten gains abroad. For that reason, he spoke against those senators who in 167 BC BC wished to attack Rome's former ally, the island of Rhodes. wished to attack Rome's former ally, the island of Rhodes.9 It was not that Cato had any fondness at all for Greeks as Greeks. Memorably, his speeches and writings attacked their intellectual pursuits, their philosophy, their poetry and their doctors. They were the 'most wretched and unruly race',10 championing nakedness and frivolity; their doctors were conspiring to kill off the 'barbarian' Romans. Romans' fashion for Greek examples, Cato said, was disgraceful, especially as Romans and Italians had heroes in their own past who were just as great. Cato's complaints reflected Rome's increased wave of Greek contact. When the Athenians sent leaders of their philosophy schools to Rome on an emba.s.sy in 155 championing nakedness and frivolity; their doctors were conspiring to kill off the 'barbarian' Romans. Romans' fashion for Greek examples, Cato said, was disgraceful, especially as Romans and Italians had heroes in their own past who were just as great. Cato's complaints reflected Rome's increased wave of Greek contact. When the Athenians sent leaders of their philosophy schools to Rome on an emba.s.sy in 155 BC BC, one of them, the sceptic Carneades, pleaded on one dayfor justice in politics, on the next day for injustice. Cato was so disgusted that he wanted the philosophers to leave Rome at once and return to corrupt their own youth, not the youth at Rome.

Nonetheless, Rome's youth had been very much taken with these Greeks' cleverness. What Cato opposed was a rapidly rising tide, and he himself had been buoyed up, of course, on its groundswell. He had studied in Athens: his work On Agriculture On Agriculture drew on Greek sources, as did his work drew on Greek sources, as did his work Origins Origins, on the beginnings of Italy's peoples and places. He had profited from a basic Greek framework, but nonetheless he detested its frills and excessive cleverness. There was also a one-sidedness in his att.i.tude to Carthage. Cato had served in the Hannibalic War and, when the Carthaginians ceased paying their indemnity for defeat (in 151), there was debate at Rome on what to do to them next. Cato, the Hannibalic veteran, was for destroying Carthage totally. He even emphasized the danger by exhibiting a fresh fig in the Senate which had 'just' been picked in Carthage, as if the place was forty-five minutes away from Rome.11 But his policy of destruction was feared for a reason which ought to have swayed him: if Rome was left with no foreign enemyto fear, would not 'luxury' and softness proliferate even more? Nonetheless, Carthage was destroyed. But his policy of destruction was feared for a reason which ought to have swayed him: if Rome was left with no foreign enemyto fear, would not 'luxury' and softness proliferate even more? Nonetheless, Carthage was destroyed.

These sorts of contradiction continued to be posed to traditional Roman ways of thinking by the spread of Roman power abroad. Friendly Greek cities inst.i.tuted cults of Rome as a G.o.ddess and even approached Roman magistrates as if they were like the courtiers or princes whom they knew in their own Greek world of kings. Such personal honours ran flatly against the freedom and equality which the senatorial cla.s.s prized among its members. As Romans became more imperious, their own social structure was even played back to them by a reluctant subordinate, King Prusias of Bithynia.12 In the 170s Roman envoys came to Prusias' court in north-west Asia, but he cleverly parodied the realities of the situation by dressing and presenting himself as a freed ex-slave, a truly Roman sort of dependant. 'You see your freedman, myself,' he told them, 'who wishes to gratify you in everything and imitate what happens among you.' Prusias then travelled to Rome and, brilliantly, went a stage further on entering the Senate. 'Hail, saviour G.o.ds,' he greeted them while grovelling in adoration both to the threshold and to the senior senators inside the building. He seemed so utterlydespicable that he was given a friendly response. Arguably, the laugh was with Prusias who was ironically parodying the self-image of his arrogant new Roman masters. In the 170s Roman envoys came to Prusias' court in north-west Asia, but he cleverly parodied the realities of the situation by dressing and presenting himself as a freed ex-slave, a truly Roman sort of dependant. 'You see your freedman, myself,' he told them, 'who wishes to gratify you in everything and imitate what happens among you.' Prusias then travelled to Rome and, brilliantly, went a stage further on entering the Senate. 'Hail, saviour G.o.ds,' he greeted them while grovelling in adoration both to the threshold and to the senior senators inside the building. He seemed so utterlydespicable that he was given a friendly response. Arguably, the laugh was with Prusias who was ironically parodying the self-image of his arrogant new Roman masters.

Rebuffs received from Rome could even touch off secondary culture-clashes farther afield. In spring 168 the Seleucid King Antiochus IV at last broke into the rival territoryof Egypt's Ptolemies, onlyto be confronted and halted there byan imperious Roman envoy. Obliged to withdraw, Antiochus staged a festival of his own in Antioch, in deliberate rivalry of the Roman generals' contemporary celebrations of their victory over Macedon. In the new Roman fashion, Antiochus staged a show of wild beasts in combat, but then baffled his guests by waiting on them personally in an ostentatious show of affability during his gigantic royal banquet.13 A year later, he stopped in Judaea, where he heeded the request of a faction of Jews in Jerusalem; they wished to subdue their opponents and adopt Greek customs while abandoning traditional Jewish practices. Antiochus supported them, as if to work off his anger after his recent rebuff in Egypt by Rome. A year later, he stopped in Judaea, where he heeded the request of a faction of Jews in Jerusalem; they wished to subdue their opponents and adopt Greek customs while abandoning traditional Jewish practices. Antiochus supported them, as if to work off his anger after his recent rebuff in Egypt by Rome.14 The result was a nationalist uprising by outraged fellow Jews and a bitter war (the 'Maccabean Revolt'). It resulted in a newly powerful Jewish state and a new theology of martyrdom for those Jews who died in the course of it. They were said to have gone directly to Paradise, the first mention of this historically fertile idea. The result was a nationalist uprising by outraged fellow Jews and a bitter war (the 'Maccabean Revolt'). It resulted in a newly powerful Jewish state and a new theology of martyrdom for those Jews who died in the course of it. They were said to have gone directly to Paradise, the first mention of this historically fertile idea.15 Above all, a culture-clash was lived out by the man to whom we owe so much of our knowledge of Rome's advance from 220 to 146, the last of the great Greek historians, Polybius, a Greek from Megalopolis. He was born into a prominent political family in the Achaean League, but in 167 he was deported to Rome with a thousand others, as a hostage suspected of hostility to the Romans. While a hostage, he befriended important Romans, including the young Scipios (hunting was one important bond with them). Later he travelled widelyin Spain and the West, even down the coast of west Africa. Yet again, a fine Greek history was to be written by an exile. Polybius' original plan was to write a historydown to 167 BC BC but he prolonged it because he lived to see the 'troubled times' of Rome's years of domination. but he prolonged it because he lived to see the 'troubled times' of Rome's years of domination.16 He himself played a part in them, by a.s.sisting in the very settlement which was imposed by Rome on Greece in 146 He himself played a part in them, by a.s.sisting in the very settlement which was imposed by Rome on Greece in 146 BC BC, after the ruthless destruction of Corinth. Polybius had a difficult role to explain: he had been a 'fellow traveller' and a partic.i.p.ator in Roman actions which otherwise he would be expected to have opposed.

Polybius is the historian in antiquity with the most explicit view of what historians should be and do. While attacking his predecessors (much to the benefit of our knowledge of them) he emphasizes the value of 'pragmatic history'.17 It is the history of events and actions as theyaffect cities, peoples and individuals, and it must be written by a 'pragmatic' individual, someone who travels to the sites in question, interviews partic.i.p.ants and personally studies doc.u.ments. Polybius is the declared enemy of library-worms like his learned predecessor Timaeus. There is much of Thucydides in his aims, except that, once again, Thucydides' exclusion of the G.o.ds as an explanation of history proved to be too austere for an admirer's simpler mind. In Polybius' view, the defeats of the kings of Macedon and Antiochus IV in one and the same year (168) were a revenge for their predecessors' beastly decision to combine in a pact in It is the history of events and actions as theyaffect cities, peoples and individuals, and it must be written by a 'pragmatic' individual, someone who travels to the sites in question, interviews partic.i.p.ants and personally studies doc.u.ments. Polybius is the declared enemy of library-worms like his learned predecessor Timaeus. There is much of Thucydides in his aims, except that, once again, Thucydides' exclusion of the G.o.ds as an explanation of history proved to be too austere for an admirer's simpler mind. In Polybius' view, the defeats of the kings of Macedon and Antiochus IV in one and the same year (168) were a revenge for their predecessors' beastly decision to combine in a pact in c. c. 200 200 BC BC and meddle against Ptolemy V of Egypt, a child-king at the time. Thucydides would have enjoyed pointing out that this 'revenge' was only a coincidence and that the 'pact' which it supposedly avenged was almost certainly a fiction publicized by the Romans. and meddle against Ptolemy V of Egypt, a child-king at the time. Thucydides would have enjoyed pointing out that this 'revenge' was only a coincidence and that the 'pact' which it supposedly avenged was almost certainly a fiction publicized by the Romans.

Nonetheless, Polybius searches for explanations of change and is explicit about formulating them. Admittedly, what he makes explicit is less penetrating than what is implicit in Thucydides. It also confronts us in his turgid sort of polytechnic Greek. But his vision across the entire Mediterranean, from Spain to Syria, is wholly to his credit and his accounts of other peoples, landscapes, myths and resources are a fine testimony to a h.e.l.lenistic Greek mind.

His observations of the Romans are particularly important. Here, at last, survive the impressions of an educated Greek who lived at Rome, learned a little Latin and formed friendships with individual upper-cla.s.s Romans during these fascinating years. In Polybius' histories, Greek speakers do castigate Romans and their behaviour as 'barbarian'.18 They are not just 'barbarians' because they are foreign speakers. Polybius also presents Roman customs as foreign, 'theirs', not 'our' Greek way. Romans could be exceptionally savage: 'one can often see,' Polybius wrote, 'in cities taken by the Romans not only the bodies of human beings but dogs cut in half and the severed limbs of other animals.' They are not just 'barbarians' because they are foreign speakers. Polybius also presents Roman customs as foreign, 'theirs', not 'our' Greek way. Romans could be exceptionally savage: 'one can often see,' Polybius wrote, 'in cities taken by the Romans not only the bodies of human beings but dogs cut in half and the severed limbs of other animals.'19 But Romans were deliberate in their ruthlessness, unlike the stereotype of the 'irrational' barbarian, someone who combined savagery and panic. When comparing Romans with peoples other than Greeks, Polybius does not call them barbarians at all. But Romans were deliberate in their ruthlessness, unlike the stereotype of the 'irrational' barbarian, someone who combined savagery and panic. When comparing Romans with peoples other than Greeks, Polybius does not call them barbarians at all.

Most suggestively, he shares perceptions of contemporary Roman behaviour which were expressed by stern Cato. For Polybius, too, most Romans were madly keen to make money, just as Cato's complaints and maxims confirm. Through his Greek education, Polybius prized restraint, patriotism and austere self-control, qualities which were supported byhis distorted image of ancient Sparta. In his Roman context, Cato trumpeted the same values. The two men knew each other personally, but the similarity of their professed values was not the result of Polybius' greater intelligence shaping what Cato thought. It was the result of a similar outlook, independentlyformed. A bridge between their shared values was their fondness for the simple Greek of the cla.s.sical Athenian, Xenophon, the enemyof luxury, the admirer of bravery and military prowess and the champion of 'moral' life, including the common bond of hunting.

For Polybius, too, the year 167 was a turning point because of the new wave of 'luxury' which the conquests in Greece released into Rome. The young, he complained, would now pay 'more than a talent' for a boy-lover; similarly, Cato warned the Roman people that they would 'see the change for the worse' in their const.i.tution when 'good-looking boys were being sold for more than the price of fields'.20 Polybius and Cato shared a disapproval of the new 'luxury' and a view that it would contribute to political decline: in his histories, Polybius is concerned to give the gist, where possible, of what his speakers actually said. But unlike Cato, Polybius had a predictive, explanatory theory, the idea that one const.i.tution follows another in a necessary cyclical pattern which is repeated through time. In the year of Cannae, Polybius believed that the Roman const.i.tution had been at its peak. It was not a 'mixed' const.i.tution in his view, one which was blended from the differing elements of oligarchy, democracy and so forth. Rather, it was in an oligarchic phase, but held in balance by elements of monarchy and democracy which served as checks against change and degeneration. Polybius and Cato shared a disapproval of the new 'luxury' and a view that it would contribute to political decline: in his histories, Polybius is concerned to give the gist, where possible, of what his speakers actually said. But unlike Cato, Polybius had a predictive, explanatory theory, the idea that one const.i.tution follows another in a necessary cyclical pattern which is repeated through time. In the year of Cannae, Polybius believed that the Roman const.i.tution had been at its peak. It was not a 'mixed' const.i.tution in his view, one which was blended from the differing elements of oligarchy, democracy and so forth. Rather, it was in an oligarchic phase, but held in balance by elements of monarchy and democracy which served as checks against change and degeneration.21 According to Polybius' theory, such change would inevitably occur, linked to changes in the citizens' 'customs' and behaviour: oligarchy would change to democracy, democracy to degenerate mob-rule and then back to monarchy, the starting point. Polybius continued writing as a very old man: he was said to have died aged eighty-two, in the mid-120s therefore, from a fall off a horse. His simple theoryof Rome's const.i.tutional elements owed more to his Greek education and its framework than to the Roman reality. Were the Roman consuls really so 'king-like' and where was a democratic role for the 'people' in a full-blooded Greek sense? Like a Greek in India, he allowed his theory to distort his understanding of what he saw and heard. But his predictions were to have a particular resonance in the next hundred years for the Rome which he knew as a resident. According to Polybius' theory, such change would inevitably occur, linked to changes in the citizens' 'customs' and behaviour: oligarchy would change to democracy, democracy to degenerate mob-rule and then back to monarchy, the starting point. Polybius continued writing as a very old man: he was said to have died aged eighty-two, in the mid-120s therefore, from a fall off a horse. His simple theoryof Rome's const.i.tutional elements owed more to his Greek education and its framework than to the Roman reality. Were the Roman consuls really so 'king-like' and where was a democratic role for the 'people' in a full-blooded Greek sense? Like a Greek in India, he allowed his theory to distort his understanding of what he saw and heard. But his predictions were to have a particular resonance in the next hundred years for the Rome which he knew as a resident.

31.

Turbulence at Home and Abroad Someone cut off the head of Gaius Gracchus, we are told, and was carrying it, but a friend of Opimius took it off him: he was called Septimuleius. At the beginning of the fighting a proclamation had been made that anyone who brought in Gaius' head... would receive its equal weight in gold. So Septimuleius stuck Gaius' head on a spear and brought it in to Opimius, and when it was placed on the scales it weighed in at seventeen and two-thirds pounds, for Septimuleius had shown himself a scoundrel in this too and had acted like a rascal: he had taken out Gracchus' brain and filled the head with lead.

Plutarch, Life of Gaius Gracchus Life of Gaius Gracchus 17 17 Sulla's memorial stands on the Campus Martius and the inscription on it, they say, is one he wrote himself, and the gist of it is that 'none of his friends surpa.s.sed him in doing good and none of his enemies in doing harm'.

Plutarch, Life of Sulla Life of Sulla 38 38 With Carthage destroyed and Greece cowed, we might have expected the Romans to settle down to a steady domination of the Mediterranean. They had removed kings from Macedon for ever; their conquests in western Asia had left a large hole in the largest h.e.l.lenistic empire, that of the Seleucids. They had intrigued decisively in the affairs of the Ptolemaic kings in Egypt: in 155 the young Ptolemy VIII had even drawn up a will bequeathing the entire kingdom to Rome if he failed to produce a legitimate heir. As he was still hardly thirty years old, the 'bequest' was rather hypothetical, and was probably meant only to scare his enemies in Egypt. But it was the first example of a practice which would have a significant future and which later worked to Rome's benefit. The main problem in view was still Spain: in the late 150s a series of campaigns were needed here against insurgents.

A system of control over Rome's conquests was also forming. During the second century BC BC Romans developed their rule over conquered peoples bysending out magistrates as governors with standing armies to help them. These individuals became focal points for their subjects' pet.i.tions and disputes. As always, many cases gravitated to a new source of justice which had suddenlybecome accessible in their midst. On the other side, however, the individual governors saw new possibilities of enrichment, and their misconduct was still veryloosely regulated. Until the 120s the most they might suffer for 'rapacity' ('extortion') was a ruling that theyshould repaywhat theyhad taken. The new scope for gain abroad would have crucial implications for individuals' capacity to compete for pre-eminence back at Rome. Romans developed their rule over conquered peoples bysending out magistrates as governors with standing armies to help them. These individuals became focal points for their subjects' pet.i.tions and disputes. As always, many cases gravitated to a new source of justice which had suddenlybecome accessible in their midst. On the other side, however, the individual governors saw new possibilities of enrichment, and their misconduct was still veryloosely regulated. Until the 120s the most they might suffer for 'rapacity' ('extortion') was a ruling that theyshould repaywhat theyhad taken. The new scope for gain abroad would have crucial implications for individuals' capacity to compete for pre-eminence back at Rome.

Most Roman warfare abroad in the third and second centuries BC BC had already had economic motives: one obvious result of victory for Roman individuals was ever more slaves and plunder. There was also subsequent access (albeit sometimes through active middlemen) to land, moneylending and a.s.sets overseas. Collectively, too, Romans began to receive regular yearly tribute from their conquests. It had begun in Sicily, from 210 onwards, where they had taken over the taxation of previous kings. Then annual tribute was imposed in Spain in the 190s; payments were spread to Greece, Asia and north Africa. After 167 the newly won control of Macedon and its rich mines enabled Romans to abolish the direct tax which had previously been levied on individual Roman citizens in Rome and Italy (the indirect taxes continued). No single uniform system of tax was imposed as yet on all provinces, but from 146 onwards Rome's subjects in north Africa are known to have had to pay a tax on 'land' and also a poll tax. Those two taxes would become the mainstays of Roman taxation in the early Empire: they were mainstays under Hadrian too. had already had economic motives: one obvious result of victory for Roman individuals was ever more slaves and plunder. There was also subsequent access (albeit sometimes through active middlemen) to land, moneylending and a.s.sets overseas. Collectively, too, Romans began to receive regular yearly tribute from their conquests. It had begun in Sicily, from 210 onwards, where they had taken over the taxation of previous kings. Then annual tribute was imposed in Spain in the 190s; payments were spread to Greece, Asia and north Africa. After 167 the newly won control of Macedon and its rich mines enabled Romans to abolish the direct tax which had previously been levied on individual Roman citizens in Rome and Italy (the indirect taxes continued). No single uniform system of tax was imposed as yet on all provinces, but from 146 onwards Rome's subjects in north Africa are known to have had to pay a tax on 'land' and also a poll tax. Those two taxes would become the mainstays of Roman taxation in the early Empire: they were mainstays under Hadrian too.

This new financial strength was confirmed by receipts of booty, fines and war-reparations: surelythese gains would allow the Romans to sort out some of their social injustices at home? In fact, the years from 146 to 80 BC BC were to see outbursts of extreme social and political tension in Rome and Italy. The historian Sall.u.s.t later looked back on the year 146 as the start of a wave of 'disturbances and riots', combined with corruption. were to see outbursts of extreme social and political tension in Rome and Italy. The historian Sall.u.s.t later looked back on the year 146 as the start of a wave of 'disturbances and riots', combined with corruption.1 The removal of the external fear of Carthage (he thought) had made things worse. It is also important that the settlement of new colonies in Italy had all but ceased since the 170s: poorer citizens were no longer being sent off from Rome to a new home. The removal of the external fear of Carthage (he thought) had made things worse. It is also important that the settlement of new colonies in Italy had all but ceased since the 170s: poorer citizens were no longer being sent off from Rome to a new home.

From the later vantage point of the Emperor Hadrian, the tensions of these years would have seemed only a prelude to others which were even more important, the emergence of Pompey and Julius Caesar in the 70s and 60s, the resulting Civil War and the eventual ending of the free Republic. The later crises therefore will feature at more length here, but for historians, these forerunners (as we now see them) are a fascinating kaleidoscope. Political combinations which would later prove so dangerous are already in evidence, and yet are somehow surmounted. Conquering generals started to enjoy prolonged commands abroad and to link up with tribunes in Rome so as to protect their interests at home. In 147 BC BC the charismatic Scipio Aemilia.n.u.s was elected directly to a consulship without any previous job as a magistrate and was then elected to a second consulship, of dubious legality. Populists started to take proposals directly to the people to turn them straight into law without approval from the Senate; in reply, political reformers were killed by senatorial opponents in the centre of Rome. In the 80s there was to be civil war for the first time in Italy and a disgruntled patrician would actually march on Rome. the charismatic Scipio Aemilia.n.u.s was elected directly to a consulship without any previous job as a magistrate and was then elected to a second consulship, of dubious legality. Populists started to take proposals directly to the people to turn them straight into law without approval from the Senate; in reply, political reformers were killed by senatorial opponents in the centre of Rome. In the 80s there was to be civil war for the first time in Italy and a disgruntled patrician would actually march on Rome.

During these decades of intense manoeuvring at Rome itself, there was nonetheless a continuing fight to retain and extend Rome's conquests overseas. Wars continued bitterly in Spain; they then erupted in north Africa and in Gaul. In 88 the bold King Mithridates of Pontus (on the south coast of the Black Sea) made as if to avenge the appalling Roman misdeeds in Greece and Asia Minor during the previous century by beginning a war against them and killing (it was said) more than 80,000 Romans in Asia in the first bout, a magnificent reprisal. Nearer home, a slave-society's worst nightmare came true: big slave-revolts and slave-wars broke out, persisting from 138 to 132 and again from 104 to 101. Their major cause was the intensified use of slave-labour in Sicily and the Italian south, a delayed result of 'Hannibal's legacy'. Above all, Rome's own heartland, her Italian allies, then rose up in war against her from 91 to 89 BC BC. They even declared their own 'Italy' and their own senate. They struck coins which showed a s.e.xually aroused bull goring a Roman she-wolf.2 Interpretation of their aims in this Social War varies, but the Romans' refusal to give them Roman citizenship (aired, but then withdrawn in 95) was crucial. Renewed offers of it did, surely, hasten the war's end. Interpretation of their aims in this Social War varies, but the Romans' refusal to give them Roman citizenship (aired, but then withdrawn in 95) was crucial. Renewed offers of it did, surely, hasten the war's end.

Freedom and justice were conspicuously involved in all of this turbulence. 'Freedom' was a rallying-cry of the rebellious Italians; in order to curb Mithridates, freedom was proclaimed by the Romans for the nearby Cappadocians in Asia. Mithridates, by contrast, was seen by Greeks (including Athens) as their 'liberator' from Rome. In the political struggles at Rome, the two-headed nature of the Roman const.i.tution and the differing ideas of liberty of its social orders also began to be exploited. On a populist view, one aspect of freedom was the freedom of the people to pa.s.s laws without consultation of the Senate. On this view, the 'people' were even free to decide about areas which senators had traditionallyreserved for their own decision: finance, the composition of courts and juries, the allotment of commands abroad, the ways in which corrupt senatorial Roman governors abroad should be regulated. A clear, populist approach began to be pursued which ignored this senatorial 'tradition' and created its own heroes; those politicians who exemplified it became objects of cult, even, among a loyal plebs long after their death.

One result of this populist approach was a reform in the method of voting at Rome. Secret ballots were introduced, first for elections (139 BC BC), then for public non-capital trials (137 BC BC) and then for legislation (131/0 BC BC). Deliberately, they reduced the scope for intimidation of the voters: they did not eliminate it, because voters still processed up narrow ramps in order to cast their votes, and 'canva.s.sers' could threaten them and try to inspect what each voter had written as he pa.s.sed up the queue before voting. Eventually, the ramps were broadened, so as to make the intimidation of individuals more difficult. In the Greek world, at Athens and elsewhere, secret ballots had been the accepted practice for particular types of trial, but the extension of them to votes on law-making is a Roman innovation. Descendants of the reformers would even ill.u.s.trate the changes in images on their coin-types.

These changes were the prelude to even more serious 'populist' turbulence. The major figures in it were Tiberius Gracchus (in 133) and then his remarkable brother, Gaius. They had a n.o.ble ancestry, but the problem which first stirred Tiberius appears to have been the poverty and apparent depopulation of Italy: in addressing it he was not only thinking of a shortage of soldiers. As a result, he proposed a reallotment of public land in Italy. Rich landowners were no longer to be allowed to encroach on it for their own purposes: a basic limit of about 350 acres for each landowner (with maybe 150 acres more for each son) would release a significant amount of land in Italy for redistribution by commissioners to rural landless peasants. The new lots, which ranged up to twentyacres, were not to be bought and sold by recipients. The proposals and the issues here were not new, but they were enthusiastically received by many countryfolk outside Rome. They were also very fiercely opposed by traditional senators. As an elected tribune, Tiberius took them directly to the people's a.s.semblies and then invoked the sovereigntyof the people in order to depose a fellow tribune who tried to veto what he was proposing. This last argument was quite unprecedented, although Tiberius could have cited an ancestor, the consul of 238 BC BC, who had built the temple to 'Jupiter Liberty' (now known as 'Liberty') on the popular hill, the Aventine. His clash with his colleagues was followed by the lucky coincidence of a bequest to Rome of the kingdom of Pergamum. Tiberius referred this financial matter to the people for their decision, too, with the proposal that some of the funds be directed to help his new settlers. Traditional senators regarded financial decisions as the Senate's. On top of it all, Tiberius then proposed to stand as tribune for a second year, with even bigger plans for reform. Led by the Pontifex Maximus, his senatorial enemies had him killed on the very Capitol hill. Tiberius (theysaid) had been aiming to be a king; he had the 'purple robe and diadem' of the king of Pergamum in his house; he had pointed to his forehead while on the Capitol as if to want a diadem on his head.3 His killer, Scipio Nasica, was a liberator acting for freedom. His killer, Scipio Nasica, was a liberator acting for freedom.

This allegation was a monstrous distortion: Tiberius was no king and if he pointed at his head, it was to show that his life was in danger. His brother Gaius was the greater political genius. Naturally, Tiberius' murder grated on him, as with others: in 125 Liberty appears on the coins of two Romans, descendants of legislators who had helped to protect it. Gaius then became elected as tribune (in 123 and 122) and proposed the most far-ranging legislation in senators' living memory. It covered almost every popular grievance. It saw to monthly distributions of grain at a subsidized price to the people; it set up new courts to try cases of extortion in which none of the jurors would be senators and voting would be by secret ballot: it proposed mixed juries in other courts, too, with a preponderance of the non-senatorial rich (the 'knights', equites equites, in the sense of those capable of serving as cavalry). Before 123 BC BC, we must remember, the judges and advisers on all major criminal and civil cases had been senators only. Gaius capped his major reform of Roman justice by legislating that no Roman citizen should be sentenced to death 'without the bidding of the Roman people'. This law directlyaddressed the senators' lynching of his brother, Tiberius. This widening of the juries was detestable to senators and their dignity, but it was upheld by its proponents as 'equal liberty'. Gaius also provided for the privatizing of tax-collection in the rich province of Asia, byhanding it over to the bids of companies who could collect the taxes (and their own profit), thereby ensuring that a known revenue would always be a.s.sured in advance of collection. He even resumed land-settlements for the poor by proposing Roman colonies overseas (including one on the site of ruined Carthage). In 125 one of the consuls had talked of giving Roman citizenship to Italian allies: the previously loyal Latin colony of Fregellae had revolted, as if in frustration, and had been all but destroyed. In the aftermath of this crisis, Gaius Gracchus seems to have proposed giving the Roman citizenship to all the peoples of Italy (precise details are disputed), but to have allowed those who might want to keep their local independence to opt for particular privileges only.

In most of his laws, there was a considered response to injustice and abuse; Gaius Gracchus was later said to have described himself as putting a 'dagger in the ribs of the Senate'.4 A close reading of his best-known law, the law on 'extortion', has helped to tone down extreme views of his radicalism: responsibilities were being given to the new equestrian jurors, too, who would have to exercise them in full public view. A close reading of his best-known law, the law on 'extortion', has helped to tone down extreme views of his radicalism: responsibilities were being given to the new equestrian jurors, too, who would have to exercise them in full public view.5 But in principle, judgement in this court was to be the job of non-senators, to whom the people, not the Senate, had devolved the task. That slight to senatorial pre-eminence was most fiercelyresented. In the political turmoil which continued after Gaius' two years as tribune, he and his supporters (up to 3,000 of them) were callously murdered. The senators simply declared an emergency and urged the consuls to see that the republic was defended and 'came to no harm'. This measure is now known by the modern name of the 'last decree': it was a brazen innovation, a measure by senators to suppress those who could be regarded (by themselves) as public enemies. In the next sixty years it was to claim some of the most notable populists as its victims. One of Gaius' attackers, the consul Opimius, was acquitted when put on trial after the event. But in principle, judgement in this court was to be the job of non-senators, to whom the people, not the Senate, had devolved the task. That slight to senatorial pre-eminence was most fiercelyresented. In the political turmoil which continued after Gaius' two years as tribune, he and his supporters (up to 3,000 of them) were callously murdered. The senators simply declared an emergency and urged the consuls to see that the republic was defended and 'came to no harm'. This measure is now known by the modern name of the 'last decree': it was a brazen innovation, a measure by senators to suppress those who could be regarded (by themselves) as public enemies. In the next sixty years it was to claim some of the most notable populists as its victims. One of Gaius' attackers, the consul Opimius, was acquitted when put on trial after the event.

Nonetheless, the two Gracchi had set a populist example which was not forgotten. Both of them received cult as G.o.ds from their admirers after their death and the spot where theydied was regarded as sacred. Against them, the more 'traditional' senators now stood forward as self-styled 'good men', or the 'best' (optimates). Badly stung, they were explicitly hostile to change, to challenges to the Senate's preeminence, to ideas that questions of finance or senatorial privilege (and much else) could be taken directly to an a.s.sembly of the people and be turned into legislation without any consultation, and prior approval, of the senators. 'Traditionalists' is one translation of their elastic catch-word optimates optimates. Theywere never organized into a party, but, from the Gracchi on, there was a real division of political approaches among prominent Romans. It polarized their political methods and professed ideals.

Gaius would not have been altogether surprised that the 'knights' (or equites equites) to whom he gave new responsibilities proved not entirely admirable in exercising them. But the next personal challenge to the senatorial n.o.bility came from an ambitious military man, not from a comparable reformer. Gaius Marius, a non-n.o.ble, rose to an unprecedented series of consulships (five in a row, from 104 to 100). He took his cue from charges that the senatorial commanders, 'good men', were proving highly incompetent in fighting a war in north Africa. He ended it, not without luck, and then won impressive victories in 102 and 101 against two feared tribes who had migrated south from the area of Jutland into southern Gaul (Provence) and north Italy. To win these wars, Marius trained his troops extremely hard and recruited legionaries for the first time from the cla.s.s of poor people who had no property whatsoever. This change was to prove an important milestone in the social impact of service in the Roman armies. From now on, many military recruits would have much more to fight for and much less to return to. The innovation was to have revolutionary results in the next fifty years, although Marius, in his emergency, had certainly not foreseen them.

Marius was a 'people's hero' rather than a reforming populist, and by his exploits he won a degree of acceptance among Rome's top families despite his non-senatorial birth. Back at Rome, the Gracchi's mantle of reform fell, rather, to the clever Saturninus, a tribune in the year 100. He began by combining with Marius but then took to proposing yet more popular laws and thereby losing the great military man's support. Saturninus was eventually killed in the centre of Rome with Marius' connivance: again, a populist's legislation ended in murder. Yet even so, political turmoil did not become anarchy. In the same year as this crisis, we know from inscriptional evidence that detailed, carefully considered laws were being pa.s.sed by the people's a.s.sembly so as to continue to regulate extortion and to prescribe details of Roman governors' conduct abroad.

In 91 BC BC came the Social War against the allied Italians, and then the war in 88 against vengeful Mithridates in Asia. These represented crises of a much greater order. Marius, not untypically, had opposed a recently revived proposal to enfranchise the Italians. In his late sixties, he then intrigued to try to take over the command of the war in Asia. Instead, the 'good men', the traditionalist senators, let it go to a formidable figure from the old patrician n.o.bility, Cornelius Sulla. Sulla had served as an officer in the past under Marius; he was known for a somewhat dissolute lifestyle, but as he also had the backing of the family who most hated Marius, he was an obvious choice for the 'traditionalists' to support. Crucially, his appointment was overturned by a tribune, Sulpicius Rufus, who took the question of the command to the people's a.s.sembly and had Marius appointed to it instead. It was a shocking blow to Sulla's esteem and an intolerable intrusion into a type of decision which senators had typically regarded as theirs to make. With awesome disdain, Sulla relied on his troops' loyalty and turned round and marched on Rome. He then settled his scores with his enemies, including the tribune Sulpicius who was killed in office. came the Social War against the allied Italians, and then the war in 88 against vengeful Mithridates in Asia. These represented crises of a much greater order. Marius, not untypically, had opposed a recently revived proposal to enfranchise the Italians. In his late sixties, he then intrigued to try to take over the command of the war in Asia. Instead, the 'good men', the traditionalist senators, let it go to a formidable figure from the old patrician n.o.bility, Cornelius Sulla. Sulla had served as an officer in the past under Marius; he was known for a somewhat dissolute lifestyle, but as he also had the backing of the family who most hated Marius, he was an obvious choice for the 'traditionalists' to support. Crucially, his appointment was overturned by a tribune, Sulpicius Rufus, who took the question of the command to the people's a.s.sembly and had Marius appointed to it instead. It was a shocking blow to Sulla's esteem and an intolerable intrusion into a type of decision which senators had typically regarded as theirs to make. With awesome disdain, Sulla relied on his troops' loyalty and turned round and marched on Rome. He then settled his scores with his enemies, including the tribune Sulpicius who was killed in office.

This behaviour was a bitter taste of civil war. Sulla escaped the consequences only by setting off for Greece to cope with Mithridates' war, his original a.s.signation. In Greece, even Athens had broken with Rome and taken Mithridates' side after a time of political turbulence in the city. Sulla earned the distinction of being the one man in history to attack both Rome and Athens when he sacked the Piraeus and parts of the main city. At Rome, his enemy Cornelius Cinna became consul for 87 and outlawed him. Nonetheless, Sulla headed on to Asia where he ended by making a rather feeble peace with Mithridates in 85. To meet his costs, he continued to ravage the Asian Greek cities in his path.

Back in Rome, Cinna died, whereupon Sulla rebelled and marched promptly back into Italyfor a second, more serious bout of civil war. Again, he showed extreme severity to his enemies (including to some of the newly enfranchised Italians), but nonetheless he won a decisive victory at the very Colline gate of Rome. It was a real breakdown of the Republic; with our hindsight it is a foretaste of the 40s BC BC and is the point at which histories of the 'Roman revolution' ought to begin. Nonetheless, after his victory, Sulla had himself approved as a dictator with the task of 'settling the state'. and is the point at which histories of the 'Roman revolution' ought to begin. Nonetheless, after his victory, Sulla had himself approved as a dictator with the task of 'settling the state'.

The laws which he then executed were detailed and not always extreme, but the most important of them were resoundingly traditionalist. Freedom and justice were at the heart of them. In the interests of justice, Sulla did increase the number of standing jury-courts, adding at least seven more, but he did away with Gaius Gracchus' 'equal liberty' by handing the juries back to senators only. He increased the number of senators from 300 to 600 (the increase was made up from his supporters), but he also regulated the lower ranks of a man's career towards the consulship: the likes of a Marius, rising directly to the top job, would now be illegal. The censors' powers to choose senators were also checked: anyone who held a junior magistracy, a quaestorship, would now automatically become a senator.

Above all, Sulla settled his veteran soldiers, so loyal in his years of rebellion, on plots of land confiscated in Italy; the sites of Fiesole and Pompeii were among those settled with new Sullan colonies. And, wonder of wonders, he neutered the populists' weapon, the tribunate, which had been turned against his own original command in Asia. He ruled that tribunes could not go on to hold other prestigious magistracies; ambitious men would therefore avoid the position. He even took away the tribunes' power to veto (and probably, propose) legislation in the people's a.s.semblies. Arguably, he did not also give the Senate the formal right to vet all proposed laws in advance. But even so, his was a stunning political reaction.

Sulla's lesser reforms were neither extreme nor ill-considered. He pa.s.sed laws which limited the freedom of commanders outside Italy, and these persisted for decades. So did his establishment of a civil court to hear cases of 'injury', which was defined as a.s.sault or violent entry into private property. By these courts, the minimal framework of justice in the old Twelve Tables was filled out. Sulla had thought carefully about details which were ill-organized. Having turned the populist clock back, he then gave up his powers as dictator and in 80, unexpectedly took up the consulship instead. He had realized a conservative vision, as if the likes of Gaius Gracchus had never existed. Having done so, he retired, whereupon he died in 79 of disease, leaving his 'restoration' to be immediately contested. His funeral was a public one, the first known for a Roman citizen: a vast procession accompanied his body to the Forum where an orator spoke out on Sulla's deeds. Actors wore the family's masks; 2,000 crowns of gold were said to have been donated; his statue was carved from the precious wood of a spice tree.6 Some thirty years later this funeral would be excelled for the next dictator, Sulla's only superior. Some thirty years later this funeral would be excelled for the next dictator, Sulla's only superior.

Sulla, the dissolute young man, had ended by legislating against disruptive luxury. What mattered more, though, was his stunning example: an outright defence of his own 'dignity', backed by veteran soldiers loyal to him and a long list of killings of enemies and confiscations of their property in Italy. From this short sharp revolution, whole fortunes changed hands, often pa.s.sing to Sulla's decidedly unsavoury agents. Sulla himself stressed his personal favour from the G.o.ds (especially Venus, whom he encountered in the town, as yet little known, of Aphrodisias in Asia Minor). He had also been told by an eastern prophet that he would achieve greatness and die at the height of his good fortune. The prophecy was one more reason why, mission accomplished, this bloodstained dictator resigned and let the 'good men' in the Senate get on with what he had put back into their hands.

32.

Pompey's Triumphs Gnaeus Pompeius Imperator, having ended thirty years of war, defeated, killed or subjected 12,183,000 men, sunk or captured 846 ships, brought under Roman protection 1,538 towns and fortified settlements and subjected the lands from the Sea of Azov to the Red Sea, fulfilled his vow to the G.o.ddess Minerva according to his merit.

Pompey's inscription on his temple to Minerva, vowed in September 62 BC Sulla's reaction was not exactly based on consensus. However, it took ten years of impa.s.sioned political dispute before its most controversial elements were dismantled. Those disputes, as always, took place in open air in the Roman Forum, supported by the s.p.a.ce for elections, the 'Campus Martius', outside the formal 'boundary' of the city. The Forum was less than a square half-mile of ground and it had already seen seething political turmoil, but the next thirty years would bring contests whose highlights were more dramatic than those on any comparable political playing field in the world. If the statues of wise Pythagoras and brave Alcibiades still looked down on the s.p.a.ce for Romans' public a.s.semblies, it was the spirit of Alcibiades, the treacherous but charming Athenian aristocrat, which was most in tune with events.

Throughout the 70s the senators did not make distinguished use of the liberty which Sulla had handed to them. Sulla's senators, after all, were mostly his own appointments, whereas previous senators, the most traditionalist ones, had been killed off by him as his opponents. If he hoped that the many members of his enlarged Senate would be honest judges of the few senatorial commanders, because they themselves would never win such high office, he was mistaken. Allegations of corruption and collusion proliferated. He had given back too much to men unworthy of administering it: there was also his own bad example of force, violence and a march on Rome. But already by the 70s the Republic had survived so much that to those in the Forum at the time, whose views we must represent, its death was not at all inevitable.

Not that the turmoil was confined to Rome and the Forum. In Italy, Sulla's land-grants to his veteran soldiers were promptly contested by existing landowners and neighbours. Those ex-soldiers who settled on their small plots did not always find farming to their taste or ability, even if they had been recruited originally from rural life: they, too, began to take on debts (Cicero blamed their 'luxury'). In 77, with Sulla only dead for a year, the ex-consul Aemilius Lepidus marched south with troops against Rome when the senators tried to summon him back from his large provincial command. Lepidus had combined commands in bits of Gaul on either side of the Alps, a precedent on which Julius Caesar's career would later thrive so dangerously. But Lepidus' troops were not so effective.