The Campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn Part 17

To Washington all this confusion and rout seemed wholly unnecessary and unreasonable, and dashing in among the flying crowds he endeavored to convince them that there was no danger, and used his utmost exertions to bring them into some order. He was roused to more than indignation at the sight, and in his letter to Congress on the following day denounced the conduct of these troops as "disgraceful and dastardly."[185] Putnam, Parsons, Fellows, and others were equally active in attempting to stop the flight, but it was to no purpose. "The very demons of fear and disorder," says Martin, "seemed to take full possession of all and everything on that day." Nothing remained but to continue the retreat by the Bloomingdale Road to Harlem Heights.

[Footnote 185: Washington's account of the panic is as follows:

"As soon as I heard the firing, I rode with all possible despatch towards the place of landing, where to my great surprise and mortification I found the troops that had been posted in the lines retreating with the utmost precipitation and those ordered to support them (Parsons' and Fellows' brigades) flying in every direction, and in the greatest confusion, notwithstanding the exertions of their generals to form them. I used every means in my power to rally and to get them into some order; but my attempts were fruitless and ineffectual; and on the appearance of a small party of the enemy, not more than sixty or seventy, their disorder increased, and they ran away in the greatest confusion, without firing a single shot."

There were several stories current after the affair which cannot be traced to any responsible source. One was that the Commander-in-Chief was so "distressed and enraged" at the conduct of the troops that "he drew his sword and snapped his pistols to check them;" and that one of his suite was obliged to seize his horse's reins and take him out of danger from the enemy. Another account represents that he threw his hat on the ground and exclaimed whether such were the troops with which he was to defend America; another states that he sought "death rather than life." Mr. Bancroft has shown how far these statements are to be accepted.]

During these scenes, Wadsworth's and Scott's brigades, which were below Douglas on the river lines, saw that their only safety lay, also, in immediate retreat, and falling back, they joined the other brigades above, though not without suffering some loss. The parties now in the greatest danger were Silliman's brigade and Knox with detachments of the artillery, who were still in the city three miles below. When Putnam, to whose division they belonged, found that no stand could be made at Kip's Bay or Murray's Hill, he galloped down through Wadsworth's and Scott's retreating troops, to extricate Silliman and the others.[186] Not a moment's time was to be lost, for should the British stretch out their troops west of the Bloomingdale Road to the North River, escape would be impossible. Silliman, meanwhile, had taken post with Knox in and to the right of Bayard's Hill Fort, from the top of which they could see the enemy occupying the island above them. At this juncture, Major Aaron Burr, Putnam's aid, rode up to the fort with orders to retreat. He was told that retreat was out of the question. Knox said that he should defend the fort to the last. But Burr, who knew the ground thoroughly, declared that he could pilot them safely to the upper end of the island, and Silliman's men set out for the attempt.[187] Putnam also had called in other guards, and the entire force then took to the woods above Greenwich, on the west side, and keeping under cover wherever it was possible, made their way along without opposition. But it proved to be a most trying and hazardous march. The day was "insupportably hot;"

more than one soldier died at the spring or brook where he drank; any moment the enemy, who at some points were not half a mile away, might be upon them. Officers rode in advance and to the right to reconnoitre and see that the way was clear. Putnam, Silliman, Burr, and others were conspicuous in their exertions. Silliman was "sometimes in the front, sometimes in the centre, and sometimes in the rear." The men extended along in the woods for two miles, and the greatest precautions were necessary to keep them out of sight of the main road.[188] Putnam encouraged them continually by flying on his horse, covered with foam, wherever his presence was most necessary. "Without his extraordinary exertions," says Colonel Humphreys, who frequently saw Putnam that day, "the guards must have been inevitably lost, and it is probable the entire corps would have been cut in pieces." Much, too, of the success of the march was due to Burr's skill and knowledge. Near Bloomingdale, the command fell in with a party of the British, when Silliman formed three hundred of his men and beat them off. After making a winding march of at least "twelve miles," these greatly distressed troops finally reached Harlem Heights after dark, to the surprise and relief of the other brigades, who had given them up for lost.

[Footnote 186: Hezekiah Munsell, a soldier of Gay's regiment in Wadsworth's brigade, says: "We soon reached the main road which our troops were travelling, and the first conspicuous person I met was Gen. Putnam. He was making his way towards New York when all were going from it. Where he was going I could not conjecture, though I afterwards learned he was going after a small garrison of men in a crescent fortification which he brought off safe."--_Hist. of Ancient Windsor_, p. 715.]

[Footnote 187: Affidavits in Davis' "Life of Burr," vol. i.]

[Footnote 188: The line of Putnam's retreat appears to have been from Bayard's Hill Fort on Grand Street across the country to Monument Lane (now Greenwich Avenue), which led to the obelisk erected in honor of General Wolf and others at a point on Fifteenth Street, a little west of Eighth Avenue. (See Montressor's Map of New York in 1775, "Valentine's Manual.") The lane there joined with an irregular road running on the line of Eighth Avenue, known afterwards as the Abington or Fitz Roy road, as far as Forty-second or Third Street. There Putnam, under Burr's guidance probably, pushed through the woods, keeping west of the Bloomingdale Road, and finally taking the latter at some point above Seventieth Street, and so on to Harlem Heights.

(See Map of New York, Part II.)]

Although skilfully conducted, this escape is to be referred, in reality, to Howe's supineness and the hospitality of Mrs. Robert Murray, at whose house the British generals stopped for rest and refreshment after driving back our troops. Instead of continuing a vigorous pursuit or making any effort to intercept other parties, they spent a valuable interval at the board of their entertaining hostess, whose American sympathies added flavor and piquancy to the conversation. "Mrs. Murray," says Dr. Thacher in his military journal, "treated them with cake and wine, and they were induced to tarry two hours or more, Governor Tryon frequently joking her about her American friends. By this happy incident, General Putnam, by continuing his march, escaped a rencounter with a greatly superior force, which must have proved fatal to his whole party. Ten minutes, it is said, would have been sufficient for the enemy to have secured the road at the turn and entirely cut off General Putnam's retreat. It has since become almost a common saying among our officers, that Mrs. Murray saved this part of the American army."

Of the Kip's Bay affair there is but one criticism to be made--it was an ungovernable panic. Beginning with a retreat from the water-line, it grew into a fright and a run for safer ground. Panics are often inexplicable. The best troops as well as the poorest have been known to fly from the merest shadow of danger. In this case, so far as the _beginning_ of the rout is concerned, probably the militiamen did no worse than Washington's best men would have done. A retreat from the ship's fire could not have been avoided, though, with better troops, the subsequent rout could have been checked and the enemy r.e.t.a.r.ded.

The incident was especially unfortunate at that time, as it served to increase existing jealousies between the troops from the different States, and so far impair the morale of the army. It excites a smile to-day to read that men from New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland charged New Englanders generally with provincialism and cowardice, and that the charge was resented; but such was the fact. The feeling between them grew to such an extent that Washington was obliged to issue orders condemning its indulgence. The Kip's Bay panic offered a favorable opportunity for emphasizing these charges, and the Connecticut and Ma.s.sachusetts runaways came in for their full share of uncomplimentary epithets. The Connecticut men were remembered particularly, "dastards" and "cowards" being the terms which greeted their ears. All this of course could not but be ruinous to the discipline of the army, and it was an alarming fact to be dealt with.[189] The men south of New England were not without reason in making their harsh criticisms, for many of the New England regiments, the militia in particular, came upon the ground with an inferior military organization. They were miserably officered in many cases, and the men, never expecting to become soldiers as such, were indifferent to discipline. But in another view the criticisms were unfair, because the Pennsylvanians and others, in making comparisons, compared their best troops with New England's poorest. As two thirds of the army were from New England--more than one third from Connecticut--men from this section were necessarily represented largely in every duty or piece of fighting, and whenever any misconduct of a few occurred, it was made to reflect discredit upon the whole. There was no difference between the better drilled and officered regiments from the several States, just as there was little difference between their hastily gathered militia. Thus it may be mentioned as a notable and somewhat humorous coincidence that at the very moment the Connecticut militia were flying from the bombardment of the ships at Kip's Bay, New Jersey and Pennsylvania militia were flying with equal haste from the bombardment of other ships at Powle's Hook as they sailed up the North River to Bloomingdale on the same morning; and that while Reed, Tilghman, Smallwood, and others, were denouncing the Kip's Bay fugitives in unmeasured terms, the indignant Mercer was likewise denouncing the "scandalous" behavior of the fugitives in his own command.[190]

[Footnote 189: This jealousy disappeared when the army was reorganized and the troops became proficient in discipline. The American soldier was then found to be equal to any that could be brought against him, regardless of the locality from which he hailed. But in the present campaign the sectional feeling referred to came near working mischief, especially as it was kept alive by so prominent an officer as Colonel Reed, the Adjutant-general. New England officers protested against the "rancor" and "malice" of his a.s.sertions, and represented their injurious influence to members of Congress. Washington, finding that the matter was becoming serious, took the occasion to send a special invitation to Colonels Silliman and Douglas to dine with him in the latter part of September, when he "disavowed and absolutely disapproved every such piece of conduct" which had been a grievance to these and other Eastern officers.--_Silliman's MS. Letter._ See also extracts in Gordon's history as to the condition of the army at this time.]

[Footnote 190: "The militia of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, stationed on Bergen and at Paulus-Hook, have behaved in a scandalous manner, running off from their posts on the first cannonade from the ships of the enemy. At all the posts we find it difficult to keep the militia to their duty." (_Mercer to Washington_, Sept. 17th, 1776.) "I don't know whether the New Engd troops will stand there [at Harlem Heights], but I am sure they will not upon open ground,"

etc.--_Tilghman._ _Doc.u.ment_ 29.]

The events of the 15th naturally and justly roused the wrath of both Washington and Mercer, and their denunciations become a part of the record of the time. But in recording them it belongs to those who write a century later to explain and qualify. Justice to the men who figured in these scenes requires that the terms of reproach should not be perpetuated as a final stigma upon their character as soldiers of the Revolution. All military experience proves that troops who have once given way in a panic are not therefore or necessarily poor troops; and the experience at Kip's Bay and Powle's Hook was only an ill.u.s.tration in the proof. These men had their revenge. If the records of New Jersey and Pennsylvania were to be thoroughly examined, they would doubtless show that large numbers of Mercer's militia re-entered the service and acquitted themselves well. This is certainly true of many of the routed crowd whom Washington found it impossible to rally on Murray's Hill and in Murray's corn-field. Some of those who ran from the Light Infantry on the 15th a.s.sisted in driving the same Light Infantry on the 16th. Prescott's men a few weeks later successfully defended a crossing in Westchester County and thwarted the enemy's designs. Not a few of the militia in Douglas's brigade were the identical men with whom Oliver Wolcott marched up to meet Burgoyne a year later, and who, under Colonels Cook and Latimer, "threw away their lives" in the decisive action of that campaign, suffering a greater loss than any other two regiments on the field. Fellows, also, was there to co-operate in forcing the British surrender. In Parsons'

brigade were young officers and soldiers who formed part of the select corps that stormed Stony Point, and among Wadsworth's troops were others who, five years later, charged upon the Yorktown redoubt with the leading American Light Infantry battalion.[191]

[Footnote 191: The Major of this battalion (Gimat's) was John Palsgrave Wyllys, of Hartford, who, as Wadsworth's Brigade-Major, was taken prisoner at Kip's Bay. Alexander Hamilton and Brigade-Major Fish, of New York, who were swept along in this retreat, also figured prominently at Yorktown. Two young ensigns in the Connecticut "levies," Stephen Betts and James Morris, were captains of Light Infantry in that affair. Lieutenant Stephen Olney, of Rhode Island, who barely escaped capture on Long Island by Cornwallis's grenadiers, led Gimat's battalion as captain, and was severely wounded while clambering into the redoubt; and there were probably a considerable number of others, officers and men, who were chased by this British general in the present campaign, who finally had the satisfaction of cornering him in Virginia in 1781. Scammell, Huntington, Tilghman, Humphreys, and others, could be named.]

When Washington found that the enemy had made their princ.i.p.al landing at Thirty-fourth Street, and that a retreat was necessary, he sent back word to have Harlem Heights well secured by the troops there, while at the same time a considerable force under Mifflin marched down to the strong ground near McGowan's to cover the escape of troops that might take the King's Bridge road. Chester and Sargent evacuated Horn's Hook and came in with Mifflin. Upon the landing of more troops at Kip's Bay, Howe sent a column towards McGowan's, and in the evening the Light Infantry reached Apthorpe's just after Silliman's retreat.

Washington had waited on the Bloomingdale Road until the last, and retired from the Apthorpe Mansion but a short time before the British occupied it. Here at Bloomingdale the enemy encamped their left wing for the night, while their right occupied Horn's Hook, their outposts not being advanced on the left beyond One Hundredth Street. The Americans slept on Harlem Heights, not quite a mile and a half above them.

"That night," says Humphreys, "our soldiers, excessively fatigued by the sultry march of the day, their clothes wet by a severe shower of rain that succeeded towards the evening, their blood chilled by the cold wind that produced a sudden change in the temperature of the air, and their hearts sunk within them by the loss of baggage, artillery, and works, in which they had been taught to put great confidence, lay upon their arms, covered only by the clouds of an uncomfortable sky."[192]

[Footnote 192: The American loss in prisoners in the Kip's Bay affair was seventeen officers and about three hundred and fifty men, nearly all from Connecticut and New York. A very few were killed and wounded, Major Chapman, of Tyler's regiment, being among the former.

The officer of highest rank among the prisoners was Colonel Samuel Selden, of Hadlyme, Conn., mentioned on page 121. (See biographical sketches, Part II.) One of his officers was Captain Eliphalet Holmes, afterwards of the Continental line, a neighbor of the Colonel's. Being a man of great strength he knocked down two Hessians, who attempted to capture him, and escaped.]

During the day, meantime, the British occupied the city. After the departure of the last troops under Silliman (Knox with others escaping to Powle's Hook by boats) a white flag was displayed on Bayard's Hill Redoubt by citizens, and in the afternoon a detachment from the fleet first took possession.[193] In the evening a brigade from Howe's force encamped along the outer line of works. The next forenoon, the 16th, "the first of the English troops came to town," under General Robertson, and were drawn up in two lines on Broadway. Governor Tryon was present with officers of rank and a great concourse of people.

"Joy and gladness seemed to appear in all countenances;" while the first act of the victors was to identify and confiscate every house owned and deserted by the rebels. "And thus," says the now happy loyalist pastor Shewkirk, "the city was delivered from those Usurpers who had oppressed it so long."

[Footnote 193: _Baurmeister's Narrative._ _Shewkirk's Diary._]

Fortunately, the demoralizing effect of the panic of the 15th was to be merely temporary. Indeed, before the details of the affair had time to circulate through the camps and work further discouragement or depression, there occurred another encounter with the enemy on the following morning, which neutralized the disgrace of the previous day and revived the spirits of our army to an astonishing degree. So much importance was attached to it at the time as being a greatly needed stimulant for the American soldier that it becomes of interest to follow its particulars. It has pa.s.sed into our history as the affair or

BATTLE OF HARLEM HEIGHTS.[194]

Never for a moment relaxing his watch over the enemy's movements, Washington, before daylight on the morning of the 16th, ordered a reconnoitring party out to ascertain the exact position of the British. The party consisted of the detachment of "Rangers,"[195] or volunteers from the New England regiments, which had been organized for scouting service since the battle of Long Island, and placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Knowlton, of Connecticut. No better man could have been found in the army to head such a corps, for he had proved his courage at Bunker Hill, and on more than one occasion since had shown his capacity for leadership. The detachment started out, not more than one hundred and twenty strong, and pa.s.sing over to the Bloomingdale heights, marched for the Bloomingdale Road, where the enemy were last seen the night before.

[Footnote 194: The centennial anniversary of this battle was celebrated in 1876, under the auspices of the New York Historical Society. The oration delivered on the occasion by the Hon. John Jay has been published by the Society, with an appendix containing a large number of doc.u.ments bearing upon the affair, the whole making a valuable contribution to our Revolutionary history.]

[Footnote 195: THE RANGERS.--The small corps known by this name consisted, first, as already stated, of about one hundred men of Durkee's Connecticut Regiment (Twentieth Continentals), who appear to have accompanied Lieutenant-Colonel Knowlton, of that regiment, when he went on any special service. These he took with him to Long Island.

After the battle there the Rangers were formally organized as a separate body, composed of volunteer officers and men from several of the New England regiments. These were borne on their respective regimental rolls as detached "on command." For captains, Knowlton had at least three excellent officers, men from his own region, whom he knew and could trust--Nathan Hale, of Charles Webb's regiment, and Stephen Brown and Thomas Grosvenor, of his own. The rolls in _Force_ show that there were officers and men in the Rangers from Durkee's, Webb's, Chester's, Wyllys', and Tyler's Connecticut; Ward's and Sargent's Ma.s.sachusetts; and Varnum's Rhode Island. For a time they received orders directly from Washington and then from Putnam, and were of great service to the army in watching the enemy along the Harlem front. They distinguished themselves on the 16th, and later in the season, when Colonel Magaw was in command of Fort Washington, he begged to have the Rangers remain with him, as he declared that they were the only safe protection to the lines. (Greene to Washington.) They remained and were taken prisoners at the surrender of the fort, November 16th. Though probably not over one hundred and fifty strong, their losses seem to have been heavy. Knowlton fell at Harlem Heights; Major Coburn, who succeeded him, was severely wounded a few weeks later; Captain Nathan Hale was executed as a spy; and Captain Brown, a man as cool as Knowlton, was killed at the defence of Fort Mifflin near Philadelphia, in 1777, a cannon-ball severing his head from his body. Grosvenor served through the war, retiring as Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the Fifth of the Connecticut line. These facts are gathered from MS. Order Books, doc.u.ments in _Force_ and _Hist. Mag._, and from MS. letter of the late Judge Oliver Burnham, of Cornwall, Conn., a soldier in Wyllys' regiment and one of the Rangers, in which he says: "Soon after the retreat from Long Island, Colonel Knowlton was ordered to raise a battalion of troops from the different regiments called the Rangers, to reconnoitre along our sh.o.r.es and between the armies. Being invited by a favorite officer, I volunteered, and on the day the enemy took New York we were at Harlem and had no share in the events of that day."]

The ground which Knowlton reconnoitred and which became the scene of the action remains to-day unchanged in its princ.i.p.al features. What was then known as Harlem Heights is that section of the island which rises prominently from the plain west of Eighth Avenue and north of One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Street. Its southern face extended from an abrupt point, called "Point of Rocks," at One Hundred and Twenty-sixth Street, east of Ninth Avenue, northwesterly to the Hudson, a distance of three quarters of a mile. At the foot of these heights lay a vale or "hollow way," through the centre of which now runs Manhattan Street, and opposite, at distances varying from a quarter to a third of a mile, rose another line of bluffs and slopes parallel to Harlem Heights. This lower elevation stood mainly in the Bloomingdale division of the city's out-ward, and is generally known to-day as Bloomingdale Heights. In 1776 there were two farms on these heights, owned and occupied by Adrian Hogeland and Benjamin Vandewater, which were partly cultivated, but mainly covered with woods. The Bloomingdale Road, as stated in a previous chapter, terminated at Hogeland's lands about One Hundred and Eighth or Tenth streets, and from there a lane or road ran easterly by Vandewater's and joined the King's Bridge road near One Hundred and Twentieth Street. East of the Bloomingdale and south of Harlem Heights stretched the tract of level land called Harlem Plains.

After the retreat of the 15th, Washington's army encamped on Harlem Heights, with their pickets lining the southern slope from Point of Rocks to the Hudson. The British, as we have seen, lay at Bloomingdale and across the upper part of Central Park to Horn's Hook. An enemy, posted at the lower boundary of Harlem Plains, around McGowan's Pa.s.s, where the ground again rises at the northern end of the Park, might be easily observed from the Point of Rocks, and any advance from that quarter could be reported at once. Nothing, however, could be seen of movements made on the Bloomingdale Road or Heights, and it was in that direction that the "Rangers" now proceeded to reconnoitre at dawn on the 16th.

Knowlton, marching under cover of the woods, soon came upon the enemy's pickets, somewhere, it would appear, between Hogeland's and Apthorpe's houses on the Bloomingdale Road, more than a mile below the American lines. This was the encampment of the Light Infantry, and their Second and Third Battalions, supported by the Forty-second Highlanders, were immediately pushed forward to drive back this party of rebels who had dared to attack them on their own ground.

Antic.i.p.ating some such move, Knowlton had already posted his men behind a stone wall, and when the British advanced he met them with a vigorous fire. His men fired eight or nine rounds a piece with good effect, when the enemy threatened to turn his flanks, and he ordered a retreat, which was well conducted. In this brief encounter the Rangers lost about ten of their number, and believed that they inflicted much more than this loss upon the Infantry.[196]

[Footnote 196: The Rangers were thus engaged in a distinct skirmish before the main action of the day. Washington wrote to Congress early on the 16th: "I have sent some reconnoitring parties to gain intelligence, if possible, of the disposition of the enemy." A letter in the _Connecticut Gazette_, reprinted in Mr. Jay's doc.u.ments, and which was probably written by Captain Brown, says: "On Monday morning the General ordered us to go and take the enemy's advanced guard; accordingly we set out just before day and found where they were; at day-brake we were discovered by the enemy, who were 400 strong, and we were 120. They marched up within six rods of us and there formed to give us Battle, which we were ready for; and Colonel Knowlton gave orders to fire, which we did, and stood theirs till we perceived they were getting their flank-guards round us. After giving them eight rounds apiece the Colonel gave orders for retreating, which we performed very well, without the loss of a man while retreating, though we lost about 10 while in action." Judge Burnham says substantially the same: "Colonel Knowlton marched close to the enemy as they lay on one of the Harlem Heights, and discharged a few rounds, and then retreated over the hill out of sight of the enemy and concealed us behind a low stone wall. The Colonel marked a place about eight or ten rods from the wall, and charged us not to rise or fire a gun until the enemy reached that place. The British followed in solid column, and soon were on the ground designated when we gave them nine rounds and retreated.... Our number engaged was only about 120."]

At his headquarters in the Morris Mansion, Washington, meantime, was writing his despatches to Congress. The unwelcome duty fell to him to report the scenes of the previous day which had so deeply stirred his indignation. He made a plain statement of the facts, described the retreat from New York, acknowledged the loss of baggage and cannon, and despondently expressed his misgivings as to the soldierly qualities of a majority of his troops. "We are now," he wrote, "encamped with the main body of the army on the Heights of Harlem, where I should hope the enemy would meet with a defeat in case of an attack, if the generality of our troops would behave with tolerable bravery. But experience, to my extreme affliction, has convinced me that this is rather to be wished for than expected. However, I trust that there are many who will act like men, and show themselves worthy of the blessings of freedom." Not unfounded was this trust, for at the very time the commander-in-chief was writing the words, the Rangers were bravely fighting in the Bloomingdale Woods, and many others soon after, including one of the very regiments which fled from Kip's Bay twenty-four hours before, were likewise to act "like men" and prove their real worth in the open field. Just as the letters were sent off word came in to headquarters that the enemy had appeared in several large bodies upon the plains, and Washington rode down to the picket-posts to make the necessary dispositions in case of an attack.

Adjutant-General Reed and Lieutenant Tilghman, who had also been writing private letters describing Sunday's panic, and other members of the staff, went to the front about the same time. Knowlton's men had not yet come in, and their fire was distinctly heard from the Point of Rocks, where the commander-in-chief was now surveying the situation. Anxious to learn whether the British were approaching in force on the Bloomingdale Heights, no attack being threatened from the plains, Colonel Reed received permission to go "down to our most advanced guard," namely, to the Rangers, whom he found making a momentary halt on their retreat. The enemy soon came up again in large numbers, and the Rangers continued to retire. Colonel Reed, describing his experience at this point, states that the British advanced so rapidly that he had not quitted a house (which may have been Vandewater's) five minutes before they were in possession of it.

"Finding how things were going," to use Reed's words, he returned to Washington "to get some support for the brave fellows who had behaved so well." Knowlton, however, fell back to our lines, and the enemy halted in their pursuit on the north-east edge of Bloomingdale Heights, opposite the Point of Rocks, where a part of them appeared in open sight, and "in the most insulting manner" sounded their bugle-horns as if on a fox chase. "I never felt such a sensation before," says Reed; "it seemed to crown our disgrace." But the chase was not yet over.

Learning from Knowlton that the British Infantry who had followed him in were about three hundred strong, and knowing that they were some distance from their main army, Washington determined, if possible, to effect their capture. Knowlton's men, who had done n.o.bly, were ready for another brush, and there were troops at hand who could be depended upon to behave well under any circ.u.mstances. The opportunity for a brisk and successful skirmish presented itself, and the general proposed to improve it. Accordingly he formed the plan of engaging the enemy's attention in their front, while a flanking party should attempt to get into their rear and cut off their escape. The troops that were stationed nearest to the Point of Rocks at this time appear to have been Nixon's brigade, of Greene's division, Weedon's newly arrived regiment of Virginians, General Beall's Marylanders, Colonel Sargent's eastern brigade, Clinton's and Scott's brigades, and other regiments belonging to Putnam's and Spencer's divisions. For the flanking detachment, the general selected Knowlton's Rangers, to whom he added a reinforcement of three of the Virginia companies, about one hundred and twenty men, under Major Andrew Leitch. These were directed to make their way or "steal around" to the rear of the enemy by their right flank. To make a demonstration against the enemy in their front, while the flanking party effected its object, a detachment of volunteers was organized from Nixon's brigade, under Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Crary, of Varnum's Rhode Islanders,[197] who marched down into the "hollow way" directly towards the British on the opposite ridge. As Washington hoped, this move had the desired effect. The British, seeing so small a party coming out against them, immediately ran down the rocky hill into an open field, where they took post behind some bushes and a rail fence that extended from the hill to the post road about four hundred yards in front of the Point of Rocks.[198] This field was part of the old Kortwright farm, lying just west of the present Harlem Lane, above One Hundred and Eighteenth Street, in which the line of that fence had been established for more than half a century before this engagement, and where it remained the same for more than half a century after. It is possible to-day to fix its exact position, for the march of modern improvements has not yet disturbed the site.

[Footnote 197: Captain John Gooch, of Varnum's regiment, wrote September 23d: "On the 16th the enemy advanced and took possession of a hight on our right flank about half a mile Distance with about 3000 [300?] men; a party from our brigade of 150 men, who turned out as volunteers, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Crary, of the regmt I belong to, were ordered out if possible to dispossess them."--_Doc.u.ment_ 30.]

[Footnote 198: Tilghman's reference to these movements is as follows: "The General rode down to our farthest lines, and when he came near them heard a firing, which he was informed was between our scouts and the outguards of the enemy. When our men [Knowlton's] came in they informed the General that there was a party of about 300 behind a woody hill, tho' they only showed a very small party to us. Upon this the General laid a plan for attacking them in the rear and cutting off their retreat, which was to be effected in the following manner: Major Leitch, with three companies of Colo Weedon's Virginia regiment, and Colo Knowlton with his Rangers, were to steal round while a party [Crary's] were to march towards them and seem as if they intended to attack in front, but not to make any real attack till they saw our men fairly in their rear. The bait took as to one part; as soon as they saw our party in front the enemy ran down the hill and took possession of some fences and bushes and began to fire at them, but at too great distance to do much execution," etc.--_Doc.u.ment_ 29.

See also Washington's letter to Congress, Sept. 18th, 1776.]

In order to keep the enemy engaged at that point, Crary's party opened fire at long range, to which the British replied, but not much execution was done on either side. Meanwhile Knowlton and Leitch moved out to get in the rear. Colonel Reed accompanied the party, and as he had been over the ground he undertook the lead, with the Virginians in advance. It was probably his intention to march down under cover of the bushes, cross the Kortwright farm un.o.bserved some little distance below the enemy, and reach the top of the Bloomingdale ridge before they were discovered. Once there, the British would be effectually hemmed in. Unfortunately, however, some "inferior officers," as it would appear, gave unauthorized directions to the flanking party; or the party forming the "feint" in front pushed on too soon, in consequence of which Leitch and Knowlton made their attack rather on the British flank than in their rear.[199] The latter now finding a retreat necessary, left the fence and started back up the hill which they had descended. Our men quickly followed, Crary in front, Knowlton and Leitch on the left, and with the Virginians leading, joined in the pursuit with splendid spirit and animation. They rushed up the slope, on about the line of One Hundred and Twentieth Street, and, climbing over the rocks, poured in their volleys upon the running Light Infantry.

[Footnote 199: It is quite clear that Knowlton and Leitch did not form two parties, as some accounts state, one moving against the right flank of the enemy and the other against the left. They acted as one body, the Virginians marching in front, having been ordered on to "reinforce" Knowlton. Thus Captain Brown writes that after retreating they "sent off for a reinforcement," which they soon received; and Colonel Reed confirms this in his testimony at the court-martial of a soldier who acted a cowardly part in the fight. "On Monday forenoon,"

he says, "I left Colonel Knowlton with a design to send him a reinforcement. I had accordingly ordered up Major Leitch, and was going up to where the firing was," etc. (_Force_, 5th Series, vol. ii.

p. 500.) Reed's letters to his wife show that Leitch and Knowlton fell near him, within a few minutes of each other, which could not have been the case had they been on opposite flanks. The accounts of Tilghman, Marshall, the soldier Martin, and others, leave no doubt as to this point that there was but one flanking party, and that Knowlton commanded it.]

It was right here, now, just on the crest of the ridge, and when our gallant advance was turning the tide against the enemy, that we suffered the loss of those two n.o.ble leaders whose memory is linked with this day's action. In a very short time after the first rush, Leitch was severely wounded not far from Reed, having received three b.a.l.l.s in his side in as many minutes; and in less than ten minutes after a bullet pierced Knowlton's body, and he too fell mortally wounded. We can identify the spot where the fall of these brave officers occurred as on the summit of the Bloomingdale Heights below One Hundred and Nineteenth Street, and about half way between the line of Ninth and Tenth Avenues. The site is included within the limits of the proposed "Morningside Park," which will thus have added to its natural attractiveness a never-fading historical a.s.sociation.[200]

[Footnote 200: Judge Burnham refers to the flank attack briefly as follows: "Pa.s.sing over we met the enemy's right flank which had been posted out of our sight on lower ground. They fired and killed Colonel Knowlton and nearly all that had reached the top of the height." This reference to the _top of the height_, taken in connection with Reed's statement that "our brave fellows mounted up the rocks and attacked them as they ran in turn," goes to confirm the selection of the spot where Leitch and Knowlton fell. Burnham states that he was within a few feet of the latter when he was shot.]

Leitch was borne to the rear to be tenderly cared for until his death at a later day. In after years the Government remembered his services by granting his widow a generous pension. Knowlton met his fate with a soldier's fort.i.tude and a patriot's devotion. "My poor Colonel,"

writes an officer of the Rangers, who without doubt was Captain Stephen Brown, next in rank to Knowlton, "my poor Colonel, in the second attack, was shot just by my side. The ball entered the small of his back. I took hold of him, asked him if he was badly wounded? He told me he was; but says he, 'I do not value my life if we do but get the day.' I then ordered two men to carry him off. He desired me by all means to keep up this flank. He seemed as unconcerned and calm as tho' nothing had happened to him." Reed, on whose horse the colonel was carried to the lines, wrote to his wife on the following day: "Our loss is also considerable. The Virginia Major (Leitch) who went up first with me was wounded with three shot in less than three minutes; but our greatest loss was a brave officer from Connecticut, whose name and spirit ought to be immortalized--one Colonel Knowlton. I a.s.sisted him off, and when gasping in the agonies of death, all his inquiry was if we had drove the enemy." Washington spoke of him in his letters and orders as "a valuable and gallant officer," who would have been "an honor to any country."

Meanwhile the Rangers and Virginians kept up their attack under their captains, and Washington, finding that the entire party needed support, sent forward three of the Maryland Independent companies, under Major Price, and parts of Griffith's and Richardson's Maryland Flying Camp.[201] At the same time, as Washington reports, some detachments from the Eastern regiments who were nearest the place of action, which included most of Nixon's and Sargent's brigades, Colonel Douglas's Connecticut levies, and a few others, were ordered into the field. Our total force engaged at this time, now about noon, was not far from eighteen hundred strong, and very soon a considerable battle was in progress. Besides Reed and other members of Washington's staff, Generals Putnam, Greene, and George Clinton accompanied the detachments, and encouraged the men by individual examples of bravery.[202] The troops now "charged the enemy with great intrepidity," and drove them from the crest of the heights back in a south-westerly direction through a piece of woods to a buckwheat field, about four hundred paces, as General Clinton describes it, from the ridge, or just east of the present Bloomingdale Asylum, where the Light Infantry, now reinforced by the Forty-second Highlanders, finally made a stand. The distance the latter troops had advanced and the sound of the firing had evidently warned Howe, at his headquarters at Apthorpe's, that they needed immediate a.s.sistance, and he promptly ordered forward the reserve with two field-pieces, together with the Yagers and Linsingen's grenadiers of Donop's corps. The field-pieces and Yagers came into action at the buckwheat field, and here a stubborn contest ensued for about an hour and a half.[203] But our troops pressed the enemy so hard at this point, and the Highlanders and Yagers having fired away their ammunition, the latter all again fell back, and the Americans pursued them vigorously to an orchard a short distance below, in the direction of the Bloomingdale Road. Here had been hard fighting in the open field, and the best British troops were beaten! At the orchard the result was the same, the enemy making little resistance, their fire "being silenced in a great measure," and the chase continued down one of the slight hills on Hogeland's lands and up another, near or quite to the terminus of the Bloomingdale Road. Beyond this third position our troops were not allowed to follow the enemy, whose main encampment was not far distant. The Fifth Regiment of Foot had been trotted up "about three miles without a halt to draw breath," reaching the ground at the close of the action.