The Campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn Part 15

We have about 50 of them in the hospital wounded. Of the other 150 'tis said that in the engagement a considerable number of the riflemen deserted and went over to the enemy and some no doubt escaped towards the other end of the Island. On the whole I do not think we had 50 men killed in the action." (_MS. letter._) These are statements made by officers who were present at the battle, and who wrote within a few days of the event. They all, with many others, reach the same conclusion that the enemy suffered in killed and wounded as much if not more than the Americans. Their testimony, moreover, is strengthened by what we know directly and indirectly from the returns and other sources.

The loss in officers, of which we have exact figures, is one basis of calculation. Ninety-one, as already stated, were taken prisoners, of whom nine were reported wounded in Howe's return. Among these were General Woodhull, Colonel Johnston, and Captain Jewett, all three mortally wounded, and Captain Bowie and Lieutenant Butler, of the Marylanders; Captain Johnston, of the artillery; Captain Peebles, of Miles', and Lieutenant Makepeace, of Huntington's. [Colonel Johnston is usually mentioned as having been killed on the field. But Howe's return gives one New Jersey colonel prisoner, and Elking's Hessian account states that he was wounded after being made prisoner.] Among officers known to be wounded, not captured, were Major McDonough, Lieutenants Course and Anderson, of the Delawares; Lieutenant Hughes, of Hitchc.o.c.k's; and Captain Farmer, of Miles'. Lieutenant Patterson, of Hay's detachment, was either killed or captured (Colonel Cunningham's return). The officers killed were Lieutenant-Colonel Parry, Captain Carpenter, Captain Veazey, and Lieutenants Sloan, Jacquet, and Taylor. Various accounts state that Colonel Rutgers, Lieutenant-Colonel Eppes, Major Abeel (of Lasher's), Captain Fellows, and Lieutenant Moore (of Pennsylvania) were killed, but there is an error in each case, all these officers being reported alive at different dates after the battle. We have, then, twenty-one killed or wounded (six only killed on the field) among the American officers engaged in the action. If, as we have a right to a.s.sume, the same proportion held among the enlisted men, our total loss in killed and wounded could not have exceeded two hundred or two hundred and fifty, or more than one hundred less than the enemy's loss. Parsons and Atlee write that they lost but two or three. Miles says that in one of his skirmishes he lost a number of men, but nearly all were made prisoners. Little's regiment lost one killed; Hitchc.o.c.k's the same. The five companies of Smallwood's battalion that attacked Cornwallis lost but one officer wounded, or at the most one killed and one wounded, and there is no reason to suppose that the men suffered very heavily. The loss among the Delawares was nearly all in prisoners. Lutz had six officers taken, but none killed or wounded; Hay lost one officer, either killed or prisoner. In Kachlein's detachment it is certain that the lieutenant-colonel, major, adjutant, three captains, and three lieutenants were not killed, which leaves little room for casualties in a party of not over four or five companies. So of all the other regiments engaged, they suffered but slightly in killed or wounded.

Howe's list of prisoners was undoubtedly swelled by captures among the Long Island militia and citizen Whigs after the battle. He includes General Woodhull and two lieutenants, for instance, who were not taken at the battle but on the day following, and who, as Washington says, were "never arranged" in his army.

The reports of the slaughter and ma.s.sacre of our troops current in the enemy's camp at the time were greatly exaggerated. Some of our men were probably cut down most wantonly in the pursuit through the woods, both by British and Hessians, but the number was small. It is a noticeable and significant fact that the American accounts make no mention of any such wholesale cruelty, and certainly our soldiers would have been the first to call attention to it.

That word "ma.s.sacre" should have no place in any accurate description of the battle.

CHAPTER V.

THE RETREAT TO NEW YORK.

The situation at the Brooklyn lines was relieved on the 29th by the famous retreat of our army to New York. If Howe had surprised us by an unexpected manoeuvre on the 27th, Washington was now to surprise the British with a different manoeuvre, conducted with greater skill. "A fine retreat," says Jomini, "should meet with a reward equal to that given for a great victory." History a.s.signs such a reward to Washington at Long Island.

This success--the extrication of the army from what was soon felt to be a dangerous position--was not to be achieved without a previous two days' experience of great hardship, trial, and despondency on the part of the troops; and unceasing anxiety and watchfulness on the part of the commander-in-chief. The night of the 27th had closed cheerlessly on the devoted Americans. The hills had been wrested from them; many of their best officers and soldiers were slain or prisoners; before them stood the whole British army, flushed with success, and liable at any hour to rush upon their works, and in their rear flowed a deep, wide river.

Washington realized the position the moment of the retreat from the pa.s.ses, and immediately took measures to guard against further disaster. Satisfied that Howe had his whole force with him, and that an attack was not to be apprehended at any other point, he ordered forward more troops to replace his losses and strengthen the lines.

Mifflin brought down from Harlem Heights the two well-drilled Pennsylvania regiments under Colonels Magaw and Shee, with some others; and Glover's Ma.s.sachusetts was sent on from Fellows' brigade.

These all crossed to Long Island early on the morning of the 28th. At the same time, the afternoon of the 27th, Washington sent word to General Mercer in New Jersey to march all the forces under his command "immediately to Powle's Hook";[160] they might be needed in New York, they might be needed on Long Island. By the morning of the 28th, the commander-in-chief had drawn to the Brooklyn lines all the troops that could be spared from other points, and all with which he proposed to resist the British if they attempted to carry his position by storm.

He had on that side the largest and best part of his army. The whole of Greene's division was there, the whole of Spencer's, half of Sullivan's, one third of Putnam's, and a part of Heath's--in all not less than thirty-five regiments or detachments, which numbered together something over nine thousand five hundred men fit for duty.[161]

[Footnote 160: This order was sent at two o'clock through General Wooster, then temporarily in New York, and Mercer received it in the evening near Newark. He sent word at once to the militia at Amboy, Woodbridge, and Elizabethtown to march to Powle's Hook. _Force_, 5th Series, vol. ii.]

[Footnote 161: A close a.n.a.lysis of the returns of September 12th, estimating all additions or reductions which should be made since the battle, shows that this was about the number on Long Island at this date and at the time of the retreat. The brigades now there were Nixon's, Heard's, Parson's, Wadsworth's, Stirling's, Scott's, two regiments of Mifflin's, one at least of McDougall's (Webb's), Glover's, and Fellows', the Long Island militia, artillery, rangers, and several independent companies. We know at what part of the lines some of these troops were posted. Greene's four old regiments doubtless occupied the forts. Varnum was at Red Hook; Little at Fort Greene; Hitchc.o.c.k at Fort Putnam, and Hand with him there and in the redoubt on the left. Forman's New Jersey had been at Fort Box. Three of Scott's battalions were a.s.signed to the centre, where the breastworks crossed the Jamaica Road. Magaw, Shee, and Glover guarded the line from Fort Putnam to the Wallabout; Silliman was at the "northern part" of the works, probably on the right of Fort Putnam; Gay's was between Fort Box and the Marsh; Douglas watched the extreme right in the woods at the mouth of Gowa.n.u.s Creek; and there was a "reserve," which perhaps included among others the remnants of Stirling's shattered brigade. Encircling them a mile or a mile and a half distant in the edge of the woods, lay the British army with tents already pitched in many places. North and south of the Jamaica Road, just below Bedford, was Howe's main column; within and west of Prospect Park were the Hessians; and on the right, Grant's division bivouacked along the Gowa.n.u.s Road.]

Had all things been relatively equal, the Americans within the lines, according to military experience, should have been well able to hold that front. But there was a total inequality of conditions. The enemy were thoroughly equipped, disciplined, and provided for. They were an army of professional soldiers, superior to any that could be brought against them the world over. Thus far they had carried everything before them, and were eager to achieve still greater victories. Behind the Brooklyn works stood a poorly armed, badly officered, and for the most part untrained ma.s.s of men, hurriedly gathered into the semblance of an army. The events of the previous day, moreover, had greatly depressed their spirits. Not a few of those who had been engaged in or witnessed the battle were badly demoralized. To make matters worse, the very elements seemed to combine against them. The two days they were still to remain on the island were days of "extraordinary wet."

It rained almost continuously, and much of the time heavily. No fact is better attested than this. August 28th, writes Colonel Little, "weather very rainy;" "29th, very rainy." Major Tallmadge speaks of the fatigue as having been aggravated by the "heavy rain." "The heavy rain which fell two days and nights without intermission, etc.," said the council which voted to retreat. Pastor Shewkirk in his diary notes the weather particularly: "Wednesday 28th," he writes, ... "in the afternoon we had extraordinary heavy rains and thunder." The flashes of the cannons were intermixed with flashes of lightning. On the 29th, "in the afternoon, such heavy rain fell again as can hardly be remembered." To all this deluge our soldiers were exposed with but little shelter. Necessity required that they should be at the lines, and constantly on the watch, ready to repel any attempt to storm them.

When they lay down in the trenches at brief intervals for rest, they kept their arms from the wet as they could. Cooking was out of the question, and the men were compelled to take up with the unaccustomed fare of hard biscuits and raw pork. Their wretched plight is referred to in more than one of the letters of the day. Writes General Scott: "You may judge of our situation, subject to almost incessant rains, without baggage or tents, and almost without victuals or drink, and in some part of the lines the men were standing up to their middles in water." Captain Olney puts it on record that "the rain fell in such torrents that the water was soon ankle deep in the fort. Yet with all these inconveniences, and a powerful enemy just without musket-shot, our men could not be kept awake." Captain Graydon, of Shee's Pennsylvanians, says in his well-known "Memoirs:" "We had no tents to screen us from the pitiless pelting, nor, if we had them, would it have comported with the incessant vigilance required to have availed ourselves of them, as, in fact, it might be said that we lay upon our arms during the whole of our stay upon the island. In the article of food we were little better off." Under the circ.u.mstances could Washington's force have withstood the shock of a determined a.s.sault by the enemy?

In spite, however, of weather, hunger, and fatigue, there was many a brave man in the American camp who kept up heart and obeyed all orders with spirit. One thing is certain, the British were not permitted to suspect the distressed condition of our army. Our pickets and riflemen, thrown out in front of the works, put on a bold face. On the 28th there was skirmishing the greater part of the day, and in the evening, as Washington reports, "it was pretty smart." Writing from the trenches on the 29th, Colonel Silliman says: "Our enemy have encamped in plain sight of our camp at the distance of about a mile and a half. We have had no general engagement yet, but no day pa.s.ses without some smart and hot skirmishes between different parties, in which the success is sometimes one way and sometimes another. We are in constant expectation of a general battle; no one can be here long without getting pretty well acquainted with the whistling of cannon and musket shot." Scarcely any particulars of these encounters[162]

are preserved, though one of them, at least, appears to have been quite an important affair. The enemy had determined to approach the lines by regular siege rather than hazard an a.s.sault, and late in the afternoon of the 28th they advanced in some force to break ground for the first parallel. The point selected was doubtless the high ground between Vanderbilt and Clinton avenues, on the line of De Kalb. As to what occurred we have but the briefest account, and that is from the pen of Colonel Little. "On the morning of the 28th," he writes, "the enemy were encamped on the heights in front of our encampment. Firing was kept up on both sides from the right to the left. Firing on both sides in front of Fort Putnam. About sunset the enemy pushed to recover the ground we had taken (about 100 rods) in front of the fort.

The fire was very hot; the enemy gave way, and our people recovered the ground. The firing ceased, and our people retired to the fort. The enemy took possession again, and on the morning of the 30th [29th] had a breastwork there 60 rods long and 150 rods distant from Fort Putnam." It was this move of the British, more than any incident since the battle, that determined Washington's future course.

[Footnote 162: In vol. ii. of the L.I. Hist. Society's "Memoirs," the author, Mr. Field, devotes pages 254-258 to the skirmishing of some Connecticut soldiers on the extreme right on the other side of Gowa.n.u.s Creek, which appears to him to have been rash and foolhardy, and strangely in contrast with what also appears to him to have been an exhibition of cowardice on their part the day before. The narrative from which the incidents are taken (Martin's) shows no such singular inconsistency in the conduct of these men. This was Colonel Douglas'

regiment, and, as Martin himself says, it moved promptly under orders from the ferry to the right to cover Stirling's retreat. "Our officers," he writes, "pressed forward towards a creek, where a large party of Americans and British were engaged." They very properly did not halt to help a company of artillerymen drag their pieces along.

The skirmish on the following day was nothing remarkable in its way.

It was just such brushes as the men engaged in that Washington, on Graydon's authority, encouraged. The regiment displayed no particular rashness on the 28th, nor any cowardice on the 27th--that is, if Martin is to be credited.]

During all these trying hours since the defeat on the 27th, the most conspicuous figure to be seen, now at one point and now at another of the threatened lines, was that of the commander-in-chief. Wherever his inspiring presence seemed necessary, there he was to be found. He cheered the troops night and day. All that the soldiers endured, he endured. For forty-eight hours, or the whole of the 28th and 29th, he took no rest whatever, and was hardly once off his horse. As he rode among the men in the storm he spoke to some in person, and everywhere he gave directions, while his aids were as tireless as their Chief in a.s.sisting him.

But circ.u.mstanced as the army was, it was inevitable that the question should come up: Can the defence of the Brooklyn front be continued without great hazard? It could not have escaped the notice of a single soldier on that side, that if, with the river in their rear, the enemy should succeed in penetrating the lines, or the fleet be able to command the crossing, they would all be lost. There was no safety but in retreat; and for twenty-four hours from the morning of the 29th, all the energies of the commander-in-chief were directed towards making the retreat successful.

To few incidents of the Revolution does greater interest attach than to this final scene in the operations on Long Island. The formal decision to abandon this point was made by a council of war, held late in the day of the 29th, at the house of Phillip Livingston, then absent as a member of the Continental Congress at Philadelphia. The mansion made historic by this event stood on the line of Hicks Street, just south of Joralemon.[163] There were present at the council, the commander-in-chief, Major-Generals Putnam and Spencer, and Brigadier-Generals Mifflin, McDougall, Parsons, Scott, Wadsworth, and Fellows. As far as known, Scott alone of these generals has left us any thing in regard to what transpired on the occasion beyond the final result. He preserves the interesting fact that when the proposition to retreat was presented it took him by surprise and he as suddenly objected to it, "from an aversion to giving the enemy a single inch of ground." It was the soil of his own State. As a member of the New York Convention and of the Committee of Safety, and now as a general officer, he had spent months in uninterrupted preparations to defend that soil, and on the first impulse of the moment the thought of yielding any more of it to the invaders was not to be entertained. But he was soon "convinced by unanswerable reasons," and the vote of the council was unanimous for retreat. Eight separate reasons were embodied in the decision. _First._ A defeat had been sustained on the 27th, and the woods lost where it was proposed to make "a princ.i.p.al stand." _Second._ The loss in officers and men had occasioned great confusion and discouragement among the troops.

_Third._ The rain had injured the arms and much of the ammunition, and the soldiers were so worn out, that it was feared that they could not be kept at the lines by any order. _Fourth._ The enemy appeared to be endeavoring to get their ships into the East River to cut off communication with New York, but the wind as yet had not served them.

_Fifth._ There were no obstructions sunk in the Channel between Long and Governor's Island, and the council was a.s.sured by General McDougall, "from his own nautic experience," that small ships could sail up by that channel; the hulks, also, sunk between Governor's Island and the Battery were regarded as insufficient obstructions for that pa.s.sage. _Sixth._ Though the lines were fortified by several strong redoubts, the breastworks were weak, being "abattised with brush" only in some places, and the enemy might break through them.

_Seventh._ The divided state of the army made a defence precarious.

_Eighth._ Several British men-of-war had worked their way into Flushing Bay from the Sound, and with their a.s.sistance the enemy could cross a force to the mainland in Westchester County, and gain the American rear in the vicinity of King's Bridge. In view of these considerations a retreat was considered imperative.

[Footnote 163: See _Doc.u.ment_ 6, in which General Scott says: "I was summoned to a council of war at Mr. Phillip Livingston's house on Thursday, 29th ult., etc."]

This was the official record of the council's action as afterwards transmitted to Congress. It is not to be inferred, however, that retreat was not thought of, or that nothing was done to effect it until the council met. That Washington had foreseen the necessity of the move, that he discussed it with others, and that he had already begun the necessary preparations, is obvious both from the record and from all that occurred during the day. The council did no more than to coincide in his views and confirm his judgment.[164]

[Footnote 164: ORIGIN OF THE RETREAT.--Precisely when and why Washington came to a determination in his own mind to retreat has been made the subject of a somewhat nice historical inquiry. Gordon gives one story; Mr. William B. Reed, biographer of Colonel Reed, gives another; and Mr. Bancroft, General Carrington, and others indulge in more or less extended criticisms on the point. Gordon's account is the most probable and the best supported.

Whatever Washington may have thought of the situation on Long Island after the defeat, it is enough to know that he immediately reinforced himself there, and that on the 27th and 28th he made no preparations to withdraw to New York. It far from follows, however, that he had concluded to stay and fight it out "on that line" at all hazards. He was acting on the defensive, and was necessarily obliged to guide himself largely by the movements of the enemy. On Long Island, therefore, he could only be on the watch, and, like a prudent general, decide according to circ.u.mstances. Up to the morning of the 29th he was still watching--watching not only the enemy, but his own army also. In his letter to Congress, written at "half after 4 o'clock A.M." of this date, he gives no intimation of a retreat, but rather leaves that body to infer that he proposed to remain where he was. He speaks, for instance, of expecting tents during the day to make the troops more comfortable. On the same morning Reed wrote: "We hope to be able to make a good stand, as our lines are pretty strong;" and he doubtless reflected the views of his Chief at the time.

The two particular dangers now to which the army was exposed were the danger of having its communication with New York cut off by the ships, and the danger of being approached by the enemy in front by siege operations, which the army was not prepared to meet. The first danger had existed ever since the arrival of the enemy, and had been provided for. All the batteries on Governor's Island and on both sides of the East River had been built to guard against it. In addition, ships had been sunk in the channel. Washington accordingly must have thoroughly canva.s.sed the risks he ran in regard to his communications. _These alone had not decided him to retreat._ On the morning of the 29th, however, he first became aware of the second danger. It was not until then that the enemy fully developed their intention of advancing by trenches. After working all night, as Howe reports, they had thrown up by morning, as Little reports, a parallel sixty rods long and one hundred and fifty rods distant from Fort Putnam. Reed wrote, "They are intrenching at a small distance." In twenty-four hours at the farthest they would have come within very close range, and the hazardous alternative would have been forced upon us to attempt to drive them out of their own works. Washington well knew that, in view of the condition of his men and the great disparity of numbers, this could not be done. When, therefore, he became a.s.sured of Howe's intentions he acted promptly--_he determined to retreat_; and this determination he reached early on the morning of the 29th.

This is substantially the theory which Gordon presents as a fact, and it is most consistent with fact. Gordon's account is this: "The victorious army encamped in the front of the American works in the evening; and on the 28th at night broke ground in form about 4 or 500 yards distant from a redoubt which covered the left of the Americans.

The same day Gen. Mifflin crossed over from New York with 1000 men; at night he made an offer to Gen. Washington of going the rounds, which was accepted. He observed the approaches of the enemy, and the forwardness of their batteries; and was convinced that no time was to be lost. The next morning he conversed with the General upon the subject, and said, 'You must either fight or retreat immediately. What is your strength?' The General answered, 'Nine thousand.' The other replied, 'It is not sufficient, we must therefore retreat.' They were both agreed as to the calling of a Council of war; and Gen. Mifflin was to propose a retreat. But as he was to make that proposal, lest his own character should suffer, he stipulated, that if a retreat should be agreed upon, he would command the rear; and if an action the van."

The fact that Mifflin was given the command of the rear on the retreat, and the fact that he sent the order to Heath that morning to send down all the boats from King's Bridge, lend the highest probability to Gordon's version of the story. Parsons, who was one of the members of the council, mentions this particularly as one of the reasons for withdrawing, namely, that the enemy were "not disposed to storm our lines, but set down to make regular approaches to us." Reed also puts as much stress on this point as any other. Giving the reasons for the retreat to Governor Livingston, he said: "The enemy at the same time possessed themselves of a piece of ground very advantageous and which they had [fortified]. We were therefore reduced to the alternative of retiring to this place or going out with [troops] to drive them off." Washington, too, is to be quoted. In his letter to Trumbull, September 6th, he writes: "As the main body of the enemy had encamped not far from our lines, and as I had reason to believe they intended to force us from them by regular approaches, which the nature of the ground favoured extremely, and at the same time meant, by the ships of war, to cut off the communication between the City and Island, and by that means keep our men divided and unable to oppose them anywhere, by the advice of the General officers, on the night of the 29th, I withdrew our troops from thence without any loss of men and but little baggage."

William B. Reed's account (Reed's Life of Reed) is to the effect, briefly, that a heavy fog settled over Long Island on the 29th, and that during the day Colonel Reed, Colonel Grayson, and General Mifflin rode to Red Hook inspecting the lines. While at the Hook, "a shift of wind" cleared the fog from the harbor, enabling the officers to catch a glimpse of the fleet at the Narrows. From certain movements of boats they inferred that the ships would sail up with the favorable breeze if it held until the tide turned and the fog cleared off. They immediately hurried to Washington, informed him of the impending danger, and induced him to call a council and order a retreat. Mr.

Bancroft, however, has shown very thoroughly that this account cannot be accepted, because the fog did not come up until the morning of the 30th, and no change of wind occurred. Colonel Reed himself says in the Livingston letter, written only the next morning, that the enemy's fleet were attempting every day to get up to town with "the wind _ahead_"--thus directly contradicting his biographer. The Reed account has several errors of detail, one being the statement that the Red Hook battery had been badly damaged by the guns of the Roebuck on the 27th. It would be nearer the truth to say that it was not hit at all.

The fleet could do nothing that day; as Admiral Howe reports, the Roebuck was "the only ship that could fetch high enough to the northward to exchange _a few random shot_ with the battery on Red Hook."

In a word, Washington, after receiving Mifflin's report in regard to the approaches of the enemy, and probably other reports from Grayson, Reed, and others in regard to the general condition of the troops (for instance, Colonel Shee's uneasiness, referred to by Graydon), found that the moment had come for decision. That decision was to retreat that night; and during the forenoon, several hours before the council met, he issued secret orders for the concentration of boats at the ferry, as described in the text.]

The first thing necessary was to provide all the transportation available in order to accomplish the retreat in the shortest time possible after beginning it. There were boats at the Brooklyn ferry and across at New York, but these were too few for the purpose.

Accordingly, on the forenoon of the 29th, Washington sent an order through Mifflin to General Heath at King's Bridge to the following effect:

LONG ISLAND, August 29th, 1776.

DEAR GENERAL--We have many battalions from New Jersey which are coming over to relieve others here. You will please therefore to order every flat bottomed boat and other craft at your post, fit for transporting troops, down to New York as soon as possible. They must be manned by some of Colonel Hutchinson's men and sent without the least delay. I write by order of the General. I am Affectionately Yours

MIFFLIN.

At about the same time, Colonel Trumbull, the commissary-general, was directed to carry a verbal order to a.s.sistant Quartermaster Hughes at New York, "to impress every kind of water craft from h.e.l.l Gate on the Sound to Spuyten Duyvil Creek that could be kept afloat and that had either sails or oars, and have them all in the east harbor of the City by dark."[165] These two orders were carried out with great energy, promptness, and secrecy by all who had any part in their execution.

Heath "immediately complied" with what Mifflin had written, and sent down all his boats under Hutchinson's men from Salem, who, like Glover's from Marblehead, were, many of them, the best of sailors. He brooked the less delay, perhaps, because he saw at once that Washington's "real intention" was, not to be reinforced from New Jersey, but to retreat from Long Island.[166] Hughes, on his part, was untiring, and rendered the greatest service. He would have been mistaken this day rather for the master of a military school, than for what he had been--the master of a cla.s.sical one. For twenty-two hours, as his biographer tells us, he never dismounted from his horse, but superintended the collection of the vessels from all points, and at evening had them ready for their purpose.[167]

[Footnote 165: Memorial of Colonel Hugh Hughes. Leake's Life of General Lamb.]

[Footnote 166: Heath's Memoirs.]

[Footnote 167: There is an interesting letter of Washington's preserved in the Hughes Memorial, which adds light on this point.

Eight years after the event, when Hughes needed some official certificate showing his authority to impress all the craft he could find, the general replied to him as follows:

"My memory is not charged with the particulars of the verbal order which you say was delivered to you through Col. Joseph Trumbull, on the 27th, August, 1776, 'for impressing all the sloops, boats, and water craft from Spyhten Duyvel, in the Hudson, to h.e.l.l Gate, in the Sound.' I recollect that it was a day which required the utmost exertion, particularly in the Quarter-Master's department, to accomplish the retreat which was intended, under cover of the succeeding night; and that no delay or ceremony could be admitted in the execution of the plan. I have no doubt, therefore, of your having received orders to the effect, and to the extent which you have mentioned; and you are at liberty to adduce this in testimony thereof.

It will, I presume, supply the place of a more formal certificate, and is more consonant with my recollection of the transactions of that day." It appears from this that Washington remembered that the _entire day_ of the 29th was devoted to planning and preparing for the retreat, and this fits the theory advanced in the note on the "Origin of the Retreat." As to the delivery of the orders about boats, it is probable that Trumbull crossed to New York with Mifflin's letter to Heath and gave it to Hughes to forward. At the same time he gave Hughes his instructions verbally. Hughes received them, says his biographer, about noon. He then had eight hours to carry them out, which gave him time to send to Heath and for Heath to comply, while he and his a.s.sistants scoured the coast everywhere else for boats, from h.e.l.l Gate down. Among other sloops impressed was the Middles.e.x, Captain Stephen Hogeboom, while on its way to Claverack. "I was prevented from proceeding," says the captain, "by Coll Wardsworth and Commissary Hughes who ordered your memorialist over with the sloop to Long Island ferry where she was used to carry off the Troops and stores after the unfortunate retreat, &c."--_N.Y. Hist. MS._, vol. i., p. 620.]

The final withdrawal of the troops from the lines was effected under the cover of a plausible general order, which was the only one known to have been issued by the commander-in-chief while on Long Island.[168] This order now comes to light for the first time, and is important as serving to correct the improbable though standard theory that the regiments were moved from their posts under the impression that they were to make a night attack upon the enemy.[169] The order as actually given was far more rational, and less likely to excite suspicion as to its true intent. In the first place, the sick, "being an enc.u.mbrance to the army" were directed to be sent to the hospital, their arms and accoutrements taken with them, and from there to be conveyed across to New York and reported to Surgeon-General Morgan. In the next place, the order announced that troops under General Mercer were expected that afternoon from New Jersey, with whom it was proposed to relieve a proportionate number of the regiments on Long Island, and "make a change in the situation of them." In view of the distressed condition of most of the troops at the lines, the propriety of such a "change" was obvious; and in all probability Washington did originally intend to make the relief. And last, as it was apparently undecided what regiments were to be relieved, they were all, or the greater part of them, directed "to parade with their arms, accoutrements, and knapsacks, at 7 o'clock, at the head of their encampments and there wait for orders." On the evening of the 29th, accordingly, we find the troops ready at their camps and the lines to march off at a moment's notice, and all prepared for a retreat by the most natural arrangement that could have been devised to conceal the real design.[170]

[Footnote 168: _Doc.u.ment_ 3. "General Orders. Head-Quarters Long Island, Aug. 29, 1776. Parole, _Sullivan_, Countersign, _Greene_."--_Col. Douglas' Order Book._]

[Footnote 169: All our princ.i.p.al accounts follow Graydon, who states that the order to attack the enemy was given "regimentally." Colonel Hand, in his letter describing the night's incidents (Reed's Life of Reed), makes no allusion to such an order, but on the contrary states that he and the other colonels of the covering party were told that they were to retreat. An order to attack would have been a poor disguise for a retreat, for every man must have felt its utter rashness and at once suspected some other move.]