The Campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn Part 13

"The enemy," writes one of the Maryland soldiers, "advanced towards us, upon which Lord Stirling, who commanded, drew up in a line and offered them battle in true English taste. The British then advanced within about 200 yards of us, and began a heavy fire from their cannon and mortars, for both the b.a.l.l.s and Sh.e.l.ls flew very fast, now and then taking off a head. Our men stood it amazingly well; not even one of them shewed a Disposition to shrink. Our orders were not to fire until the Enemy came within fifty yards of us, but when they perceived we stood their fire so cooly and resolutely they declined coming any nearer, altho' treble our number."[141] Colonel Haslet, although not with his regiment, reported to his friend Caesar Rodney that "the Delawares drew up on the side of a hill, and stood upwards of four hours, with a firm, determined countenance, in close array, their colors flying, the enemy's artillery playing on them all the while, not daring to advance and attack them;"[142] and his ensign, Stephens, pointed with pride to the standard "torn with shot" while held in his hands.

[Footnote 141: _Extracts from the Stiles Diary_ in vol. ii., p. 488, of the Long Island Historical Society's _Memoirs_.]

[Footnote 142: _Haslet to Rodney._ _Force_, 5th Series, vol. ii., p.

881.]

Galled perhaps by the fire of Carpenter's battery, the British light troops retired to their main line, and the firing from this time was continued chiefly by the artillery. On their left they advanced one howitzer to within three hundred yards of Stirling's right, and in front of his left they opened with another piece at a distance of six hundred yards, and until about eleven o'clock the cannonading was vigorously sustained. Here was an engagement begun, and for four hours Stirling's men were encouraged with the belief that they were holding back the invaders. Their general inspired them with his own resolution and bravery, both by word and example; and their good conduct in this their first experience under fire, exposed without cover to cannon and musket shot, indicated that Grant could not have pushed them back without suffering severely. The casualties had not been large, but the nerves of the men were none the less tested by the ordeal. Among the Marylanders, Captain Edward Veazey, who commanded one of the independent companies, doing duty with Smallwood's regiment, fell "early in the engagement;" and either here, or on the retreat at a later hour, also fell Captain Carpenter, whose battery had been doing good work on Stirling's line. Of the Delawares, Major MacDonough and Lieutenants Anderson and Course were slightly wounded. Accounts agree that few of the men in either Smallwood's, Haslet's, or Kachlein's battalions were killed or wounded while holding this position.

The three regiments immediately under Stirling thus not only appeared to be doing well, but had actually proved themselves the best of soldiers, both by keeping an unwavering line when the British light troops advanced, as if to be followed by the main column, and in maintaining their ranks and discipline when subjected to the subsequent fire of the artillery.

Nor were these the only men who did themselves credit. That little party composed of Atlee's and Huntington's battalions, under General Parsons, which had gone into the woods to protect Stirling's left, must not be forgotten. Our published accounts heretofore fail to particularize the service it did; but it was of no small account, as Parson's and Atlee's independent testimony and the returns of the British losses clearly show. The party, not much over three hundred strong, filed off to the left, and soon came in sight of "a hill of clear ground" about three hundred yards distant, which was judged to be the proper situation from which to watch the enemy.[143] The direction Parsons' men took, the distances mentioned, and the fact that tradition a.s.sociates the site with part of the fighting on that day, can leave no doubt but that the hill referred to here was one of the two or three distinct elevations in the north-western section of Greenwood Cemetery, and to one of which has since been given the commemorative t.i.tle of "Battle Hill." A spot fitly named, for around it some brave work was done! As the detachment neared the hill, the British flanking troops were also observed to be marching to seize it.

Atlee seeing this hurried his men to reach it first, but the enemy were there before him and poured a volley into his battalion.

Fortunately, not being well aimed, this did trifling damage, but under the shock a part of his men, with two companies from the Delaware regiment, which had been ordered to join them, wavered. Rallying the most of them, Atlee soon ordered an advance up the hill, telling the men at the same time "to preserve their fire and aim aright;" and they all pushed forward with so much resolution, and apparently with such an effective discharge of their pieces, that the enemy fell back, leaving behind them twelve killed and a lieutenant and four privates wounded. In this encounter Atlee lost his "worthy friend" and lieutenant-colonel, Caleb Parry, who fell dead upon the field without a groan, while cheering on the battalion. Ordering four soldiers to take the remains of "the hero" back into the Brooklyn lines, Atlee halted his "brave fellows" on the hill, and all Parsons' command here took post to await the further movements of the British on this flank.

The force they had met and repulsed consisted of the Twenty-third and Forty-fourth and a part of the Seventeenth regiments, by whom they were soon to be attacked again. In half an hour after the first affair the enemy formed for another effort to seize the hill, but again Atlee's and Huntington's men opened upon them, and for a second time compelled their retreat, with the loss of Lieutenant-Colonel Grant, a brave and valued field-officer of the Fortieth Regiment, whose fall gave ground for the report, credited for some days after in the American army, that Major-General Grant, the division commander, was among the enemy's killed in the battle of Long Island. Parsons' men by this time had fired away all their ammunition (Atlee says that his battalion, at least, had entirely emptied their cartridge-boxes), and had used what charges could be got from the enemy's dead and wounded, when Huntington's ammunition cart "very luckily" came on the ground, and the men were re-supplied for still a third attack, which was threatened with the a.s.sistance of the Forty-second Highlanders; but the British this time kept a safe distance, and Parsons and Atlee remained on the hill, where they collected the enemy's dead and placed their wounded under the shelter of the trees. Thus bravely and effectively had this small body of Americans protected Stirling's flank and dealt the enemy the severest blows they suffered at any one point during the day, and this, as in the case of Stirling's men, with but small loss to themselves. From behind fences and trees, and, if tradition is correct, from the tops of trees as well, and from open ground on the hill, they kept up their destructive fire and successfully accomplished what they had been called upon to do.[144]

That the British did not intend at this hour to drive Parsons and Atlee from their post is no detraction from the spirited fight made by these officers and their men, who knew nothing of the enemy's intentions, and who actually won the field from the troops they met.

All along this front, from Stirling holding the road on the right to Parsons holding the left, with a long gap between them, the fighting thus far had resulted most favorably to the American side. The main line, as already stated, had lost not more than two officers killed and three or four wounded, with a small number of men; while Parsons and Atlee both report that in addition to the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Parry they lost only one or two men wounded. But, on the part of the British, Grant's two brigades, with the Forty-second Highlanders and the two companies of New York loyalists, lost, according to Howe's official report, two officers killed and four wounded, and among the men twenty-five killed and ninety-nine wounded. The four regiments alone which at different times encountered Parsons--the Seventeenth, Twenty-third, Forty-fourth, and Forty-second--lost in the aggregate eighty-six officers and men killed and wounded.

[Footnote 143: _Atlee's Journal._ _Force_, 5th Series, vol. i., p.

1251.]

[Footnote 144: Parsons' reference to this affair at or near "Battle Hill" in Greenwood is as follows: "I was ordered with Col. Atlee and part of his Reg't, and Lt. Col. Clark with Col. Huntington's Reg't to cover the left flank of our main body. This we executed though our number did at no time exceed 300 men and we were attacked three several times by two regiments, ye 44th and 23d and repulsed them in every attack with considerable loss. The number of dead we had collected together and the heap the enemy had made we supposed amounted to about 60. We had 12 or 14 wounded prisoners who we caused to be dressed and their wounds put in the best state our situation would admit."--_Doc.u.ment_ 5.

See Colonel Atlee's journal in _Force's Archives_ for a full account of the part his battalion took in this fighting.]

While, now, Stirling and Parsons seemed to be effectually blocking the advance of the British by the lower road and the Greenwood hills, what was the situation at the other pa.s.ses?

Up to eight o'clock, some five hours after Grant's appearance at the Red Lion, no determined attack had been reported from either the Flatbush or Bedford roads. The Hessians had made some show of advancing from Flatbush at an early hour, but they had not as yet driven in our pickets, although approaching near enough for the guns at the breastwork on the road to fire upon them. No word had come from Miles; nothing had been heard from the patrol of officers at the Jamaica Pa.s.s. Whatever tactics the enemy were pursuing, it was evident that at this hour they had not developed indications of a simultaneous advance "all along the line." Were they making their princ.i.p.al push against Stirling? Were they waiting for the fleet to work its way up to co-operate? or would they still attempt to force the pa.s.ses and the hills at all points and overcome the American outguards by sheer weight of numbers? Whatever theory our generals may have entertained at this time as to the intentions of the British--a point which we have no means of determining--it is certain that at about half-past eight or nine o'clock Major-General Sullivan rode out from the Brooklyn lines to the Flatbush Pa.s.s, with the evident purpose of examining the situation at that and other points, and of obtaining the latest information respecting the enemy's movements. We have this substantially from his own pen: "I went," he says, "to the hill near Flatbush to reconnoitre the enemy."[145] Nothing more natural, and nothing more necessary; the situation at that hour required that some responsible general officer should be in this vicinity to direct the disposition of the troops the moment the enemy uncovered their plan.

Stirling on the lower road had his hands full, and it became some one's duty to see that he was not put in danger by any possible mishap elsewhere on the hills. Sullivan, therefore, the second in command, went out to "examine" and to "reconnoitre." He had been out the evening before, making the rounds with Putnam; to him Miles had reported the situation of affairs on the extreme left; and it was by his general orders that the last detail of guards had been made for each of the pa.s.ses. He was accordingly familiar with the plan of the outer defence, and upon reaching the Flatbush Pa.s.s, where, as Miles states, he took his station at the redoubt or barricade on the road, he seems to have given certain directions on the strength of the information he had obtained. If we may credit the writer of one of the letters published at the time, the general was told that the main body of the enemy were advancing by the lower road, "whereupon he ordered another battalion to the a.s.sistance of Lord Stirling, keeping 800 men to guard the pa.s.s."[146] It is not difficult to accept this as a correct statement of what actually occurred, because it is what we should expect would have taken place under the circ.u.mstances. That Sullivan took out any additional troops with him when he went to the pa.s.s does not appear, but doubtless some were sent there. But as to this Flatbush Pa.s.s, the most that can be said with any degree of certainty is, that at about nine o'clock in the morning the Hessians still remained comparatively quiet at the foot of the hills below; that our guards and pickets stood at their different posts, not in regular line, but detached on either side of the road, the commander of each party governing himself as necessity required; that they were expected to hold that point stubbornly, if for no other purpose now than to secure Stirling's line of retreat; and that if attacked they were to be reinforced. At the hour Sullivan reached the pa.s.s the situation at all points appeared to be satisfactory.

[Footnote 145: Most of our writers are led into the error of supposing that Sullivan was already at the Flatbush Pa.s.s, and that when he went to reconnoitre he started from this point. The general says: "I went to the Hill near Flatbush to reconnoitre the enemy, and with a picket of four hundred men was surrounded by the enemy," etc. He went to the hill--where from? The main camp, necessarily. We already had our pickets well out in front, and had Sullivan gone beyond these he would have come upon the Hessians. Besides his position fully overlooked Flatbush, and no reconnoissance was necessary. Miles states that the general remained at the redoubt. The quotation above means no more than that Sullivan went out from the Brooklyn lines, and afterwards was surrounded and fought with four hundred of the guard who were there at the Pa.s.s with him.]

[Footnote 146: _Doc.u.ment_ 19.]

But little did the Americans suspect that at the very moment their defence seemed well arranged and their outguards vigilant they were already in the web which the enemy had been silently weaving around them during the night. That flanking column! Skilfully had it played its part in the British plans, and with crushing weight was it now to fall upon our outpost guards, who felt themselves secure along the hills and in the woods. Cross again into the opposite camp and follow the approach of this unlooked-for danger. First, Lord Howe withdrew Cornwallis from Flatbush to Flatlands towards evening on the 26th, and at nine o'clock at night set this flanking corps in motion. Sir Henry Clinton commanded the van, which consisted of the light dragoons and the brigade of light infantry. Cornwallis and the reserve immediately followed; and after him marched the First Brigade and the Seventy-first Regiment, with fourteen pieces of field artillery. These troops formed the advance corps, and were followed at a proper interval by Lord Percy and Howe himself, with the Second, Third, and Fifth brigades, the guards, and ten guns. The Forty-ninth Regiment, with four twelve-pounders, and the baggage with a separate guard, brought up the rear. All told, this column was hardly less than ten thousand strong. With three Flatbush Tories acting as guides, it took up the march and headed, as Howe reports, "across the country through the new lots" towards the Jamaica Pa.s.s, moving slowly and cautiously along the road from Flatlands until it reached Shoemaker's Bridge, which crossed a creek emptying into Jamaica Bay, when the column struck over the fields to the Jamaica Road, where it came to a halt in the open lots a short distance south-east of the pa.s.s, and directly in front of Howard's Halfway House.[147]

[Footnote 147: Consult map of the battle-field, Part II.]

Here now occurred one of those incidents which, though insignificant in themselves, sometimes become fatalities that turn the scale of battle. The five American officers whom General Sullivan had sent out the evening before to patrol this pa.s.s had stationed themselves at this time, now between two and three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, a short distance east of Howard's house, apparently waiting for sounds of the enemy on the line of the road. Evidently they had no thought of his approach "across lots" from the direction of Flatlands, or they could not have left the pa.s.s unwatched by one or more of the party. For most of them, this was the first tour of military duty of so responsible a nature, and whatever mistakes they made may be referred to their inexperience or ignorance of the relative situation of the roads in that vicinity. Who had charge of the party does not appear. So far as known, only one of them, Lieutenant Van Wagenen, had seen any considerable service; but although something of a veteran, having entered the army in 1775 and charged with Montgomery upon Quebec, he could have known nothing of the country he was now patrolling. Lieutenants Troup and Duns...o...b..were young Columbia College graduates of two years' standing, who had eagerly taken up the cause of the colonists in the midst of adverse a.s.sociations. Gilliland may have once been an officer in McDougall's regiment, and Hoogland was adjutant of Colonel Lasher's battalion. Had these officers, who without doubt were all mounted, been patrolling at the pa.s.s or nearer the lines, the events of the 27th might have worn a far different aspect. As it was, the British by coming into the road at Howard's had put themselves in the rear of the patrol, and its capture was quickly effected. Captain William Glanville Evelyn, "a gallant officer" of the Fourth Infantry, or King's Own, and a descendant of the eminent John Evelyn, of England, led the British advance this night, and it fell to his fortune to surround and capture all five American officers and send them immediately to Clinton, who commanded the leading column.

Here was a blow inflicted upon us by the British, the real importance of which they themselves even were ignorant of, for they had made prisoners of the only patrol that was watching the Jamaica route from the pa.s.s down to the very lines themselves!

Clinton "interrogated" the prisoners upon the spot, and ascertained from them that the pa.s.s had not been occupied by the Americans. He then attempted to obtain information of the position at Brooklyn and the number of troops now there, by pressing the officers with questions, when Duns...o...b.. indignant at the advantage he was taking of their situation, replied to Clinton that "under other circ.u.mstances he would not dare insult them in that manner." For this the young lieutenant was called "an impudent rebel," and the British officers threatened to have him hanged. Duns...o...b..s courage was equal to the occasion, and, scouting the threat, declared that Washington would hang man for man in return, and that as for himself he should give Clinton no further information. But stoutly as Duns...o...b..and his fellows maintained their rights and honor as prisoners, their capture was one of the fatal turns that brought misfortune to the American army.[148]

[Footnote 148: Hardly one of our modern accounts refers to this patrol or its capture. The incident, however, affected the situation gravely.

Howe mentions it in his report as follows: "General Clinton being arrived within half a mile of the pa.s.s about two hours before daybreak, halted, and settled his disposition for the attack. One of his patrols falling in with a patrol of the enemy's officers took them; and the General learning from their information that the Rebels had not occupied the pa.s.s, detached a battalion of Light Infantry to secure it." Gordon says this: "One of his [Clinton's] patrols falls in with a patrol of American officers on horseback, who are trepanned and made prisoners." The letter in the _South Carolina Gazette_ (_Doc.u.ment_ 19) is to similar effect: "Five officers were also sent out on horseback to patrol the last-mentioned road and that leading to Jamaica, ... and were all made prisoners." Still stronger is the testimony of a letter to be found in the _Autobiography and Correspondence of Mary Granville, Mrs. Delany, with Interesting Reminiscences of George III. and Queen Charlotte, &c., London, 1862_.

"The Hon. Mrs. Boscawen to Mrs. Delany.--_Glan Villa_, 17th Oct.

1776.... To compleat the prosperity of my journey I found on my return to ye inn the most delightful news of our success on Long Island so that I had a most agreeable supper and drank health to the n.o.ble brothers [the two Howes]. We have had a letter from Capt. Evelyn from the field of battle; he was in ye brigade of light infantry, and took 5 officers prisoners who were sent to observe our motions. He mentions Dr. Boscawen's son being well, for whom we were in great care, being the only child. O! to compleat this by good news from N.

York and then peace!" We know who these officers were from several sources, the most authoritative and important being the doc.u.ments left by one of the party himself, Lieutenant Van Wagenen, and now in the possession of his grandson, Mr. Gerret H. Van Wagenen, of Brooklyn.

This officer had been sent down to Philadelphia in charge of prisoners from Canada. At this point his deposition states that "on his return to New York he found the enemy landing upon Long Island, and being a supernumerary he went to Long Island and offered his services to Gen'l Sullivan, who requested him, and four other officers, namely, Robert Troup, Edward Duns...o...b.. William Guilderland and Jeromus Hooghland, to go and reconnoitre the enemy, who were observed to be in motion, and in the various advances on the enemy, fell in with a body of horse and infantry by whom he and his little party were made prisoners, and continued a Prisoner for about twenty-two months." Respecting the questioning of the officers by Clinton, there is good authority.

Lieutenants Troup and Duns...o...b.. who afterwards rose to the rank of Lieutenant-colonel and Captain respectively, have daughters still living in New York, and from their own recollections and from papers in their possession, the account given in the text is collated. At the time of Captain Duns...o...b..s death one or more letters were published by friends who had the particulars of the incident directly from him.

(See biographical sketches of these officers, Part II.) The sending out of officers on such duty as was required this night, was not unusual. The British scouts who preceded the expedition to Lexington in 1775 were officers in disguise. Similar instances during the war could be recalled as at Brandywine. Mr. Henry Onderdonk, Jr., of Jamaica, states, in his carefully compiled and valuable collection of _Revolutionary Incidents on Long Island_, that the patrol was captured under a tree east of Howard's House.]

Upon learning that the pa.s.s was unguarded, Clinton, as Howe reports, ordered one of the light infantry battalions to occupy it, and soon after the main column followed. It would appear, however, that he still moved cautiously, and that the battalion, or the troops that followed, avoided a direct approach, and reached the Jamaica Road on the other side of the pa.s.s by a roundabout lane known as the Rockaway Path. The innkeeper Howard was waked up, and with his son compelled to guide the British around to the road, where it was discovered, as the patrol had stated, that the pa.s.s was unguarded. When the whole force had marched through to the other side it was halted for a brief "rest and refreshment," and then continued down the road to Bedford, where the van, consisting of dragoons and light infantry, arrived about half-past eight o'clock in the morning. So this flanking corps had succeeded in making a slow, difficult, and circuitous march of some nine miles from Flatlands during the night, and had placed itself directly in the rear of the left of the American outposts, before its approach was known in the Brooklyn camp. It was now nearer the lines than were our picket guards at either of the outposts on the hills, and by a swift advance down the Jamaica Road and along the Gowa.n.u.s Road to its intersection with the Port Road, it could have interposed itself across every avenue of retreat from the hills to the lines. It was Howe's plan to cut off the American retreat entirely, but while successful in reaching our rear he fortunately failed to reap the fullest advantage of his move. The loss he was now able to inflict upon us was hardly a third of what might have been possible. But for the Americans it was more than enough. From this point followed trial and disaster. The day, which had opened so promisingly on the lower road, had already, at early dawn, been lost to them at the Jamaica Pa.s.s.

What next happened after the British reached Bedford? What, in the first place, had Miles been about in the woods on the extreme left that the enemy should gain his rear before he knew it? Fortunately we have the colonel himself and his lieutenant-colonel, Brodhead, to tell us much if they do not explain all. Miles then puts it on record that, on the day before the engagement, General Sullivan came to his camp, to whom he reported his belief that when the enemy moved they would fall into the Jamaica Road, and he hoped there were troops there to watch them. On the following morning, at about seven o'clock, firing began at the redoubt on the Flatbush Road, and he immediately marched in that direction, but was stopped by Colonel Wyllys at the Bedford Pa.s.s, who informed him that he could not pa.s.s on, as they were to defend the Bedford Road. "Colonel Wyllys bearing a Continental, and I a State commission," says Miles, "he was considered a senior officer, and I was obliged to submit; but I told him I was convinced the main body of the enemy would take the Jamaica Road, that there was no probability of their coming along the road he was then guarding, and if he would not let me proceed to where the firing was, I would return and endeavor to get into the Jamaica Road before General Howe. To this he consented, and I immediately made a retrograde march, and after marching nearly two miles, the whole distance through woods, I arrived within sight of the Jamaica Road, and to my great mortification I saw the main body of the enemy in full march between me and our lines, and the baggage guard just coming into the road."

Had Miles been surprised? This is one of the problems of the battle.

For four days he had been on the watch on this flank, and now the British were in his rear! Would he have made that "retrograde" march this morning, when the strictest attention to one's particular orders was necessary, unless he had known that there were no troops on the Jamaica Road, and unless it was a part of his duty to reconnoitre in that direction? But he was now making a stout effort to find and fight Howe, and before charging him with a blunder let us follow the battle to its close.

One of Miles' soldiers hurried into camp and reported to Putnam that infantry and cavalry were marching down from the Jamaica Pa.s.s;[149]

but all too late, for right upon the heels of the information came the enemy! They pushed down the road from Bedford, and across the country, to attack the American outguards in the rear, while the Hessians were to come up in front. So, if we glance over the field again at about half-past nine or ten o'clock on this eventful morning, we find the whole aspect changed, and our entire force on the hills apparently caught in a trap. Stirling was still facing Grant upon the right, but his rear was in danger; while Sullivan and the picket guards at the other pa.s.ses were wedged in between the two powerful columns under Howe and De Heister. What now was done? Who escaped?

[Footnote 149: _Force_, 5th Series, vol. i., p. 1195.]

Evidently Miles, way out in the woods on the left, had the least prospect of getting back to the Brooklyn lines. When he found the British on the road between him and camp he first proposed to attack their baggage guard and cut his way through to the Sound, but on consulting his officers (his first battalion alone being with him) he turned about, determined to attempt a retreat to camp. It was impossible for him to succeed, for he had a march of full three miles to make; and after encountering the enemy once or twice in the woods, he, with many of his men, was compelled to surrender. Brodhead, while marching through the woods in Indian file to join him, was also attacked and his men dispersed, though most of them, with the lieutenant-colonel himself, escaped to the lines. The rout was speedily communicated to the guards at the two remaining points. At the Bedford Pa.s.s the detachments under Colonel Wyllys and Lieutenant-Colonel Wills appear to have realized their danger about the time the British reached Bedford village. Finding Miles' troops broken up and flying, they too, through fear of being intercepted, took up the retreat. Finally, at the Flatbush Pa.s.s--the last point in the outpost line to be attacked--the peril was still greater, for now the Hessians were moving up in front. Here, as we have seen, General Sullivan had just arrived to examine the situation. He had not long to wait, however, before the nature of that situation fully dawned upon him and the troops at the pa.s.s. While watching the Hessians at Flatbush they suddenly hear the rattle of musketry on the left of their rear, where British light infantry and dragoons are beginning to chase and fire upon Miles, Brodhead, and Wyllys, and their broken detachments. The Flatbush Pa.s.s was a point to be held, for it was the centre of the outpost line, and retreat therefrom would endanger Stirling; but Sullivan and his men must act promptly if they would do no more even than save themselves, for the enemy by this time are much nearer the Brooklyn lines than they. Just what occurred at this juncture the records fail to tell us clearly. Did Sullivan, as one letter states, immediately send word to Stirling to retreat?[150]

This would have been the first and natural step. Whoever the commanding officer might be at the Flatbush Pa.s.s, it was for him to watch the situation at the outpost line and give orders to the right and left. All depended on what was done at that pa.s.s. If the guards there gave way all the others must give way instantly. Whether the word, therefore, reached Stirling or not, we must believe that Sullivan sent it, as he ought to have done, and is reported to have done. As for the general himself and his party, retreat was the only alternative. Leaving the advanced pickets to fall back before the Hessians, they turned towards the British in their rear. Very soon they encountered the light infantry and dragoons, who were now engaging in the attack with the highest dash and spirit. Reinforced by four companies of the guards, the latter captured three pieces of our artillery--the same, doubtless, which had just been playing upon the Hessians, but were now turned, in the retreat, upon the British--and which our gunners defended "heroically" to the last. Sullivan and his men fought well, and apparently in separate parties, until nearly all that had been stationed at the Flatbush Pa.s.s succeeded in breaking or making their way through to the lines.

[Footnote 150: The supposition that Stirling commanded outside of the lines on Long Island is erroneous. He had command of the reserves in camp (Orders of August 25th), and was the proper officer to call upon to reinforce any part of the outer line in case of attack. Sullivan says, "Lord Stirling commanded the main body without the lines;" by which is meant that he was with the princ.i.p.al force that went out, as he was. Until the attack, the general officer of the day was in charge of the outposts. Sullivan governed himself according to circ.u.mstances.

He was to be second in command under Putnam within the lines, he writes; but the situation soon required his presence outside, where he was also familiar with the dispositions.]

Meanwhile the Hessians appeared. They came up from the Flatbush plains with drums beating and colors flying. Donop's grenadiers and yagers led, and immediately after them followed the veteran De Heister at the head of the brigades. Reaching the summit of the ridge, they deployed their lines, and putting their sharpshooters in advance, moved rapidly upon the position which our Flatbush Pa.s.s guard had just abandoned.

They met with little opposition, for they had nothing before them but our scattered pickets. Soon, however, they fell in with the retreating groups which the British had cut off from the lines and had pushed back into the hills, and upon these they fell fiercely, and in many instances cruelly. Where they found a rifleman resisting too long, they pinned him with their bayonets, and to some of the wounded they showed no mercy. Most of the prisoners fell into their hands, for the reason that they had been driven towards the Hessians by the British; but otherwise the day afforded no opportunity for fair fighting between these "foreigners" and our troops.[151]

[Footnote 151: The Hessians are usually credited with taking a prominent part in this battle, whereas the day was practically decided before they came up. Necessarily our guards at the Flatbush Pa.s.s knew that the British were in their rear as soon or sooner than the Hessians knew it. They therefore turned to meet this unexpected enemy.

What Olney and Henshaw say settles this point. Olney states that Cornell marched towards the lines on hearing firing in his rear, leaving Olney to reinforce his pickets in front of the Hessians.

Henshaw writes that, finding the enemy between him and the lines, and knowing no orders could come to retreat, he marched for camp. Cornell and Henshaw were old officers, knew the ground thoroughly, and saw at once that they must retreat. No mention is made of the Hessians.

Lieutenant Olney was in front of the latter some time before he followed after his regiment. Howe reports that it was the _British_ who took our guns in that part of the field. If there was any such severe fighting at that pa.s.s, as Von Elking makes out, would the Hessians have lost but two men killed--all that they lost during the day? There are errors of fact in this writer's account. The most that the Hessians did was to chase, capture, and sometimes bayonet those of our soldiers whom the British had already routed. The real fighting of the day was done by Howe's English troops, and the very best he had, princ.i.p.ally the light infantry, grenadiers, dragoons, and Highlanders.]

Thus all along the hills, from the Flatbush Pa.s.s to the extreme left, our outer guards were in full retreat! It was a flight and fight to reach the Brooklyn lines! Ten o'clock--and Miles, Brodhead, Wyllys, Wills, Johnston, Henshaw, and Cornell, with two thousand men, were hurrying through the woods, down the slopes and across the fields, some singly, some in groups, some keeping together in companies, some in battalions, all aiming for one objective--the camp! Here they fought the light infantry; there they were charged upon by the dragoons; those who were intercepted fell into the hands or upon the bayonets of the Hessians. It was a trying and desperate situation from which there was no relief and for a long time the woods echoed with the shouts and cries of the contending parties. But upon the whole the loss to the Americans up to this time was not heavy, and could Stirling have been saved, the enemy would have had no great victory to boast of. Full half of Miles' two battalions reached the lines; Wyllys' and Chester's suffered but slightly; Henshaw and Cornell brought their men in without much loss, and in comparatively good order; the greatest blow to the Jerseymen was the death of their brave colonel, Johnston, their casualties otherwise being light; and Knowlton's hundred rangers just saved themselves from the dragoons, "with the utmost difficulty and on the full run." The artillerymen suffered more. General Sullivan himself, after showing good courage and avoiding capture until noon, endeavored to conceal himself, but was found and made prisoner by three Hessian grenadiers.[152]

[Footnote 152: During this fighting by the British infantry, Cornwallis and the reserves moved straight down the Jamaica Road. The Thirty-third Regiment and the grenadiers in their pursuit of some of the American fugitives approached the fortified lines between Fort Greene and Fort Putnam, and showed such eagerness to storm them that, according to Howe's report, it required repeated orders to hold them back. On the part of the Americans, Little reports that the enemy "attempted to force our lines, but soon retreated, being met with a smart fire from our breastworks;" and Little, no doubt, was at Fort Greene, an eye-witness.]

The day was lost at the left and centre, and it only remains to return to Stirling on the right. This general stood his ground firmly, though the firing in his rear grew ominously distinct. He refused to retreat, says Scott, for want of orders. If Sullivan sent him orders, as we have a.s.sumed on one writer's authority that he did, they failed to reach him. The time had come for the general to act on his own judgment, and finding his salvation dependent on an immediate retreat, he fell back from Grant's front between eleven and twelve o'clock, but only to discover that he too was surrounded. The force which had antic.i.p.ated him was Cornwallis with the Seventy-first Regiment and the Second Grenadiers, and they were holding his line of retreat on the Gowa.n.u.s Road. Stirling, realizing his danger, at once determined upon the only manoeuvre that promised escape for any of his command. Upon his left lay the Gowa.n.u.s marsh and creek, where both were at their broadest, and where a crossing had never been attempted. But now the attempt must be made, or every man is lost. Upon the other side of the creek are the Brooklyn peninsula, the lines, and safety. Stirling therefore ordered his men to make their way across as they could, while, to protect them as they forded or swam, he himself took Gist and half the Maryland battalion and proceeded to attack Cornwallis.

Against all the misfortunes of the day this piece of resolution and true soldiership stands out in n.o.ble relief. The Marylanders followed their general without flinching, and were soon "warmly engaged" with the enemy, who had posted themselves at a house--the old "Cortelyou"

house--above the upper mills near the intersection of the Port and Gowa.n.u.s roads. They rallied to the attack several times, as Stirling reports, and seemed on the point of dislodging Cornwallis, when reinforcements came up, and the British drove back the Marylanders into a piece of woods. Here, with conspicuous courage and determination, they formed again for still another effort to break through. Stirling's example was inspiring. "He encouraged and animated our young soldiers," writes Gist, "with almost invincible resolution."

But his handful of brave men had done all that was possible, and in their last charge they were met by great numbers and forced to retire again, "with much precipitation and confusion."[153] They broke up into small parties and sought escape. Nine only, among whom was Major Gist, succeeded in crossing the creek, the rest having retreated into the woods.[154] Stirling endeavored to get into the lines between the British and Fort Box, or by way of the mill-dam, but finding this impossible, he turned, ran through their fire, and eluding pursuit around a hill, made his way to the Hessian corps and surrendered himself to General De Heister. He had sacrificed himself and party as prisoners, but his main object was accomplished. The rest of the command was saved! They crossed the marsh and creek with a loss of but two or three killed and six or eight drowned.

[Footnote 153: The conduct of the Marylanders was soldierly beyond praise. But some accounts subject them to a singular martyrdom, killing every man of the two hundred and fifty-nine reported missing.

As there was but one officer wounded, or at the most one killed and one wounded in the party, according to the official returns, the proportion of men killed was doubtless small. The letter in _Force_, 5th Series, vol. i., p. 1232, referring to this attack, bears every evidence of having been written by Gist himself, and it is quoted as his in the text. In this letter Gist speaks of being surrounded on all sides, and then adds: "The impracticability of forcing through such a formidable body of troops rendered it the height of rashness and imprudence to risk the lives of our remaining party in a third attempt, and it became necessary for us to endeavor to effect our escape in the best manner we possibly could." This shows that there were many left to disperse. Their prudence was equal to their courage.]

[Footnote 154: Before Stirling's fight with Cornwallis took place, the mill and little bridge at the further end of the mill-dam across Gowa.n.u.s Creek were burned down. Colonel Smallwood charged "a certain Colonel Ward" with the act, and claimed that the destruction of the bridge prevented the escape of Stirling and the Marylanders with him.

Mr. Bancroft and Mr. Field repeat the charge. But Smallwood is contradicted both by Stirling and Gist, the former stating that he could not get by the British on the road full half a mile beyond the bridge, and the latter adding that he was driven back into the woods.

The charge had no foundation, the bridge not having been set on fire until after the enemy took possession of the road above (see Ewing's sketch). The "Colonel Ward" was Colonel Jonathan Ward, of Ma.s.sachusetts; and the probability is that he and Colonel Tyler, both of whom lost some men during the day, had been sent out on the Port Road, but, finding Cornwallis there, retreated, burning mill and bridge to obstruct the latter's possible advance in that quarter.]