The Campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn Part 11

[Footnote 105: "Till of late I had no doubt in my own mind of defending this place."--_Washington to Congress_, September 2d, 1776.]

What occasioned the princ.i.p.al anxiety in the mind of the commander-in-chief was the number of points at which the British could make an attack and their distance from one another. They could advance into New Jersey from Staten Island; they could make a direct attack upon the city with their fleet, while the transports sailed up the Hudson and the troops effected a landing in his rear; they could cross to Long Island and fall upon Greene in force; or they could make landings at different points as feints, and then concentrate more rapidly than Washington, as their water carriage would enable them to do, and strike where he was weakest.[106]

[Footnote 106: "Before the landing of the enemy in Long Island, the point of attack could not be known, nor any satisfactory judgment formed of their intentions. It might be on Long Island, on Bergen, or directly on the city."--_Washington to Congress_, September 9th, 1776.]

The summer and the campaign season were pa.s.sing, and still the uncertainty was protracted--when and where will the enemy attack?

CHAPTER IV.

THE BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND.

At length, upon the twenty-second of August, after days of expectation and suspense in the American camp, the British moved forward.

Thoroughly informed of Washington's position, the strength of his army, and the condition of his lines at every point,[107] Lord Howe matured his plan of action deliberately, and decided to advance by way of Long Island. An attack from this quarter promised the speediest success and at the least cost, for, should he be able to force the defences of Brooklyn, New York would be at his mercy; or, failing in this, he could threaten Washington's flank from h.e.l.l Gate or beyond, where part of the fleet had been sent through the Sound, and by a push into Westchester County compel the evacuation of the city.

Preparations were accordingly made to transport the troops from Staten Island across to the Long Island coast and debark them at Gravesend Bay, a mile to the eastward of the Narrows. A thunder-storm of great violence on the previous evening, which had fallen with fatal effect on more than one of Washington's soldiers, threatened to delay the movement, but a still atmosphere followed, and the morning of the 22d broke favorably.[108] At dawn the three frigates Phoenix, Greyhound and Rose, with the bomb-ketches Thunder and Carca.s.s, took their stations close into the Bay as covering ships for the landing, while Sir George Collier placed the Rainbow within the Narrows, opposite De Nyse's Ferry, now Fort Hamilton, to silence a battery supposed to be at that point. Upon the Staten Island sh.o.r.e fifteen thousand British and Hessian troops, fully equipped, and forty pieces of artillery had been drawn up during the day and evening before, and a part of them embarked upon transports lying near at anchor. At the beach were moored seventy-five flat-boats, eleven batteaux, and two galleys, built expressly for the present service, and manned by sailors from the ships of war, which, with the rest of the naval armament, were placed under the direction of Commodore Hotham.

[Footnote 107: The Tories gave Howe all the information he needed. One Gilbert Forbes testified at the "Hickey Plot" examination that a Sergeant Graham, formerly of the Royal Artillery, had told him that he (the sergeant), at the request of Governor Tryon, had surveyed the works around the city and on Long Island, and had concerted a plan of attack, which he gave to the governor (_Force_, 4th Series, vol. vi., p. 1178). On his arrival at Staten Island, Howe wrote to Germaine, July 7th: "I met with Governor Tryon, on board of ship at the Hook, and many gentlemen, fast friends to government, attending him, from whom I have had the fullest information of the state of the rebels, who are numerous, and very advantageously posted, with strong intrenchments, both upon Long Island and that of New York, with more than one hundred pieces of cannon for the defence of the town towards the sea," etc.--_Force_, 5th Series, vol. i., p. 105.]

[Footnote 108: This storm, which is mentioned by Colonel Douglas, Captain Hale, Chaplain Benedict, and others, hung over the city from seven to ten in the evening, and is described by Pastor Shewkirk as being more terrible than that which "struck into Trinity Church"

twenty years before. Captain Van Wyck and two lieutenants of McDougall's regiment and a Connecticut soldier were killed by the lightning.]

As soon as the covering frigates were in position, the brigade of light infantry and the reserves of grenadiers and foot, forming an advance corps four thousand strong and headed by Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis, entered the flotilla and were rowed in ten divisions to the Gravesend landing, where they formed upon the plain without opposition.[109] Then followed the remaining troops from the transports, and before noon the fifteen thousand, with guns and baggage, had been safely transferred to Long Island. All who witnessed this naval spectacle that morning were the enemy themselves, a few Dutch farmers in the vicinity, and the pickets of Hand's riflemen, who at once reported the movement at camp.

[Footnote 109: The landing-place was at the present village of Bath.

No opposition by the Americans would have availed and none was attempted. Washington wrote to Hanc.o.c.k, August 20th: "Nor will it be possible to prevent their landing on the island, as its great extent affords a variety of places favorable for that purpose, and the whole of our works on it are at the end opposite to the city. However, we shall attempt to hara.s.s them as much as possible, which will be all that we can do." To the same effect Colonel Reed's letter of August 23d: "As there were so many landing-places, and the people of the island generally so treacherous, we never expected to prevent the landing." General Parsons says (_Doc.u.ment_ 5): "The landing of the troops could not be prevented at the distance of six or seven miles from our lines, in a plain under the cannon of the ships, just within the sh.o.r.e." An American battery had gone down to De Nyse's, earlier in the summer, to annoy the Asia, but there was none there at this date.

The particulars of the debarkation and of subsequent movements of the enemy appear in the reports and letters of the two Howes and Sir George Collier. (_Force_, 5th Series, vol. i., pp. 1255-6; and _Naval Chronicle_, 1841.)]

The landing successfully effected, Cornwallis was immediately detached with the reserves, Donop's corps of cha.s.seurs and grenadiers, and six field-pieces, to occupy the village of Flatbush, but with orders not to attempt the "pa.s.s" beyond, if he found it held by the rebels; and the main force encamped nearer the coast, from the Narrows to Flatlands. As Cornwallis advanced, Colonel Hand and his two hundred riflemen hurried down from their outpost camp above Utrecht, and, keeping close to the enemy's front, marched part of the way "alongside of them, in the edge of the woods," but avoided an open fight in the field with superior numbers.[110] Captain Hamilton and twenty men of the battalion fell back on the road in advance, burning grain and stacks of hay, and killing cattle, which, says Lieutenant-Colonel Chambers, he did "very cleverly." Among the inhabitants along the coast, confusion, excitement, and distress prevailed,[111] and many moved off their goods in great haste to find refuge in the American lines or farther east on the island; while others remained to welcome the enemy, for whose success they had been secretly praying from the outset.

[Footnote 110: "On the morning of the 22d of August there were nine thousand British troops on New Utrecht plains. The guard alarmed our small camp, and we a.s.sembled at the flagstaff. We marched our forces, about two hundred in number, to New Utrecht, to watch the movements of the enemy. When we came on the hill we discovered a party of them advancing toward us. We prepared to give them a warm reception, when an imprudent fellow fired, and they immediately halted and turned toward Flatbush. The main body also moved along the great road toward the same place."--Lieutenant-Colonel Chambers, of Hand's riflemen, to his Wife, September 3d, 1776. _Chambersburg in the Colony and the Revolution._]

[Footnote 111: _Strong's History of Flatbush._]

The section of Long Island which the enemy now occupied was a broad low plain, stretching northward from the coast from four to six miles, and eastward a still further distance. Scattered over its level surface were four villages, surrounded with farms. Nearest to the Narrows, and nearly a mile from the coast, stood New Utrecht; another mile south-east of this was Gravesend; north-east from Gravesend, nearly three miles, the road led through Flatlands, and directly north from Flatlands, and about half-way to Brooklyn Church, lay Flatbush.

Between this plain and the Brooklyn lines ran a ridge of hills, which extended from New York Bay midway through the island to its eastern extremity. The ridge varied in height from one hundred to one hundred and fifty feet above the sea, and from the plain it rose somewhat abruptly from forty to eighty feet, but fell off more gradually in its descent on the other side. Its entire surface was covered with a dense growth of woods and thickets, and to an enemy advancing from below it presented a continuous barrier, a huge natural abattis, impa.s.sable to artillery, where with proportionate numbers a successful defence could be sustained.

The roads across the ridge pa.s.sed through its natural depressions, of which there were four within a distance of six miles from the harbor.

The main highway, or Jamaica Road--that which led up from Brooklyn Ferry--after pa.s.sing through Bedford, kept on still north of the hills, and crossed them at the "Jamaica Pa.s.s," about four miles from the fortified line. From this branched three roads leading to the villages in the plain. The most direct was that to Flatbush, which cut through the ridge a mile and a half from the works. Three quarters of a mile to the left, towards the Jamaica Pa.s.s, a road from Bedford led also to Flatbush; and near the coast ran the Gowa.n.u.s Road to the Narrows. Where the Red Lion Tavern stood on this road, about three miles from Brooklyn Church, a narrow lane, known as the Martense Lane, now marking the southern boundary of Greenwood Cemetery, diverged to the left through a hollow in the ridge and connected with roads on the plain. To clearly understand succeeding movements on Long Island, it is necessary to have in mind the relative situation of these several routes and pa.s.ses.

When word of the enemy's landing reached Sullivan and Washington the troops were immediately put under arms. The commander-in-chief had already been prepared for the intelligence by a dispatch from Governor Livingston, of New Jersey, the night before, to the effect that he had certain information from the British camp that they were then embarking troops and would move to the attack on the following day.[112] As the report came in that the enemy intended to march at once upon Sullivan, Washington promptly sent him a reinforcement of six regiments, which included Miles' and Atlee's from Stirling's brigade, Chester's and Silliman's from Wadsworth's, and probably Lasher's and Drake's from Scott's, numbering together some eighteen hundred men. They crossed with light spirits, and were marched to alarm-posts. Miles' two battalions went on to the Bedford Pa.s.s; Silliman was ordered down into "a woody hill near Red Hook, to prevent any more troops from landing thereabout."[113] Hand's riflemen, supported by one of the Eastern regiments, watched and annoyed the Hessians under Donop at Flatbush, and detachments were sent to guard the lower roads near the Red Lion.[114] Within the Brooklyn lines the troops stood to their alarm-posts. Colonel Little, expecting that "morning would bring us to battle," and remembering his promise to defend Fort Greene to the last extremity, enclosed his will to his son, and directed him in a certain event to take proper charge at home.

[Footnote 112: Livingston sent a spy to Staten Island on the night of the 20th, who brought word that the British were embarking, and would attack on Long Island and up the North River. Washington received the information during the storm on the following evening, and immediately sent word to Heath at King's Bridge that the enemy were upon "the point of striking the long-expected stroke." The next morning, the 22d, he wrote again instructing Heath to pick out "eight hundred or a thousand, light, active men, and good marksmen," ready to move rapidly wherever they were most needed; and he promised to send him some artillery, "if," he continues, "we have not other employment upon hand, which General Putnam, who is this instant come in, seems to think we a.s.suredly shall, this day, as there is a considerable embarkation on board of the enemy's boats." (_Ma.s.s. Hist. Soc. Coll._, volume for 1878. The Heath correspondence.) On the same date Washington wrote to Hanc.o.c.k: "The falling down of several ships yesterday evening to the Narrows, crowded with men, those succeeded by many more this morning, and a great number of boats parading around them, as I was just now informed, with troops, are all circ.u.mstances indicating an attack, and it is not improbable it will be made to-day.

It could not have happened last night, by reason of a most violent gust." (_Force_, 5th Series, vol. i., p. 1110). On the 21st, Colonel Hand at the Narrows reported three times to General Nixon that the British transports were filling with men and moving down, and the reports were sent to Washington. These facts show how closely the enemy were watched. The embarkation was known at headquarters early on the morning of the 22d, before the landing was made on Long Island.]

[Footnote 113: Washington wrote to Heath the next day: "Our first accounts were that they intended by a forced march to surprise General Sullivan's lines, who commands during the illness of General Greene; whereupon I immediately reinforced that post with six regiments."

Miles, Silliman, and Chester's adjutant, Tallmadge, state that their regiments were among the first to cross after the enemy landed.

Sullivan's orders of the 25th and other records seem to indicate that Atlee's, Lasher's, and Drake's were the other three battalions sent over at the same time.]

[Footnote 114: See Sullivan's orders, Silliman's letters, Miles'

Journal (Part II.), and Chambers' letter. [Transcriber's Note: The marker in the text for this footnote is missing in the original.]]

The morning of the 23d, however, brought no battle, nor did the enemy attempt any advance for three days. Washington made Sullivan an early visit, saw the situation there for himself, and during the day issued another of his fervent orders to the army. He formally announced the landing of the British, and again reminded his troops that the moment was approaching on which their honor and success and the safety of the country depended. "Remember, officers and soldiers," he said, "that you are freemen, fighting for the blessings of liberty; that slavery will be your portion, and that of your posterity, if you do not acquit yourselves like men. Remember how your courage and spirit have been despised and traduced by your cruel invaders; though they have found by dear experience at Boston, Charleston, and other places what a few brave men, contending in their own land and in the best of causes, can do against base hirelings and mercenaries." He urged them, too, to be cool, but determined; not to fire at a distance, but wait for the word from their officers; and gave express orders that if any man attempted to skulk, lie down, or retreat, he must be instantly shot down as an example. Those who should distinguish themselves for gallantry and good conduct were a.s.sured that they might depend upon being honorably noticed and suitably rewarded. Strict orders as to other matters were also issued. The commissary-general was to have five days' baked bread on hand for distribution; the men were to have constantly ready with them two days' hard bread and pork, and the officers were to see not only that they had it, but kept it. The officers of the newly arrived militiamen were instructed also to see that the cartridges fitted their soldiers' muskets, and that each man had twenty-four rounds and two flints.

On the Long Island front, Sullivan was alert, and kept his division in readiness for the attack, which was now hourly expected. He ordered his command that afternoon, the 23d, to prepare two days' provisions and turn out the next morning at three o'clock. For the night, he a.s.signed Hitchc.o.c.k's and Little's regiments to guard the Flatbush Pa.s.s, Johnston's and Martin's to the coast road, and Remsen's Long Island militia to support Miles on the Bedford Road. They were all to be at their posts at six o'clock, and the regiments they relieved were to return to their encampments and, like the rest, "get two days'

provisions dressed, and be ready for action."

Meanwhile some brisk skirmishing occurred in front of Flatbush. In the afternoon of this day, the enemy, as Sullivan reported, formed, and attempted to pa.s.s the road by Bedford, but meeting a warm reception from the riflemen, some "musketry" sent to their support, and two or three of our field pieces, they fell back. "Our men," wrote Sullivan to Washington, "followed them to the house of Judge Lefferts (where a number of them had taken lodgings), drove them out, and burnt the house and a number of other buildings contiguous. They think they killed a number; and, as evidence of it, they produced three officers'

hangers, a carbine, and one dead body, with a considerable sum of money in pocket. I have ordered a party out for prisoners to-night."[115] The enemy returned in force, and the American skirmishers, having but two wounded, withdrew to the hills; but their conduct in the affair was so highly appreciated by Sullivan, that he issued a congratulatory order in the following terms:

"The general returns his thanks to the brave officers and soldiers who, with so much spirit and intrepidity, repulsed the enemy and defeated their designs of taking possession of the woods near our lines. He is now convinced that the troops he has the honor to command will not, in point of bravery, yield to any troops in the universe.

The cheerfulness with which they do their duty, and the patience with which they undergo fatigue, evince exalted sentiments of freedom and love of country, and gives him most satisfactory evidence that when called upon they will prove themselves worthy of that freedom for which they are now contending."[116]

[Footnote 115: Referring evidently to this skirmish, Lieutenant-Colonel Chambers says: "Strong guards were maintained all day on the flanks of the enemy, and our regiment and the Hessian yagers kept up a severe firing, with a loss of but two wounded on our side. We laid a few Hessians low, and made them retreat out of Flatbush. Our people went into the town and brought the goods out of the burning houses. The enemy liked to have lost their field-pieces.

Captain Steel acted bravely. We would certainly have had the cannon had it not been for some foolish person calling retreat. The main body of the foe returned to town, and when our lads came back they told of their exploits."]

[Footnote 116: Little's Order Book, _Doc.u.ment_ 2. But it seems that Remsen's Long Island militiamen were seized by a panic, either during this skirmish or at a later hour, on the Bedford Road, and ran from their posts. Sullivan rebuked them sharply in his orders of the 24th (_Doc.u.ment_ 2), and confined them thereafter to "fatigue" duty. This proved to be only the first of several militia panics experienced in this campaign.]

On the 24th, Washington was still in doubt as to the intentions of the enemy. Reports represented their numbers on Long Island at not more than eight thousand, whereas they were double this estimate; and it was suspected at headquarters that their landing might only be a feint to draw off our troops to that side, while the real attack should be made on New York. But the imprudence of running any risks on the Brooklyn side was obvious, and Washington sent over a further reinforcement of four regiments, which appear to have been Wyllys's, Huntington's, and Tyler's of Parsons' brigade (his entire command was there on the next day) together with the Pennsylvania detachments under Lieutenant-Colonel Lutz and Major Hay. On this date Brigadier-General Lord Stirling crossed over, where more than half his brigade had preceded him; and Brigadier-General John Nixon, whose name now first appears in connection with the operations on Long Island, was detailed as field officer of the day, with orders to take command of the outer line and post his men "in the edge of the woods next the enemy."[117]

[Footnote 117: Sullivan's Orders, August 24th. _Doc.u.ment_ 2.]

But the princ.i.p.al event of the 24th was the change made in the chief command on Long Island. Sullivan was superseded by Putnam. There were now on that side the whole of Nixon's and Heard's brigades (the two regiments on Governor's Island excepted), the larger part of Stirling's and Parson's, and half of Scott's and Wadsworth's. As this roster included one third of the army's effective force, the command could properly be a.s.signed to Putnam as the senior major-general present; but it does not appear that the question of his rank entered into the reasons for the change. In a letter to Governor Livingston from Colonel Reed, the adjutant-general, dated August 30th, 1776, the statement is made that Washington, "finding a great force going to Long Island, sent over Putnam;" leaving the inference to be drawn that, apart from his rank, Putnam was considered the proper officer, or an officer competent, to command such a force. Reed states further that some movements had been made on Long Island of which the commander-in-chief did not entirely approve, and this also called for a change. Sullivan, too, was wholly unacquainted with the ground; although, as to this, Putnam's knowledge of it was not extensive, as he had been over it only "occasionally." That Sullivan was a brave, zealous, and active officer, his military career abundantly proves.

Appointed a brigadier-general from New Hampshire, he commanded a brigade under Lee throughout the Boston siege, and had been sent, as already stated, in the spring of this year to help repair the misfortunes attending our force on the Canada border; but success was not to be met with there, and Sullivan, finding Gates promoted to the chief command in that quarter, returned, after visiting Congress, to the New York army. Like most of our general officers at that date, he as yet lacked military experience, especially in an independent capacity, for which his ambition to succeed was not a sufficient equivalent. How far Putnam was more competent to a.s.sume the command on Long Island, is a point which the issue there, at least, did not determine. His record before this was all in his favor. A veteran of the old war, a man of known personal courage, blunt, honest, practical, and devoted to the American cause, he had the confidence of at least the older part of the army, with which he had been identified from the beginning of the struggle. As he had never been tried in a separate department, Washington could not say how he would manage it, but he could say, from his experience with him at Boston, that Putnam was "a most valuable man and fine executive officer,"[118]

and such he continued to prove himself through the present campaign.

He seconded Washington heartily and efficiently in all his plans and preparations, and when he was sent to Long Island the commander-in-chief had reason to feel that whatever directions he might give as to operations there, Putnam would follow them out to the letter. But if Putnam took the general command across the river, Sullivan continued in active subordinate control, as second in command.[119]

[Footnote 118: Washington to Congress, January 30th, 1776.]

[Footnote 119: In regard to the change in the command, the adjutant-general's statement in full is this: "On General Greene's being sick, Sullivan took the command, who was wholly unacquainted with the ground or country. Some movements being made which the general did not approve entirely, and finding a great force going to Long Island, he sent over Putnam, who had been over occasionally; this gave some disgust, so that Putnam was directed to soothe and soften as much as possible." (_Sedgwick's Life of Livingston_, p. 201.) What movements were referred to, unless it was the random firing of the skirmishers and the burning of houses at Flatbush by some of our men, or how Putnam was to reconcile Sullivan to the change, as he was directed (this evidently being the meaning of Reed's last phrase), does not appear. From subsequent occurrences, the inference is justified that Putnam did not disturb Sullivan's arrangements, but left the disposition of the troops to him. What Sullivan himself says is given in a note further along in the chapter. That Putnam went over on the 24th, and in the forenoon, is evident from a letter from Reed to his wife of that date, in which he says: "While I am writing, there is a heavy firing and clouds of smoke rising from the wood [on Long Island]. General Putnam was made happy by obtaining leave to go over--the brave old man was quite miserable at being kept here."

(_Reed's Life of Reed._) This firing, as Washington wrote to Schuyler on the same date, occurred in the morning. Putnam had been engaged during the summer, princ.i.p.ally, in looking after the defences in the city and the river obstructions. He had charge, also, of the water transportation, boats, pettiaugers, etc. His division was in the city or close to it. Had the enemy, accordingly, attacked the city directly, it would have fallen largely to Putnam to conduct the defence; and this is doubtless the reason why, as Reed says, he was "kept here." But as it now seemed certain that the British were concentrating on Long Island, he evidently wished to be with the troops there, where that morning there was "a heavy firing" going on, and obtained leave to cross. Finding a change desirable, Washington, probably at the same time, gave Putnam the command and "sent" him over.]

On the 25th, Putnam received written instructions from Washington. He was directed to form a proper line of defence around his encampment and works on the most advantageous ground; to have a brigadier of the day constantly upon the lines that he might be on the spot to command; to have field-officers go the rounds and report the situation of the guards; to have the guards particularly instructed in their duty; and to compel all the men on duty to remain at their camps or quarters and be ready to turn out at a moment's warning. The wood next to Red Hook bordering Gowa.n.u.s Creek was to be well attended to, and the woods elsewhere secured by abattis, if necessary, to make the enemy's progress as difficult as possible. The militia, or troops which were least disciplined and had seen the least service, were to man the interior lines, while the best men were "at all hazards" to prevent the enemy's pa.s.sing the woods and approaching the works. He disapproved also of the unmeaning picket firing and the burning of houses, and warned the general finally that when the attack came it was certain to be "sudden and violent."[120]

[Footnote 120: Mr. Davis, in his Life of Aaron Burr, who was Putnam's aid at this time, states that after crossing to Long Island and making the round of the outposts, he (Burr) urged his general to beat up the enemy's camp, but that Putnam declined, on the ground that his orders required him to remain strictly on the defensive.]

For brigadier for the day, General Lord Stirling was a.s.signed to duty on this date.[121]

[Footnote 121: Sullivan's Orders, August 25th. _Doc.u.ment_ 2.]

In the skirmishing that continued from the 24th to the 26th the Americans showed skill and bravery, although at times indulging in desultory firing. The riflemen, supported by field-pieces, made occasioned dashes upon the enemy and picked off their men with almost no loss to themselves. Among the troops on picket near Flatbush, on the 25th, were Colonel Silliman and his Connecticut battalion; and from the colonel, who wrote from there, on a drum-head, to his wife, we get a glimpse of the situation at that point during his tour of duty. "I am now posted," he says, "within about half a mile from the Regulars with my Regt. under the covert of a woody hill to stop their pa.s.sage into the country. There are a number of Regts. posted all around the town within about the same distance and for the same purpose. The Regulars keep up an almost constant fire from their Cannon and Mortars at some or other of us, but neither shott nor sh.e.l.l has come near my Regt. as yet and they are at too great a distance to fire muskets at. I have a scouting party going out now to see if they can't pick up some or get something from them.... They have wounded in all of our men in 3 days skirmish about 8 or 9, one or two mortally, which is not half the number that we have killed for them besides wounded." On the 26th a considerable party with artillery attacked the Hessians and drove them in, killing several men belonging to the Von Lossberg regiment, which later in the day advanced in turn and compelled our skirmishers to fall back. In this affair Colonel Ephraim Martin, of New Jersey, was severely wounded.

On the morning of the 26th, Washington again crossed to Long Island, where he remained until night. The records are quite silent as to how he pa.s.sed the most of his time, but judging from his letter to Congress of this date, in which he expressed his belief that the enemy had landed nearly all their force on that side, and that it was there they would make their "grand push," it was doubtless a busy, watchful, and anxious day with him. To suppose that he did not inform himself of all the preparations made to meet the enemy, that he did not know what number of men were posted on the hills and at what points, that he did not study the several modes and directions of attack possible for the enemy to adopt, and that he did not himself give personal directions, would be to charge that at the most important moment of the campaign he failed to exercise that care and attention to detail which he exercised on so many occasions both before and after. Indeed, although Putnam and Sullivan were in immediate command on Long Island, Washington never shifted the final responsibility from his own shoulders, and as a matter of fact was probably as well acquainted with the ground as either of these generals. Towards evening, in company with Putnam, Sullivan, and other officers, he rode down to the outposts near Flatbush and examined the position of the enemy. How long he remained, or what information he was able to gather, does not appear; but both the other generals, Putnam and Sullivan, made a detour of the pickets either at this time or at an earlier hour in the day, visited Miles and Brodhead on the extreme left, took their opinion as to the movements and intentions of the British, so far as one could be formed by them, and then rode off to the right "to reconnoitre the enemies lines."[122]

[Footnote 122: Several writers, Mr. Sparks among them, make the statement that neither Washington nor Putnam went outside of the Brooklyn lines. It would be impossible to credit this without absolute proof of the fact. Washington always reconnoitred the position of the enemy whenever they were near each other; in the last scenes of the war at Yorktown he was among the first at the outposts examining the British works. Undoubtedly he rode out to the Flatbush Pa.s.s on the 26th, as stated by the writer of the letter to the _South Carolina Gazette_ (Doc.u.ment 19), who says: "The evening preceding the action, General Washington, with a number of general officers, went down to view the motions of the enemy, who were encamped at Flatbush." A letter from a survivor of the Revolution, present on Long Island, published in a newspaper several years since, well authenticated, and preserved in one of Mr. Onderdonk's sc.r.a.p-books in the Astor Library, New York, confirms this statement. The soldier recollects that he saw Washington and others looking at the enemy with their gla.s.ses.]

On this day also, the 26th, additional regiments were sent over. Two of these were the remainder of Stirling's brigade--Haslet's Delaware battalion, the largest in the army, as we have seen, and Smallwood's Marylanders, one of the choicest and best equipped. Either on this or one of the two previous days, Lieutenant-Colonel Kachlein's incomplete battalion of Pennsylvania riflemen, with two or three independent companies from Maryland, crossed; and among the last to go over were one hundred picked men, the nucleus of the "Rangers," from Durkee's Connecticut Continentals at Bergen, with Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Knowlton at their head.[123] These additions raised the force on Long Island on the night of the 26th to a total of about seven thousand men fit for duty.[124]