The Black Phalanx Part 4

"We have resolved to raise, immediately, seven hundred and fifty negroes, to be incorporated with the other troops; and a bill is now almost completed."

It does not appear that the negroes were formed into separate organizations in this State, but filled the depleted ranks of the Continental regiments, where their energy and daring was not less than that displayed by their white comrades, with whom they fought, shoulder to shoulder. The advocates of arming the negroes were not confined to the Eastern and Middle sections; some of the best men of the South favored and advocated the enlistment of free negroes, and made many, though for a long time unsuccessful, efforts to obtain legal sanction for such enlistment throughout the South. But their advice was not listened to, even in the face of certain invasion, and then the whites would not, and could not be induced to rally to the defence of their own particular section and homes.

For fear that I may be accused of too highly coloring the picture of the Southern laxity of fervor and patriotism, I quote from the valuable essay which accompanies the history of the American Loyalists:

"The whole number of regulars enlisted for the Continental service, from the beginning to the close of the struggle, was 231,959. Of these, I have once remarked, 67,907 were from Ma.s.sachusetts; and I may now add, that every State south of Pennsylvania provided but 59,493, or 8,414 _less_ than this single State."

The men of Ma.s.sachusetts did not more firmly adhere to their policy of mixed troops as against separate organizations, based upon color, than did the men of the South to their peculiar inst.i.tution, and against the arming of negroes, free or slave. The war having fairly set in upon Southern soil, and so urgent the necessity for recruiting the army, that Congress again took up the subject of enrolling negroes as soldiers. It was decided that the general Government had no control over the States in the matter, but a series of resolutions were adopted recommending to the States of Georgia and South Carolina, the arming of three thousand able-bodied negroes.

Now began an earnest battle for the carrying out of the policy, as recommended by Congress. Its friends were among the bravest and truest to the cause of freedom in the States. Hon. Henry Laurens lead in the effort. Even before the matter was brought to the attention of Congress, he wrote to Gen. Washington, as follows:

"Our affairs in the Southern department are more favorable than we had considered them a few days ago; nevertheless, the country is greatly distressed, and will be so unless further re-inforcements are sent to its relief. Had we arms for three thousand such black men as I could select in Carolina, I should have no doubt of success in driving the British out of Georgia, and subduing East Florida before the end of July."

Washington knew the temper of the Southerners. He was well aware that slaves could not be entrusted with arms within sight of the enemy's camp, and within hearing of his proclamation of freedom to all who would join his Majesty's standard, unless equal inducements were offered them by the colonists, and to this he knew the Southern colonist would not consent. In his reply to Mr. Laurens, he said:

"The policy of our arming slaves, is, in my opinion a moot point, unless the enemy set the example. For, should we begin to form battallions of them, I have not the smallest doubt, if the war is to be prosecuted, of their following us in it, and justifying the measure upon our own ground. The contest then must be, who can arm fastest. And where are our arms? Besides, I am not clear that a discrimination will not render slavery more irksome to those who remain in it. Most of the good and evil things in this life are judged of by comparison; and I fear a comparison in this case will be productive of much discontent in those who are held in servitude. But, as this is a subject that has never employed much of my thoughts, these are no more than the first crude ideas that have struck me upon the occasion."

Washington certainly had no doubts as to the value of the negro as a soldier, but for the reasons stated, did not give the weight of his influence, at this important juncture, to the policy of their enlistment, while so many of the leading men of the colonies were favorable to the action.

Among those who advocated the raising of negro troops was Col. John Laurens, a native of South Carolina and a brave patriot, who had acted as aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, and had seen service in Rhode Island and elsewhere. He was the son of Hon. Henry Laurens, at one time President of Congress, and was noted for his high qualities of character. A commission of lieutenant-colonel was granted to him by Congress, and he proceeded to South Carolina to use his personal influence to induce the Legislature to authorize the enlistment of negroes. His services in Rhode Island had given him an opportunity to witness the conduct and worth of the negro soldier.

Alexander Hamilton in the course of a long letter to John Jay, relating to the mission of Col. Laurens to South Carolina, says:

"I foresee that this project will have to combat much opposition from prejudice and self-interest. The contempt we have been taught to entertain for the blacks makes us fancy many things that are founded neither in reason nor experience; and an unwillingness to part company with property of so valuable a kind will furnish a thousand arguments to show the impracticability or pernicious tendency of a scheme which requires such a sacrifice. But it should be considered, that, if we do not make use of them in this way, the enemy probably will; and that the best way to counteract the temptations they will hold out will be to offer them ourselves. An essential part of the plan is to give them their freedom with their muskets. This will secure their fidelity, animate their courage, and, I believe, will have a good influence upon those who remain, by opening a door to their emanc.i.p.ation. This circ.u.mstance, I confess has no small weight in inducing me to wish the success of the project; for the dictates of humanity and true policy, equally interest me in favor of this unfortunate cla.s.s of men."

The patriotic zeal of Col. Laurens for the accomplishment of his design was earnest and conscientious. He wrote to his friend Hamilton in these words:

"Ternant will relate to you how many violent struggles I have had between duty and inclination--how much my heart was with you, while I appeared to be most actively employed here. But it appears to me, that I should be inexcusable in the light of a citizen, if I did not continue my utmost efforts for carrying the plan of the black levies into execution, while there remains the smallest hope of success."

The condition of the colonies and the Continental army at that time was critical in the extreme. The campaign of 1779 had closed gloomily for the Americans. The British had not only been active in raiding in Virginia and destroying property, but in organizing negro troops. Lord Dunmore, as we have seen, as early as November, 1775, had issued a proclamation, inviting the negroes to join the Royal forces, to which a great many slaves responded, and were organized into companies. A regiment had been organized by the British on Long Island in 1776, and now, Sir Henry Clinton invited them by the following proclamation:

"By his Excellency Sir Henry Clinton, K. B., General and Commander-in-Chief of all his Majesty's Forces, within the Colonies lying on the Atlantic Ocean, from Nova Scotia to West Florida, inclusive, &c., &c.

PROCLAMATION.

"Whereas the enemy have adopted a practice of enrolling _Negroes_ among their _Troops_, I do hereby give notice _That_ all Negroes taken in arms, or upon any military _Duty_, shall be purchased for _the public service_ at a stated _Price_; the money to be paid to the _Captors_.

"But I do most strictly forbid any _Person_ to sell or claim _Right_ over any Negro, the property of a Rebel, who may take refuge in any part of this _Army_: And I do promise to every negro who shall desert the _Rebel Standard_, full security to follow within these _Lines_, any Occupation which he shall think proper.

"Given under my Hand at Head-Quarters, Philipsburg, the 30th day of June, 1779. H. CLINTON.

"By his Excellency's command, John Smith, Secretary."

It is highly probable that many negroes made their way to the British camp. Col. Laurens wrote to General Washington, under date of February, 1780, six months after the issuing of Sir Henry Clinton's proclamation, as follows:

"Private accounts say that General Provost is left to command at Savannah; that his troops consist of Hessians and Loyalists that were there before, _re-inforced by a corps of blacks and a detachment of savages_. It is generally reported that Sir. Henry Clinton commands the present expedition."

Clinton left New York in the latter part of 1779, for the reduction of Charleston, which he completed in May, three months after the date of Col. Laurens' letter. Gen. Lincoln, who commanded the American forces at Charleston, joined in the effort to arm the negroes. In a letter to Gov.

Rutledge, dated Charleston, March 13th, 1780, he says:

"Give me leave to add once more, that I think the measure of raising a black corps a necessary one; that I have great reason to believe, if permission is given for it, that many men would soon be obtained. I have repeatedly urged this matter, not only because Congress has recommended it, and because it thereby becomes my duty to attempt to have it executed, but because my own mind suggests the utility and importance of the measure, as the safety of the town makes it necessary."

The project of raising negro troops gained some friends in all sections, and Statesmen, both South and North, as they talked about it, became more free to express their approbation of the measure. They had witnessed the militia from Virginia and North Carolina, at the battle of Camden, throw down their arms before the enemy;[4] they had seen black and white troops under command of Gen. Provost occupy Savannah; the surrender of Charlestown had become necessary; and these evils were all brought about by the apathy of the white inhabitants.

Among those who spoke out in favor of Col. Laurens' and Gen. Lincoln's plan, was Hon. James Madison, who, on the 20th of November, 1780, wrote to Joseph Jones:

"I am glad to find the Legislature persisting in their resolution to recruit their line of the army for the war; though, without deciding on the expediency of the mode under their consideration, would it not be as well to liberate and make soldiers at once of the blacks themselves, as to make them instruments for enlisting white soldiers? It would certainly be more consonant with the principles of liberty: and, with white officers and a majority of white soldiers, no imaginable danger could be feared from themselves; as there certainly could be none from the effect of the example on those who should remain in bondage; experience having shown that a freedman immediately loses all attachment and sympathy with his former fellow slaves."

No circ.u.mstances under which the South was placed, could induce either their legislators or the people to adopt the recommendations of Congress or the advice of the patriots and statesmen of their section. The opposition to the arming of the negroes was much stronger than the love for independence. The British, however, adopted the plan, and left no stone unturned to augment the strength of their army. Thousands of negroes flocked to the Royal standard at every opportunity, just as in the war of the Rebellion in 1861-'65, they sought freedom under the national banner.

It has ever been the rule among American historians to omit giving credit to those negroes who sought to gain their freedom by joining the British. They have generally also failed to acknowledge the valor of those who swelled the ranks of the Continental army. Enough, however, can be gathered, mostly from private correspondence, to show that the hope of success for the Americans rested either in the docility of the negroes at the South, or in their loyalty to the cause of Independence.

At all events, upon the action of the blacks more than upon the bravery and valor of the American troops, depended the future status of the Colonies; hence the solicitude of officers and of the leading citizens; and it was not the love of universal freedom, which prompted their efforts for arming negroes; not at all, but their keen appreciation of the value of a neutral power, which could be utilized for the benefit of America's Independence. Nor do I attribute other than the same motive to the British, who did arm and did free a great many of the negroes, who joined their service, especially at the South, where they must have organized quite a large force,--not less than 5,000. Early in 1781, (Feb'y) Gen. Greene, then in command in North Carolina, writing to General Washington about the doings of the enemy in South Carolina, where he formally commanded, says:

"The enemy have ordered two regiments of negroes to be immediately embodied, and are drafting a great portion of the young men of that State [South Carolina], to serve during the war."

A few days after writing this letter, Gen. Greene met the British at Guilford Court House, and again witnessed the cowardice of the Southern militia,[5] whose conduct gave victory to the British, under Cornwallis.

The persistency of Col. Laurens in his effort to organize negro troops, was still noteworthy. Having returned from France, whither he went on important business, connected with the welfare of the States, he resumed his "favorite pursuit." Under date of May, 19, 1782, in a letter addressed to Washington, he says:

"The plan which brought me to this country was urged with all the zeal which the subject inspired, both in our Privy Council and a.s.sembly; but the single voice of reason was drowned by the howling of a triple-headed monster, in which prejudice, avarice, and pusillanimity were united. It was some degree of consolation to me, however, to perceive that the truth and philosophy had gained some ground; the suffrages in favor of the measure being twice as numerous as on a former occasion. Some hopes have been lately given me from Georgia; but I fear, when the question is put, we shall be out-voted there with as much disparity as we have been in this country.

"I earnestly desire to be where any active plans are likely to be executed, and to be near your Excellency on all occasions in which my services can be acceptable. The pursuit of an object which, I confess, is a favorite one with me, because I always regarded the interests of this country and those of the Union as intimately connected with it, has detached me more than once from your family, but those sentiments of veneration and attachments with which your Excellency has inspired me, keep me always near you, with the sincerest and most zealous wishes for a continuance of your happiness and glory."

Here ended the project of arming negroes in South Carolina, and before an earnest effort could be made in Georgia, the brave man laid his life upon the altar of American liberty.

But to show the state of public opinion at the South, as understood by the Commander-in-Chief of the American army, we have but to read Washington's reply to Col. Laurens' last letter, in which he speaks of "making a last effort" in Georgia. Gen. Washington uses this emphatic language:

"I must confess that I am not at all astonished at the failure of your plan. That spirit of freedom, which, at the commencement of this contest, would have gladly sacrificed everything to the attainment of its object, has long since subsided, and every selfish pa.s.sion has taken its place. It is not the public but private interest which influences the generality of mankind; nor can the Americans any longer boast an exception. Under the circ.u.mstances, it would rather have been surprising if you had succeeded; nor will you, I fear, have better success in Georgia."

This letter settles forever any boast of the Southerners, that to them is due the credit of gaining the independence of the United States. It is true Cornwallis' surrender at Yorktown, Va., was the last of the series of battles fought for independence.[6] But we must remember that the French were at Yorktown. It cannot be doubted but that from Charleston to Yorktown the Americans met negro troops more than once fighting under the Royal flag; while at the east, in every important engagement between the two enemies,--British and American,--the negro was found fighting with the Americans. This division of the negroes can easily be accounted for, since at the North and East the object of the war was acknowledged to be set forth in the Declaration of Independence; at the South only so much of the Declaration was accepted as demanded Independence from Great Britain. Therefore, though in separate and opposing armies, the object of the negro was the same--liberty. It is to be regretted that the historians of the Revolutionary period did not more particularly chronicle the part taken by negroes at the South, though enough is known to put their employment beyond doubt.

Johnson, the author of the life of Gen. Greene, speaking of Greene's recommendation to the Legislature of South Carolina to enroll negroes, says:

"There is a sovereign, who, at this time, draws his soldiery from the same cla.s.s of people; and finds a facility in forming and disciplining an army, which no other power enjoys. Nor does his immense military force, formed from that cla.s.s of his subjects, excite the least apprehension; for the soldier's will is subdued to that of his officer, and his improved condition takes away the habit of identifying himself with the cla.s.s from which he has been separated. Military men know what mere machines men become under discipline, and believe that any men, who may be obedient, may be made soldiers; and that increasing their numbers increases the means of their own subjection and government."

Cornwallis doubtless had gathered within his lines a large number of negroes, to whose energy and labor, the erection of his breastworks were mainly due. Lafayette feeling satisfied that the position of his army before Yorktown would confine the British, and make the escape of Cornwallis impossible without battle, wrote to Gen. Washington in September:

"I hope you will find we have taken the best precautions to lessen his Lordship's escape. I hardly believe he will make the attempt. If he does, he must give up ships, artillery, baggage, part of his horses, and all the negroes."

All this time in some of the Northern States an opposition as strong as at the South had existed against organizing negro troops, and in some instances even against employing them as soldiers. The effort for separate organizations had been going on, but with only the little success that has been already noticed. In a biographical sketch of Col.

David Humphreys, in the "National Portrait Gallery of Distinguished Americans," is the following:

"In November, 1782, he was, by resolution of Congress, commissioned as a Lieutenant-Colonel, with order that his commission should bear date from the 23rd of June, 1780, when he received his appointment as aid-de-camp to the Commander-in-Chief. He had, when in active service, given the sanction of his name and influence in the establishment of a company of colored infantry, attached to Meigs', afterwards Butler's, regiment, in the Connecticut line. He continued to be the nominal captain of that company until the establishment of peace."

Though the Legislature of Connecticut had taken up the subject of arming negroes generally, as early as 1777, and a bill, as we have seen, was presented to that Legislature, for their enrollment, the advocates of the measure, in every attempt to pa.s.s it, had been beaten. Nevertheless, as appears by the record given above, Col. Humphrey took charge and organized a company, with which he served until the close of the war.

But this company of fifty odd men were not all that did service in the army from Connecticut, for in many of her white regiments, negroes, bond and free, stood in the ranks with the whites. And, notwithstanding the unsuccessful attempts of Col. Laurens and the advocates of negro soldiery at the South, the negro was an attache of the Southern army, and rendered efficient aid during the struggle, in building breastworks, driving teams and piloting the army through dense woods, swamps, and across rivers. Not a few were spies and drummers. To select or point out a particular battle or siege, in which they rendered active service to the British, would not be a difficult task, though the information at hand is too limited for a detailed account of the part which they bore in these struggles. The true patriots of the Revolution were not slow in according to their black compatriots that meed of praise which was their due. In almost every locality, either North or South, after the war, there lived one or two privileged negroes, who, on great occasions,--days of muster, 4th of July, Washington's birthday, and the like,--were treated with more than ordinary courtesy by the other people. That a great and dastardly wrong was committed upon many, in like manner in which Simon Lee[7] was treated, is true. Many negroes at the South, who fought for American independence were re-enslaved, and this is so far beyond a doubt that no one denies it. The re-enslaving of these soldiers,--not by those who took part in the conflict, but the _stay-at-home's_,--was so flagrant an outrage that the Legislature of Virginia, in 1783, in order to give freedom to those who had been re-enslaved, and to rebuke the injustice of the treatment, pa.s.sed the following act: