The Birth Of Yugoslavia Volume Ii Part 13

Unfortunately it seems obvious that this exploit, if not ordered by the Italian Government was, at any rate, permitted by them. How otherwise could the automobile containing these men have got past the sentries at the Suak bridge and two other Italian sentry posts? Moreover, these men were in possession of doc.u.ments which proved that official Italian circles at Rieka were privy to their undertaking, and that they proposed to investigate the Yugoslav military positions on the frontier....

These five fascisti brigands--who were also lieutenants of the Italian army--would therefore have to be tried not only for attempted murder but for attempted espionage. They were put into a train and transported to the prison at Zagreb. "If once we begin to march," so the Italian soldiers at Rieka had over and over again been telling the Croats, "then we shall not halt before we come to Zagreb, your capital." Those five will perhaps some day explain to their comrades how quickly Zagreb can be reached.... As yet those whom they left behind them had not lost their bombast: a manifesto was issued by them which declared that five true patriots had sallied forth to Saint Anna, for the purpose of parleying with the Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly, and that in a barbarous fashion they had been arrested, maltreated and possibly killed. Let the people avenge the shedding of such n.o.ble blood. Everything, everything must be done in order to liberate the captured brethren. And so, towards eleven at night, about sixty fascisti and legionaries came together. Armed to the teeth, they designed to cross over into Yugoslav territory, but when they noticed that the sentry posts had been strengthened they went home to bed.

A number of American and European journalists rushed out to Belgrade, under the impression that the Yugoslav-Italian War could now no longer be avoided. But they did not realize how great a self-control the Yugoslavs possess. It may be, as a commentator put it in the _Nation_,[69] that Italy "is practically at war with Yugoslavia," for she is obsessed by the "Pan-Slav menace"; but if they insist on the arbitrament of arms they will have to wait until the Yugoslavs have time to deal with them.... The Free State of Rieka owes its existence to a Treaty between Italy and Yugoslavia; both of them should therefore guarantee its freedom. Italian and Yugoslav _gendarmerie_ and troops should resist together the incursions of fascisti; and if the two races cannot work in harmony, then let the administration of the town be entrusted to neutral troops; and as High Commissioner one would suggest Mr. Blakeney, the British Consul at Belgrade. If this imperturbable and most kindly man were to fail in the attempt at repeating in Rieka what has been accomplished in Danzig, then, indeed, one might despair; but he would brilliantly and placidly succeed. All the other qualifications are his; an intimate knowledge of every Near Eastern language--and, of course, Italian; a perfect acquaintance with the mentality of all those peoples; common sense of an uncommon order, and the whole-hearted confidence of those with whom he comes into contact. Great Britain and France compelled the Yugoslavs, at enormous sacrifices, to sign the Treaty of Rapallo; they are, therefore, morally obliged to see that it is executed. For too many months the Italians were saying that they would carry out their part of it and leave the third zone in Dalmatia if the Yugoslavs would agree to a few more concessions, commercial and territorial, that were not in the Treaty. During the Genoa Conference in the spring of 1922 the Italian authorities confessed to the Yugoslav delegates that their hands were bound by the fascisti. These elements would certainly object to the execution of that part of the Treaty of Rapallo which refers to the port of Baro. Accurately speaking, the arrangements with regard to Baro are embodied in a letter from Count Sforza, the then Foreign Secretary, and are added to the Treaty as an appendix. Both were signed on the same day, and apparently this plan of an appendix was adopted on account of the fascisti. Yet if Count Sforza had not signed that letter it is safe to say that the Yugoslavs would not have signed the main body of a Treaty which to them was the reverse of favourable. And at Genoa the Italians started haggling about a strip of land near Baro, in the hope that some success would stay the zeal of the fascisti. Furthermore they pleaded that Zadar could not live if Yugoslavia did not, in addition to supplying it with water, give it railway communication with the interior. The Yugoslavs were thus invited to construct at great expense a railway to a foreign town which their own ibenik and other Adriatic towns did not possess. This, naturally, they refused to undertake, as also to agree to the Italian suggestion that a free zone of some twenty kilometres should be inst.i.tuted at the back of Zadar. One might safely say that the Italian agents in this region would not have confined themselves to salutary measures for the welfare of the town. It is stated in the Treaty of Rapallo that in case of disagreement either party could invoke an arbitrator, and the Yugoslavs, who happen now to be the weaker party, have been contemplating application to the League of Nations. Well, in Genoa it was proposed by Italy that Yugoslavia should renounce the clause which deals with an eventual arbitration. If you make a large number of demands--never mind that they should be in opposition to a Treaty you have signed--then you may gain a few of them--and Italy was hoping that the Free State would repay the costs which she incurred there on account of her unruly son d'Annunzio, and, likewise, that the good Italianists who at the end of the Great War committed wholesale thefts from the State warehouses should not be made to pay for it. With all their guile and strength the Italians were endeavouring to avoid the execution of her Treaty of Rapallo. "Italy is the one Power in Europe,"

says Mr. Harold Goad[70] who thrusts himself upon our notice, "Italy is the one Power in Europe that is most obviously and most consistently working for peace and conciliation in every field."

HOPES IN THE LITTLE ENTENTE

The complicated troubles, avoidable and unavoidable, that have been raging in Central Europe after the War are being met to some extent by the Little Entente, an a.s.sociation in the first place between Yugoslavia and the kindred Czecho-Slovakia, and afterwards between them and Roumania. The world was a.s.sured that this union had for its object the establishment of peace, security and normal economic activities in Central and Eastern Europe; no acquisitive purposes were in the background, and since these three States now recognized that if they try to swallow more of the late Austro-Hungarian monarchy they will suffer from chronic indigestion, we need not be suspicious of their altruism.

It is perfectly true that the first impulse which moved the creators of the Little Entente was not constructive but defensive; their great Allies did not appear, in the opinion of the three Succession States, to be taking the necessary precautions against the elements of reaction.

Otherwise they, especially France (which was naturally more determined that Austria should not join herself to Germany), would not have favoured the idea of a Danubian Federation, in which Austria and Hungary would play leading parts. The Great Powers would also, if they had been less exclusively concerned with their own interests, have handled with more resolution the attempts of Charles of Habsburg to place himself at the head of the present reactionary regime at Buda-Pest; and if it had not been for certain energetic measures taken by the members of the Little Entente it may well be doubted whether the Government of Admiral Horthy, which does not conceal the fact that it is royalist--the king being temporarily absent--would have required Charles to leave the country. The Little Entente pointed out to their great Allies what these had apparently overlooked, namely, that the return of the Habsburgs was not opposed by the Succession States out of pure malice but for the reason that it would inevitably strengthen the magnates and the high ecclesiastics in their desire to bring about the restoration of Hungary's old frontiers. As the frontiers are now drawn there dwell--and this could not be prevented--a number of Magyars in each of the three neighbouring States (the fewest being in Yugoslavia), just as the present Hungary includes a Czech-Slovak, Roumanian and Yugoslav population.[71] But the Great Powers agree that if this frontier is to be changed at all, every precaution should be taken against having it changed by force. It is no exaggeration to say that there can be no real peace in Central Europe until normal intercourse with Russia is re-established, but let it in the meantime be the task of the Little Entente to guard the temporary peace from being shattered.

Apart from this defensive object the countries of the Little Entente have the positive aim of a resumption of normal economic conditions and the inst.i.tution of a new order of things in accordance with the new political construction of Central and Eastern Europe. It is obvious that these three States have numerous interests in common which make their co-operation very natural, if not indeed indispensable.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 46: April 16, 1920.]

[Footnote 47: January 22, 1920.]

[Footnote 48: According to the Rome correspondent of the _Pet.i.t Journal_.]

[Footnote 49: But the wind was considerably tempered for him: vessels laden with his precise requirements sailed over from Italy and said they had been captured by d'Annunzio's arditi.

General Badoglio, in command of the royal troops outside the town, ascertained in November 1919 that Rieka's coal-supply was nearly exhausted and 7000 tons per month were required for the public services alone. He accordingly informed a syndicate of coal merchants in Triest that he would be personally responsible for the first consignment of coal to d'Annunzio. A month earlier, when the town was supposed to be blockaded, it was announced that a limited supply of food-stuffs would, nevertheless, be introduced, through the Red Cross, for very young children. This amounted, as a matter of fact, to 21 truckloads a week. It is significant that there was no rise in the prices charged in the public restaurants of Rieka, and that persons living outside the line of Armistice found it cheaper to do their shopping in the besieged city.]

[Footnote 50: February 20, 1920.]

[Footnote 51: September 1921.]

[Footnote 52: However, in the Yugoslav Parliament, although some of the deputies have spent their lives in far-off, primitive places--by no means all of those who represent the Albanians can read and write--one does not hear such deplorable language as that which, according to the _Grazer Volksblatt_ of January 19, 1922, disgraced the Austrian a.s.sembly. A certain Dr. Waneck, of the Pan-German party, wished to criticize the Minister of Finance, Professor Dr. Gurtler of the Christian Socialists. He remarked that one could not expect this Minister to be sober at four o'clock in the afternoon, and went on to say that no less than five banks, whose names he would give, had received early information from the Minister, which enabled them to speculate successfully. He repeated this accusation several times and with great violence, but when he was invited to reveal the names of these banks--"No, sir!" he cried. "I will not do so, because I don't want to."]

[Footnote 53: Cf. "The Tri-Une Kingdom," by Pavle Popovic and Jovan M. Jovanovic, in the _Quarterly Review_, October 1921.]

[Footnote 54: He was kept for some time in confinement at Mitrovica, in Syrmia, and in November 1920 he was liberated in consequence of the great amnesty.]

[Footnote 55: Cf. _Spectator_, July 17, 1920.]

[Footnote 56: Cf. _Edinburgh Review_, July 1920.]

[Footnote 57: A few months after this, in the course of a little controversy in the _Sat.u.r.day Review_ (which arose from an unsigned and, I hoped, rather reasonable article of mine on the Adriatic Settlement) I quoted from memory this pa.s.sage of Mrs. Re-Bartlett's and said that the Italian captain was giving chocolates to the children at Kievo. Thereupon Mr. Harold W. E.

Goad of the British-Italian League wrote a highly indignant letter to the editor, and in the course of it he denounced me for having egregiously invented the chocolates "for the sole purpose of throwing her testimony into ridicule.... What do you, Sir, think of such methods as that?" And he concluded by declaring that I wallowed in a "truly Balkan slough of distortion and calumny." Well, on referring to Mrs.

Re-Bartlett's article I find that there is no mention of chocolates, and I apologize; presumably the children were crowding round their adored _Capitano_ in order to thank him for the bridges and waterworks which were being built in Dalmatia.]

[Footnote 58: During the Italian occupation, said Professor Salvemini, teachers, doctors and priests were deported or expelled from the country, while the Italian Government had to dissolve 30 munic.i.p.al councils out of 33, so that at the head of the communes were Italian officials and not properly elected mayors. Moreover, all liberties were suppressed. No Slav newspapers, no Slav societies were permitted, and 32 out of 57 magistrates were dismissed--these methods being due not to cruelty or folly, said the Professor, but to the necessity of keeping order by forcible means in a country which was wholly hostile.]

[Footnote 59: November 13, 1920.]

[Footnote 60: November 15, 1920.]

[Footnote 61: This, of course, did not meet with the approval of Signor d'Annunzio. He made numerous p.r.o.nouncements with regard to his inflexible desires, saying that, if necessary, he would offer up his bleeding corpse. And his resistance to the Italian Government did not confine itself to rhetoric. During his usurpation of Rieka this man had done his country grievous harm. It was not only that he held her up to the smiles of the malicious who said that she could not keep order in her own house, but he was guiding the people back to barbarism. When sailors of the royal navy deserted to his standard, he knelt before them in the streets of Rieka at a time when from Russia Lenin was inciting the Italian Communists to revolution and to the conquest of the State. He refused to deal with Giolitti, even as he had rejected the advances of Nitti. But the aged Giolitti grasped the problem with more firmness, which was what one might expect from the statesman who, after his return to power, had leaned neither on the industrial magnates of Milan nor on their Bolevik antagonists. Giolitti was resolved to put an end to the nuisance of d'Annunzio; in no const.i.tutional State is there room for a Prime Minister and such a swashbuckler. The Nationalists of Italy were furious when they perceived that the Premier was in earnest and that force would be employed against their idol. And it had to come to that, for the utterly misguided man continued to resist--hoping doubtless for wholesale desertions in the army and navy--with the deplorable result that a good many Italians were slain by Italians. Orders were issued by the Government that all possible care should be taken of d'Annunzio's person; and eventually when Rieka was taken by the royalist troops the poet broke his oath that he would surely die; he announced that Italy was not worth dying for and it was said that he had sailed away on an aeroplane. He had accomplished none of his desires; the town had not become Italian, though he had bathed it in Italian blood. His overweening personal ambitions had been shipwrecked on the rock of ridicule, for as he made his inglorious exit he shouted at the world that he was "still alive and inexorable." But yet he may have unconsciously achieved something, for his seizure of what he loved to call the "holocaust city" provided the extreme Nationalists with a private stage where--in uniforms of their own design, in cloaks and feathers and flowing black ties and with eccentric arrangements of the hair--they could strut and caper and fling bombastic insults at the authorities in Rome, until the Government found it opportune to take them in hand. The greatest Italian poet and one of the greatest imaginative writers in Europe will now be able to devote himself--if his rather morbid Muse has suffered no injury--to his predestined task. Those--the comparatively few that read--whose acquaintance with this writer's work usually caused them to regret his methods, could not help admiring his personal activities, his genius for leadership and his vital fire during the War. But, once this was over, he relapsed; and expressing himself very clearly in action, so that he became known to the many instead of the few, he lived what he previously wrote, and now it is generally recognized that Gabriel of the Annunciation, as he calls himself, who produced a row of obscene and histrionic novels, is a mountebank, a self-deceiver and a most affected bore. When he came to Rieka he thought fit to appeal to the England of Milton. And, like him, Milton lived as he wrote. Milton, Dante and Sophocles--to mention no others of the supreme writers--were as serious and responsible in their public actions as in the pursuit of their art.]

[Footnote 62: Whatever be the limitations of the _Dom_ as a newspaper--it is almost exclusively occupied with the person and programme of Mr. Radic--yet that brings with it the virtue, most exceptional in Yugoslavia, of refusing to engage in polemics. This would otherwise take up a good deal of its s.p.a.ce, as Radic has become such a bogey-man that nothing is too ridiculous for his opponents to believe. A Czech newspaper not long ago informed the world that this monstrous personage had told an interviewer that not only had Serbian soldiers in Macedonia been murdering 200 children but that they had roasted and consumed them. Furthermore Radic had said that the British Minister to Yugoslavia had called upon him and had asked his advice with some persistence, not even wishing to leave Radic time to reflect, as to whether the Prince-Regent should rule in Russia, while an English Prince should be invited to occupy the Yugoslav throne. The first of these remarks proved conclusively, said a number of Belgrade papers, that Radic was a knave and by the second he had demonstrated that he was an imbecile. And my friend Mr. Leiper of the _Morning Post_ speculated as to whether he was more likely to end his days in a lunatic asylum or a prison. But Radic was caring about none of these things; his birthday happened at about this time and some 30,000 of his adherents came to do him honour at his birthplace, over 500 of them on decorated horses having met him at Sisak station the previous evening. When I asked him what he had to say about the two afore-mentioned remarks he gave me an amusing account of how the interviewer had appreciated the various samples of wine which he (Radic) had just brought down from his vineyard. The conversation lasted for about four hours, and in the course of it Radic mentioned that a certain Moslem deputy from Novi Bazar, irritated by the fact that Mr. Drakovic, Minister of the Interior, found no pleasure in his continued presence on a commission of inquiry in the region of Kossovo, had been throwing out very dark hints about a child which he accused the Serbs of killing in the stormy days of 1878, and then relating to the Tsar that this dastardly deed had been committed by the Turks. This was the basis of that part of the interview. As for the other absurdity, it was mentioned that some courtiers had told the Prince-Regent that he alone could establish an orderly Government in Russia, whereupon Radic observed that England and France were not likely to allow one person to reign both there and in Yugoslavia. And when I asked why he had not published this explanation in his paper, he said that he couldn't very well charge a guest with having liked his wine too much.]

[Footnote 63: Cf. _The Quarterly Review_ (October 1921), in which Messrs. Pavle Popovic and Jovan M. Jovanovic published a very able survey of Yugoslav conditions.]

[Footnote 64: Cf. _Nineteenth Century and After_, January 1921.]

[Footnote 65: April 26, 1921.]

[Footnote 66: Unhappily it became apparent that the Italians were not disposed to have the Treaty put in force]

[Footnote 67: March 23, 1922.]

[Footnote 68: Cf. an article in a fascisti newspaper, quoted by the _Zagreber Tagblatt_ of May 14, 1922.]

[Footnote 69: Cf. "The Rise of the Little Entente," by Dorothy Thompson. April 1, 1922.]

[Footnote 70: _Fortnightly Review_, May 1922.]

[Footnote 71: The magnates of Hungary and their friends do not grow weary of lamenting the sad fate of the Magyar minorities.

Whatever may be happening in Transylvania, they have a very poor case against the Serbs. In the Voivodina there are, according to Hungarian statistics, about 382,000 Magyars out of 14 million inhabitants. These Magyars have their primary and secondary schools, their newspapers and so forth, whereas in the spring of 1922 the schools in various Serbian villages near Budapest were forcibly closed, the lady teachers being told that if they stayed they would have to undergo the physical examination which is applied to prost.i.tutes.]

VIII

YUGOSLAVIA'S FRONTIERS

INTRODUCTION--(_a_) THE ALBANIAN FRONTIER: 1. THE ACTORS--2. THE AUDIENCE RUSH THE STAGE--3. SERBS, ALBANIANS AND THE MISCHIEF-MAKERS--4.

THE STATE OF ALBANIAN CULTURE--5. A METHOD WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN TRIED IN ALBANIA--6. THE ATTRACTION OF YUGOSLAVIA--7. RELIGIOUS AND OTHER MATTERS IN THE BORDER REGION--8. A DIGRESSION ON TWO RIVAL ALBANIAN AUTHORITIES--9. WHAT FACES THE YUGOSLAVS--10. DR. TRUMBIC'S PROPOSAL--11. THE POSITION IN 1921: THE TIRANA GOVERNMENT AND THE MIRDITI--12. SERBIA'S GOOD INFLUENCE--13. EUROPEAN MEASURES AGAINST THE YUGOSLAVS AND THEIR FRIENDS--14. THE REGION FROM WHICH THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE RETIRED--15. THE PROSPECT--(_b_) THE GREEK FRONTIER--(_c_) THE BULGARIAN FRONTIER--(_d_) THE ROUMANIAN FRONTIER: 1. THE STATE OF THE ROUMANIANS IN EASTERN SERBIA--2. THE BANAT--(_e_) THE HUNGARIAN FRONTIER--(_f_) THE AUSTRIAN FRONTIER--(_g_) THE ITALIAN FRONTIER.

INTRODUCTION

n.o.body could have expected in the autumn of 1918 that the frontiers of the new State would be rapidly delimitated. Ethnological, economic, historic and strategical arguments--to mention no others--would be brought forward by either side, and the Supreme Council, which had to deliver judgment on these knotty problems, would be often more preoccupied with their own interests and their relation to each other.

It would also happen that a member of the Supreme Council would be simultaneously judge and pleader. The mills of justice would therefore grind very slowly, for they would be conscious that the fruit of their efforts, evolved with much foreign material clogging the machinery and with parts of the machinery jerked out of their line of track, would be received with acute criticism. When more than two years had elapsed from the time of the Armistice a considerable part of Yugoslavia's frontiers remained undecided. We will travel along the frontier lines, starting with that between Yugoslavs and Albanians.

(a) THE ALBANIAN FRONTIER

1. THE ACTORS

Those who in old Turkish days lived in that wild border country which is dealt with on these pages would have been surprised to hear that they would be the objects of a great deal of discussion in the west of Europe. But in those days there was no Yugoslavia and no Albania and no League of Nations, and very few were the writers who took up this question. It is, undoubtedly, a question of importance, though some of these writers, remembering that the fate of the world was dependent on the fraction of an inch of Cleopatra's nose, seem almost to have imagined that it was proportionately more dependent on those several hundred kilometres of disputed frontier. It would not so much matter that they have introduced a good deal of pa.s.sion into their arguments if they had not also exerted some influence on influential men--and this compels one to pay them what would otherwise be excessive attention.

Let us consider the frontier which the Amba.s.sadors' Conference in November 1921 a.s.signed to Yugoslavia and the Albanians. We have already mentioned some of the previous points of contact between those Balkan neighbours who for centuries have been acquiring knowledge of each other and who, therefore, as Berati Bey, the Albanian delegate in Paris, very wisely said, should have been left to manage their own frontier question. A number of Western Europeans will exclaim that this could not be accomplished without the shedding of blood; but it is rather more than probable that the interference of Western Europe--partly philanthropic and partly otherwise--will be responsible for greater loss of life. If it could not be permitted that two of the less powerful peoples should attempt to settle their own affairs, then, at any rate, the most competent of alien judges should have sat on the tribunal. A frontier in that part of Europe should primarily take the peculiarities of the people into account, and I believe that if Sir Charles Eliot and Baron Nopsca with their unrivalled knowledge of the Albanians had been consulted it is probable they would, for some years to come, have thought desirable the frontier which is preferred by General Franchet d'Esperey, by a majority of the local Albanians, and by those who hope for peace in the Balkans.

2. THE AUDIENCE RUSH THE STAGE