The American Indian as Participant in the Civil War Part 41

Magruder wanted Indian Territory attached to the District of Texas [p.

295] and was much disgusted that Gano's brigade was beyond his reach; inasmuch as Smith himself had placed it in Indian Territory and Steele could retain it there if he so pleased [pp. 349, 369, 371].]

[Footnote 875: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1063, 1065, 1076, 1109.]

[Footnote 876: Cooper's influence was greatest with the Choctaws and Chickasaws. The Choctaw wavering of which there were numerous signs [Ibid., 1019, 1024], the disposition of the Choctaw Council towards neutrality [Ibid., 1042, 1046], which Scott was called upon to check [Ibid., 1030-1031], and the Choctaw complaint about the absence or inadequacy of arms [Ibid., 1021] were all made the most of, in order to accentuate Steele's incapacity for his task. October 7, the Chickasaw Legislature pet.i.tioned for the elevation of Cooper to the full command in Indian Territory [Ibid., 1123-1124]. It was, of course, a covert attack upon Steele.]

[Footnote 877: Dissatisfaction with Bankhead on the part of his men had been the chief cause of the transfer to Richard M. Gano. Steele had a good deal of trouble with Gano's brigade as also with Ba.s.s's regiment [See _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, nos. 267, 268].]

the Indians to believe that it was; in order that they might with impunity charge Steele with having violated their treaty pledges.[878]

To nothing did they hold so rigidly as to the promise that white troops were always to support Indian.

In the role of Indian superintendent ex officio, Steele had no fewer difficulties and perplexities than in that of military chief. The feeding of indigents was a problem not easily solved, if solvable.

In the absence of legislative provision, Hindman had inst.i.tuted the questionable practice of furnishing relief to civilians at the cost of the army commissary and no other course had ever been deemed expedient by his successors. In July, 1863, Steele had ordered[879] practically all distribution agencies to be abolished, his reason being that only refugees,[880] Indians out of their own country, ought, in the season of ripened and ripening crops, to need subsistence and such subsistence, being limited in amount and derived altogether from the army supply, could be most economically handled by the regular commissaries. As winter approached and the necessity for feeding on a large scale became again p.r.o.nounced,

[Footnote 878: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1063-1064, 1064-1065.]

[Footnote 879: "I am instructed by the Gen. Com'dg to direct that you issue an order abolishing all agencies in the Indian country for feeding 'Indigents.'

"It is thought that the crops now coming in will be sufficient to support these people without any further drain upon Govt supplies.

"What little issues are absolutely necessary will be made by post commissaries."--DUVAL to Lee, July 1, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 268, p. 119.]

[Footnote 880: "I beg leave to recommend to your favorable consideration the accompanying letter from the Hon. E.C. Boudinot. The necessity of feeding not only the refugees, but to some extent during the winter the other Indians, has been recognized by all commanders, the drouth of last year having cut the crops very short. As the crops are now maturing I have in a great measure discontinued the issue except to refugee Cherokees and Osages, both of whom are out of their own country ..."--STEELE to Smith, July 13, 1863, Ibid., pp.

142-143.]

he was disposed to keep the whole matter still under army regulations so as to "avoid increasing compet.i.tion."[881] The army exchequer could be subsequently reimbursed when specific appropriations for Indians should be made. Supplies of clothing had naturally to be otherwise provided for and for those he contracted[882] in northern Texas.

Steele's whole policy with regard to the indigents was subjected to the severest criticism;[883] for it was based upon the idea that to be forewarned is to be forearmed. Disappointed speculators and grafters were chief among his critics and, in spite of all his precautions, they outwitted him. Peculation appeared on every hand, white sharpers abounded, and Indians, relatively affluent, subsisted at government expense.

Another source of embarra.s.sment was developed by the application of war measures, primarily intended for the states only, to the Indian country. Indian property was impressed[884] as occasion arose. Very

[Footnote 881: Steele to Scott, August 7, 1863, _Confederate Records_, pp. 179-180.]

[Footnote 882: Steele to Bryan, November 9, 1863, _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 267, p. 31. The Reserve Indians had all along been fed by contract [Steele to Scott, August 7, 1863, Ibid., no. 268, pp. 179-180]. In the fall, Steele renewed the contract with Johnson and Grimes [Steele to S.A. Roberts, November 15, 1863, Ibid., no. 267, p. 37] and detailed men from his command, from Martin's regiment, to a.s.sist in its execution [Steele to McCulloch, November 22, 1863, Ibid., p. 41].]

[Footnote 883: The Creeks were particularly dissatisfied. They claimed that food and raiment had been promised them, but the source of the promises Steele was powerless to determine [Steele to Vore, November 20, 1863, Ibid., p. 39]. Indian soldiers on leave seemed to expect their usual allowances and Cooper, although disclaiming that he had any desire to "pander to the prejudices" of the natives, was always to be found on their side in any contention with Steele. To all appearances, the Indians had Cooper's support, in demanding all the privileges and profits of regular troops and "all the lat.i.tude of irregular, or partisan" [Steele to Cooper, November 24, 1863, Ibid., pp. 44-45].]

[Footnote 884: Concerning the request of Steele that cotton and teams be ordered exempt from impressment, see Steele to Bryan, November 9, 1863. _Confederate Records_, chap. 2, no. 267, p. 31. The Choctaws had considerable cotton and the question was what was to be done with it in case of an advance of (cont.)]

frequently was this the case in the matter of transportation facilities, in that also of negro labor. It was Steele's opinion that the impressment law and the grain t.i.the law were not operative as against the Indians[885] but his necessities forced the practice, and execution by the army, under his orders, only intensified Indian opposition to him.

Indian opposition to Steele in tangible form took two directions, one of which, the advancement of Douglas H. Cooper, has already been frequently referred to. The other was the advancement of Stand Watie.

During the summer, Stand Watie, as chief of the Confederate Cherokees, had authorized the formation of a Cherokee brigade,[886] the object being, the dislodgment of the Federals from Fort Gibson and their consequent retirement from the Cherokee country. The brigade had not materialized; but all Stand Watie's subsequent efforts were directed towards the accomplishment of its patriotic object. Love of country best explains his whole military endeavor. The enemy in the Cherokee country he hara.s.sed, the enemy elsewhere, he left for others to deal with. Generally speaking, in consequence, the autumn months of 1863 found Watie hovering around the Arkansas, the Cherokees and their neighbors with him, while Cooper, almost equally particularistic because the Choctaws and Chickasaws were his main support, concerned himself with plans for the recovery of Fort Smith.

[Footnote 884: (cont.) the enemy. Was it to be burnt and the owners were they to be indemnified [Steele to Anderson, December 9, 1863, _Confederate Records_, p. 68]? Steele peremptorily forbade confiscation of Indian property and discouraged any interference "with the duties of agents, or with the National Council or government of the tribes" [Steele to Captain J.L. Randolph, enrolling officer, July 7, 1863, Ibid., no. 268, p. 132].]

[Footnote 885: Crosby to A.S. Cabell, October 6, 1863, Ibid., no. 267, p. 2.]

[Footnote 886: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1103.]

The fervid patriotism of one leader and the overweening personal ambition of the other divided the Indians, then, into two camps and it was but natural that the idea should soon evolve that Indian interests could be best subserved by the formation of two distinct Indian brigades. To this idea General Smith, when appealed to, subscribed;[887] but General Steele was dubious about the propriety of putting Stand Watie in charge of one of the brigades. "He appears to exercise," said Steele, "no restraint over his men in keeping them together, and his requisitions upon the depots seem to be made with utter disregard of the numbers present or even on his rolls."[888]

General Smith conceived it would be possible, by organizing the Indians into their own brigades and satisfying them that way, to draw off the white contingent and make of it a separate brigade, still operating, however, within the Indian country. To Cooper, the thought of a separate white brigade was most unwelcome. The Indians could be an effective force only in close conjunction with white troops. The separation of whites and Indians would inevitably mean, although not at present intended, the isolation of the latter and, perhaps, their ultimate abandonment.

The various proposals and counter-proposals all converged in an opposition to Steele. His presence in the Indian country seemed to block the advancement of everybody. Cooper resented his authority over himself and Stand Watie interpreted his waiting policy as due to inertness and inept.i.tude. So small a hold did the Federals really have on the Indian country that if Steele would only exert himself it could easily be

[Footnote 887: _Official Records_, vol. 22, part ii, 1055-1056.]

[Footnote 888:--Ibid., 1065.]

broken. But Steele was neither aggressive nor venturesome. His task was truly beyond him. Discouraged, he asked to be relieved and he was relieved, Brigadier-general Samuel B. Maxey being chosen as his successor.[889] Again Cooper had been pa.s.sed over, notwithstanding that his Indian friends had done everything they could for him. They had made allegations against Steele; in order that a major-generalship might be secured for Cooper and brigadier-generalships for some of themselves.[890] Boudinot was believed by Steele to be at the bottom of the whole scheme; but it had been in process of concoction for a long time and Steele had few friends. General Smith was the stanchest of that few and even Holmes[891] was not among them.

Obviously, with things in such a chaotic state, military operations in the Indian country, during the autumn and early winter were almost negligible.[892] Steele expected that the Federals would attempt a drive from Fort Smith to the Red River and he collected what forces he could for that contingency. Little reliance was to be placed upon the Cherokees since they were intent upon recovering Fort Gibson; but the Choctaws through whose country the hostile force would proceed, were the drive made, aroused themselves as in the first days of the war.

They recruited their regiments anew

[Footnote 889: Special Orders, no. 214, December 11, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1094.]

[Footnote 890: Steele to S. Cooper, December 19, 1863, Ibid., 1100-1101.]

[Footnote 891: Boudinot to Davis, December 21, 1863, Ibid., 1103.]

[Footnote 892: Steele contended that between the very natural fear that the Indians entertained that the white troops were going to be withdrawn from their country and Magruder's determination to get those same white troops, it was impossible to make any move upon military principles [Steele to Anderson, November 9, 1863, Ibid., 1064-1065]. Steele refused to recognize Magruder's right to interfere with his command [Steele to Cooper, November 8, 1863, Ibid., 1063-1064].]

and they organized a militia; but the drive was never made.[893]

The only military activity anywhere was in the Cherokee country and it was almost too insignificant for mention. Towards the end of November, the Federal force there was greatly reduced in numbers, the white and negro contingents being called away to Fort Smith.[894] The Indian Home Guards under Phillips were alone in occupation. With a detachment of the Third Indian, Watie had one lone skirmish, although about one half of Phillips's brigade was out scouting. The skirmish occurred on Barren Fork, a tributary of the Illinois, on the eighteenth of December.[895] Late in November, Watie had planned a daring cavalry raid into the Neosho Valley.[896] The skirmish on Barren Fork arrested him in his course somewhat; but, as the Federals, satisfied with a rather petty success, did not pursue him, he went on and succeeded in entering southwest Missouri. The raid did little damage and was only another of the disjointed individual undertakings that Steele deplored but that the Confederates were being more and more compelled to make.

[Footnote 893: Steele to Gov. Samuel Garland, Nov. 30, 1863, _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part ii, 1082. Col. McCurtain of the Choctaw militia reported to Cooper that he expected to have fifteen hundred Choctaws a.s.sembled by December first [Steele to Cano, December 2, 1863, Ibid., 1085]. The Second Choctaw regiment continued scattered and out of ammunition [Steele to Cooper, December 22, 1863, Ibid., 1109]. The Seminole battalion was ordered to report to Bourland for frontier defence [Duval to Cooper, December 20, 1863, Ibid., 1102].]

[Footnote 894: Britton, _Civil War on the Borde_, vol. ii, 236.]

[Footnote 895: _Official Records_, vol. xxii, part i, 781-782.]

[Footnote 896:--Ibid., part ii, 722, 746, 752.]

XIII. ASPECTS, CHIEFLY MILITARY, 1864-1865

The a.s.signment of General Maxey to the command of Indian Territory invigorated Confederate administration north of the Red River, the only part of the country in undisputed occupancy. Close upon the a.s.sumption of his new duties, came a project[897] for sweeping reforms, involving army reorganization, camps of instruction for the Indian soldiery, a more general enlistment, virtually conscription, of Indians--this upon the theory that "Whosoever is not for us is against us"--the selection of more competent and reliable staff officers, and the adoption of such a plan of offensive operations as would mean the retaking of Forts Smith and Gibson.[898] To Maxey, thoroughly familiar with the geography of the region, the surrender of those two places appeared as a gross error in military technique; for the Arkansas River was a natural line of defence, the Red was not. "If the Indian Territory gives way," argued he, "the granary of the Trans-Mississippi Department, the breadstuffs, and beef of this and the Arkansas army are gone, the left flank of Holmes' army is turned, and with it not only the meat and bread, but the salt and iron of what is left of the Trans-Mississippi Department."[899]

[Footnote 897: Maxey to Anderson, January 12, 1864, _Official Records_, vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 856-858.]

[Footnote 898: To this list might be added the proper fitting out of the troops, which was one of the first things that Maxey called to Smith's attention [Ibid., vol. xxii, part ii, 1112-1113].]

[Footnote 899: This idea met with Smith's full approval [Ibid., vol. x.x.xiv, part ii, 918].]

Army reorganization was an immense proposition and was bound to be a difficult undertaking under the most favorable of auspices, yet it stood as fundamental to everything else. Upon what lines ought it to proceed? One possibility was, the formation of the two brigades, with Stand Watie and Cooper individually in command, which had already been suggested to General Smith and favored by him; but which had recently been found incompatible with his latest recommendation that all the Indian troops should be commanded, _in toto_, by Cooper.[900] One feature of great importance in its favor it had in that it did not ostensibly run counter to the Indian understanding of their treaties that white troops should be always a.s.sociated with Indian in the guaranteed protection of the Indian country, which was all very well but scarcely enough to balance an insuperable objection, which Cooper, when consulted, pointed out.[901] The Indians had a strong aversion to any military consolidation that involved the elimination of their separate tribal characters. They had allied themselves with the Confederacy as nations and as nations they wished to fight. Moreover, due regard ought always to be given, argued Cooper, to their tribal prejudices, their preferences, call them what one will, and to their historical neighborhood alliances. Choctaws and Chickasaws might well stay together and Creeks and Seminoles; but woe betide the contrivance that should attempt the amalgamation of Choctaws and Cherokees.