The American Indian as Participant in the Civil War Part 18

[Footnote 352: _Daily Conservative_, December 27, 1861.]

[Footnote 353: Ross to Weer, July 8, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 486-487; Moore, _Rebellion Record_, vol. v, 549.]

proposed to remain true, as had ever been its custom, to its treaty obligations. To fortify his position, he submitted doc.u.ments justifying his own and tribal actions since the beginning of the war.[354] Weer was naturally much embarra.s.sed. Apparently, he had had the notion that the Indians would rush into the arms of the Union with the first appearance of a Federal soldier; but he was grievously mistaken. None the less, verbal reports that reached his headquarters on Wolf Creek restored somewhat his equanimity and gave him the impression that Ross, thoroughly anti-secessionist at heart himself, was acting diplomatically and biding his time.[355] Weer referred[356]

the matter to Blunt for instructions at the very moment when Blunt, ignorant that he had already had communication with Ross, was urging[357] him to be expeditious, since it was "desirable to return the refugee Indians now in Kansas to their homes as soon as practicable."

There were other reasons, more purely military, why a certain haste was rather necessary. Some of those reasons inspired Colonel Weer to have the country around about him well reconnoitered. On the fourteenth of July, he sent out two detachments. One, led by Major W.T. Campbell, was to examine "the alleged position of the enemy south of the Arkansas," and the other, led by Captain H.S. Greeno, to repair to Tahlequah and Park Hill.[358] Campbell, before he had advanced far, found out that there was a strong Confederate force at Fort Davis[359]

so he halted at Fort Gibson and was

[Footnote 354: Weer to Moonlight, July 12, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 487. The doc.u.ments are to be found accompanying Weer's letter, Ibid., 489-505.]

[Footnote 355: Blunt to Stanton, July 21, 1862, Ibid., 486.]

[Footnote 356: Weer to Moonlight, July 12, 1862, Ibid., 487-488.]

[Footnote 357: Blunt to Weer, July 12, 1862, Ibid., 488-489.]

[Footnote 358: Weer to Moonlight, July 16, 1862, Ibid., 160-161.]

[Footnote 359: Campbell to Weer, July 14, 1862, Ibid., 161.]

there joined by Weer. Meanwhile, Greeno with his detachment of one company of whites and fifty Cherokee Indians had reached Tahlequah and had gone into camp two and one-half miles to the southward.[360] He was then not far from Park Hill, the residence of Chief Ross. All the way down he had been on the watch for news; but the only forces he could hear of were some Indian, who were believed to be friendly to the Union although ostensibly still serving the Confederacy. It was a time of crisis both with them and with him; for their leaders had just been summoned by Colonel Cooper, now in undisputed command north of the Canadian, to report immediately for duty at Fort Davis, his headquarters. Whatever was to be done would have to be done quickly.

There was no time to lose and Greeno decided the matter for all concerned by resorting to what turned out to be a very clever expedient. He made the commissioned men all prisoners of war[361] and then turned his attention to the Princ.i.p.al Chief, who was likewise in a dilemma, he having received a despatch from Cooper ordering him, under authority of treaty provisions and "in the name of President Davis, Confederate States of America, to issue a proclamation calling on all Cherokee Indians over 18 and under 35 to come forward and a.s.sist in protecting the country from invasion."[362] Greeno thought the matter over and concluded there was nothing for him to do but to capture Ross also and to release him, subsequently, on parole. These things he did and there were many people who thought, both then and long

[Footnote 360: Greeno to Weer, July 15, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 473; Carruth and Martin to Coffin, July 19, 1862, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, _Report_, 1862, 158-160.]

[Footnote 361: Greeno to Weer, July 17, 1862, _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 161-162.]

[Footnote 362: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 473.]

afterwards, that the whole affair had been arranged for beforehand and that victor and victim had been in collusion with each other all the way through.

Up to this point the Indian Expedition can be said to have met with more than a fair measure of success; but its troubles were now to begin or rather to a.s.sert themselves; for most of them had been present since the very beginning. Fundamental to everything else was the fact that it was summer-time and summer-time, too, in a prairie region. Troops from the north, from Wisconsin and from Ohio, were not acclimated and they found the heat of June and July almost insufferable. There were times when they lacked good drinking water, which made bad matters worse. The Germans were particularly discontented and came to despise the miserable company in which they found themselves. It was miserable, not so much because it was largely Indian, but because it was so ill-equipped and so disorderly. At Cowskin Prairie, the scouts had to be called in, not because their work was finished, but because they and their ponies were no longer equal to it.[363] They had played out for the simple reason that they were not well fitted out. The country east of Grand River was "very broken and flinty and their ponies unshod." It has been claimed, although maybe with some exaggeration, that not "a single horse-shoe or nail" had been provided for Colonel Salomon's brigade.[364]

The supplies of the Indian Expedition were insufficient and, although at Spavinaw Creek Colonel Watie's entire commissary had been captured[365] and Clarkson's at Locust Grove, there was great scarcity. Weer had

[Footnote 363: _Official Records_, vol. xiii, 460.]

[Footnote 364: Love, _Wisconsin in the War of Rebellion_, 580.]

[Footnote 365: Anderson, Life of General Stand Wate, 19.]

been cautioned again and again not to cut himself off from easy communication with Fort Scott.[366] He had shown a disposition to wander widely from the straight road to Fort Gibson; but Blunt had insisted that he refrain altogether from making excursions into adjoining states.[367] He had himself realized the shortness of his provisions and had made a desperate effort to get to the Grand Saline so as to replenish his supply of salt at the place where the Confederates had been manufacturing that article for many months. He had known also that for some things, such as ordnance stores, he would have to look even as far as Fort Leavenworth.[368]

The climax of all these affairs was reached July 18, 1862. On that day, Frederick Salomon, colonel of the First Brigade, took matters into his own hands and arrested his superior officer. It was undoubtedly a clear case of mutiny[369] but there was much to be said in extenuation of Salomon's conduct. The reasons for his action, as stated in a _p.r.o.nunciamento_[370] to his a.s.sociates in command and as submitted to General Blunt[371] are here given. They speak for themselves.

Headquarters Indian Expedition, Camp on Grand River, July 18, 1862.

To Commanders of the different Corps const.i.tuting Indian Expedition:

Sirs: In military as well as civil affairs great and violent wrongs need speedy and certain remedies. The time had arrived, in my judgment, in the history of this expedition when the greatest wrong ever perpetrated upon any troops was about

[Footnote 366: Consider, for example, Blunt's orders of July 14 [_Official Records_, vol. xiii, 472].]

[Footnote 367: Blunt to Weer, July 3, 1862, Ibid., 461.]

[Footnote 368: Weer to Moonlight, July 2, 1862, Ibid.]

[Footnote 369: As such the Indian agents regarded it. See their communication on the subject, July 19, 1862, Ibid., 478.]

[Footnote 370: Ibid., 475-476.]

[Footnote 371: Ibid., 484-485.]

to fall with crushing weight upon the n.o.ble men composing the command.

Some one must act, and that at once, or starvation and capture were the imminent hazards that looked us in the face.

As next in command to Colonel Weer, and upon his express refusal to move at all for the salvation of his troops, I felt the responsibility resting upon me.

I have arrested Colonel Weer and a.s.sumed command.

The causes leading to this arrest you all know. I need not reiterate them here. Suffice to say that we are 160 miles from the base of operations, almost entirely through an enemy's country, and without communication being left open behind us. We have been pushed forward thus far by forced and fatiguing marches under the violent southern sun without any adequate object. By Colonel Weer's orders we were forced to encamp where our famishing men were unable to obtain anything but putrid, stinking water. Our reports for disability and unfitness for duty were disregarded; our cries for help and complaints of unnecessary hardships and suffering were received with closed ears.

Yesterday a council of war, convened by the order of Colonel Weer, decided that our only safety lay in falling back to some point from which we could reopen communication with our commissary depot. Colonel Weer overrides and annuls the decision of that council, and announces his determination not to move from this point. We have but three days'

rations on hand and an order issued by him putting the command on half rations. For nearly two weeks we have no communication from our rear.

We have no knowledge when supply trains will reach us, neither has Colonel Weer. Three sets of couriers, dispatched at different times to find these trains and report, have so far made no report. Reliable information has been received that large bodies of the enemy were moving to our rear, and yet we lay here idle. We are now and ever since our arrival here have been entirely without vegetables or healthy food for our troops. I have stood with arms folded and seen my men faint and fall away from me like the leaves of autumn because I thought myself powerless to save them.

I will look upon this scene no longer. I know the responsibility I have a.s.sumed. I have acted after careful thought

and deliberation. Give me your confidence for a few days, and all that man can do, and with a pure purpose and a firm faith that he is right, shall be done for the preservation of the troops.

F. Salomon, _Colonel Ninth Wis. Vols_., _Comdg. Indian Expedition_.

Headquarters Indian Expedition, Camp on Wolf Creek, Cherokee Nation, July 20, 1862.

Brig. Gen. James G. Blunt,

_Commanding Department of Kansas_:

Sir: I have the honor to report that I have arrested Col. William Weer, commanding the Indian Expedition, and have a.s.sumed command.

Among the numerous reasons for this step a few of the chief are as follows:

From the day of our first report to him we have found him a man abusive and violent in his intercourse with his fellow-officers, notoriously intemperate in habits, entirely disregarding military usages and discipline, always rash in speech, act, and orders, refusing to inferior officers and their reports that consideration which is due an officer of the U.S. Army.

Starting from Cowskin Prairie on the 1st instant, we were pushed rapidly forward to the vicinity of Fort Gibson, on the Arkansas River, a distance of 160 miles from Fort Scott. No effort was made by him to keep communication open behind us. It seemed he desired none. We had but twenty-three days' rations on hand. As soon as he reached a position on Grand River 14 miles from Fort Gibson his movements suddenly ceased. We could then have crossed the Arkansas River, but it seemed there was no object to be attained in his judgment by such a move. There we lay entirely idle from the 9th to the 19th. We had at last reached the point when we had but three days' rations on hand.

Something must be done. We were in a barren country, with a large force of the enemy in front of us, a large and now impa.s.sable river between us, and no news from our train or from our base of operations for twelve days. What were we to do? Colonel Weer called a council of war, at which he stated that the Arkansas River was now impa.s.sable to our forces; that a train containing commissary stores had been expected for three days; that three different sets of couriers sent out some time previous had

entirely failed to report; that he had been twelve days entirely without communication with or from the department, and that he had received reliable information that a large force of the enemy were moving to our rear via the Verdigris River for the purpose of cutting off our train.

Upon this and other information the council of war decided that our only safety lay in falling back to some point where we could reopen communication and learn the whereabouts of our train of subsistence.