Superstition In All Ages (1732) Part 6

LXV.--ACCORDING TO THE IDEAS WHICH THEOLOGY GIVES OF DIVINITY, TO LOVE G.o.d IS IMPOSSIBLE.

If I take my ideas of G.o.d from theology, G.o.d shows Himself to me in such a light as to repel love. The devotees who tell us that they love their G.o.d sincerely, are either liars or fools who see their G.o.d but in profile; it is impossible to love a being, the thought of whom tends to excite terror, and whose judgments make us tremble. How can we face without fear, a G.o.d whom we suppose sufficiently barbarous to wish to d.a.m.n us forever? Let them not speak to us of a filial or respectful fear mingled with love, which men should have for their G.o.d. A son can not love his father when he knows he is cruel enough to inflict exquisite torments upon him; in short, to punish him for the least faults. No man upon earth can have the least spark of love for a G.o.d who holds in reserve eternal, hard, and violent chastis.e.m.e.nts for ninety-nine hundredths of His children.

LXVI.--BY THE INVENTION OF THE DOGMA OF THE ETERNAL TORMENTS OF h.e.l.l, THEOLOGIANS HAVE MADE OF THEIR G.o.d A DETESTABLE BEING, MORE WICKED THAN THE MOST WICKED OF MEN, A PERVERSE AND CRUEL TYRANT WITHOUT AIM.

The inventors of the dogma of eternal torments in h.e.l.l, have made of the G.o.d whom they call so good, the most detestable of beings. Cruelty in man is the last term of corruption. There is no sensitive soul but is moved and revolts at the recital alone of the torments which the greatest criminal endures; but cruelty merits the greater indignation when we consider it gratuitous or without motive. The most sanguinary tyrants, Caligula, Nero, Domitian, had at least some motive in tormenting their victims and insulting their sufferings; these motives were, either their own safety, the fury of revenge, the design to frighten by terrible examples, or perhaps the vanity to make parade of their power, and the desire to satisfy a barbarous curiosity. Can a G.o.d have any of these motives? In tormenting the victims of His wrath, He would punish beings who could not really endanger His immovable power, nor trouble His felicity, which nothing can change. On the other hand, the sufferings of the other life would be useless to the living, who can not witness them; these torments would be useless to the d.a.m.ned, because in h.e.l.l is no more conversion, and the hour of mercy is pa.s.sed; from which it follows, that G.o.d, in the exercise of His eternal vengeance, would have no other aim than to amuse Himself and insult the weakness of His creatures. I appeal to the whole human race! Is there in nature a man so cruel as to wish in cold blood to torment, I do not say his fellow-beings, but any sentient being whatever, without fee, without profit, without curiosity, without having anything to fear? Conclude, then, O theologians! that according to your own principles, your G.o.d is infinitely more wicked than the most wicked of men. You will tell me, perhaps, that infinite offenses deserve infinite chastis.e.m.e.nts, and I will tell you that we can not offend a G.o.d whose happiness is infinite.

I will tell you further, that offenses of finite beings can not be infinite; that a G.o.d who does not want to be offended, can not consent to make His creatures' offenses last for eternity; I will tell you that a G.o.d infinitely good, can not be infinitely cruel, nor grant His creatures infinite existence solely for the pleasure of tormenting them forever.

It could have been but the most cruel barbarity, the most notorious imposition, but the blindest ambition which could have created the dogma of eternal d.a.m.nation. If there exists a G.o.d who could be offended or blasphemed, there would not be upon earth any greater blasphemers than those who dare to say that this G.o.d is perverse enough to take pleasure in dooming His feeble creatures to useless torments for all eternity.

LXVII.--THEOLOGY IS BUT A SERIES OF PALPABLE CONTRADICTIONS.

To pretend that G.o.d can be offended with the actions of men, is to annihilate all the ideas that are given to us of this being. To say that man can disturb the order of the universe, that he can grasp the lightning from G.o.d's hand, that he can upset His projects, is to claim that man is stronger than his G.o.d, that he is the arbiter of His will, that it depends on him to change His goodness into cruelty. Theology does nothing but destroy with one hand that which it builds with the other. If all religion is founded upon a G.o.d who becomes angry, and who is appeased, all religion is founded upon a palpable contradiction.

All religions agree in exalting the wisdom and the infinite power of the Divinity; but as soon as they expose His conduct, we discover but imprudence, want of foresight, weakness, and folly. G.o.d, it is said, created the world for Himself; and so far He has not succeeded in making Himself properly respected! G.o.d has created men in order to have in His dominion subjects who would render Him homage; and we continually see men revolt against Him!

LXVIII.--THE PRETENDED WORKS OF G.o.d DO NOT PROVE AT ALL WHAT WE CALL DIVINE PERFECTION.

We are continually told of the Divine perfections; and as soon as we ask the proofs of them, we are shown the works in which we are a.s.sured that these perfections are written in ineffaceable characters. All these works, however, are imperfect and perishable; man, who is regarded as the masterpiece, as the most marvelous work of Divinity, is full of imperfections which render him disagreeable in the eyes of the Almighty workman who has formed him; this surprising work becomes often so revolting and so odious to its Author, that He feels Himself compelled to cast him into the fire. But if the choicest work of Divinity is imperfect, by what are we to judge of the Divine perfections? Can a work with which the author himself is so little satisfied, cause us to admire his skill? Physical man is subject to a thousand infirmities, to countless evils, to death; the moral man is full of defects; and yet they exhaust themselves by telling us that he is the most beautiful work of the most perfect of beings.

LXIX.--THE PERFECTION OF G.o.d DOES NOT SHOW TO ANY MORE ADVANTAGE IN THE PRETENDED CREATION OF ANGELS AND PURE SPIRITS.

It appears that G.o.d, in creating more perfect beings than men, did not succeed any better, or give stronger proofs of His perfection. Do we not see in many religions that angels and pure spirits revolted against their Master, and even attempted to expel Him from His throne? G.o.d intended the happiness of angels and of men, and He has never succeeded in rendering happy either angels or men; pride, malice, sins, the imperfections of His creatures, have always been opposed to the wishes of the perfect Creator.

LXX.--THEOLOGY PREACHES THE OMNIPOTENCE OF ITS G.o.d, AND CONTINUALLY SHOWS HIM IMPOTENT.

All religion is visibly founded upon the principle that "G.o.d proposes and man disposes." All the theologies of the world show us an unequal combat between Divinity on the one side, and His creatures on the other.

G.o.d never relies on His honor; in spite of His almighty power, He could not succeed in making the works of His hands as He would like them to be. To complete the absurdity, there is a religion which pretends that G.o.d Himself died to redeem the human race; and, in spite of His death, men are not in the least as this G.o.d would desire them to be!

LXXI.--ACCORDING TO ALL THE RELIGIOUS SYSTEMS OF THE EARTH, G.o.d WOULD BE THE MOST CAPRICIOUS AND THE MOST INSENSATE OF BEINGS.

Nothing could be more extravagant than the role which in every country theology makes Divinity play. If the thing was real, we would be obliged to see in it the most capricious and the most insane of beings; one would be obliged to believe that G.o.d made the world to be the theater of dishonoring wars with His creatures; that He created angels, men, demons, wicked spirits, but as adversaries, against whom He could exercise His power. He gives them liberty to offend Him, makes them wicked enough to upset His projects, obstinate enough to never give up: all for the pleasure of getting angry, and being appeased, of reconciling Himself, and of repairing the confusion they have made. Had Divinity formed at once His creatures such as they ought to be in order to please Him, what trouble He might have spared Himself! or, at least, how much embarra.s.sment He might have saved to His theologians! According to all the religious systems of the earth, G.o.d seems to be occupied but in doing Himself injury; He does it as those charlatans do who wound themselves, in order to have occasion to show the public the value of their ointments. We do not see, however, that so far Divinity has been able to radically cure itself of the evil which is caused by men.

LXXII.--IT IS ABSURD TO SAY THAT EVIL DOES NOT COME FROM G.o.d.

G.o.d is the author of all; still we are a.s.sured that evil does not come from G.o.d. Whence, then, does it come? From men? But who has made men? It is G.o.d: then that evil comes from G.o.d. If He had not made men as they are, moral evil or sin would not exist in the world. We must blame G.o.d, then, that man is so perverse. If man has the power to do wrong or to offend G.o.d, we must conclude that G.o.d wishes to be offended; that G.o.d, who has created man, resolved that evil should be done by him: without this, man would be an effect contrary to the cause from which he derives his being.

LXXIII.--THE FORESIGHT ATTRIBUTED TO G.o.d, WOULD GIVE TO GUILTY MEN WHOM HE PUNISHES, THE RIGHT TO COMPLAIN OF HIS CRUELTY.

The faculty of foresight, or the ability to know in advance all which is to happen in the world, is attributed to G.o.d. But this foresight can scarcely belong to His glory, nor spare Him the reproaches which men could legitimately heap upon Him. If G.o.d had the foresight of the future, did He not foresee the fall of His creatures whom He had destined to happiness? If He resolved in His decrees to allow this fall, there is no doubt that He desired it to take place: otherwise it would not have happened. If the Divine foresight of the sin of His creatures had been necessary or forced, it might be supposed that G.o.d was compelled by His justice to punish the guilty; but G.o.d, enjoying the faculty of foresight and the power to predestinate everything, would it not depend upon Himself not to impose upon men these cruel laws? Or, at least, could He not have dispensed with creating beings whom He might be compelled to punish and to render unhappy by a subsequent decree? What does it matter whether G.o.d destined men to happiness or to misery by a previous decree, the effect of His foresight, or by a subsequent decree, the effect of His justice. Does the arrangement of these decrees change the fate of the miserable? Would they not have the right to complain of a G.o.d who, having the power of leaving them in oblivion, brought them forth, although He foresaw very well that His justice would force Him sooner or later to punish them?

LXXIV.--ABSURDITY OF THE THEOLOGICAL FABLES UPON ORIGINAL SIN AND UPON SATAN.

Man, say you, issuing from the hands of G.o.d, was pure, innocent, and good; but his nature became corrupted in consequence of sin. If man could sin, when just leaving the hands of G.o.d, his nature was then not perfect! Why did G.o.d permit him to sin, and his nature to become corrupt? Why did G.o.d allow him to be seduced, knowing well that he would be too weak to resist the tempter? Why did G.o.d create a Satan, a malicious spirit, a tempter? Why did not G.o.d, who was so desirous of doing good to mankind, why did He not annihilate, once for all, so many evil genii whose nature rendered them enemies of our happiness? Or rather, why did G.o.d create evil spirits, whose victories and terrible influences upon the human race He must have foreseen? Finally, by what fatality, in all the religions of the world, has the evil principle such a marked advantage over the good principle or over Divinity?

LXXV.--THE DEVIL, LIKE RELIGION, WAS INVENTED TO ENRICH THE PRIESTS.

We are told a story of the simple-heartedness of an Italian monk, which does him honor. This good man preaching one day felt obliged to announce to his auditory that, thanks to Heaven, he had at last discovered a sure means of rendering all men happy. "The devil," said he, "tempts men but to have them as comrades of his misery in h.e.l.l. Let us address ourselves, then, to the Pope, who possesses the keys of paradise and of h.e.l.l; let us ask him to beseech G.o.d, at the head of the whole Church, to reconcile Himself with the devil; to take him back into His favor; to re-establish him in His first rank. This can not fail to put an end to his sinister projects against mankind." The good monk did not see, perhaps, that the devil is at least fully as useful as G.o.d to the ministers of religion. These reap too many benefits from their differences to lend themselves willingly to a reconciliation between the two enemies ties, upon whose contests their existence and their revenues depend. If men would cease to be tempted and to sin, the ministry of priests would become useless to them. Manicheism is evidently the support of all religions; but unfortunately the devil, being invented to remove all suspicion of malice from Divinity, proves to us at every moment the powerlessness or the awkwardness of his celestial Adversary.

LXXVI.--IF G.o.d COULD NOT RENDER HUMAN NATURE SINLESS, HE HAS NO RIGHT TO PUNISH MAN.

Man's nature, it is said, must necessarily become corrupt. G.o.d could not endow him with sinlessness, which is an inalienable portion of Divine perfection. But if G.o.d could not render him sinless, why did He take the trouble of creating man, whose nature was to become corrupt, and which, consequently, had to offend G.o.d? On the other side, if G.o.d Himself was not able to render human nature sinless, what right had He to punish men for not being sinless? It is but by the right of might. But the right of the strongest is violence; and violence is not suited to the most Just of Beings. G.o.d would be supremely unjust if He punished men for not having a portion of the Divine perfections, or for not being able to be G.o.ds like Himself.

Could not G.o.d have at least endowed men with that sort of perfection of which their nature is susceptible? If some men are good or render themselves agreeable to their G.o.d, why did not this G.o.d bestow the same favor or give the same dispositions to all beings of our kind? Why does the number of wicked exceed so greatly the number of good people? Why, for every friend, does G.o.d find ten thousand enemies in a world which depended upon Him alone to people with honest men? If it is true that G.o.d intends to form in heaven a court of saints, of chosen ones, or of men who have lived in this world according to His views, would He not have had a court more numerous, more brilliant, and more honorable to Him, if it were composed of all the men to whom, in creating them, He could have granted the degree of goodness necessary to obtain eternal happiness? Finally, were it not easier not to take man from nothingness than to create him full of defects, rebellious to his Creator, perpetually exposed to lose himself by a fatal abuse of his liberty?

Instead of creating men, a perfect G.o.d ought to have created only docile and submissive angels. The angels, it is said, are free; a few among them have sinned; but all of them have not sinned; all have not abused their liberty by revolting against their Master. Could not G.o.d have created only angels of the good kind? If G.o.d could create angels who have not sinned, could He not create men sinless, or those who would never abuse their liberty by doing evil. If the chosen ones are incapable of sinning in heaven, could not G.o.d have made sinless men upon the earth?

LXXVII.--IT IS ABSURD TO SAY THAT G.o.d'S CONDUCT MUST BE A MYSTERY TO MAN, AND THAT HE HAS NO RIGHT TO EXAMINE AND JUDGE IT.

We are told that the enormous distance which separates G.o.d from men, makes G.o.d's conduct necessarily a mystery for us, and that we have no right to interrogate our Master. Is this statement satisfactory? But according to you, when my eternal happiness is involved, have I not the right to examine G.o.d's own conduct? It is but with the hope of happiness that men submit to the empire of a G.o.d. A despot to whom men are subjected but through fear, a master whom they can not interrogate, a totally inaccessible sovereign, can not merit the homage of intelligent beings. If G.o.d's conduct is a mystery to me, it is not made for me. Man can not adore, admire, respect, or imitate a conduct of which everything is impossible to conceive, or of which he can not form any but revolting ideas; unless it is pretended that he should worship all the things of which he is forced to be ignorant, and then all that he does not understand becomes admirable.

Priests! you teach us that the designs of G.o.d are impenetrable; that His ways are not our ways; that His thoughts are not our thoughts; that it is folly to complain of His administration, whose motives and secret ways are entirely unknown to us; that there is temerity in accusing Him of unjust judgments, because they are incomprehensible to us. But do you not see that by speaking in this manner, you destroy with your own hands all your profound systems which have no design but to explain the ways of Divinity that you call impenetrable? These judgments, these ways, and these designs, have you penetrated them? You dare not say so; and, although you season incessantly, you do not understand them more than we do. If by chance you know the plan of G.o.d, which you tell us to admire, while there are many people who find it so little worthy of a just, good, intelligent, and rational being; do not say that this plan is impenetrable. If you are as ignorant as we, have some indulgence for those who ingenuously confess that they comprehend nothing of it, or that they see nothing in it Divine. Cease to persecute for opinions which you do not understand yourselves; cease to slander each other for dreams and conjectures which are altogether contradictory; speak to us of intelligible and truly useful things; and no longer tell us of the impenetrable ways of a G.o.d, about which you do nothing but stammer and contradict yourselves.