Supernatural Religion Volume I Part 10

For no new order of things could make the present order different, and a miracle, could we suppose it becoming the ordinary fact of another different order of nature, would not be less a violation of the laws of nature in the present one.(1) Dr. Mozley also rejects this explanation.

We pause here to remark that, throughout the whole inquiry into the question of miracles, we meet with nothing from theologians but mere a.s.sumptions, against which the invariability of the known order of nature steadily opposes itself. The facts of the narrative of the miracle are first a.s.sumed, and so are the theories by which it is explained. Now, with regard to every theory which seeks to explain miracles by a.s.sumption, we may quote words applied by one of the ablest defenders of miracles to some conclusion of straw, which he placed in the mouth of an imaginary antagonist in order that he might refute it: "But the question is," said the late Dean of St. Paul's, "not whether such a conclusion has been a.s.serted, as many other absurdities have been a.s.serted, by the advocates of a theory, but whether it has been established on such scientific grounds as to be ent.i.tled to the a.s.sent of all duly cultivated minds, whatever their own consciences may say to the contrary."(2) Divines are very strict in demanding absolute demonstrations from men of science and others, but we do not find them at all ready to furnish conclusions of similar accuracy regarding dogmatic theology.

Immediately after his indignant demand for scientific accuracy of demonstration, Dr. Mansel proceeds to argue as follows: In the will of man we have the solitary instance of an efficient cause, in the highest sense of the

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term, acting among the physical causes of the material world, and producing results which could not have been brought about by any mere sequence of physical causes. If a man of his own will throw a stone into the air, its motion, as soon as it has left his hand, is determined by a combination of purely material laws; but by what _law_ came it to be thrown at all? The law of gravitation, no doubt, remains constant and unbroken, whether the stone is lying on the ground, or moving through the air, but all the laws of matter could not have brought about the particular result without the interposition of the free will of the man who throws the stone. Subst.i.tute the will of G.o.d for the will of man, and the argument becomes applicable to the whole extent of Creation and to all the phenomena which it embraces.(1)

It is evident that Dr. Mansel's argument merely tends to prove that every effect must have a cause, a proposition too obvious to require any argument at all. If a man had not thrown the stone, the stone would have remained lying on the ground. No one doubts this. We have here, however, this "solitary instance of an efficient cause acting among the physical causes of the material world," producing results which are wholly determined by material laws,(2) and incapable of producing any opposed to them. If, therefore, we subst.i.tute, as Dr. Mansel desires, "the will of G.o.d" for "the will of man," we arrive at no results which are not in harmony

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with the order of nature. We have no ground whatever for a.s.suming any efficient cause acting in any other way than in accordance with the laws of nature. It is, how-fever, one of the gross fallacies of this argument, as applied to miracles, to pa.s.s from the efficient cause producing results which are strictly in accordance with natural laws, and determined by them, to an a.s.sumed efficient cause producing effects which are opposed to natural law. The restoration to life of a decomposed human body and the miraculous multiplication of loaves and fishes are opposed to natural laws, and no a.s.sumed efficient cause conceivable to which they may be referred can harmonize them.

Dr. Mozley continues his argument in a similar way. He inquires: "Is the suspension of physical and material laws by a Spiritual Being inconceivable? We reply that, however inconceivable this kind of suspension of physical law is, it is a fact. Physical laws are suspended any time an animate being moves any part of its body; the laws of matter are suspended by the laws of life."(l) He goes on to maintain that, although it is true that his spirit is united with the matter in which it moves in a way in which the Great Spirit who acts on matter in the miracle is not, yet the action of G.o.d's Spirit in the miracle of walking on the water is no more inconceivable than the action of his own spirit in holding up his own hand. "Antecedently, one step on the ground and an ascent to heaven are alike incredible. But this appearance of incredibility is answered in one case literally _ambulando_. How can I place any reliance upon it in the other?"(2) From this ill.u.s.tration,

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Dr. Mozley, with a haste very unlike his previous careful procedure, jumps at the following conclusions: "The const.i.tution of nature, then, disproved the incredibility of the Divine suspension of physical law; but more than this, it creates a presumption for it."(l) The laws of life of which we have experience, he argues, are themselves in an ascending scale. First come the laws which regulate unorganized matter; next the laws of vegetation; then the laws of animal life, with its voluntary motion; and above these again, the laws of moral being. A supposed intelligent being whose experience was limited to one or more cla.s.ses in this ascending scale of laws would be totally incapable of conceiving the action of the higher cla.s.ses. The progressive succession of laws is perfectly conceivable backward, but an absolute mystery forward. "a.n.a.logy," therefore, when in this ascending series we arrive at man, leads us to expect that there is a higher sphere of law as much above _him_ as he is above the lower natures in the scale, and "supplies a presumption in favour of such a belief."(2) And so we arrive at the question whether there is or is not a G.o.d, a Personal Head in nature, whose free will penetrates the universal frame invisibly to us, and is an omnipresent agent. If there be, Dr. Mozley concludes, then, every miracle in Scripture is as natural an event in the universe as any chemical experiment in the physical world.(3)

This is precisely the argument of Dr. Mansel, regarding the "Efficient Cause," somewhat elaborated, but, however ingeniously devised, it is equally based upon a.s.sumption and defective in a.n.a.logy. The "cla.s.ses of

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law" to which the Bampton Lecturer refers work harmoniously side by side, regulating the matter to which they apply. Unorganized matter, vegetation, and animal life, may each have special conditions modifying phenomena, but they are all equally subject to the same general laws.

Man is as much under the influence of gravitation as a stone is. The special operation of physical laws is less a modification of law than that law acting under different conditions. The law of gravitation suffers no alteration, whether it cause the fall of an apple or shape the orbit of a planet. The reproduction of the plant and of the animal is regulated by the same fundamental principle acting through different organisms. The harmonious action of physical laws, and their adaptability to an infinite variety of forms, const.i.tute the perfection of that code which produces the order of nature.(1) The mere superiority of man over lower forms of organic and inorganic matter does not lift him above physical laws, and the a.n.a.logy of every grade in nature forbids the presumption that higher forms may exist which are exempt from their control.

If in animated beings, as is affirmed, we had the solitary instance of an "efficient cause" acting among the forces of nature, and possessing the power of initiation, this "efficient cause" produces no disturbance of physical law. Its existence is as much a recognized part of the infinite variety of form within the order of nature as the existence of a crystal or a plant; and although the character of the force exercised by it may not be clearly understood, its effects are regulated by the same laws as

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govern all other forces in nature. If "the laws of matter are suspended by the laws of life" each time an animated being moves any part of its body, one physical law is counteracted in precisely the same manner, and to an equivalent degree, each time another physical law is called into action. The Law of gravitation, for instance, is equally neutralized by the law of magnetism each time a magnet suspends a weight in the air. In each case, a law is successfully resisted precisely to the extent of the force employed. The arm that is raised by the animated being falls again, in obedience to law, as soon as the force which raised it is exhausted, quite as certainly as the weight descends when the magnetic current fails. This, however, is not the suspension of law in the sense of a miracle, but, on the contrary, is simply the natural operation upon each other of co-existent laws. It is a recognized part of the order of nature,(1) and instead of

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rendering credible any supernatural suspension of laws, the a.n.a.logy of animated beings distinctly excludes it. The introduction of life in no way changes the relation between cause and effect, which const.i.tutes the order of nature, and is the essence of its law. Life favours no presumption for the suspension of law, but, on the contrary, whilst acting in nature, universally exhibits the prevalence and invariability of law. The "laws of life" may be subtle, but they are an integral portion of the great order of nature, working harmoniously with the laws of matter, and not one whit more independent of them than any one natural law is of another.

The supposed "Efficient Cause," is wholly circ.u.mscribed by law. It is brought into existence by the operation of immutable physical laws, and from the cradle to the grave it is subject to those laws. So inseparably is it connected with matter, and consequently with the laws which regulate matter, that it cannot even become conscious of its own existence without the intervention of matter. The whole process of life is dependent on obedience to natural laws, and so powerless is this efficient cause to resist their jurisdiction, that, in spite of its highest efforts, it pines or ceases to exist in consequence of the mere natural operation of law upon the matter with which it is united, and without

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which it is impotent. It cannot receive an impression from without that is not conveyed in accordance with law, and perceived by an exquisitely ordered organism, in every part of which law reigns supreme; nor can it communicate from within except through channels equally ordered by law.

A slight injury may derange the delicate mechanical contrivances of eye, ear, and vocal chords, and may further destroy the reason and paralyze the body, reducing the animated being, by the derangement of those channels to which physical law limits its action, to a mere smouldering spark of life, without consciousness and without expression. The "laws of life" act amongst the laws of matter, but are not independent of them, and the action of both cla.s.ses of law is regulated by precisely the same principles.

Dr. Mozley's affirmation, that _antecedently_ one step on the ground and an ascent to heaven are alike incredible, does not help him. In that sense it follows that there is nothing that is not antecedently incredible, nothing credible until it has happened. This argument, however, while it limits us to actual experience, prohibits presumptions with regard to that which is beyond experience. To argue that, because a step on the ground and an ascent to heaven are antecedently alike incredible, yet as we subsequently make that step, therefore the ascent to heaven, which we cannot make, from incredible becomes credible, is a contradiction in terms. If the ascent be antecedently incredible, it cannot at the same time be antecedently credible. That which is incredible cannot become credible because something else quite different becomes credible. It is apparent that such an argument is vicious.

Experience comes

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with its sober wisdom to check such reasoning. We believe in our power to walk because we habitually exercise it: we disbelieve in bodily ascensions because all experience excludes them. The step is part of the recognised order of nature, and has none of the elements in it of the miraculous. But if we leap into the air on the brink of a precipice, belief in an ascent to heaven is shattered to pieces at the bottom to which the law of gravitation infallibly drags us.

There is absolutely nothing in the const.i.tution of nature, we may say, reversing Dr. Mozley's a.s.sertion, which does not prove the incredibility of a Divine suspension of physical laws, and does not create a presumption against it. There is no instance producible, or even logically conceivable, of any power whose effects are opposed to the ultimate ruling of the laws of nature. The occurrence of anything opposed to those laws is incredible. Dr. Mozley has himself shown that miracles cannot be explained either by unknown connection with known law, or by reference to unknown law; and he renounces the explanation of "higher law." His distinction between the laws of nature and the "laws of the universe,"(1) by which he nevertheless endeavours to make a miracle credible, is one which is purely imaginary, and cannot affect us in our present position within the order of nature. We know of no laws of the universe differing from the laws of nature. So far as human observation can range, these laws alone prevail. For all practical purposes, therefore, such a distinction is futile, and belief is necessarily limited to the actual operation of natural laws. The occasional intervention of an unknown "efficient cause," producing the effects

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called "miracles"--effects which are not referrible to any known law--is totally opposed to experience, and such a hypothesis to explain alleged occurrences of a miraculous character cannot find a legitimate place within the order of nature.

2.

The proposition with which Dr. Mozley commences these Bampton Lectures, and for which he contends to their close, is this: "That miracles, or visible suspensions of the order of nature for a providential purpose, are not in contradiction to reason."(1) He shows that, the purpose of miracles is to attest a supernatural revelation, which, without them, we could not be justified in believing. "Christianity," he distinctly states, "cannot be maintained as a revelation undiscoverable by human reason--a revelation of a supernatural scheme for man's salvation without the evidence of miracles."(2) Out of this very admission he attempts to construct an argument in support of miracles: "Hence it follows," he continues, "that upon the supposition of the Divine design of a revelation, a miracle is not an anomaly or irregularity, but part of the system of the universe; because, though an irregularity and an anomaly in relation to either part, it has a complete adaptation to the whole. There being two worlds, a visible and invisible, and a communication between the two being wanted, a miracle is the instrument of that communication."(3)

Here, again, the argument is based upon mere a.s.sumption.

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The supposition of the Divine design of a revelation is the result of a foregone conclusion in its favour, and is not suggested by antecedent probability. It is, in fact, derived solely from the contents of the revelation itself. Divines a.s.sume that a communication of this nature is in accordance with reason, and was necessary for the salvation of the human race, simply because they believe that it took place. No attempt is seriously made independently to prove the reality of the supposed "Divine design of a revelation." A revelation having, it is supposed, been made, that revelation is consequently supposed to have been contemplated, and to have necessitated and justified suspensions of the order of nature to effect it. The proposition for which the evidence of miracles is demanded is viciously employed as evidence for miracles.

The circ.u.mstances upon which the a.s.sumption of the necessity and reasonableness of a revelation is based, however, are incredible, and contrary to reason. We are asked to believe that G.o.d made man in his own image, pure and sinless, and intended him to continue so, but that scarcely had this, his n.o.blest work, left the hands of the Creator, than man was tempted into sin by Satan, an all-powerful and persistent enemy of G.o.d, whose existence and antagonism to a Being in whose eyes sin is abomination are not accounted for and are incredible.(1) Adam's fall brought a curse upon the earth, and incurred the penalty of death for himself and for the whole of his posterity. The human race, although created perfect and without sin,

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thus disappointed the expectations of the Creator, and became daily more wicked, the Evil Spirit having succeeded in frustrating the designs of the Almighty, so that G.o.d repented that he had made man, and at length destroyed by a deluge all the inhabitants of the earth, with the exception of eight persons who feared him. This sweeping purification, however, was as futile as the original design, and the race of men soon became more wicked than ever. The final and only adequate remedy devised by G.o.d for the salvation of his creatures, become so desperately and hopelessly evil, was the incarnation of himself in the person of "the Son," the second person in a mysterious Trinity of which the G.o.dhead is said to be composed, (who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, and born of the Virgin Mary,) and his death upon the cross as a vicarious expiation of the sins of the world, without which supposed satisfaction of the justice of G.o.d his mercy could not possibly have been extended to the frail and sinful work of his own hands. The crucifixion of the incarnate G.o.d was the crowning guilt of a nation whom G.o.d himself had selected as his own peculiar people, and whom he had condescended to guide by constant direct revelations of his will, but who, from the first, had displayed the most persistent and remarkable proclivity to sin against him, and, in spite of the wonderful miracles wrought on their behalf, to forsake his service for the worship of other G.o.ds. We are asked to believe, therefore, in the frustration of the Divine design of creation, and in the fall of man into a state of wickedness hateful to G.o.d, requiring and justifying the Divine design of a revelation, and such a revelation as this, as a preliminary to the further proposition that, on the supposition of such a design, miracles would not be contrary to reason.

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Antecedently, nothing could be more absolutely incredible or contrary to reason than these statements, or the supposition of such a design. Dr.

Mozley himself admits that, as human announcements, the doctrines of Christianity would be the "wildest delusions," which we could not be justified in believing, and that such a scheme could not be maintained without miraculous evidence. The supposition of the Divine design of the revelation is solely derived from the doctrines supposed to have been revealed, and, indeed, that design forms part of them. Until they are proved to be Divine truths, these statements must obviously be considered human announcements, and consequently they are antecedently incredible, and the "wildest delusions." As Dr. Mozley does not pretend that there is anything antecedently credible upon which he can base an a.s.sertion that there was actually

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any "Divine design of a revelation," or that any "communication between the two worlds" was requisite, it is therefore clear that his argument consists merely of a.s.sumptions admitted to be antecedently incredible.

It advances a supposition of that which is contrary to reason to justify supposed visible suspensions of the order of nature, which are also contrary to reason. Incredible a.s.sumptions cannot give probability to incredible evidence- Tertullian's audacious paradox: "Credo quia impossible," of which such reasoning is ill.u.s.trative, is but the cry of enthusiastic credulity.

The whole theory of this abortive design of creation, with such impotent efforts to amend it, is emphatically contradicted by the glorious perfection and invariability of the order of nature. It is difficult to say whether the details of the scheme, or the circ.u.mstances which are supposed to have led to its adoption, are more shocking to reason or to moral sense. The imperfection ascribed to the Divine work is scarcely more derogatory to the power and wisdom of the Creator, than the supposed satisfaction of his justice in the death of himself incarnate, the innocent for the guilty, is degrading to the idea of his moral perfection. The supposed necessity for repeated interference to correct the imperfection of the original creation, the nature of the means employed, and the triumphant opposition of Satan, are anthropomorphic conceptions totally incompatible with the idea of an Infinitely Wise and Almighty Being. The const.i.tution of nature, so far from favouring any hypothesis of original perfection and subsequent deterioration, bears everywhere the record of systematic upward progression. Not only is the a.s.sumption, that any revelation of the nature of ecclesiastical Christianity was necessary, excluded upon

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philosophical grounds, but it is contradicted by the whole operation of natural laws, which contain in themselves inexorable penalties against natural retrogression, or even unprogressiveness, and furnish the only requisite stimulus to improvement.(1) The survival only of the fittest is the

1 We venture to add a pa.s.sage from Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Social Statics," which we have met with for the first time since this work was published, in ill.u.s.tration of this a.s.sertion. Mr. Spencer affirms "the evanescence of evil" and the perfectibility of man, upon the ground that: "All evil results from the non-adaptation of const.i.tution to conditions." After an elaborate demonstration of this, he resumes as follows: "If there be any conclusiveness in the foregoing arguments, such a faith is well founded. As commonly supported by evidence drawn from history, it cannot be considered indisputable. The inference that as adyancement has been hitherto the rule, it will be the rule henceforth, may be called a plausible speculation. But when it is shown that this adyancement is due to the working of a universal law; and that in virtue of that law it must continue until the state we call perfection is reached, then the advent of such a state is removed out of the region of probability into that of certainty. If any one demurs to this let him point out the error. Here are the several steps of the argument. All imperfection is unfitness to the conditions of existence.

This unfitness must consist either in having a faculty or faculties in excess; or in having a faculty or faculties deficient; or in both.

A faculty in excess is one which the conditions of existence do not afford full exercise to; and a faculty that is deficient is one from which the conditions of existence demand more than it can perform.

But it is an essential principle of life that a faculty to which circ.u.mstances do not allow full exercise diminishes; and that a faculty on which circ.u.mstances make excessive demands increases.

And so long as this excess and this deficiency continue, there must continue decrease on the one hand, and growth on the other.