Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 96

Reply Obj. 2: All things which make up beat.i.tude are sufficient of themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the natural gifts; because no beat.i.tude is self-subsisting, except the uncreated beat.i.tude.

Reply Obj. 3: There cannot be two operations of the one faculty at the one time, except the one be ordained to the other. But natural knowledge and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory.

Accordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love from existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory.

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 8]

Whether a Beatified Angel Can Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For, as as said above (A. 7), beat.i.tude does not do away with nature. But it is of the very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore a beatified angel can sin.

Obj. 2: Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3). But the will of the angel in beat.i.tude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is inclined towards good and evil.

Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for man to be able to choose good or evil. But the freedom of will is not lessened in the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that "there is in the holy angels that nature which cannot sin." Therefore the holy angels cannot sin.

_I answer that,_ The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for this is, because their beat.i.tude consists in seeing G.o.d through His essence. Now, G.o.d's essence is the very essence of goodness.

Consequently the angel beholding G.o.d is disposed towards G.o.d in the same way as anyone else not seeing G.o.d is to the common form of goodness. Now it is impossible for any man either to will or to do anything except aiming at what is good; or for him to wish to turn away from good precisely as such. Therefore the beatified angel can neither will nor act, except as aiming towards G.o.d. Now whoever wills or acts in this manner cannot sin. Consequently the beatified angel cannot sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Created good, considered in itself, can fail.

But from its perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is the union of beat.i.tude, it is rendered unable to sin, for the reason already alleged.

Reply Obj. 2: The rational powers are referred to opposites in the things to which they are not inclined naturally; but as to the things whereunto they have a natural tendency, they are not referred to opposites. For the intellect cannot but a.s.sent to naturally known principles; in the same way, the will cannot help clinging to good, formally as good; because the will is naturally ordained to good as to its proper object. Consequently the will of the angels is referred to opposites, as to doing many things, or not doing them. But they have no tendency to opposites with regard to G.o.d Himself, Whom they see to be the very nature of goodness; but in all things their aim is towards G.o.d, which ever alternative they choose, that is not sinful.

Reply Obj. 3: Free-will in its choice of means to an end is disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions. Now it is evident that it belongs to the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to different conclusions, according to given principles; but for it to proceed to some conclusion by pa.s.sing out of the order of the principles, comes of its own defect. Hence it belongs to the perfection of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose between opposite things, keeping the order of the end in view; but it comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning away from the order of the end; and this is to sin. Hence there is greater liberty of will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is in ourselves, who can sin.

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NINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 3]

Whether the Beatified Angels Advance in Beat.i.tude?

Objection 1: It would seem that the beatified angels can advance in beat.i.tude. For charity is the principle of merit. But there is perfect charity in the angels. Therefore the beatified angels can merit. Now, as merit increases, the reward of beat.i.tude increases.

Therefore the beatified angels can progress in beat.i.tude.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that "G.o.d makes use of us for our own gain, and for His own goodness. The same thing happens to the angels, whom He uses for spiritual ministrations"; since "they are all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all ... ?'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation" (Heb. 1:14). This would not be for their profit were they not to merit thereby, nor to advance to beat.i.tude. It remains, then, that the beatified angels can merit, and can advance in beat.i.tude.

Obj. 3: Further, it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying the foremost place not to be able to advance. But the angels are not in the highest degree of beat.i.tude. Therefore if unable to ascend higher, it would appear that there is imperfection and defect in them; which is not admissible.

_On the contrary,_ Merit and progress belong to this present condition of life. But angels are not wayfarers travelling towards beat.i.tude, they are already in possession of beat.i.tude. Consequently the beatified angels can neither merit nor advance in beat.i.tude.

_I answer that,_ In every movement the mover's intention is centered upon one determined end, to which he intends to lead the movable subject; because intention looks to the end, to which infinite progress is repugnant. Now it is evident, since the rational creature cannot of its own power attain to its beat.i.tude, which consists in the vision of G.o.d, as is clear from what has gone before (Q. 12, A.

4), that it needs to be moved by G.o.d towards its beat.i.tude. Therefore there must be some one determined thing to which every rational creature is directed as to its last end.

Now this one determinate object cannot, in the vision of G.o.d, consist precisely in that which is seen; for the Supreme Truth is seen by all the blessed in various degrees: but it is on the part of the mode of vision, that diverse terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of Him Who directs towards the end. For it is impossible that as the rational creature is led on to the vision of the Supreme Essence, it should be led on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision, which is comprehension, for this belongs to G.o.d only; as is evident from what was said above (Q. 12, A. 7; Q. 14, A. 3). But since infinite efficacy is required for comprehending G.o.d, while the creature's efficacy in beholding is only finite; and since every finite being is in infinite degrees removed from the infinite; it comes to pa.s.s that the rational creature understands G.o.d more or less clearly according to infinite degrees. And as beat.i.tude consists in vision, so the degree of vision lies in a determinate mode of the vision.

Therefore every rational creature is so led by G.o.d to the end of its beat.i.tude, that from G.o.d's predestination it is brought even to a determinate degree of beat.i.tude. Consequently, when that degree is once secured, it cannot pa.s.s to a higher degree.

Reply Obj. 1: Merit belongs to a subject which is moving towards its end. Now the rational creature is moved towards its end, not merely pa.s.sively, but also by working actively. If the end is within the power of the rational creature, then its action is said to procure the end; as man acquires knowledge by reflection: but if the end be beyond its power, and is looked for from another, then the action will be meritorious of such end. But what is already in the ultimate term is not said to be moved, but to have been moved. Consequently, to merit belongs to the imperfect charity of this life; whereas perfect charity does not merit but rather enjoys the reward. Even as in acquired habits, the operation preceding the habit is productive of the habit; but the operation from an acquired habit is both perfect and enjoyable. In the same way the act of perfect charity has no quality of merit, but belongs rather to the perfection of the reward.

Reply Obj. 2: A thing can be termed useful in two ways. First of all, as being on the way to an end; and so the merit of beat.i.tude is useful. Secondly, as the part is useful for the whole; as the wall for a house. In this way the angelic ministerings are useful for the beatified angels, inasmuch as they are a part of their beat.i.tude; for to pour out acquired perfection upon others is of the nature of what is perfect, considered as perfect.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a beatified angel is not absolutely in the highest degree of beat.i.tude, yet, in his own regard he is in the highest degree, according to Divine predestination. Nevertheless the joy of the angels can be increased with regard to the salvation of such as are saved by their ministrations, according to Luke 15:10: "There is [Vulg.'shall be'] joy before the angels of G.o.d upon one sinner doing penance." Such joy belongs to their accidental reward, which can be increased unto judgment day. Hence some writers say that they can merit as to their accidental reward. But it is better to say that the Blessed can in no wise merit without being at the same time a wayfarer and a comprehensor; like Christ, Who alone was such. For the Blessed acquire such joy from the virtue of their beat.i.tude, rather than merit it.

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QUESTION 63

THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN (In Nine Articles)

In the next place we must consider how angels became evil: first of all with regard to the evil of fault; and secondly, as to the evil of punishment. Under the first heading there are nine points for consideration:

(1) Can there be evil of fault in the angels?

(2) What kind of sins can be in them?

(3) What did the angel seek in sinning?

(4) Supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing, are any of them naturally evil?

(5) Supposing that it is not so, could any one of them become evil in the first instant of his creation by an act of his own will?

(6) Supposing that he did not, was there any interval between his creation and fall?

(7) Was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the highest among the angels?

(8) Was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the others sinning?

(9) Did as many sin as remained steadfast?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 1]

Whether the Evil of Fault Can Be in the Angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the angels. For there can be no evil except in things which are in potentiality, as is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text. 19), because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality. But the angels have not being in potentiality, since they are subsisting forms. Therefore there can be no evil in them.

Obj. 2: Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies. But philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies.

Therefore neither can there be in the angels.

Obj. 3: Further, what is natural to a thing is always in it. But it is natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love towards G.o.d. Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But in loving G.o.d they do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin.

Obj. 4: Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently good.

Now for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a true good; because in them either there can be no error at all, or at least not before guilt. Therefore the angels can desire only what it truly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good.

Consequently the angel does not sin by desire.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (Job 4:18): "In His angels He found wickedness."

_I answer that,_ An angel or any other rational creature considered in his own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to sin, such creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the condition of nature. The reason of this is, because sinning is nothing else than a deviation from that rect.i.tude which an act ought to have; whether we speak of sin in nature, art, or morals. That act alone, the rule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never fall short of rect.i.tude. Were the craftsman's hand the rule itself engraving, he could not engrave the wood otherwise than rightly; but if the rightness of engraving be judged by another rule, then the engraving may be right or faulty. Now the Divine will is the sole rule of G.o.d's act, because it is not referred to any higher end. But every created will has rect.i.tude of act so far only as it is regulated according to the Divine will, to which the last end is to be referred: as every desire of a subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his superior; for instance, the soldier's will, according to the will of his commanding officer. Thus only in the Divine will can there be no sin; whereas there can be sin in the will of every creature; considering the condition of its nature.