Summa Theologica Part IV (Tertia Pars) Part 6

Whether It Is Befitting for a Divine Person to a.s.sume?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not befitting to a Divine Person to a.s.sume a created nature. For a Divine Person signifies something most perfect. Now no addition can be made to what is perfect. Therefore, since to a.s.sume is to take to oneself, and consequently what is a.s.sumed is added to the one who a.s.sumes, it does not seem to be befitting to a Divine Person to a.s.sume a created nature.

Obj. 2: Further, that to which anything is a.s.sumed is communicated in some degree to what is a.s.sumed to it, just as dignity is communicated to whosoever is a.s.sumed to a dignity. But it is of the nature of a person to be incommunicable, as was said above (I, Q. 29, A. 1).

Therefore it is not befitting to a Divine Person to a.s.sume, i.e. to take to Himself.

Obj. 3: Further, person is const.i.tuted by nature. But it is repugnant that the thing const.i.tuted should a.s.sume the const.i.tuent, since the effect does not act on its cause. Hence it is not befitting to a Person to a.s.sume a nature.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii): "This G.o.d, i.e. the only-Begotten one, took the form," i.e. the nature, "of a servant to His own Person." But the only-Begotten G.o.d is a Person. Therefore it is befitting to a Person to take, i.e. to a.s.sume a nature.

_I answer that,_ In the word "a.s.sumption" are implied two things, viz. the principle and the term of the act, for to a.s.sume is to take something to oneself. Now of this a.s.sumption a Person is both the principle and the term. The principle--because it properly belongs to a person to act, and this a.s.suming of flesh took place by the Divine action. Likewise a Person is the term of this a.s.sumption, because, as was said above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 2), the union took place in the Person, and not in the nature. Hence it is plain that to a.s.sume a nature is most properly befitting to a Person.

Reply Obj. 1: Since the Divine Person is infinite, no addition can be made to it: Hence Cyril says [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26]: "We do not conceive the mode of conjunction to be according to addition"; just as in the union of man with G.o.d, nothing is added to G.o.d by the grace of adoption, but what is Divine is united to man; hence, not G.o.d but man is perfected.

Reply Obj. 2: A Divine Person is said to be incommunicable inasmuch as It cannot be predicated of several supposita, but nothing prevents several things being predicated of the Person. Hence it is not contrary to the nature of person to be communicated so as to subsist in several natures, for even in a created person several natures may concur accidentally, as in the person of one man we find quant.i.ty and quality. But this is proper to a Divine Person, on account of its infinity, that there should be a concourse of natures in it, not accidentally, but in subsistence.

Reply Obj. 3: As was said above (Q. 2, A. 1), the human nature const.i.tutes a Divine Person, not simply, but forasmuch as the Person is denominated from such a nature. For human nature does not make the Son of Man to be simply, since He was from eternity, but only to be man. It is by the Divine Nature that a Divine Person is const.i.tuted simply. Hence the Divine Person is not said to a.s.sume the Divine Nature, but to a.s.sume the human nature.

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SECOND ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 2]

Whether It Is Befitting to the Divine Nature to a.s.sume?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not befitting to the Divine Nature to a.s.sume. Because, as was said above (A. 1), to a.s.sume is to take to oneself. But the Divine Nature did not take to Itself human nature, for the union did not take place in the nature, as was said above (Q. 2, AA. 1, 3). Hence it is not befitting to the Divine Nature to a.s.sume human nature.

Obj. 2: Further, the Divine Nature is common to the three Persons.

If, therefore, it is befitting to the Divine Nature to a.s.sume, it consequently is befitting to the three Persons; and thus the Father a.s.sumed human nature even as the Son, which is erroneous.

Obj. 3: Further, to a.s.sume is to act. But to act befits a person, not a nature, which is rather taken to be the principle by which the agent acts. Therefore to a.s.sume is not befitting to the nature.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Fulgentius) says (De Fide ad Petrum ii): "That nature which remains eternally begotten of the Father"

(i.e. which is received from the Father by eternal generation) "took our nature free of sin from His Mother."

_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 1), in the word a.s.sumption two things are signified--to wit, the principle and the term of the action. Now to be the principle of the a.s.sumption belongs to the Divine Nature in itself, because the a.s.sumption took place by Its power; but to be the term of the a.s.sumption does not belong to the Divine Nature in itself, but by reason of the Person in Whom It is considered to be. Hence a Person is primarily and more properly said to a.s.sume, but it may be said secondarily that the Nature a.s.sumed a nature to Its Person. And after the same manner the Nature is also said to be incarnate, not that it is changed to flesh, but that it a.s.sumed the nature of flesh. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6): "Following the blessed Athanasius and Cyril we say that the Nature of G.o.d is incarnate."

Reply Obj. 1: "Oneself" is reciprocal, and points to the same suppositum. But the Divine Nature is not a distinct suppositum from the Person of the Word. Hence, inasmuch as the Divine Nature took human nature to the Person of the Word, It is said to take it to Itself. But although the Father takes human nature to the Person of the Word, He did not thereby take it to Himself, for the suppositum of the Father and the Son is not one, and hence it cannot properly be said that the Father a.s.sumes human nature.

Reply Obj. 2: What is befitting to the Divine Nature in Itself is befitting to the three Persons, as goodness, wisdom, and the like.

But to a.s.sume belongs to It by reason of the Person of the Word, as was said above, and hence it is befitting to that Person alone.

Reply Obj. 3: As in G.o.d _what is_ and _whereby it is_ are the same, so likewise in Him _what acts_ and _whereby it acts_ are the same, since everything acts, inasmuch as it is a being. Hence the Divine Nature is both that whereby G.o.d acts, and the very G.o.d Who acts.

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THIRD ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 3]

Whether the Nature Abstracted from the Personality Can a.s.sume?

Objection 1: It would seem that if we abstract the Personality by our mind, the Nature cannot a.s.sume. For it was said above (A. 1) that it belongs to the Nature to a.s.sume by reason of the Person. But what belongs to one by reason of another cannot belong to it if the other is removed; as a body, which is visible by reason of color, without color cannot be seen. Hence if the Personality be mentally abstracted, the Nature cannot a.s.sume.

Obj. 2: Further, a.s.sumption implies the term of union, as was said above (A. 1). But the union cannot take place in the nature, but only in the Person. Therefore, if the Personality be abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot a.s.sume.

Obj. 3: Further, it has been said above (I, Q. 40, A. 3) that in the G.o.dhead if the Personality is abstracted, nothing remains. But the one who a.s.sumes is something. Therefore, if the Personality is abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot a.s.sume.

_On the contrary,_ In the G.o.dhead Personality signifies a personal property; and this is threefold, viz. Paternity, Filiation and Procession, as was said above (I, Q. 30, A. 2). Now if we mentally abstract these, there still remains the omnipotence of G.o.d, by which the Incarnation was wrought, as the angel says (Luke 1:37): "No word shall be impossible with G.o.d." Therefore it seems that if the Personality be removed, the Divine Nature can still a.s.sume.

_I answer that,_ The intellect stands in two ways towards G.o.d. First, to know G.o.d as He is, and in this manner it is impossible for the intellect to circ.u.mscribe something in G.o.d and leave the rest, for all that is in G.o.d is one, except the distinction of Persons; and as regards these, if one is removed the other is taken away, since they are distinguished by relations only which must be together at the same time. Secondly, the intellect stands towards G.o.d, not indeed as knowing G.o.d as He is, but in its own way, i.e. understanding manifoldly and separately what in G.o.d is one: and in this way our intellect can understand the Divine goodness and wisdom, and the like, which are called essential attributes, without understanding Paternity or Filiation, which are called Personalities. And hence if we abstract Personality by our intellect, we may still understand the Nature a.s.suming.

Reply Obj. 1: Because in G.o.d _what is,_ and _whereby it is,_ are one, if any one of the things which are attributed to G.o.d in the abstract is considered in itself, abstracted from all else, it will still be something subsisting, and consequently a Person, since it is an intellectual nature. Hence just as we now say three Persons, on account of holding three personal properties, so likewise if we mentally exclude the personal properties there will still remain in our thought the Divine Nature as subsisting and as a Person. And in this way It may be understood to a.s.sume human nature by reason of Its subsistence or Personality.

Reply Obj. 2: Even if the personal properties of the three Persons are abstracted by our mind, nevertheless there will remain in our thoughts the one Personality of G.o.d, as the Jews consider. And the a.s.sumption can be terminated in It, as we now say it is terminated in the Person of the Word.

Reply Obj. 3: If we mentally abstract the Personality, it is said that nothing remains by way of resolution, i.e. as if the subject of the relation and the relation itself were distinct because all we can think of in G.o.d is considered as a subsisting suppositum. However, some of the things predicated of G.o.d can be understood without others, not by way of resolution, but by the way mentioned above.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 4]

Whether One Person Without Another Can a.s.sume a Created Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that one Person cannot a.s.sume a created nature without another a.s.suming it. For "the works of the Trinity are inseparable," as Augustine says (Enchiridion x.x.xviii). But as the three Persons have one essence, so likewise They have one operation.

Now to a.s.sume is an operation. Therefore it cannot belong to one without belonging to another.

Obj. 2: Further, as we say the Person of the Son became incarnate, so also did the Nature; for "the whole Divine Nature became incarnate in one of Its hypostases," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6). But the Nature is common to the three Persons. Therefore the a.s.sumption is.

Obj. 3: Further, as the human nature in Christ is a.s.sumed by G.o.d, so likewise are men a.s.sumed by Him through grace, according to Rom.

14:3: "G.o.d hath taken him to Him." But this a.s.sumption pertains to all the Persons; therefore the first also.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that the mystery of the Incarnation pertains to "discrete theology," i.e. according to which something "distinct" is said of the Divine Persons.

_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 1), a.s.sumption implies two things, viz. the act of a.s.suming and the term of a.s.sumption. Now the act of a.s.sumption proceeds from the Divine power, which is common to the three Persons, but the term of the a.s.sumption is a Person, as stated above (A. 2). Hence what has to do with action in the a.s.sumption is common to the three Persons; but what pertains to the nature of term belongs to one Person in such a manner as not to belong to another; for the three Persons caused the human nature to be united to the one Person of the Son.

Reply Obj. 1: This reason regards the operation, and the conclusion would follow if it implied this operation only, without the term, which is a Person.

Reply Obj. 2: The Nature is said to be incarnate, and to a.s.sume by reason of the Person in Whom the union is terminated, as stated above (AA. 1, 2), and not as it is common to the three Persons. Now "the whole Divine Nature is" said to be "incarnate"; not that It is incarnate in all the Persons, but inasmuch as nothing is wanting to the perfection of the Divine Nature of the Person incarnate, as Damascene explains there.

Reply Obj. 3: The a.s.sumption which takes place by the grace of adoption is terminated in a certain partic.i.p.ation of the Divine Nature, by an a.s.similation to Its goodness, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: "That you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature"; and hence this a.s.sumption is common to the three Persons, in regard to the principle and the term. But the a.s.sumption which is by the grace of union is common on the part of the principle, but not on the part of the term, as was said above.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [III, Q. 3, Art. 5]

Whether Each of the Divine Persons Could Have a.s.sumed Human Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that no other Divine Person could have a.s.sumed human nature except the Person of the Son. For by this a.s.sumption it has been brought about that G.o.d is the Son of Man. But it was not becoming that either the Father or the Holy Ghost should be said to be a Son; for this would tend to the confusion of the Divine Persons. Therefore the Father and Holy Ghost could not have a.s.sumed flesh.

Obj. 2: Further, by the Divine Incarnation men have come into possession of the adoption of sons, according to Rom. 8:15: "For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but the spirit of adoption of sons." But sonship by adoption is a partic.i.p.ated likeness of natural sonship which does not belong to the Father nor the Holy Ghost; hence it is said (Rom. 8:29): "For whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son." Therefore it seems that no other Person except the Person of the Son could have become incarnate.

Obj. 3: Further, the Son is said to be sent and to be begotten by the temporal nativity, inasmuch as He became incarnate. But it does not belong to the Father to be sent, for He is innascible, as was said above (I, Q. 32, A. 3; First Part, Q. 43, A. 4). Therefore at least the Person of the Father cannot become incarnate.

_On the contrary,_ Whatever the Son can do, so can the Father and the Holy Ghost, otherwise the power of the three Persons would not be one. But the Son was able to become incarnate. Therefore the Father and the Holy Ghost were able to become incarnate.