Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 184

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Whether fort.i.tude is only about fear and daring?

(4) Whether it is only about fear of death?

(5) Whether it is only in warlike matters?

(6) Whether endurance is its chief act?

(7) Whether its action is directed to its own good?

(8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action?

(9) Whether fort.i.tude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?

(10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action?

(11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue?

(12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues.

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 1]

Whether Fort.i.tude Is a Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:9): "Virtue is perfected in infirmity." But fort.i.tude is contrary to infirmity. Therefore fort.i.tude is not a virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, if it is a virtue, it is either theological, intellectual, or moral. Now fort.i.tude is not contained among the theological virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be gathered from what we have said above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 2; Q. 62, A.

3). Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7, 8): "Some seem to be brave through ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers," both of which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral virtue, "and some are called brave on account of certain pa.s.sions"; for instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonor, or again on account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does not act from pa.s.sion but from choice, as stated above (I-II, Q. 55, A. 4).

Therefore fort.i.tude is not a virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since it is a "good quality of the mind," as stated above (Ethic. iii, 7, 8).

But fort.i.tude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results from the temperament of the body. Therefore it seems that fort.i.tude is not a virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv, xxi, xxii) numbers fort.i.tude among the virtues.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good."

Hence human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes a man good, and renders his work good. Now man's good is to be in accordance with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22).

Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his work accord with reason. This happens in three ways: first, by rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the intellectual virtues; secondly, by establishing the rect.i.tude of reason in human affairs, and this belongs to justice; thirdly, by removing the obstacles to the establishment of this rect.i.tude in human affairs.

Now the human will is hindered in two ways from following the rect.i.tude of reason. First, through being drawn by some object of pleasure to something other than what the rect.i.tude of reason requires; and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance.

Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that which is in accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that presents itself. In order to remove this obstacle fort.i.tude of the mind is requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty even as a man, by fort.i.tude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles.

Hence it is evident that fort.i.tude is a virtue, in so far as it conforms man to reason.

Reply Obj. 1: The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in the infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, of which the Apostle was speaking. Now it belongs to fort.i.tude of the mind to bear bravely with infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue of patience or fort.i.tude, as also to acknowledge one's own infirmity, and this belongs to the perfection that is called humility.

Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes a person performs the exterior act of a virtue without having the virtue, and from some other cause than virtue. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in which people are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through performing acts of fort.i.tude without having the virtue. This may be done in three ways. First, because they tend to that which is difficult as though it were not difficult: and this again happens in three ways, for sometimes this is owing to ignorance, through not perceiving the greatness of the danger; sometimes it is owing to the fact that one is hopeful of overcoming dangers--when, for instance, one has often experienced escape from danger; and sometimes this is owing to a certain science and art, as in the case of soldiers who, through skill and practice in the use of arms, think little of the dangers of battle, as they reckon themselves capable of defending themselves against them; thus Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i), "No man fears to do what he is confident of having learned to do well."

Secondly, a man performs an act of fort.i.tude without having the virtue, through the impulse of a pa.s.sion, whether of sorrow that he wishes to cast off, or again of anger. Thirdly, through choice, not indeed of a due end, but of some temporal advantage to be obtained, such as honor, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss.

Reply Obj. 3: The fort.i.tude of the soul which is reckoned a virtue, as explained in the Reply to the First Objection, is so called from its likeness to fort.i.tude of the body. Nor is it inconsistent with the notion of virtue, that a man should have a natural inclination to virtue by reason of his natural temperament, as stated above (I-II, Q. 63, A. 1).

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 2]

Whether Fort.i.tude Is a Special Virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude is not a special virtue. For it is written (Wis. 7:7): "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fort.i.tude," where the text has "virtue" for "fort.i.tude."

Since then the term "virtue" is common to all virtues, it seems that fort.i.tude is a general virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fort.i.tude is not lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honor of the virtues and guards their behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled against pleasures, unyielding to l.u.s.ts, avoiding covetousness as a deformity that weakens virtue"; and he says the same further on in connection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any special virtue. Therefore fort.i.tude is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, fort.i.tude would seem to derive its name from firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in _Ethic._ ii. Therefore fort.i.tude is a general virtue.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it among the other virtues.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), the term "fort.i.tude" can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue, since as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii), it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly and immovably. Secondly, fort.i.tude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore Tully says (Rhet. ii), that "fort.i.tude is deliberate facing of dangers and bearing of toils." In this sense fort.i.tude is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special matter.

Reply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 116) the word virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural power is, in one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in another sense is a principle of action, as stated in _Metaph._ v, 17. And since this latter meaning is the more common, the term "virtue," as denoting the extreme limit of such a power, is a common term, for virtue taken in a general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby one acts well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the first sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a special virtue, namely fort.i.tude, to which it belongs to stand firm against all kinds of a.s.saults.

Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose takes fort.i.tude in a broad sense, as denoting firmness of mind in face of a.s.saults of all kinds. Nevertheless even as a special virtue with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the a.s.saults of all vices. For he that can stand firm in things that are most difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence, to resist those which are less difficult.

Reply Obj. 3: This objection takes fort.i.tude in the first sense.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 123, Art. 3]

Whether Fort.i.tude Is About Fear and Daring?

Objection 1: It seems that fort.i.tude is not about fear and daring.

For Gregory says (Moral. vii): "The fort.i.tude of the just man is to overcome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence, to quench the l.u.s.ts of the present life." Therefore fort.i.tude seems to be about pleasures rather than about fear and daring.

Obj. 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), that it belongs to fort.i.tude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly has nothing to do with the pa.s.sions of fear and daring, but rather with a man's toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore fort.i.tude is not about fear and daring.

Obj. 3: Further, not only daring, but also hope, is opposed to fear, as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1, ad 2) in the treatise on pa.s.sions. Therefore fort.i.tude should not be about daring any more than about hope.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 9) that fort.i.tude is about fear and daring.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the virtue of fort.i.tude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from following the reason. Now to be withdrawn from something difficult belongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil that entails difficulty, as stated above (I-II, Q. 42, AA. 3, 5) in the treatise on pa.s.sions. Hence fort.i.tude is chiefly about fear of difficult things, which can withdraw the will from following the reason. And it behooves one not only firmly to bear the a.s.sault of these difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately to withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel them altogether in order to free oneself therefrom for the future, which seems to come under the notion of daring. Therefore fort.i.tude is about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.

Reply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking then of the fort.i.tude of the just man, as to its common relation to all virtues. Hence he first of all mentions matters pertaining to temperance, as in the words quoted, and then adds that which pertains properly to fort.i.tude as a special virtue, by saying: "To love the trials of this life for the sake of an eternal reward."

Reply Obj. 2: Dangers and toils do not withdraw the will from the course of reason, except in so far as they are an object of fear.

Hence fort.i.tude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but mediately about dangers and toils, these being the objects of those pa.s.sions.

Reply Obj. 3: Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the object, for hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is about the same object, and is opposed to fear by way of approach and withdrawal, as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 1). And since fort.i.tude properly regards those temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as appears from Tully's definition quoted in the Second Objection, it follows that fort.i.tude properly is about fear and daring and not about hope, except in so far as it is connected with daring, as stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2).

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