Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 43

Whether There Is Power in G.o.d?

Objection 1: It seems that power is not in G.o.d. For as primary matter is to power, so G.o.d, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent--namely, G.o.d--is devoid of power.

Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in G.o.d; because whatsoever is in G.o.d, is G.o.d, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 3). Therefore, there is no power in G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine power is G.o.d's essence, since there is nothing accidental in G.o.d: and of the essence of G.o.d there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in G.o.d.

Obj. 4: Further, it was shown above (Q. 14, A. 8; Q. 19, A. 4) that G.o.d's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore, to a.s.sign power to G.o.d; but only knowledge and will.

_On the contrary,_ It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is round about Thee" (Ps. 88:9).

_I answer that,_ Power is twofold--namely, pa.s.sive, which exists not at all in G.o.d; and active, which we must a.s.sign to Him in the highest degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas everything is pa.s.sive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above (Q. 3, A. 2; Q. 4, AA. 1, 2), that G.o.d is pure act, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, and in no way whatsoever to be pa.s.sive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power. For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas pa.s.sive power is the principle of being acted upon by something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that in G.o.d there is active power in the highest degree.

Reply Obj. 1: Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but pa.s.sive power is contrary to act; for a thing is pa.s.sive according as it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in G.o.d, but only active power.

Reply Obj. 2: Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be n.o.bler than power. But G.o.d's action is not distinct from His power, for both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in G.o.d n.o.bler than His power.

Reply Obj. 3: In creatures, power is the principle not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in G.o.d the idea of power is retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence itself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either under the notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of _suppositum_ possessing nature, and under that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in G.o.d in so far as it is the principle of an effect.

Reply Obj. 4: Power is predicated of G.o.d not as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs, which three things in G.o.d are identified. Or we may say, that the knowledge or will of G.o.d, according as it is the effective principle, has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of the knowledge and will of G.o.d precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 2]

Whether the Power of G.o.d Is Infinite?

Objection 1: It seems that the power of G.o.d is not infinite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6). But the power of G.o.d is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite.

Obj. 2: Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of G.o.d were infinite, it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.

Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause instantaneous movement. G.o.d, however, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20, 22, 23). Therefore, His power is not infinite.

_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "G.o.d's power is immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of G.o.d is infinite.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), active power exists in G.o.d according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine essence (Q. 7, A. 1). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in G.o.d should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine essence, through which G.o.d acts, is infinite, as was shown above (Q. 7, A. 1) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to quant.i.ty. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above (Q. 7, A. 1); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.

Reply Obj. 2: The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is clear that G.o.d is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 5; Q. 4, A. 3).

Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of G.o.d should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of G.o.d would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But the power of G.o.d is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it.

Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would move without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover.

The reason of this is that one body moving another is a univocal agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite, it would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 3]

Whether G.o.d Is Omnipotent?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is not omnipotent. For movement and pa.s.siveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with G.o.d, for He is immovable, as was said above (Q. 2, A. 3). Therefore He is not omnipotent.

Obj. 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But G.o.d cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is not omnipotent.

Obj. 3: Further, it is said of G.o.d that He manifests His omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore G.o.d is not omnipotent.

Obj. 4: Further, upon the text, "G.o.d hath made foolish the wisdom of this world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: "G.o.d hath made the wisdom of this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not G.o.d', etc.] by showing those things to be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the divine power. If G.o.d, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in things if G.o.d were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility.

Therefore G.o.d is not omnipotent.

_On the contrary,_ It is said: "No word shall be impossible with G.o.d"

(Luke 1:37).

_I answer that,_ All confess that G.o.d is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that G.o.d can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, "G.o.d can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that G.o.d can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now G.o.d cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say that G.o.d is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that G.o.d is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able to do.

It remains therefore, that G.o.d is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.

It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power in G.o.d is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being.

Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which G.o.d is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of G.o.d, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing.

Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which G.o.d is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that G.o.d cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with G.o.d."

For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.

Reply Obj. 1: G.o.d is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to pa.s.sive power, as was shown above (A. 1). Whence the fact that He is immovable or impa.s.sible is not repugnant to His omnipotence.

Reply Obj. 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that G.o.d cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 3) that G.o.d can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible--as, for instance, if we were to say that G.o.d can do evil things if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that G.o.d can do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became G.o.ds, like Jupiter or Mercury.

Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that G.o.d has supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the partic.i.p.ation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (Q. 21, A.

4), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of something already given him gratuitously by G.o.d. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains the first foundation of all good things.

Reply Obj. 4: The absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself. But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which it belongs to G.o.d alone to do immediately--as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like--are said to be possible in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above (Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be impossible to G.o.d. So it is clear that the omnipotence of G.o.d does not take away from things their impossibility and necessity.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 4]

Whether G.o.d Can Make the Past Not to Have Been?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d can make the past not to have been.

For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is only impossible accidentally. But G.o.d can do what is impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible, from the fact that his running is a thing of the past.

Therefore G.o.d can make the past not to have been.

Obj. 2: Further, what G.o.d could do, He can do now, since His power is not lessened. But G.o.d could have effected, before Socrates ran, that he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, G.o.d could effect that he did not run.

Obj. 3: Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity.

But G.o.d can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt.

_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. 22 ad Eustoch.): "Although G.o.d can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted." Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been.

_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 7, A. 2), there does not fall under the scope of G.o.d's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen.

Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If G.o.d is almighty, let Him make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If G.o.d is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2): "Of this one thing alone is G.o.d deprived--namely, to make undone the things that have been done."