Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 61

Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d draws all things to Himself, in so far as He is the source of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend to be like G.o.d, Who is Being itself.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 2]

Whether Hatred of G.o.d Is the Greatest of Sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of G.o.d is not the greatest of sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost, since it cannot be forgiven, according to Matt. 12:32. Now hatred of G.o.d is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, as may be seen from what has been said above (Q. 14, A. 2).

Therefore hatred of G.o.d is not the most grievous sin.

Obj. 2: Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from G.o.d. Now an unbeliever who has not even knowledge of G.o.d seems to be further away from Him than a believer, who though he hate G.o.d, nevertheless knows Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is graver than the sin of hatred against G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, G.o.d is an object of hatred, only by reason of those of His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which is punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin.

Therefore hatred of G.o.d is not the most grievous sin.

_On the contrary,_ The best is opposite to the worst, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of G.o.d is contrary to the love of G.o.d, wherein man's best consists. Therefore hatred of G.o.d is man's worst sin.

_I answer that,_ The defect in sin consists in its aversion from G.o.d, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 3): and this aversion would not have the character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt consists in a voluntary aversion from G.o.d.

Now this voluntary aversion from G.o.d is directly implied in the hatred of G.o.d, but in other sins, by partic.i.p.ation and indirectly.

For just as the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it directly shun what it hates. Hence when a man hates G.o.d, his will is directly averted from G.o.d, whereas in other sins, fornication for instance, a man turns away from G.o.d, not directly, but indirectly, in so far, namely, as he desires an inordinate pleasure, to which aversion from G.o.d is connected. Now that which is so by itself, always takes precedence of that which is so by another. Wherefore hatred of G.o.d is more grievous than other sins.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), "it is one thing not to do good things, and another to hate the giver of good things, even as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to sin deliberately." This implies that to hate G.o.d, the giver of all good things, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of G.o.d is chiefly a sin against the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost denotes a special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found in every kind of that sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be voluntary: wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful. Now it becomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its sinfulness from hatred of G.o.d, Whose truth is the object of faith; and hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of G.o.d is a greater sin than unbelief.

Reply Obj. 3: Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates G.o.d the author of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on them, and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence for the Divine justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that G.o.d commands us to bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other hand, to break out into hatred of G.o.d when He inflicts those punishments, is to hate G.o.d's very justice, and that is a most grievous sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxv, 11): "Even as sometimes it is more grievous to love sin than to do it, so is it more wicked to hate justice than not to have done it."

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 3]

Whether hatred of one's neighbor is always a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin. For no sin is commanded or counselled by G.o.d, according to Prov. 8:8: "All My words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them." Now, it is written (Luke 14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father and mother ... he cannot be My disciple." Therefore hatred of one's neighbor is not always a sin.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing wherein we imitate G.o.d can be a sin. But it is in imitation of G.o.d that we hate certain people: for it is written (Rom. 1:30): "Detractors, hateful to G.o.d." Therefore it is possible to hate certain people without committing a sin.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, for sin is a "wandering away from what is according to nature," according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4, 30; iv, 20). Now it is natural to a thing to hate whatever is contrary to it, and to aim at its undoing.

Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to hate one's I enemy.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 2:9): "He that ... hateth his brother, is in darkness." Now spiritual darkness is sin.

Therefore there cannot be hatred of one's neighbor without sin.

_I answer that,_ Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above (I-II, Q.

29, A. 2); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love of that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of what he holds from G.o.d, i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not in respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i.e. in respect of sin and lack of justice.

Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one's brother, and whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate our brother's nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our love for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in him, since desire for another's good is equivalent to hatred of his evil. Consequently the hatred of one's brother, if we consider it simply, is always sinful.

Reply Obj. 1: By the commandment of G.o.d (Ex. 20:12) we must honor our parents--as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must hate them in so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the perfection of Divine justice.

Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d hates the sin which is in the detractor, not his nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.

Reply Obj. 3: Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods which they have received from G.o.d: wherefore, in this respect, we should love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are hostile to us.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 4]

Whether Hatred of Our Neighbor Is the Most Grievous Sin Against Our Neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our neighbor. For it is written (1 John 3:15): "Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." Now murder is the most grievous of sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also.

Obj. 2: Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we give our neighbor is love, since all other things are referable to love.

Therefore hatred is the worst.

_On the contrary,_ A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a man hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e.g. theft, murder and adultery. Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin.

Moreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on Matt. 5:19, "He that shall break one of these least commandments," says: "The commandments of Moses, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, count for little in their reward, but they count for much if they be disobeyed. On the other hand the commandments of Christ such as, Thou shalt not be angry, Thou shalt not desire, are reckoned great in their reward, but little in the transgression." Now hatred is an internal movement like anger and desire. Therefore hatred of one's brother is a less grievous sin than murder.

_I answer that,_ Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two counts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins, secondly by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned against. On the first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than external actions that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder of man's will, which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the root of sin, so that if a man's outward actions were to be inordinate, without any disorder in his will, they would not be sinful, for instance, if he were to kill a man, through ignorance or out of zeal for justice: and if there be anything sinful in a man's outward sins against his neighbor, it is all to be traced to his inward hatred.

On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a man's outward sins are worse than his inward hatred. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

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FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 5]

Whether Hatred Is a Capital Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred is directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief of the capital sins, and the origin of all others.

Obj. 2: Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations of our pa.s.sions, according to Rom. 7:5: "The pa.s.sions of sins ... did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now all other pa.s.sions of the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown above (I-II, Q. 25, AA. 1, 2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned one of the capital sins.

Obj. 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil more than any other pa.s.sion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should be reckoned a capital sin.

_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi) does not reckon hatred among the seven capital sins.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 84, AA. 3, 4), a capital vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is contrary to man's nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it is corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all in that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is first in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first and foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good, and especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor's good.

Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and therefore it is not a capital vice.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated in _Phys._ vii, text. 18, "the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its nature." Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be first among the vices, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one's natural good, is the first of the soul's pa.s.sions, even as love of one's natural good is. But hatred of one's connatural good cannot be first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of an already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.

Reply Obj. 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the reason that it is incompatible with one's natural good, and the hatred of such an evil may have priority over the other pa.s.sions. There is, however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which, namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not.

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SIXTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 6]

Whether Hatred Arises from Envy?

Objection 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy is sorrow for another's good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow, for, on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate.