Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 122

that "no fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition to contain, for example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of fornication." Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular.

Obj. 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words express the thoughts of the mind." Now it often happens that man, while in a state of pa.s.sion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even in particular.

Therefore it seems that the pa.s.sions cannot draw the reason against its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.

_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin." Now the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a pa.s.sion, it seems that a pa.s.sion draws the reason counter to its knowledge.

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by pa.s.sion; wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written (Prov. 14:22): "They err that work evil."

Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according to the words of Luke 12:47: "The servant who knew that the will of his lord ... and did not ... shall be beaten with many stripes,"

and of James 4:17: "To him ... who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Consequently he was not altogether right, and it is necessary, with the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction. Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge, viz. universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rect.i.tude of the will and of the deed, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 1). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, and yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will not to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known habitually from not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does not seem difficult for a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in particular what he knows habitually, may happen through mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not attend to the consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g.

some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity; and, in this way, a man who is in a state of pa.s.sion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, in so far as the pa.s.sions hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of distraction, as explained above (A. 1). Secondly, by way of opposition, because a pa.s.sion often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, by way of bodily trans.m.u.tation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body, fetters the use of reason. That this takes place in the pa.s.sions is evident from the fact that sometimes, when the pa.s.sions are very intense, man loses the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through excess of love or anger. It is in this way that pa.s.sion draws the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general.

Reply Obj. 1: Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge, since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing that, in matters of action, pa.s.sion acts counter to universal knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking.

Reply Obj. 2: The fact that something appears good in particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a pa.s.sion: and yet this particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason.

Reply Obj. 3: It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at the same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has true habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a false opinion about a particular negative: because an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act.

Reply Obj. 4: He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on account of a pa.s.sion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the pa.s.sion, and draws his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, two particular and two universal, of which one is of the son, e.g. No fornication is lawful, and the other, of pa.s.sion, e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence pa.s.sion fetters the reason, and hinders it from arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the pa.s.sion lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the second.

Reply Obj. 5: Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to judge, his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state of pa.s.sion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 3.

________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 3]

Whether a Sin Committed Through Pa.s.sion, Should Be Called a Sin of Weakness?

Objection 1: It would seem that a sin committed through pa.s.sion should not be called a sin of weakness. For a pa.s.sion is a vehement movement of the sensitive appet.i.te, as stated above (A. 1). Now vehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore a sin committed through pa.s.sion, should not be called a sin of weakness.

Obj. 2: Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written (Ps. 77:39): "He remembered that they are flesh." Therefore sins of weakness should be those which result from bodily defects, rather than those which are due to a pa.s.sion.

Obj. 3: Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will, whether he do or do not the things to which his pa.s.sions incline him, according to Gen. 4:7: "Thy appet.i.te shall be under thee [*Vulg.: 'The l.u.s.t thereof shall be under thee.'], and thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore sin committed through pa.s.sion is not a sin of weakness.

_On the contrary,_ Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the pa.s.sions diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease.

Therefore a sin that arises from pa.s.sion should be called a sin of weakness.

_I answer that,_ The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way of likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body is said to be weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution of its proper action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so that the humors and members of the human body cease to be subject to its governing and motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when it cannot do the work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see clearly, as the Philosopher states (De Hist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply with the order of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for the reason is the ruling power of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by any pa.s.sion contrary to the order of reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid manner to the due action of man, it is said to be a sin of weakness.

Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the incontinent man to an epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary to his intention.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger the movement of pa.s.sion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul.

Reply Obj. 2: Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body may have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a pa.s.sion, as stated above (A. 1). Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of soul is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the pa.s.sions of the soul arise in us through the sensitive appet.i.te being a power using a corporeal organ.

Reply Obj. 3: It is in the will's power to give or refuse its consent to what pa.s.sion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our appet.i.te is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered in the way already explained (A. 1).

________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 4]

Whether Self-love Is the Source of Every Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper cause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself (Lev.

19:18). Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin.

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:8): "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence"; on which words a gloss says that "the law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils," the reason for which is that concupiscence is the cause of every sin. Now concupiscence is a distinct pa.s.sion from love, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 2; Q. 23, A.

4). Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine in commenting on Ps. 79:17, "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing false humility."

Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin.

Obj. 4: Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor.

Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "self-love, amounting to contempt of G.o.d, builds up the city of Babylon." Now every sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of every sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 75, A. 1), the proper and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a mutable good; in which respect every sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal good inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him. Therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate self-love, leading to contempt of G.o.d, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) reckons to be the cause of sin.

Reply Obj. 2: Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated.

Reply Obj. 3: Man is said to love both the good he desires for himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is directed to the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance of evil: for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But each of these is reduced to self-love, since it is through loving himself that man either desires good things, or avoids evil things.

Reply Obj. 4: A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix): wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems to be committed through self-love.

________________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 5]

Whether Concupiscence of the Flesh, Concupiscence of the Eyes, and Pride of Life Are Fittingly Described As Causes of Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly described as causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle (1 Tim.

6:10), "covetousness [*Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of all evils." Now pride of life is not included in covetousness.

Therefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin.

Obj. 2: Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes, according to Dan. 13:56: "Beauty hath deceived thee." Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with concupiscence of the flesh.

Obj. 3: Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated above (Q. 30, A. 2). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore "concupiscence of the hearing" and of the other senses should also have been mentioned.

Obj. 4: Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance of evil things, as stated above (A. 4, ad 3). But nothing is mentioned here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the causes of sin are insufficiently described.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 2:16): "All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] pride of life." Now a thing is said to be "in the world" by reason of sin: wherefore it is written (1 John 5:19): "The whole world is seated in wickedness." Therefore these three are causes of sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), inordinate self-love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of good: for a man desires good for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways, the object of the sensitive appet.i.te, wherein are the pa.s.sions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as it is the object of the concupiscible part; secondly, under the aspect of difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible part, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated above (Q. 30, A. 3). One is natural, and is directed to those things which sustain the nature of the body, whether as regards the preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, or as regards the preservation of the species, such as s.e.xual matters: and the inordinate appet.i.te of such things is called "concupiscence of the flesh." The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation or pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar mode of perception; such are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual concupiscence is called "concupiscence of the eyes," whether this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote curiosity according to Augustine's exposition (Confess. x); or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly to the eyes, so as to denote covetousness, according to the explanation of others.

The inordinate appet.i.te of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of life"; for pride is the inordinate appet.i.te of excellence, as we shall state further on (Q. 84, A. 2; II-II, Q. 162, A. 1).

It is therefore evident that all pa.s.sions that are a cause of sin can be reduced to these three: since all the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible pa.s.sions to the third, which is not divided into two because all the irascible pa.s.sions conform to spiritual concupiscence.

Reply Obj. 1: "Pride of life" is included in covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of appet.i.te for any kind of good. How covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of "avarice,"