Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 89

Obj. 4: Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of the present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. "caution, docility," and the like. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence.

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic.

vi, 9, 10, 11), who a.s.signs these three virtues as being annexed to prudence.

_I answer that,_ Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the third, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, in so far as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue which perfects the command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. _eustochia_, which perfects counsel; and _synesis_ and _gnome_, which are parts of prudence in relation to judgment, and of whose distinction we shall speak further on (ad 3).

Reply Obj. 1: Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz.

_euboulia_.

Reply Obj. 2: Judgment about what is to be done is directed to something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a man's judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded aright in the point of what has to be done.

Reply Obj. 3: Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there are two virtues for good judgment: because difference is based not on common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which p.r.o.nounce judgment, differ according to their different objects. _Synesis_ and _gnome_ differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based: for _synesis_ judges of actions according to the common law; while _gnome_ bases its judgment on the natural law, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on (II-II, Q. 51, A. 4).

Reply Obj. 4: Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion, potential parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as secondary virtues to a princ.i.p.al virtue: and we shall speak of them later (II-II, Q. 48, seqq.).

________________________

QUESTION 58

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (In Five Articles)

We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and the others.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?

(2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?

(3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue?

(4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?

(5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral virtue?

________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 1]

Whether Every Virtue Is a Moral Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue.

Because moral virtue is so called from the Latin _mos,_ i.e. custom.

Now, we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues.

Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral virtue is "a habit of choosing the rational mean." But every virtue is a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following the rational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on (Q. 64, AA. 1, 2, 3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit like a second nature, in accord with reason." But since every human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with reason: since man's good "consists in that which agrees with his reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher [says] (Ethic. i, 13): "When we speak of a man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that he is gentle or sober." Accordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue.

_I answer that,_ In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word _mos;_ for thus we shall be able to discover what a _moral_ virtue is. Now _mos_ has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read (Acts 15:1): "Except you be circ.u.mcised after the manner (_morem_) of Moses, you cannot be saved." Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action, in which sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read (2 Macc. 1:2) that "rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [*Leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them": and the word is used in the same sense in Ps. 67:7, where we read: "Who maketh men of one manner (_moris_) to dwell in a house." For both these significations there is but one word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word _ethos_is written sometimes with a long, and sometimes a short _e._

Now _moral_ virtue is so called from _mos_ in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the other meaning of _mos,_ i.e. _custom,_ is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination similar to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appet.i.tive power, whose function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above (Q. 9, A. 1).

Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appet.i.tive faculty.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument takes _mos_ in the sense of _custom._

Reply Obj. 2: Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appet.i.tive part of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appet.i.tive faculty (Q. 13, A. 1). Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that habit alone which perfects the appet.i.tive faculty: although the acts of other habits also may be a matter of choice.

Reply Obj. 3: "Nature is the principle of movement" (Phys. ii, text.

3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the appet.i.tive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which are in the appet.i.tive faculty.

________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 2]

Whether Moral Virtue Differs from Intellectual Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) "that virtue is the art of right conduct." But art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ.

Obj. 2: Further, some authors put science in the definition of virtues: thus some define perseverance as a "science or habit regarding those things to which we should hold or not hold"; and holiness as "a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his duty to G.o.d." Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that "virtue is the rect.i.tude and perfection of reason." But this belongs to the intellectual virtues, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual.

Obj. 4: Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that "moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it." Now this right reason that fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual.

_On the contrary,_ It is stated in _Ethic._ i, 13 that "there are two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral."

_I answer that,_ Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "the soul rules the body like a despot," i.e. as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel.

Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who said "every virtue is a kind of prudence," as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; and that every one who sins, does so through ignorance.

Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appet.i.tive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "reason commands the appet.i.tive faculty by a politic power," whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition. Hence Augustine says on Ps. 118 (Serm. 8) that "sometimes we understand (what is right) while desire is slow, or follows not at all," in so far as the habits or pa.s.sions of the appet.i.tive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice.

Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue; but also that his appet.i.te be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs from intellectual virtue, even as the appet.i.te differs from the reason. Hence just as the appet.i.te is the principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in conformity with reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine usually applies the term "art" to any form of right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that "virtue is the art of right conduct," this applies to prudence essentially; but to other virtues, by partic.i.p.ation, for as much as they are directed by prudence.

Reply Obj. 2: All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we have said about art (ad 1).

The same applies to the Third Objection.

Reply Obj. 4: Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, but as something belonging by way of partic.i.p.ation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction of prudence.

________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 3]

Whether Virtue Is Adequately Divided into Moral and Intellectual?

Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between moral and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (Ethic. vi, 3, 5); and again is placed by all among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further on (Q. 61, A. 1). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral, as though there were no mean between them.