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Obj. 2: Further, by His goodness G.o.d is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because G.o.d is good, we exist." But G.o.d cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist; which would be the case were He to annihilate anything.
Obj. 3: Further, if G.o.d were to annihilate anything it would be by His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action is existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated; for when one thing is generated another undergoes corruption. Therefore G.o.d cannot annihilate anything.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 10:24): "Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing."
_I answer that,_ Some have held that G.o.d, in giving existence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, G.o.d could not annihilate anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we have said above (Q. 19, A. 4), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that G.o.d created things of His own free-will, according to Ps. 134:6: "Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done." Therefore that G.o.d gives existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve things in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before things existed, G.o.d was free not to give them existence, and not to make them; so after they are made, He is free not to continue their existence; and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to annihilate them.
Reply Obj. 1: Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as such is a cause of something existing. Therefore G.o.d cannot cause a thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly G.o.d can be the cause of things being reduced to non-existence, by withdrawing His action therefrom.
Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in existence.
Reply Obj. 3: If G.o.d were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on G.o.d's part; but a mere cessation of His action.
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FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 4]
Whether Anything Is Annihilated?
Objection 1: It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing but G.o.d. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but G.o.d. Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing.
Obj. 2: Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys.
viii, 10) that, "a finite power cannot move in infinite time."
Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing.
Obj. 3: Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are reduced to nothing.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 3:14): "I have learned that all the works that G.o.d hath made continue for ever."
_I answer that,_ Some of those things which G.o.d does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen miraculously, and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be explained (Q. 105, A. 6). Now whatever G.o.d wills to do according to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but those things which occur miraculously, are ordered for the manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, "To each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit" (1 Cor. 12:7); and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles.
Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated.
For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no potentiality to non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace; since rather the power and goodness of G.o.d are manifested by the preservation of things in existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated.
Reply Obj. 1: That things are brought into existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since the power of G.o.d is conspicuously shown in His preserving all things in existence, according to the Apostle: "Upholding all things by the word of His power" (Heb. 1:3).
Reply Obj. 2: A creature's potentiality to existence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to G.o.d Himself, from Whom existence is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things, however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent from receiving the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue to exist for ever.
Reply Obj. 3: Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something "of a being"; for it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.
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QUESTION 105
OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY G.o.d (In Eight Articles)
We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures by G.o.d; secondly, the change of one creature by another.
Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether G.o.d can move immediately the matter to the form?
(2) Whether He can immediately move a body?
(3) Whether He can move the intellect?
(4) Whether He can move the will?
(5) Whether G.o.d works in every worker?
(6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?
(7) Whether all that G.o.d does is miraculous?
(8) Of the diversity of miracles.
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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 1]
Whether G.o.d Can Move the Matter Immediately to the Form?
Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did.
vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because, like begets like. But G.o.d is not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter.
Obj. 2: Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by some other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general a.s.sertion does not move the mind, except by means of some particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any particular form, except by means of a particular agent.
Obj. 3: As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as we have seen above (Q. 104, A. 2). But the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are produced by G.o.d, only by means of particular causes.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:7): "G.o.d formed man of the slime of the earth."
_I answer that,_ G.o.d can move matter immediately to form; because whatever is in pa.s.sive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by G.o.d, it can be reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing else but the act of matter.
Reply Obj. 1: An effect is a.s.similated to the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man, and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which the power of that cause extends. Now the power of G.o.d extends to both matter and form; as we have said above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 44, A. 2); wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to G.o.d by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing like itself; so also can G.o.d. But no other form not existing in matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance extends over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument would hold if G.o.d were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.
Reply Obj. 3: The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to G.o.d; wherefore since G.o.d ordains other causes to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by Himself without any other cause.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 2]
Whether G.o.d Can Move a Body Immediately?
Objection 1: It would seem that G.o.d cannot move a body immediately.
For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact between G.o.d and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): "There is no contact with G.o.d." Therefore G.o.d cannot move a body immediately.
Obj. 2: Further, G.o.d is the mover unmoved. But such also is the desirable object when apprehended. Therefore G.o.d moves as the object of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. Therefore G.o.d cannot move a body immediately.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a body to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist at once in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved immediately by an infinite power. But G.o.d's power is infinite, as we have explained (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore G.o.d cannot move a body immediately.