Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 125

Obj. 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But the irascible and concupiscible appet.i.tes resist reason: according to the Apostle (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appet.i.tes do not obey reason.

Obj. 3: Further, as the appet.i.tive power is inferior to the rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers of the sensitive appet.i.te, the irascible and concupiscible, obey reason.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided into concupiscence and anger."

_I answer that,_ In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will; first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appet.i.te is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the estimative power, as we have said above (Q. 78, A. 4), is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some "the particular reason," because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appet.i.te is naturally moved by this particular reason.

But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions.

Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appet.i.te, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this appet.i.te obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.

To the will also is the sensitive appet.i.te subject in execution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appet.i.tes: for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no superior counteracting appet.i.te. On the contrary, man is not moved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible appet.i.tes: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appet.i.te. For wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower appet.i.te is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appet.i.te consents. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), that "the higher appet.i.te moves the lower appet.i.te, as the higher sphere moves the lower." In this way, therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appet.i.te rather on the part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): "We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appet.i.te by a politic and royal power." For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appet.i.te has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appet.i.te is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey.

Reply Obj. 3: The exterior senses require for action exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appet.i.tive and apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore they are subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appet.i.tive power, but can also form the phantasms of the imagination.

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QUESTION 82

OF THE WILL (In Five Articles)

We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the will desires something of necessity?

(2) Whether it desires everything of necessity?

(3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect?

(4) Whether the will moves the intellect?

(5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 1]

Whether the Will Desires Something of Necessity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires nothing of necessity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity.

Obj. 2: Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is a rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), "the will is in the reason." Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity.

Obj. 3: Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act of the will cannot be necessitated.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that "all desire happiness with one will." Now if this were not necessary, but contingent, there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the will desires something of necessity.

_I answer that,_ The word "necessity" is employed in many ways. For that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to it by an intrinsic principle--either material, as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible--or formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is "natural" and "absolute necessity." In another way, that a thing must be, belongs to it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent. On the part of the end, as when without it the end is not to be attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This is called "necessity of end," and sometimes also "utility." On the part of the agent, a thing must be, when someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called "necessity of coercion."

Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will.

For we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing.

But the very movement of the will is an inclination to something.

Therefore, as a thing is called natural because it is according to the inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and voluntary.

But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship.

In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will.

Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and every movement arises from something immovable.

Reply Obj. 1: The words of Augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity "does not take away the liberty of the will," as he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10).

Reply Obj. 2: The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power.

Reply Obj. 3: We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end, but "the means to the end," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9).

Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions of which we are masters.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 2]

Whether the Will Desires of Necessity, Whatever It Desires?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires all things of necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the scope of the will." Therefore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it.

Obj. 2: Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's object moves it of necessity.

Obj. 3: Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of the sensitive appet.i.te, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is the object of the intellectual appet.i.te, which is called the will.

But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appet.i.te of necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are moved by things seen." Therefore it seems that whatever is apprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is the will by which we sin and live well," and so the will extends to opposite things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires.

_I answer that,_ The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already (A. 1).

Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary connection with the first principles; such as contingent propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the first principles. And to such the intellect does not a.s.sent of necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of the first principles. And to these the intellect a.s.sents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it does not a.s.sent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is the same with the will. For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to G.o.d, in Whom alone true happiness consists.

Nevertheless, until through the cert.i.tude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to G.o.d of necessity, nor to those things which are of G.o.d. But the will of the man who sees G.o.d in His essence of necessity adheres to G.o.d, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires.

Reply Obj. 1: The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one.

Reply Obj. 2: The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable, so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it.

Reply Obj. 3: The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some one thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appet.i.te in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that compares several things together: therefore from several things the intellectual appet.i.te--that is, the will--may be moved; but not of necessity from one thing.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 3]

Whether the Will Is a Higher Power Than the Intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is a higher power than the intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and highest power.

Obj. 2: Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the powers of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more n.o.ble.

Now the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the intellect. Therefore the will is a more n.o.ble and perfect power than the intellect.