Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War Part 53

He's in the saddle now! Fall in, Steady, the whole Brigade!

Hill's at the Ford, cut off!--we'll win His way out, ball and blade.

What matter if our shoes are worn?

What matter if our feet are torn?

Quick step! we're with him before morn!

That's Stonewall Jackson's way.

The sun's bright lances rout the mists Of morning--and, by George!

There's Longstreet struggling in the lists, Hemmed in an ugly gorge.

Pope and his columns whipped before-- "Bayonets and grape!" hear Stonewall roar, "Charge, Stuart! pay off Ashby's score!"

That's Stonewall Jackson's way.

Ah! maiden, wait and watch and yearn For news of Stonewall's band; Ah! widow, read with eyes that burn The ring upon thy hand.

Ah! wife, sew on, pray on, hope on Thy life shall not be all forlorn; The foe had better ne'er been born That gets in Stonewall's way.

NOTE

Jackson's Strength and Losses, August-September 1882.

Strength at Cedar Run, August 9: Winder's (Jackson's own) Division (estimate) 3,000 Ewell's Division.* 5,350 (* Report of July 31, O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 965.) Lawton's Brigade*2 2,200 (*2 Report of August 20, O.R. volume 12 part 3 page 966.

Not engaged at Cedar Run.) A.P. Hill's (the Light) Division*3 12,000 (*3 Report of July 20, O.R. volume 11 part 3 page 645. (3 1/2 regiments had been added.) Robertson's Cavalry Brigade*4 (estimate) 1,200 (*4 Four regiments.) ------ 23,750 Losses at Cedar Run: Winder's Division 718 Ewell's Division 195 The Light Division 381 Cavalry, etc. 20 1,314 ------ 22,436 Losses on the Rappahannock, August 20 to 24 100 Losses at Bristoe Station and Mana.s.sas Junction, August 26, 27 300 Losses at Groveton, August 28: Stonewall Division (estimate) 441 Ewell's Division 759 1,200 Stragglers and sick (estimate) 1,200 Cavalry transferred to Stuart 1,200 4,000 ------ Strength at Second Mana.s.sas, August 29 and 30 18,436

Losses: Taliaferro's Division 416 Ewell's Division 364 The Light Division 1,507 2,387 Loss at Chantilly, September 1 500 ------ Should have marched into Maryland 15,549

Strength at Sharpsburg: Jones' Division 2,000 Ewell's Division 4,000 The Light Division 5,000 (1 Brigade left at Harper's Ferry) 800 11,800*

Loss at Harper's Ferry 62 Losses at Sharpsburg: Jones' Division 700 Ewell's Division 1,334 The Light Division 404 2,438 ------ Strength on September 19 9,300 (* 3866 sick and straggling since August 28 = 21 per cent.)

The Report of September 22, O.R. volume 14 part 2 page 621, gives

Jackson's own Division 2,558 Ewell's Division 8,290 The Light Division 4,777 ------ 10,620*

(* Over 1300 stragglers had rejoined.)

CHAPTER 2.20. FREDERICKSBURG.

1862.

October.

While the Army of Northern Virginia was resting in the Valley, McClellan was preparing for a winter campaign. He was unable, however, to keep pace with the impatience of the Northern people. Not only was he determined to postpone all movement until his army was properly equipped, his ranks recruited, his cavalry remounted, and his administrative services reorganised, but the military authorities at Washington were very slow in meeting his demands. Notwithstanding, then, the orders of the President, the remonstrances of Halleck, and the clamour of the press, for more than five weeks after the battle of Sharpsburg he remained inactive on the Potomac. It may be that in the interests of the army he was perfectly right in resisting the pressure brought to bear upon him. He was certainly the best judge of the temper of his troops, and could estimate more exactly than either Lincoln or Halleck the chances of success if he were to encounter Lee's veterans on their native soil. However this may be, his inaction was not in accordance with the demands of the political situation. The President, immediately the Confederates retired from Maryland, had taken a step which changed the character of the war.

Hitherto the Northerners had fought for the restoration of the Union on the basis of the Const.i.tution, as interpreted by themselves. Now, after eighteen months of conflict, the Const.i.tution was deliberately violated. For the clause which forbade all interference with the domestic inst.i.tutions of the several States, a declaration that slavery should no longer exist within the boundaries of the Republic was subst.i.tuted, and the armies of the Union were called upon to fight for the freedom of the negro.

In the condition of political parties this measure Was daring. It was not approved by the Democrats, and many of the soldiers were Democrats; or by those--and they were not a few--who believed that compromise was the surest means of restoring peace; or by those--and they were numerous--who thought the dissolution of the Union a smaller evil than the continuance of the war. The opposition was very strong, and there was but one means of reconciling it--vigorous action on the part of the army, the immediate invasion of Virginia, and a decisive victory. Delay would expose the framers of the measure to the imputation of having promised more than they could perform, of wantonly tampering with the Const.i.tution, and of widening the breach between North and South beyond all hope of healing.

In consequence, therefore, of McClellan's refusal to move forward, the friction between the Federal Government and their general-in-chief, which, so long as Lee remained in Maryland, had been allayed, once more a.s.serted its baneful influence; and the aggressive att.i.tude of the Confederates did not serve to make matters smoother. Although the greater part of October was for the Army of Northern Virginia a period of unusual leisure, the troops were not altogether idle. As soon as the stragglers had been brought in, and the ranks of the divisions once more presented a respectable appearance, various enterprises were undertaken. The Second Army Corps was entrusted with the destruction of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, a duty carried out by Jackson with characteristic thoroughness. The line from Harper's Ferry to Winchester, as well as that from Mana.s.sas Junction to Strasburg, were also torn up; and the spoils of the late campaign were sent south to Richmond and Staunton.

These preparations for defensive warfare were not, however, so immediately embarra.s.sing to the enemy as the action of the cavalry.

Stuart's three brigades, after the affair at Boteler's Ford, picketed the line of the Potomac from the North Mountain to the Shenandoah, a distance of forty miles: Hampton's brigade at Hedgesville, Fitzhugh Lee's at Shepherdstown, Munford's at Charlestown, and headquarters near Leetown.

On October 8 General Lee, suspecting that McClellan was meditating some movement, ordered the cavalry to cross the Potomac and reconnoitre.

October 9.

Selecting 600 men from each of his brigades, with General Hampton, Colonels W. H. F. Lee and W. E. Jones in command, and accompanied by four horse-artillery guns, Stuart rendezvoused on the night of the 9th at Darkesville. As the day dawned he crossed the Potomac at McCoy's Ford, drove in the Federal pickets, and broke up a signal station near Fairview.

October 10.

Marching due north, he reached Mercersburg at noon, and Chambersburg, forty-six miles from Darkesville, at 7 P.M. on October 10.

Chambersburg, although a Federal supply depot of some importance, was without a garrison, and here 275 sick and wounded were paroled, 500 horses requisitioned, the wires cut, and the railroad obstructed; while the machine shops, several trains of loaded cars, and a large quant.i.ty of small arms, ammunition, and clothing was destroyed.

October 11.

At nine the next morning the force marched in the direction of Gettysburg, moving round the Federal rear.

October 12.

Then, crossing the mountains, it turned south through Emmittsburg, pa.s.sed the Monocacy near Frederick, and after a march of ninety miles since leaving Chambersburg reached Hyattstown at daylight on the 12th. Here, on the road which formed McClellan's line of communication with Washington, a few waggons were captured, and information came to hand that 4000 or 5000 Federal troops were near Poolesville, guarding the fords across the Potomac. Moving at a trot through the woods, the column, leaving Poolesville two or three miles to the left, made for the mouth of the Monocacy. About a mile and a half from that river an advanced guard of hostile cavalry, moving eastward, was encountered and driven in. Colonel Lee's men were dismounted, a gun was brought into action, and under cover of this screen, posted on a high crest, the main body made a dash for White's Ford. The point of pa.s.sage, although guarded by about 100 Federal riflemen, was quickly seized, and Stuart's whole force, together with the captured horses, had completed the crossing before the enemy, advancing in large force from the Monocacy, was in a position to interfere.

This brilliantly conducted expedition was as fruitful of results as the ride round McClellan's army in the previous June. The information obtained was most important. Lee, besides being furnished with a sufficiently full report of the Federal dispositions, learned that no part of McClellan's army had been detached to Washington, but that it was being reinforced from that quarter, and that therefore no over-sea expedition against Richmond was to be apprehended. Several hundred fine horses from the farms of Pennsylvania furnished excellent remounts for the Confederate troopers. Prominent officials were brought in as hostages for the safety of the Virginia citizens who had been thrown into Northern prisons. Only a few scouts were captured by the enemy, and not a man was killed. The distance marched by Stuart, from Darkesville to White's Ford, was one hundred and twenty-six miles, of which the last eighty were covered without a halt. Crossing the Potomac at McCoy's Ford about 6 A.M. on October 10, he had recrossed it at White's Ford, between 1 and 2 P.M. on October 12; he was thus for fifty-six hours inside the enemy's lines, and during the greater part of his march within thirty miles of McClellan's headquarters near Harper's Ferry.

It is often the case in war that a well-planned and boldly executed enterprise has a far greater effect than could possibly have been antic.i.p.ated. Neither Lee nor Stuart looked for larger results from this raid than a certain amount of plunder and a good deal of intelligence. But skill and daring were crowned with a more ample reward than the attainment of the immediate object.

In the first place, the expedition, although there was little fighting, was most destructive to the Federal cavalry. McClellan had done all in his power to arrest the raiders. Directly the news came in that they had crossed the Potomac, troops were sent in every direction to cut off their retreat. Yet so eminently judicious were Stuart's precautions, so intelligent the Maryland soldiers who acted as his guides, and so rapid his movements, that although constant reports were received by the Federal generals as to the progress and direction of his column, the information came always too late to serve any practical purpose, and his pursuers were never in time to bar his march. General Pleasanton, with such cavalry as could be spared from the picket line, marched seventy-eight miles in four-and-twenty hours, and General Averell's brigade, quartered on the Upper Potomac, two hundred miles in four days. The severity of the marches told heavily on these commands, already worn out by hard work on the outposts; and so many of the horses broke down that a period of repose was absolutely necessary to refit them for the field. Until his cavalry should have recovered it was impossible for McClellan to invade Virginia.

In the second place, neither the Northern Government nor the Northern people could forget that this was the second time that McClellan had allowed Stuart to ride at will round the Army of the Potomac. Public confidence in the general-in-chief was greatly shaken; and a handle was given to his opponents in the ranks of the abolitionists, who, because he was a Democrat, and had much influence with the army, were already clamouring for his removal.

October 26.

The respite which Stuart had gained for Virginia was not, however, of long duration. On October 26, McClellan, having ascertained by means of a strong reconnaissance in force that the Confederate army was still in the vicinity of Winchester, commenced the pa.s.sage of the Potomac. The princ.i.p.al point of crossing was near Berlin, and so soon as it became evident that the Federal line of operations lay east of the Blue Ridge, Lee ordered Longstreet to Culpeper Court House.

Jackson, taking post on the road between Berryville and Charlestown, was to remain in the Valley.

On November 7 the situation was as follows:--

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

First Corps Warrenton.

Second Corps Rectortown.

Third Corps Between Mana.s.sas Junction and Warrenton.

Fifth Corps White Plains.

Ninth Corps Waterloo.

Eleventh Corps New Baltimore.

Cavalry Division Rappahannock Station and Sperryville.

Line of Supply Orange and Alexandria and Mana.s.sas Railways.

Twelfth Corps Harper's Ferry and Sharpsburg.

ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA.

First Corps Culpeper Court House.

Second Corps Headquarters, Millwood.

Cavalry Division Hampton's and Fitzhugh Lee's Brigades on the Rappahannock.

Munford's Brigade with Jackson.

Lines of Supply Staunton--Strasburg.

Staunton--Culpeper Court House.

Richmond--Gordonsville.