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[Footnote 133: Wheeler, Biographical History of Congress, p. 74.]
[Footnote 134: Ford, History of Illinois, pp. 263-265; Linn, Story of the Mormons, pp. 236-237.]
[Footnote 135: Linn, Story of the Mormons, pp. 237-238.]
[Footnote 136: _Ibid._, p. 244.]
[Footnote 137: _Times and Seasons_, II, p. 414.]
[Footnote 138: Illinois _State Register_, August 13, 1841.]
[Footnote 139: _Ibid._, September 24, 1841.]
[Footnote 140: _Times and Seasons_, III, p. 651.]
[Footnote 141: Ford, History of Illinois, p. 269.]
[Footnote 142: Illinois _State Register_, June 17, 1842. Douglas replied in a speech of equal tartness. See _Register_, July 1, 1842.]
[Footnote 143: Illinois _State Register_, June 10, 1842.]
[Footnote 144: Ford, History of Illinois, pp. 277-278.]
[Footnote 145: Gregg, History of Hanc.o.c.k County, p. 419.]
[Footnote 146: Illinois _State Register_, November 4, 1842.]
[Footnote 147: Illinois _State Register_, December 23, 1842.]
[Footnote 148: Conkling, Recollections of the Bench and Bar, Fergus Historical Series, No. 22.]
[Footnote 149: Conkling, Recollections of the Bench and Bar, Fergus Historical Series, No. 22]
[Footnote 150: Arnold, Reminiscences of the Illinois Bar, Fergus Historical Series, No. 22.]
[Footnote 151: Arnold, Reminiscences of the Illinois Bar.]
[Footnote 152: Davidson and Stuve, History of Illinois, p. 698.]
[Footnote 153: Statute of June 25, 1842.]
[Footnote 154: A sheet called _The Gerrymander_ was published in March 1843, which contained a series of cartoons exhibiting the monstrosities of this apportionment. The Fifth District is called "the Nondescript."]
[Footnote 155: Patterson, Early Society in Southern Illinois, Fergus Historical Series No. 14; Korner, Das deutsche Element in den Vereinigten Staaten, pp. 245, 277; Baker, America as the Political Utopia of Young Germany; Peoria _Register_, June 30, 1838; Ballance, History of Peoria, pp. 201-202.]
[Footnote 156: Illinois _State Register_, March 10, 1843.]
[Footnote 157: Illinois _State Register_, June 16, 1843.]
[Footnote 158: Sheahan, Douglas, p. 55; Wheeler, Biographical History of Congress, p. 75.]
[Footnote 159: _Globe_, 28 Cong. 1 Sess. App. pp. 598 ff.]
[Footnote 160: Alton _Telegraph_, July 20, 1843.]
[Footnote 161: Sheahan, Douglas, p. 56; Wheeler, Biographical History of Congress, p. 75; Alton _Telegraph_, August 26, 1843.]
[Footnote 162: According to the returns in the office of the Secretary of State. The _Whig Almanac_ gives 451 as Douglas's majority.]
CHAPTER IV
UNDER THE AEGIS OF ANDREW JACKSON
In his own const.i.tuency a member of the national House of Representatives may be a marked man; but his office confers no particular distinction at the national capital. He must achieve distinction either by native talent or through fortuitous circ.u.mstance; rarely is greatness thrust upon him. A newly elected member labors under a peculiar and immediate necessity to acquire importance, since the time of his probation is very brief. The representative who takes his seat in December of the odd year, must stand for re-election in the following year. Between these termini, lies only a single session. During his absence eager rivals may be undermining his influence at home, and the very possession of office may weaken his chances among those disposed to consider rotation in office a cardinal principle of democracy. If a newly elected congressman wishes to continue in office, he is condemned to do something great.
What qualities had Douglas which would single him out from the crowd and impress his const.i.tuents with a sense of his capacity for public service? What had he to offset his youth, his rawness, and his legislative inexperience? None of his colleagues cared a fig about his record in the Illinois Legislature and on the Bench. In Congress, as then const.i.tuted, every man had to stand on his own feet, unsupported by the dubious props of a local reputation.
There was certainly nothing commanding in the figure of the gentleman from Illinois. "He had a herculean frame," writes a contemporary, "with the exception of his lower limbs, which were short and small, dwarfing what otherwise would have been a conspicuous figure.... His large round head surmounted a ma.s.sive neck, and his features were symmetrical, although his small nose deprived them of dignity."[163]
It was his ma.s.sive forehead, indeed, that redeemed his appearance from the commonplace. Beneath his brow were deep-set, dark eyes that also challenged attention.[164] It was not a graceful nor an attractive exterior surely, but it was the very embodiment of force. Moreover, the Little Giant had qualities of mind and heart that made men forget his physical shortcomings. His ready wit, his suavity, and his heartiness made him a general favorite almost at once.[165] He was soon able to demonstrate his intellectual power.
The House was considering a bill to remit the fine imposed upon General Andrew Jackson at New Orleans for contempt of court. It was a hackneyed theme. No new, extenuating circ.u.mstances could be adduced to clear the old warrior of high-handed conduct; but a presidential election was approaching and there was political capital to be made by defending "Old Hickory." From boyhood Douglas had idolized Andrew Jackson. With much the same boyish indignation which led him to tear down the coffin handbills in old Brandon, he now sprang to the defense of his hero. The case had been well threshed already. Jackson had been defended eloquently, and sometimes truthfully. A man of less audacity would have hesitated to swell this tide of eloquence, and at first, it seemed as though Douglas had little but vehemence to add to the eulogies already p.r.o.nounced. There was nothing novel in the a.s.sertion that Jackson had neither violated the Const.i.tution by declaring martial law at New Orleans, nor a.s.sumed any authority which was not "fully authorized and legalized by his position, his duty, and the unavoidable necessity of the case." The House was used to these dogmatic reiterations. But Douglas struck into untrodden ways when he contended, that even if Jackson had violated the laws and the Const.i.tution, his condemnation for contempt of court was "unjust, irregular and illegal." Every unlawful act is not necessarily a contempt of court, he argued. "The doctrine of contempts only applies to those acts which obstruct the proceedings of the court, and against which the general laws of the land do not afford adequate protection.... It is inc.u.mbent upon those who defend and applaud the conduct of the judge to point out the specific act done by General Jackson which const.i.tuted a contempt of court. The mere declaration of martial law is not of that character.... It was a matter over which the civil tribunals had no jurisdiction, and with which they had no concern, unless some specific crime had been committed or injury done; and not even then until it was brought before them according to the forms of law."[166]
The old hero had never had a more adroit counsel. Like a good lawyer, Douglas seemed to feel himself in duty bound to spar for every technical advantage, and to construe the law, wherever possible, in favor of his client. At the same time he did not forget that the House was the jury in this case, and capable of human emotions upon which he might play. At times he became declamatory beyond the point of good taste. In voice and manner he betrayed the school in which he had been trained. "When I hear gentlemen," he cried in strident tones, "attempting to justify this unrighteous fine upon General Jackson upon the ground of non-compliance with rules of court and mere formalities, I must confess that I cannot appreciate the force of the argument. In cases of war and desolation, in times of peril and disaster, we should look at the substance and not the shadow of things. I envy not the feelings of the man who can reason coolly and calmly about the force of precedents and the tendency of examples in the fury of the war-cry, when 'booty and beauty' is the watchword. Talk not to me about rules and forms in court when the enemy's cannon are pointed at the door, and the flames encircle the cupola! The man whose stoicism would enable him to philosophize coolly under these circ.u.mstances would fiddle while the Capitol was burning, and laugh at the horror and anguish that surrounded him in the midst of the conflagration! I claim not the possession of these remarkable feelings. I concede them all to those who think that the savior of New Orleans ought to be treated like a criminal for not possessing them in a higher degree. Their course in this debate has proved them worthy disciples of the doctrine they profess. Let them receive all the encomiums which such sentiments are calculated to inspire."[167]
His closing words were marked with much the same perfervid rhetoric, only less objectionable because they were charged with genuine emotion: "Can gentlemen see nothing to admire, nothing to commend, in the closing scenes, when, fresh from the battlefield, the victorious general--the idol of his army and the acknowledged savior of his countrymen--stood before Judge Hall, and quelled the tumult and indignant murmurs of the mult.i.tude by telling him that 'the same arm which had defended the city from the ravages of a foreign enemy should protect him in the discharge of his duty?' Is this the conduct of a lawless desperado, who delights in trampling upon Const.i.tution, and law, and right? Is there no reverence for the supremacy of the laws and the civil inst.i.tutions of the country displayed on this occasion?
If such acts of heroism and moderation, of chivalry and submission, have no charms to excite the admiration or soften the animosities of gentlemen in the Opposition, I have no desire to see them vote for this bill. The character of the hero of New Orleans requires no endors.e.m.e.nt from such a source. They wish to fix a mark, a stigma of reproach, upon his character, and send him to his grave branded as a criminal. His stern, inflexible adherence to Democratic principles, his unwavering devotion to his country, and his intrepid opposition to her enemies, have so long thwarted their unhallowed schemes of ambition and power, that they fear the potency of his name on earth, even after his spirit shall have ascended to heaven."
"An eloquent, sophistical speech, prodigiously admired by the slave Democracy of the House," was the comment of John Quincy Adams; words of high praise, for the veteran statesman had little patience with the style of oratory affected by this "homunculus."[168] A correspondent of a Richmond newspaper wrote that this effort had given Douglas high rank as a debater.[169] Evidence on every hand confirms the impression that by a single, happy stroke the young Illinoisan had achieved enviable distinction; but whether he had qualities which would secure an enduring reputation, was still open to question.
In the long run, the confidence of party a.s.sociates is the surest pa.s.sport to real influence in the House. It might easily happen, indeed, that Douglas, with all his rough eloquence, would remain an impotent legislator. The history of Congress is strewn with oratorical derelicts, who have often edified their auditors, but quite as often blocked the course of legislation. No one knew better than Douglas, that only as he served his party, could he hope to see his wishes crystallize into laws, and his ambitions a.s.sume the guise of reality.
His opportunity to render effective service came also in this first session.
Four States had neglected to comply with the recent act of Congress reapportioning representation, having elected their twenty-one members by general ticket. The language of the statute was explicit: "In every case where a State is ent.i.tled to more than one Representative, the number to which each State shall be ent.i.tled under this apportionment shall be elected by districts composed of contiguous territory equal in number to the number of Representatives, to which said State may be ent.i.tled, no one district electing more than one Representative."[170]
Now all but two of these twenty-one Representatives were Democrats.
Would a Democratic majority punish this flagrant transgression of Federal law by unseating the offenders?
In self-respect the Democratic members of the House could not do less than appoint a committee to investigate whether the representatives in question had been elected "in conformity to the Const.i.tution and the law."[171] Thereupon it devolved upon the six Democratic members of this committee of nine to construct a theory, by which they might seat their party a.s.sociates under cover of legality. Not that they held _any_ such explicit mandate from the party, nor that they deliberately went to work to pervert the law; they were simply under psychological pressure from which only men of the severest impartiality could free themselves. The work of drafting the majority report (it was a foregone conclusion that the committee would divide), fell to Douglas.
It p.r.o.nounced the law of 1842 "not a _law_ made in pursuance of the Const.i.tution of the United States, and valid, operative, and binding upon the States." Accordingly, the representatives of the four States in question were ent.i.tled to their seats.
By what process of reasoning had Douglas reached this conclusion? The report directed its criticism chiefly against the second section of the Act of 1842, which subst.i.tuted the district for the general ticket in congressional elections. The Const.i.tution provides that "the Times, Places, and Manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations." But by the law of 1842, contended the report, Congress had only partially exercised its power, and had attempted "to subvert the entire system of legislation adopted by the several States of the Union, and to compel them to conform to certain rules established by Congress for their government." Congress "may" make or alter such regulations, but "the right to change State laws or to enact others which shall suspend them, does not imply the right to compel the State legislatures to make such change or new enactments." Congress may exercise the privilege of making such regulations, only when the State legislatures refuse to act, or act in a way to subvert the Const.i.tution. If Congress acts at all in fixing times, places, and manner of elections, it must act exhaustively, leaving nothing for the State legislatures to do. The Act of 1842 was general in its nature, and inoperative without State legislation. The history of the Const.i.tutional Convention of 1787 was cited to prove that it was generally understood that Congress would exercise this power only in a few specified cases.[172]
Replying to the attacks which this report evoked, Douglas took still higher ground. He was ready to affirm that Congress had no power to district the States. To concede to Congress so great a power was to deny those reserved rights of the States, without which their sovereignty would be an empty t.i.tle. "Congress may alter, but it cannot supersede these regulations [of the States] till it supplies others in their places, so as to leave the right of representation perfect."[173]
The argument of the report was bold and ingenious, if not convincing.
The minority were ready to admit that the case had been cleverly stated, although hardly a man doubted that political considerations had weighed most heavily with the chairman of the committee. Douglas resented the suggestion with such warmth, however, that it is charitable to suppose he was not conscious of the bias under which he had labored.