Stephen A. Douglas: A Study in American Politics Part 40

Believing the country should have a.s.surances that President Lincoln did not meditate war,--did not, in short, propose to yield to the aggressive wing of his party,--Douglas sought to force a show of hands.[968] On March 13th, he offered a resolution which was designed to draw the fire of Republican senators. The Secretary of War was requested to furnish information about the Southern forts now in possession of the Federal government; to state whether reinforcements were needed to retain them; whether under existing laws the government had the power and means to reinforce them, and whether it was wise to retain military possession of such forts and to recapture those that had been lost, except for the purpose of subjugating and occupying the States which had seceded; and finally, if such were the motives, to supply estimates of the military force required to reduce the seceding States and to protect the national capital.[969] The wording of the resolution was purposely involved. Douglas hoped that it would precipitate a discussion which would disclose the covert wish of the aggressives, and force an authoritative announcement of President Lincoln's policy. Doubtless there was a political motive behind all this. Douglas was not averse to putting his bitter and implacable enemies in their true light, as foes of compromise even to the extent of disrupting the Union.[970]

Not receiving any response, Douglas took the floor in defense of his resolution. He believed that the country should have the information which his resolution was designed to elicit. The people were apprehensive of civil war. He had put his construction upon the President's inaugural; but "the Republican side of the Chamber remains mute and silent, neither a.s.senting nor dissenting." The answer which he believed the resolution would call forth, would demonstrate two points of prime importance: "First, that the President does not meditate war; and, secondly, that he has no means for prosecuting a warfare upon the seceding States, even if he desired."

With his wonted dialectic skill Douglas sought to establish his case.

The existing laws made no provision for collecting the revenue on shipboard. It was admitted on all sides that collection at the port of entry in South Carolina was impossible. The President had no legal right to blockade the port of Charleston. He could not employ the army to enforce the laws in the seceded States, for the military could be used only to aid a civil process; and where was the marshal in South Carolina to execute a writ? The President must have known that he lacked these powers. He must have referred to the future action of Congress, then, when he said that he should execute the laws in all the States, unless the "requisite means were withheld." But Congress had not pa.s.sed laws empowering the Executive to collect revenue or to gain possession of the forts. What, then, was the inference? Clearly this, that the Republican senators did not desire to confer these powers.

If this inference is not correct, if this interpretation of the inaugural address is faulty, urged Douglas, why preserve this impenetrable silence? Why not let the people know what the policy of the administration is? They have a right to know. "The President of the United States holds the destiny of this country in his hands. I believe he means peace, and war will be averted, unless he is overruled by the disunion portion of his party. We all know the irrepressible conflict is going on in their camp.... Then, throw aside this petty squabble about how you are to get along with your pledges before election; meet the issues as they are presented; do what duty, honor, and patriotism require, and appeal to the people to sustain you. Peace is the only policy that can save the country or save your party."[971]

On the Republican side of the chamber, this appeal was bitterly resented. It met with no adequate response, because there was none to give; but Wilson roundly denounced it as a wicked, mischief-making utterance.[972] Unhappily, Douglas allowed himself to be drawn into a personal altercation with Fessenden, in which he lost his temper and marred the effect of his patriotic appeal. There was probably some truth in Douglas's charge that both senators intended to be personally irritating.[973] Under the circ.u.mstances, it was easier to indulge in personal disparagement of Douglas, than to meet his embarra.s.sing questions.

How far Douglas still believed in the possibility of saving the Union through compromise, it is impossible to say. Publicly he continued to talk in an optimistic strain.[974] On March 25th, he expressed his satisfaction in the Senate that only one danger-point remained; Fort Sumter, he understood, was to be evacuated.[975] But among his friends no one looked into the future with more anxiety than he. Intimations from the South that citizens of the United States would probably be excluded from the courts of the Confederacy, wrung from him the admission that such action would be equivalent to war.[976] He noted anxiously the evident purpose of the Confederated States to coerce Kentucky and Virginia into secession.[977] Indeed, it is probable that before the Senate adjourned, his ultimate hope was to rally the Union men in the border States.[978]

When President Lincoln at last determined to send supplies to Fort Sumter, the issue of peace or war rested with Jefferson Davis and his cabinet at Montgomery. Early on the morning of April 12th, a sh.e.l.l, fired from a battery in Charleston harbor, burst directly over Fort Sumter, proclaiming to anxious ears the close of an era.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 892: Rhodes, History of the United States, III, pp. 116 ff.]

[Footnote 893: Rhodes, History of the United States, III, pp.

131-132.]

[Footnote 894: Chicago _Times and Herald_, December 7, 1860.]

[Footnote 895: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 896: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 12.]

[Footnote 897: _Ibid._, p. 29.]

[Footnote 898: _Ibid._, p. 3.]

[Footnote 899: _Ibid._, pp. 11-12.]

[Footnote 900: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 28.]

[Footnote 901: _Ibid._, p. 57.]

[Footnote 902: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 52.]

[Footnote 903: Rhodes, History of the United States, III, pp.

151-153.]

[Footnote 904: Report of the Committee of Thirteen, pp. 11-12.]

[Footnote 905: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 158.]

[Footnote 906: December 21st.]

[Footnote 907: MS. Letter, Douglas to C.H. Lanphier, December 25, 1860.]

[Footnote 908: Report of the Committee of Thirteen, p. 16.]

[Footnote 909: _Ibid._, p. 18.]

[Footnote 910: McPherson, Political History of the Rebellion, p. 38.]

[Footnote 911: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., App., p. 35.]

[Footnote 912: _Ibid._, p. 38.]

[Footnote 913: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., App., p. 39. It is not unlikely that Douglas may have been rea.s.sured on this point by some communication from Lincoln himself. The Diary of a Public Man (_North American Review_, Vol. 129,) p. 130, gives the impression that they had been in correspondence. Personal relations between them had been cordial even in 1859, just after the debates; See Publication No. 11, of the Illinois Historical Library, p. 191.]

[Footnote 914: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., App., p. 39.]

[Footnote 915: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., App., p. 41.]

[Footnote 916: _Ibid._, p. 42.]

[Footnote 917: January 10th, 11th, and 19th.]

[Footnote 918: The resolution was carried, 25 to 23, six Southern Senators refusing to vote. _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 409.]

[Footnote 919: McPherson, Political History of the Rebellion, p. 39.]

[Footnote 920: Diary of a Public Man, pp. 133-134. Douglas was on terms of intimacy with the writer, and must have shared these communications. Besides, Douglas had independent sources of information.]

[Footnote 921: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 445-446.]

[Footnote 922: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 508.]

[Footnote 923: _Ibid._, p. 586.]

[Footnote 924: Senate Bill, No. 549, 36 Cong., 2 Sess.]

[Footnote 925: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 661.]

[Footnote 926: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 927: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 669.]

[Footnote 928: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 764.]

[Footnote 929: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 930: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 764.]

[Footnote 931: _Ibid._, p. 765.]