Stephen A. Douglas: A Study in American Politics Part 27

[Footnote 592: Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 442-443; Iglehart, History of the Douglas Estate in Chicago.]

[Footnote 593: Letter in Chicago _Times_, August 30, 1857.]

[Footnote 594: _Globe_, 29 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 749-750.]

[Footnote 595: _Globe_, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 870.]

[Footnote 596: _Ibid._, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 75.]

[Footnote 597: _Globe_, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 266.]

[Footnote 598: _Ibid._, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 350-351.]

[Footnote 599: _Ibid._, p. 769.]

[Footnote 600: _Globe_, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 951.]

[Footnote 601: _Ibid._, p. 952.]

[Footnote 602: Letter to Governor Matteson, January 2, 1854, in Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 358 ff.]

[Footnote 603: MS. Letter, Douglas to C.H. Lanphier, November 11, 1853.]

[Footnote 604: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 953.]

[Footnote 605: _Globe_, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 953.]

[Footnote 606: _Ibid._, p. 1050.]

[Footnote 607: Chicago _Times_, January 27, 1858.]

[Footnote 608: _Globe_, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 132.]

[Footnote 609: Mrs. Pryor, Reminiscences of Peace and War, p. 68; Villard, Memoirs, I, p. 92.]

[Footnote 610: Letter of Mrs. Lippincott ("Grace Greenwood") to the writer.]

[Footnote 611: Conversation with Stephen A. Douglas, Esq., of Chicago.]

[Footnote 612: The marriage took place November 20, 1856.]

[Footnote 613: See Philadelphia _Press_, June 8, 1861.]

[Footnote 614: Letter of J.H. Roberts, Esq., of Chicago to the writer; also letter of Mrs. Lippincott to the writer.]

[Footnote 615: See Philadelphia _Press_, November 17, 1860.]

[Footnote 616: For a copy of this letter, I am indebted to J.H.

Roberts, Esq., of Chicago.]

[Footnote 617: Conversation with Henry Greenbaum, Esq., of Chicago.]

[Footnote 618: Major G.M. McConnell in the Transactions of the Illinois Historical Society, 1900; see also Forney, Anecdotes of Public Men, I, p. 147.]

[Footnote 619: Schuyler Colfax in the South Bend _Register,_ June, 1861; Forney in his Eulogy, 1861; Greeley, Recollections of a Busy Life, p. 359.]

[Footnote 620: The New York _Times_, June 23, 1857, published this speech of June 12th, in full.]

CHAPTER XV

THE REVOLT OF DOUGLAS

Had anyone prophesied at the close of the year 1856, that within a twelvemonth Douglas would be denounced as a traitor to Democracy, he would have been thought mad. That Douglas of all men should break with his party under any circ.u.mstances was almost unthinkable. His whole public career had been inseparably connected with his party. To be sure, he had never gone so far as to say "my party right or wrong"; but that was because he had never felt obliged to make a moral choice.

He was always convinced that his party was right. Within the circ.u.mference of party, he had always found ample freedom of movement.

He had never lacked the courage of his convictions, but hitherto his convictions had never collided with the dominant opinion of Democracy.

He undoubtedly believed profoundly in the mission of his party, as an organization standing above all for popular government and the preservation of the Union. No ordinary circ.u.mstances would justify him in weakening the influence or impairing the organization of the Democratic party. Paradoxical as it may seem, his partisanship was dictated by a profound patriotism. He believed the maintenance of the Union to be dependent upon the integrity of his party. So thinking and feeling he entered upon the most memorable controversy of his career.

When President Buchanan asked Robert J. Walker of Mississippi to become governor of Kansas, the choice met with the hearty approval of Douglas. Not all the President's appointments had been acceptable to the Senator from Illinois. But here was one that he could indorse unreservedly. He used all his influence to persuade Walker to accept the uncoveted mission. With great reluctance Walker consented, but only upon the most explicit understanding with the administration as to the policy to be followed in Kansas. It was well understood on both sides that a true construction of the Kansas-Nebraska Act required the submission to popular vote of any const.i.tution which the prospective convention might adopt. This was emphatically the view of Douglas, whom Governor Walker took pains to consult on his way through Chicago.[621]

The call for an election of delegates to a const.i.tutional convention had already been issued, when Walker reached Kansas. The free-State people were incensed because the appointment of delegates had been made on the basis of a defective census and registration; and even the a.s.surance of the governor, in his inaugural, that the const.i.tution would be submitted to a popular vote, failed to overcome their distrust. They therefore took no part in the election of delegates.

This course was unfortunate, for it gave the control of the convention wholly into the hands of the pro-slavery party, with consequences that were far-reaching for Kansas and the nation.[622] But by October the free-State party had abandoned its policy of abstention from territorial politics, so far as to partic.i.p.ate in the election of a new territorial legislature. The result was a decisive free-State victory. The next legislature would have an ample majority of free-State men in both chambers. It was with the discomfiting knowledge, then, that they represented only a minority of the community that the delegates of the const.i.tutional convention began their labors.[623] It was clear to the dullest intelligence that any pro-slavery const.i.tution would be voted down, if it were submitted fairly to the people of Kansas. Gloom settled down upon the hopes of the pro-slavery party.

When the doc.u.ment which embodied the labors of the convention was made public, the free-State party awoke from its late complacence to find itself tricked by a desperate game. The const.i.tution was not to be submitted to a full and fair vote; but only the article relating to slavery. The people of Kansas were to vote for the "Const.i.tution with slavery" or for the "Const.i.tution with no slavery." By either alternative the const.i.tution would be adopted. But should the const.i.tution with no slavery be ratified, a clause of the schedule still guaranteed "the right of property in slaves now in this Territory."[624] The choice offered to an opponent of slavery in Kansas was between a const.i.tution sanctioning and safeguarding all forms of slave property,[625] and a const.i.tution which guaranteed the full possession of slaves then in the Territory, with no a.s.surances as to the status of the natural increase of these slaves. Viewed in the most charitable light, this was a gambler's device for securing the stakes by hook or crook. Still further to guard existing property rights in slaves, it was provided that if the const.i.tution should be amended after 1864, no alteration should be made to affect "the rights of property in the ownership of slaves."[626]

The news from Lecompton stirred Douglas profoundly. In a peculiar sense he stood sponsor for justice to bleeding Kansas, not only because he had advocated in abstract terms the perfect freedom of the people to form their domestic inst.i.tutions in their own way, but because he had become personally responsible for the conduct of the leader of the Lecompton party. John Calhoun, president of the convention, had been appointed surveyor general of the Territory upon his recommendation. Governor Walker had retained Calhoun in that office because of Douglas's a.s.surance that Calhoun would support the policy of submission.[627] Moreover, Governor Walker had gone to his post with the a.s.surance that the leaders of the administration would support this course.

Was it likely that the pro-slavery party in Kansas would take this desperate course, without a.s.surance of some sort from Washington?

There were persistent rumors that President Buchanan approved the Lecompton const.i.tution,[628] but Douglas was loth to give credence to them. The press of Illinois and of the Northwest voiced public sentiment in condemning the work of the Lecomptonites.[629] Douglas was soon on his way to Washington, determined to know the President's mind; his own was made up.

The interview between President Buchanan and Douglas, as recounted by the latter, takes on a dramatic aspect.[630] Douglas found his worst fears realized. The President was clearly under the influence of an aggressive group of Southern statesmen, who were bent upon making Kansas a slave State under the Lecompton const.i.tution. Laboring under intense feeling, Douglas then threw down the gauntlet: he would oppose the policy of the administration publicly to the bitter end. "Mr.

Douglas," said the President rising to his feet excitedly, "I desire you to remember that no Democrat ever yet differed from an administration of his own choice without being crushed. Beware of the fate of Tallmadge and Rives." "Mr. President" rejoined Douglas also rising, "I wish you to remember that General Jackson is dead."

The Chicago _Times_, reporting the interview, intimated that there had been a want of agreement, but no lack of courtesy or regard on either side. Douglas was not yet ready to issue an ultimatum. The situation might be remedied. On the night following this memorable encounter, Douglas was serenaded by friends and responded with a brief speech, but he did not allude to the Kansas question.[631] It was generally expected that he would show his hand on Monday, the opening day of Congress. The President's message did not reach Congress, however, until Tuesday. Immediately upon its reading, Douglas offered the usual motion to print the message, adding, as he took his seat, that he totally dissented from "that portion of the message which may fairly be construed as approving of the proceedings of the Lecompton convention." At an early date he would state the reasons for his dissent.[632]

On the following day, December 9th, Douglas took the irrevocable step.

For three hours he held the Senate and the audience in the galleries in rapt attention, while with more than his wonted gravity and earnestness he denounced the Lecompton const.i.tution.[633] He began with a conciliatory reference to the President's message. He was happy to find, after a more careful examination, that the President had refrained from making any recommendation as to the course which Congress should pursue with regard to the const.i.tution. And so, he added adroitly, the Kansas question is not to be treated as an administration measure. He shared the disappointment of the President that the const.i.tution had not been submitted fully and freely to the people of Kansas; but the President, he conceived, had made a fundamental error in supposing that the Nebraska Act provided for the disposition of the slavery question apart from other local matters.

The direct opposite was true. The main object of the Act was to remove an odious restriction by which the people had been prevented from deciding the slavery question for themselves, like all other local and domestic concerns. If the President was right in thinking that by the terms of the Nebraska bill the slavery question must be submitted to the people, then every other clause of the const.i.tution should be submitted to them. To do less would be to reduce popular sovereignty to a farce.

But Douglas could not maintain this conciliatory att.i.tude. His sense of justice was too deeply outraged. He recalled facts which every well-informed person knew. "I know that men, high in authority and in the confidence of the territorial and National Government, canva.s.sed every part of Kansas during the election of delegates, and each one of them pledged himself to the people that no snap judgment was to be taken. Up to the time of the meeting of the convention, in October last, the pretense was kept up, the profession was openly made, and believed by me, and I thought believed by them, that the convention intended to submit a const.i.tution to the people, and not to attempt to put a government in operation without such submission."[634] How was this pledge redeemed? All men, forsooth, must vote for the const.i.tution, whether they like it or not, in order to be permitted to vote for or against slavery! This would be like an election under the First Consul, when, so his enemies averred, Napoleon addressed his troops with the words: "Now, my soldiers, you are to go to the election and vote freely just as you please. If you vote for Napoleon, all is well; vote against him, and you are to be instantly shot." That was a fair election! "This election," said Douglas with bitter irony, "is to be _equally fair!_ All men in favor of the const.i.tution may vote for it--all men against it shall not vote at all! Why not let them vote against it? I have asked a very large number of the gentlemen who framed the const.i.tution ... and I have received the same answer from every one of them.... They say if they allowed a negative vote the const.i.tution would have been voted down by an overwhelming majority, and hence the fellows shall not be allowed to vote at all."

"Will you force it on them against their will," he demanded, "simply because they would have voted it down if you had consulted them? If you will, are you going to force it upon them under the plea of leaving them perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic inst.i.tutions in their own way? Is that the mode in which I am called upon to carry out the principle of self-government and popular sovereignty in the Territories?" It is no answer, he argued, that the const.i.tution is un.o.bjectionable. "You have no right to force an unexceptionable const.i.tution on a people." The pro-slavery clause was not the offense in the const.i.tution, to his mind. "If Kansas wants a slave-State const.i.tution she has a right to it, if she wants a free-State const.i.tution she has a right to it. It is none of my business which way the slavery clause is decided. I care not whether it is voted up or down." The whole affair looked to him "like a system of trickery and jugglery to defeat the fair expression of the will of the people."[635]

The vehemence of his utterance had now carried Douglas perhaps farther than he had meant to go.[636] He paused to plead for a fair policy which would redeem party pledges: