Stephen A. Douglas: A Study in American Politics Part 15

With a bit of brag, which was perhaps pardonable tinder the circ.u.mstances, Douglas reminded the Senate of his efforts to secure the admission of California and of his prediction that the people of that country would form a free State const.i.tution. A few months had sufficed to vindicate his position at the last session. And yet, strangely enough, the North was still fearful lest slavery should be extended to New Mexico and Utah. "There is no ground for apprehension on this point," he stoutly contended. "If there was one inch of territory in the whole of our acquisition from Mexico, where slavery could exist, it was in the valleys of the Sacramento and San Joaquin, within the limits of the State of California. It should be borne in mind, that climate regulates this matter, and that climate depends upon the elevation above the sea as much as upon parallels of lat.i.tude." Why then leave the question open for further agitation?

Give the people of California the government to which they are ent.i.tled. "The country is now free by law and in fact--it is free according to those laws of nature and of G.o.d, to which the Senator from Ma.s.sachusetts alluded, and must forever remain free. It will be free under any bill you may pa.s.s, or without any bill at all."[351]

Though he did not discuss the compromise resolutions nor commit himself to their support, Douglas paid a n.o.ble tribute to the spirit in which they had been offered. He spoke feelingly of "the self-sacrificing spirit which prompted the venerable Senator from Kentucky to exhibit the matchless moral courage of standing undaunted between the two great hostile factions, and rebuking the violence and excesses of each, and pointing out their respective errors, in a spirit of kindness, moderation, and firmness, which made them conscious that he was right." Clay's example was already, he believed, checking the tide of popular excitement. For his part, he entertained no fears as to the future. "The Union will not be put in peril; California will be admitted; governments for the territories must be established; and thus the controversy will end, and I trust forever."

A cheerful bit of Western optimism to which the country at large was not yet ready to subscribe.

With his wonted aggressiveness Douglas had a batch of bills ready by March 25th, covering the controverted question of California and the Territories. The origin of these bills is a matter of no little interest. A group of Southern Whigs in the House, led by Toombs and Stephens of Georgia, had taken a determined stand against the admission of California, until a.s.surances were given that concessions would be made to the South in the organization of the new Territories.[352]

With both Toombs and Stephens, Douglas was on friendly terms, despite their political differences. Perhaps it was at his suggestion that McClernand of Illinois approached these gentlemen with an olive branch. At all events, a conference was arranged at the Speaker's house, at which Douglas was represented by his friends McClernand, Richardson, and Linn Boyd of Kentucky. Boyd was chairman of the House Committee on Territories; and Richardson a member of the committee.

McClernand announced that he had consulted with Douglas and that they were in entire agreement on the points at issue. Douglas had thought it better not to be present in person. The Southerners stated their position frankly and fully. They would consent to the admission of California only upon condition that, in organizing the territorial governments, the power should be given to the people to legislate in regard to slavery, and to frame const.i.tutions with or without slavery.

Congress was to bind itself to admit them as States, without any restrictions upon the subject of slavery. The wording of the territorial bills, which would compa.s.s these ends, was carefully agreed upon and put in writing. On the basis of this agreement Douglas and McClernand drafted bills for both the Senate and the House Committees.[353]

But the suggestion had already been made and was growing in favor, that a select committee should be intrusted with these and other delicate questions, in order to secure a basis of compromise in the spirit of Clay's resolutions. Believing that such a course would indefinitely delay, and even put in jeopardy, the measure that lay nearest to his heart,--the admission of California,--Douglas resisted the appointment of such a committee. If it seemed best to join the California bill with others now pending, he preferred that the Senate, rather than a committee, should decide the conditions. But when he was outvoted, Douglas adopted the sensible course of refusing to obstruct the work of the Committee of Thirteen by any instructions. He was inclined to believe the whole project a farce: well, if it was, the sooner it was over, the better; he was not disposed to wrangle and turn the farce into a tragedy.[354]

Douglas was not chosen a member of the select Committee of Thirteen.

He could hardly expect to be; but he contributed not a little to its labors, if a traditional story be true. In a chance conversation, Clay, who was chairman of the committee, told Douglas that their report would recommend the union of his two bills,--the California and the Territorial bills,--instead of a bill of their own. Clay intimated that the committee felt some delicacy about appropriating Douglas's carefully drawn measures. With a courtesy quite equal to Clay's, Douglas urged him to use the bills if it was deemed wise. For his part, he did not believe that they could pa.s.s the Senate as a single bill. In that event, he could then urge the original bills separately upon the Senate. Then Clay, extending his hand, said, "You are the most generous man living. I _will_ unite the bills and report them; but justice shall nevertheless be done you as the real author of the measures." A pretty story, and not altogether improbable. At all events, the first part of "the Omnibus Bill," reported by the Committee of Thirteen, consisted of Douglas's two bills joined together by a wafer.[355]

There was one highly significant change in the territorial bills inside the Omnibus. Douglas's measures had been silent on the slavery question; these forbade the territorial legislatures to pa.s.s any measure in respect to African slavery, restricting the powers of the territorial legislatures at a vital point. Now on this question Douglas's instructions bound him to an affirmative vote. He was in the uncomfortable and hazardous position of one who must choose between his convictions, and the retention of political office. It was a situation all the more embarra.s.sing, because he had so often a.s.serted the direct responsibility of a representative to his const.i.tuents. He extricated himself from the predicament in characteristic fashion. He reaffirmed his convictions; sought to ward off the question; but followed instructions when he had to give his vote. He obeyed the letter, but violated the spirit of his instructions.

In the debates on the Omnibus Bill, Douglas reiterated his theory of non-interference with the right of the people to legislate for themselves on the question of slavery. He was now forced to further interesting a.s.sertions by some pointed questions from Senator Davis of Mississippi. "The Senator says that the inhabitants of a territory have a right to decide what their inst.i.tutions shall be. When? By what authority? How many of them?" Douglas replied: "Without determining the precise number, I will a.s.sume that the right ought to accrue to the people at the moment they have enough to const.i.tute a government.... Your bill concedes that a representative government is necessary--a government founded upon the principles of popular sovereignty, and the right of the people to enact their own laws; and for this reason you give them a legislature const.i.tuted of two branches, like the legislatures of the different States and Territories of the Union; you confer upon them the right to legislate upon all rightful subjects of legislation, except negroes. Why except negroes?"[356] Forced to a further explanation, he added, "I am not, therefore, prepared to say that under the const.i.tution, we have not the power to pa.s.s laws excluding negro slaves from the territories....

But I do say that, if left to myself to carry out my own opinions, I would leave the whole subject to the people of the territories themselves.... I believe it is one of those rights to be conceded to the territories the moment they have governments and legislatures established for them."[357] In short, this was a policy dictated by expediency, and not--as yet--by any const.i.tutional necessity. Douglas was not yet ready to abandon the high national ground of supreme, Federal control over the Territories.

But the restrictive clause in the territorial bills satisfied the radical Southerners as little as it pleased Douglas. Berrien wished to make the clause more precise by forbidding the territorial legislatures "to establish or prohibit African slavery"; but Hale, with his preternatural keenness for the supposed intrigues of the slave power, believed that even with these restrictions the legislatures might still recognize slavery as an already established inst.i.tution; and he therefore moved to add the word "allow." Douglas voted consistently; first against Berrien's amendment, and then, when it carried, for Hale's, hoping thereby to discredit the former.[358]

Douglas's own amendment removing all restrictions, was voted down.[359] True to his instructions, he voted for Seward's proposition to impose the Wilmot Proviso upon the Territories, but he was happy to find himself in the minority.[360] And so the battle went on, threatening to end in a draw.

A motion to abolish and prohibit peon slavery elicited an apparently spontaneous and sincere expression of detestation from Douglas of "this revolting system." Black slavery was not abhorrent to him; but a species of slavery not confined to any color or race, which might, because of a trifling debt, condemn the free white man and his posterity to an endless servitude--this was indeed intolerable. If the Senate was about to abolish black slavery, being unwilling to intrust the territorial legislature with such measures, surely it ought in all consistency to abolish also peonage. But the Senate preferred not to be consistent.[361]

By the last of July, the Omnibus--in the words of Benton--had been overturned, and all the inmates but one spilled out. The Utah bill was the lucky survivor, but even it was not suffered to pa.s.s without material alterations. Clay now joined with Douglas to secure the omission of the clause forbidding the territorial legislature to touch the subject of slavery. In this they finally succeeded.[362] The bill was thus restored to its original form.[363]

Everyone admitted that the compromise scheme had been wrecked. It was highly probable, however, that with some changes the proposals of the committee could be adopted, if they were considered separately. Such was Douglas's opinion. The eventuality had occurred which he had foreseen. He was ready for it. He had promptly called up his original California bill and had secured its consideration, when the Utah bill pa.s.sed to a third reading. Then a bill to settle the Texan boundary controversy was introduced. The Senate pa.s.sed many weary days discussing first one and then the other. The Texas question was disposed of on August 9th; the California bill, after weathering many storms, came to port four days later; and two days afterward, New Mexico was organized as a Territory under the same conditions as Utah.

That is to say, the Senate handed on these bills with its approval to the lower house, where all were voted. It remained only to complete the compromise programme piece-meal, by abolishing the slave trade in the District of Columbia and by providing a more stringent fugitive slave law. By the middle of September, these measures had become law, and the work of Congress went to its final review before the tribunal of public opinion.

Douglas voted for all the compromise measures but the Fugitive Slave Law. This was an unfortunate omission, for many a Congressman had sought to dodge the question.[364] The partisan press did not spare him, though he stated publicly that he would have voted for the bill, had he not been forced to absent himself. Such excuses were common and unconvincing. Irritated by sly thrusts on every side, Douglas at last resolved to give a detailed account of the circ.u.mstances that had prevented him from putting himself on record in the vote. This public vindication was made upon the floor of the Senate a year later.[365] A "pecuniary obligation" for nearly four thousand dollars was about to fall due in New York. Arrangements which he had made to pay the note miscarried, so that he was compelled to go to New York at once, or suffer the note to be protested. Upon the a.s.surance of his fellow senators that the discussion of the bill would continue at least a week, he hastened to New York. While dining with some friends from Illinois, he was astounded to hear that the bill had been ordered engrossed for a third reading. He immediately left the city for Washington, but arrived too late. He was about to ask permission then to explain his absence, when his colleague dissuaded him. Everyone knew, said Shields, that he was in favor of the bill; besides, very probably the bill would be returned from the House with amendments.

The circ.u.mstantial nature of this defense now seems quite unnecessary.

After all, the best refutation of the charge lay in Douglas's reputation for courageous and manly conduct. He was true to himself when he said, "The dodging of votes--the attempt to avoid responsibility--is no part of my system of political tactics."

If it is difficult to distribute the credit--or discredit--of having pa.s.sed the compromise measures, it verges on the impossible to fix the responsibility on any individual. Clay fathered the scheme of adjustment; but he did not work out the details, and it was just this matter of details which aggravated the situation. Clay no longer coveted glory. His dominant feeling was one of thankfulness. "It was rather a triumph for the Union, for harmony and concord." Douglas agreed with him: "No man and no party has acquired a triumph, except the party friendly to the Union." But the younger man did covet honor, and he could not refrain from reminding the Senate that he had played "an humble part in the enactment of all these great measures."[366]

Oddly enough, Jefferson Davis condescended to tickle the vanity of Douglas by testifying, "If any man has a right to be proud of the success of these measures, it is the Senator from Illinois."[367]

Both Douglas and Toombs told their const.i.tuents that Congress had agreed upon a great, fundamental principle in dealing with the Territories. Both spoke with some degree of authority, for the two territorial bills had pa.s.sed in the identical form upon which they had agreed in conference. But what was this principle? Toombs called it the principle which the South had unwisely compromised away in 1820--the principle of non-interference with slavery by Congress, the right of the people to hold slaves in the common Territories. Douglas called the great principle, "the right of the people to form and regulate their own internal concerns and domestic inst.i.tutions in their own way."[368] So stated the principle seems direct and simple.

But was Toombs willing to concede that the people of a Territory might exclude slavery? He never said so; while Douglas conceded both the positive power to exclude, and the negative power to permit, slavery.

Here was a discrepancy.[369] And it was probably because they could not agree on this point, that a provision was added to the territorial bills, providing that cases involving t.i.tle to slaves might be appealed to the Supreme Court. Whether the people of Utah and New Mexico might exclude slaves, was to be left to the judiciary. In any case Congress was not to interfere with slavery in the Territories.

One other question was raised subsequently. Was it intended that Congress should act on this principle in organizing future Territories? In other words, was the principle, newly recovered, to be applied retroactively? There was no answer to the question in 1850, for the simple reason that no one thought to ask it.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 327: See the chapter on "State Policy" in Davidson and Stuve, History of Illinois.]

[Footnote 328: Davidson and Stuve, History of Illinois, pp. 573-574; Ackerman, Early Illinois Railroads, in Fergus Historical Series, p.

32.]

[Footnote 329: Letter of Breese to Douglas, Illinois _State Register_, February 6, 1851.]

[Footnote 330: Forney, Anecdotes, I, pp. 18-20.]

[Footnote 331: Letter of Douglas to Breese, _State Register_, January 20, 1851.]

[Footnote 332: _Ibid._, January 20, 1851.]

[Footnote 333: Sanborn, Congressional Grants of Land in Aid of Railways, Bulletin of the University of Wisconsin, pp. 27-30.]

[Footnote 334: Cutts, Const.i.tutional and Party Questions, pp.

193-194.]

[Footnote 335: Douglas renewed his bill in the short session of 1848-1849, but did not secure action upon it.]

[Footnote 336: Cutts, Const.i.tutional and Party Questions, p. 195.

There is so much brag in this account that one is disposed to distrust the details.]

[Footnote 337: Sanborn, Congressional Grants, pp. 31-34.]

[Footnote 338: _Globe,_31 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 904. The vote was 26 to 14.]

[Footnote 339: _Ibid._, p. 1838.]

[Footnote 340: Sanborn, Congressional Grants, p. 35.]

[Footnote 341: John Wentworth, in his _Congressional Reminiscences_, hints at some vote-getting in the East by tariff concessions; but Douglas insisted that it was the Chicago branch, promising to connect with Eastern roads, which won votes in New York, Pennsylvania and New England. See Illinois _State Register_, March 13, 1851. The subject is discussed by Sanborn, Congressional Grants, pp. 35-36.]

[Footnote 342: _Globe_, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 853.]

[Footnote 343: _Ibid._, p. 869.]

[Footnote 344: The economic significance of the Illinois Central Railroad appears in a letter of Vice-President McClellan to Douglas in 1856. The management was even then planning to bring sugar from Havana directly to the Chicago market, and to take the wheat and pork of the Northwest to the West Indies _via_ New Orleans.]

[Footnote 345: _Globe_, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 365.]

[Footnote 346: _Globe_, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 366.]

[Footnote 347: _Globe_, 31 Cong., 1 Sess., App., pp. 369-370.]

[Footnote 348: _Globe,_ 31 Cong., 1 Sess., App., p. 370.]

[Footnote 349: _Ibid._]